Simulation-based approach to design of inherently safer processes

Safety of chemical processes and plants is a matter of high priority. The design of an inherently safer process is one of very beneficial ways of achieving this goal.The paper describes the method of designing an inherently safer process for a chosen set of equipment and materials involved by applying non-linear optimization. The optimization is aimed at finding an operational mode, which guarantees safety of the process under normal conditions and provides maximal attainable safety in case of one typical accident scenario – cooling failure. Discussion covers problem statement, choice of the optimization criteria, appropriate methods for defining control variables.An important practical challenge is stability analysis of the optimized process mode with respect to permissible deviations of control parameters and variables from the estimated values. The original method for the stability analysis of a non-stationary process is proposed. It comprises simplified preliminary evaluation method followed by the more detailed numerical optimization-based analysis.Several examples illustrate application of the methods proposed.     

Calculation of Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI) value for the Dow Guide taking credit for the loss control measures

The Dow Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI) is universally used in evaluating the hazard category of a process plant, area of exposure, expected losses in case of fire and explosion, etc. In the current procedure, the effects of the loss control measures (LCMs) on the F&EI value are not taken into account. This makes the plant look more hazardous, makes it more spread out, requires more elaborate emergency measures and alarms the public and the civil administration more than is necessary. It also affects the insurance premium.We suggest taking the effects of the LCMs into account in the F&EI value. We call this the ‘Offset F&EI’ value. It favorably affects all the above items, and other related ones. To do this, we have developed the relevant equations and have proved the efficacy of the Offset F&EI by means of an example.     

Inherently safer design review and their timing during chemical process development and design

This paper discusses the enhancement of inherent safety review and its implementation in the chemical process development and design. The aim is to update and improve the existing inherently safer design review (ISDR) practices during design of chemical process plant by exploiting major accident cases from the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) and Failure Knowledge Database (FKD). Although the basic guidelines to conduct ISDR during design phase are available, however they are too general and incomplete. The review criteria and their best timing for application are still missing. This paper attempts to develop the accident-based ISDR for chemical process plant design. The proposed accident-based ISDR is supported with detail review criteria for each phase of process design. The timing of ISDR application is corresponding to the common design tasks and decisions made in the design project. Therefore, timely design review could be done at the specific design task and the findings help designer to make a correct decision making.     

Fire and Explosion Index calculation method incorporating classified safety measure credits

Based on an analysis of two methods for the modification of the F&EI for the DOW Guide, it is found that the effects of safety measures are not classified. Moreover, the efficiency of the measures is magnified to various degrees, as the positive impact of the loss reduction measures are applied to the rate reduction of the intrinsic hazard in the evaluated unit. For this reason, a modification method using classified safety measures is proposed, in which safety measures are classified into process protection measures and loss reduction measures. The calculation of the modified F&EI involves the credit factors of process protection measures, whereas the determination of the maximum probable property damage incorporates the loss reduction measures. This method could provide more reasonable reference data for hazard units because of its more objective and reasonable evaluation results.     

Taking Credit for Loss Control Measures in the Plant with the Likely Loss Fire and Explosion Index (LL-F&EI)

This communication proposes a new relationship for estimation of the damage factor (DF) used in the Dow Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI). The proposed new relation more clearly shows how the damage factor depends on other factors in the F&EI, such as material factor (MF) and Process Unit Hazards Factor, and leads to the definition of a new index which accounts for loss control measures implemented in the plant, and thus gives a measure of risk. Analysis shows that three types of relations exist between DF and Process Unit Hazards Factor depending on the size of the MF—low, medium or high. Further analysis shows, that the procedure in the current F&EI Guide may overestimate the DF for a very low MF and moderate to high Process Unit Hazards Factor.The analysis leads to the definition of the Likely Loss Fire & Explosion Index, which provides an estimate of risk of losses from fires and explosions as well as degrees of risk similar to the estimate of hazards and degrees of hazard associated with the Fire & Explosion Index.     

Inherently safer design of solvent processes at the conceptual stage: Practical application for substitution

The implementation of inherently safer design concepts is considered beneficial to avoid hazards during early stages of design. The application of existing process design and modeling techniques that aid ‘substitution’, ‘intensification’ and ‘attenuation’ has been shown in this work. The techniques have been applied to solvent processes because of the inherent hazards associated with them, such as large inventories, and presence of highly toxic and flammable materials. For ‘substitution’, computer aided molecular design technique has been applied to select inherently safer solvents for a solvent operation. For ‘intensification’ and ‘attenuation’, consequence models and regulatory guidance from EPA RMP have been integrated into process simulation. Combining existing techniques provides a design team with a higher level of information to make decisions based on process safety. A case study has been shown for liquid extraction of acetic acid–water mixture. Suitable solvents were identified using ICAS 11.0-ProCAMD, and consequence models were integrated into Aspen plus simulator using a calculator sheet. Solvents such as 5-nonanone, 2-nonanone and 5-methyl-2-hexanone provide inherently safer options, but conventionally-used solvent, ethyl acetate, provides higher degree of separation capability. A conclusive decision regarding feasible solvents and operating conditions would depend on design requirements, regulatory guidance, and safety criteria specified for the process. Inherent safety has always been an important consideration to be implemented during early design steps, and this paper presents a methodology to incorporate the principles and to obtain inherently safer alternatives.     

Inherent risk assessment—A new concept to evaluate risk in preliminary design stage

Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) has been a very popular and useful methodology which is widely accepted by the industry over the past few decades. QRA is typically carried out at a stage where complete plant has been designed and sited. At that time, the opportunity to include inherent safety design features is limited and may incur higher cost. This paper proposes a new concept to evaluate risk inherent to a process owing to the chemical it uses and the process conditions. The risk assessment tool is integrated with process design simulator (HYSYS) to provide necessary process data as early as the initial design stages, where modifications based on inherent safety principles can still be incorporated to enhance the process safety of the plant. The risk assessment tool consists of two components which calculate the probability and the consequences relating to possible risk due to major accidents. A case study on the potential explosion due to the release of flammable material demonstrates that the tool is capable to identify potential high risk of process streams. Further improvement of the process design is possible by applying inherent safety principles to make the process under consideration inherently safer. Since this tool is fully integrated with HYSYS, re-evaluation of the inherent risk takes very little time and effort. The new tool addresses the lack of systematic methodology and technology, which is one of the barriers to designing inherently safer plants.     

Toward an inherently safer design and operation of batch and semi-batch processes: The N-oxidation of alkylpyridines

This work shows an application of inherent safety principles to a reaction widely used in the pharmaceutical industry. More specifically, it incorporates the teachings of Trevor Kletz into the design of an inherently safer process for the N-oxidation of alkylpyridines. This reaction is of interest because of the hazards resulting from the undesired, gas-generating decomposition of hydrogen peroxide, the oxidizing agent. The generation of oxygen, combined with the flammability of the alkylpyridines, represents a serious fire and explosion hazard for this process. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how an inherently safer process can be potentially achieved by designing improved reactors and by assessing conditions that reduce or eliminate the hazards. Furthermore, it is shown that such improvement in safety increases the efficiency of the process and results in a cost reduction.     

Inherently safer design in offshore oil and gas projects

Like all hazardous installations, inherently safer design (ISD) is one of the key tools in offshore oil and gas projects to minimize risks in offshore facilities. As the life cycle of offshore facilities is relatively short compared with onshore counterparts and there are many projects running every year, the potential is high for raising inherent safety standards and lowering safety risks throughout the offshore industry as old facilities are phased out. This paper gives an overview of offshore facilities and examples of implementation of ISD. Good examples of ISD are numerous. Industry guidance on ISD implementation abound. Yet, the systematic implementation of it in the industry is patchy. There are many reasons for factors which impede the effective, efficient and consistent implementation of ISD in projects. This paper describes some of them and proposes solution to address them. They include (a) the effective integration of ISD into hazard management systems with appropriate language to engage all disciplines in projects, (b) the phasing of resources to enable the project to capture ISD measures which are only available during early phases, (c) application of appropriate ISD goals and ISD performance metrics at various stages and (d) the appropriate use of quantified risk assessment to support ISD.     

Inherent safety in offshore oil and gas activities: a review of the present status and future directions

Inherent safety is a proactive approach for hazard/risk management during process plant design and operation. It has been proven that, considering the lifetime costs of a process and its operation, an inherently safer approach is a cost-optimal option. Inherent safety can be incorporated at any stage of design and operation; however, its application at the earliest possible stages of process design (such as process selection and conceptual design) yields the best results.Although it is an attractive and cost-effective approach to hazard/risk management, inherent safety has not been used as widely as other techniques such as HAZOP and quantitative risk assessment. There are many reasons responsible for this; key among them are a lack of awareness and the non-availability of a systematic methodology and tools.The inherent safety approach is the best option for hazard/risk management in offshore oil and gas activities. In the past, it has been applied to several aspects of offshore process design and operation. However, its use is still limited. This article attempts to present a complete picture of inherent safety application in offshore oil and gas activities. It discuses the use of available technology for implementation of inherent safety principles in various offshore activities, both current and planned for the future.     

Qualitative Assessment for Inherently Safer Design (QAISD) at preliminary design stage

Conventional hazard evaluation techniques such as what-if checklist and hazard and operability (HAZOP) studies are often used to recognise potential hazards and recommend possible solutions. They are used to reduce any potential incidents in the process plant to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) level. Nevertheless, the suggested risk reduction alternatives merely focus on added passive and active safety systems rather than preventing or minimising the inherent hazards at source through application of inherently safer design (ISD) concept. One of the attributed reasons could be the shortage of techniques or tools to support implementation of the concept. Thus, this paper proposes a qualitative methodology that integrates ISD concept with hazard review technique to identify inherent hazards and generate ISD options at early stage of design as proactive measures to produce inherently safer plant. A modified theory of inventive problem solving (TRIZ) hazard review method is used in this work to identify inherent hazards, whereby an extended inherent safety heuristics tool is developed based on established ISD principles to create potential ISD options. The developed method namely Qualitative Assessment for Inherently Safer Design (QAISD) could be applied during preliminary design stage and the information required to apply the method would be based on common process and safety database of the studied process. However, user experiences and understanding of inherent safety concept are crucial for effective utilisation of the QAISD. This qualitative methodology is applied to a typical batch reactor of toluene nitration as a case study. The results show several ISD strategies that could be considered at early stage of design in order to prevent and minimise the potential of thermal runaway in the nitration process.     

Systematic inherent safety and its implementation in chlorine liquefaction process

As a proactive safeguard, inherent safety has been regarded as the top hierarchy for loss prevention and risk management due to its salient features in eliminating or significantly reducing risks at source rather than mitigating them by add-on protections. Simultaneously, various assessment tools have been developed for ranking and selecting inherently safer designs or modifications. However, there still lacks a metric that can systematically incorporate various hazardous factors, which may hinder most industries from utilizing it to a full extent. To address this limitation, this work developed a Systematic Inherent Safety Metric (SISM) for measuring the inherently safer modifications. Firstly, the conceptual framework of SIS was proposed based on 5M1E (man, machine, material, method, measurement, and environment). Subsequently, analytic hierarchy process and fuzzy comprehensive evaluation were adapted to conduct risk identification and assessment. Finally, taking chlorine liquefaction process as a case study, the applicability and efficacy of SIS were validated based on PDCA (plan-do-check-action) cycle. The results show that the SISM value has improved from the relatively dangerous (RD) to the relatively safe (RS) after implementing SIS, thus demonstrating that the revised design is inherently safer than the base design.     

Inherent risk assessment methodology in preliminary design stage: A case study for toxic release

At preliminary design stage, process designers normally lack of information on the risk level from process plant. An inherently safer process plant could be designed if the information of risk levels could be known earlier at the preliminary design stage. If the risk level could be determined, there is a possibility to eliminate or reduce the risk by applying the well-known concept: inherent safety principle. This paper presents a technique to determine the risk levels at preliminary process design stage using a 2-region risk matrix concept. A model to calculate the severity and likelihood of a toxic release accident was developed in Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. This model is integrated with process design simulator, iCON to allow for data transfer during preliminary design stage. 2-region risk matrix is proposed and used to evaluate the acceptability of the inherent risk based on the severity and likelihood rating. If the inherent risk level is unacceptable, modification for improvement can be done using the inherent safety principles. A case study has been carried out to illustrate the benefit of applying this newly developed technique. It was successfully shown that an inherently safer plant could easily be designed by applying this technique.     

Inherent safety tool for explosion consequences study

The lack of formal integration between process design stages with risk and consequence estimation is a hurdle to designing inherently safe process plants. Conventional risk assessment methodologies are often not carried out concurrently with process design. Therefore, process designers lack the information about risk levels and consequence that may result from the process conditions being considered in a particular process route until the design is completed. Hence, effects of changes in process conditions on risk levels and consequence cannot be studied in a time effective manner during the design stages. Few studies have been identified on the possibility and viability of integrating risk estimation with process design. But viable framework and methodology for doing so has not yet been reported. This paper presents a feasible framework in which risk and consequences estimation can be part of design stages. A demonstrative tool named as integrated risk estimation tool (iRET) was developed by using process simulation software, HYSYS and spreadsheet, MS Excel as the platforms. iRET estimates risk due to explosions by using TNT equivalence method and the TNO correlation method. iRET has a potential to be extended to include all forms of risk such as fire, explosion, toxic gas releases and boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE). The paper also presents case studies to demonstrate the functionality and viability of using iRET in conjunction with process design. The results of these case studies have successfully shown that the risk due to explosion can be assessed during the initial design stage ensuring a safer plant. The framework and iRET there by presented here provide systematic methodology and technology to design inherently safer plants.     

Solvent design and inherent safety assessment of solvent alternatives for palm oil recovery

The concept of inherent safety is important in developing an inherently safer and user-friendly process. This paper discusses a new integrated approach of computer-aided product design and inherent safety assessment. Computer-aided Molecular Design (CAMD) approach was utilized in this work to identify potential alternative to n-hexane, the widely used industrial solvent in extracting residual palm oil from pressed palm fibre. The formulation of solvent mixtures was optimized to meet the targeted physical properties before being tested using the Soxhlet Extraction method. Inherent safety assessment to assess the solvent's flammability, toxicity, reactivity, and explosiveness was conducted on the new solvent mix, Mixture 1 (n-hexane + ethanol), Mixture 2 (n-hexane + acetone) and Mixture 3 (n-hexane + n-butanol). It was found that Mixture 1 and 3 are safer than n-hexane and able to extract more oil than n-hexane and Mixture 2. However, the utilization of the solvent is dependent on the end product from the residual palm oil.     

Simple graphical method for inherent occupational health assessment

The concept of inherently safer design was introduced to design a fundamentally safer process so that hazards can be avoided or minimized rather than controlled or managed. The ideology has later been extended to the environmental, but not health criteria due to its complicated underlying principles. Even though health risk methods are already established, majority are for existing plants assessment. Early consideration of health aspect starting from process design stage however, has received much less attention. This paper introduces a simple graphical method to evaluate the inherent occupational health hazards of chemical processes during the R&D stage. A survey was conducted to identify the important health parameters for the graphical method development, involving nine world inherent safety and health experts. Based on their input, process mode, material volatility, operating pressure and chemical health hazard (toxicity and adverse effect) are the significant factors affecting inherent health hazards of chemical processes. The choice of parameters was bounded by the information availability at this stage. The method was applied on six routes to methyl methacrylate and ten routes to acetic acid. The parameters were plotted for each subprocess of the alternative routes. The ‘healthiest’ route was selected based on thorough hazards assessment across all the subprocesses. The first case study reveals the tertiary butyl alcohol as the ‘healthiest’ one as it poses relatively lower, or at least comparable hazards to the other routes due to exposure and health impacts. Meanwhile the acetic acid case study indicates ethanol oxide and ethyl oxide based routes as the inherently healthier as they operate at lower operating pressure besides posing comparable hazards level for the other three parameters, compared to the other routes. The case studies show that the inherent occupational health of a chemical process can already be evaluated easily in the R&D stage with the simple graphical method proposed.     

The Bhopal gas tragedy: could it have happened in a developed country?

The Bhopal gas tragedy occurred in December 1984 wherein approximately 41 tonnes of deadly MIC was released in the dead of night. It caused the death of over 3000 people and continued life-long misery for over 300,000 with certain genetic defects passed on to the next generation. It happened in a plant operated by a multinational, Union Carbide Corporation, in a developing country, India. The tragedy has changed the chemical process industry (CPI) forever. The results have been new legislation with better enforcement, enhancement in process safety, development of inherently safer plants, harsher court judgements, pro-active media and NGOs, rights-conscious public, and a CPI management willing to invest in safety related equipment and training. These have already resulted in savings of several hundred lives and over a billion dollars in accident damages [Kletz, T. (1998a). Process plants: a handbook of inherently safer designs. London: Taylor & Francis. Sutton, I. Chemical Engineering, 106(5), (1999). 114]. However, thousands did not have to die for the world to realise the disaster potential of CPI. The question that still remains is whether such an accident could have happened in a developed country. The answer is ‘yes’, as a number of major accidents in the developed countries since 1984, such as the Piper Alpha oil platform fire (1988, 167 killed), the Zeebrugge ferry disaster (1987, 167 killed), Phillips petroleum fire and explosion (1989, 23 killed), the Challenger disaster (1986, 7 killed), Esso Australia Longford explosion (1998, 2 killed) have demonstrated. One or more of the following are the primary reasons for such disasters: The indifferent attitude of the management towards safety, the lax enforcement of the existing regulations by the regulatory bodies as well as unusual delays in the judicial systems. Such conditions can happen regardless of the level of development in a country. Hence, the Bhopal gas tragedy could have happened in a developed country too, albeit with a lower probability. This paper is concerned with the possibility and not with the probability value. It also points out that further significant advances in process safety will occur with fundamental research into the causes of accidents and with a move towards inherently safer design.     

化工过程开发中本质安全化设计策略

本质安全化设计是预防人为失误及设备失效、降低化工过程风险应优先采用的技术。在比较传统设计方法与本质安全化设计方法的基础上,讨论了化工过程开发各阶段实现本质安全的机会,认为在开发初期,实施本质安全化的成本低,难度小;通过分析可行性研究、工艺研究、概念设计、基础设计、工程设计等阶段本质安全化设计的影响因素、设计目标和设计方法,探索化工过程开发中本质安全化设计策略,提出了化工过程本质安全化设计流程。通过工艺过程本质安全设计、工艺流程的简化和优化、不同设计方案的本质安全度评估等措施,可提高化工过程本质安全水平。     

Optimizing the design of storage facilities through the application of ISD and QRA

Four strategies can be used to achieve safety in chemical processes: inherent, passive, active and procedural. However, the strategy that offers the best results is the inherent safety approach, especially if it is applied during the initial stages of a project. Inherently Safer Design (ISD) permanently eliminates or reduces hazards, and thus avoids or diminishes the consequences of incidents. ISD can be applied using four strategies: substitution, minimization, moderation and simplification. In this paper, we propose a methodology that combines ISD strategies with Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) to optimize the design of storage installations. As 17% of major accidents in the chemical industry occur during the storage process and cause significant losses, it is essential to improve safety in such installations. The proposed method applies QRA to estimate the risk associated with a specific design. The design can then be compared to others to determine which is inherently safer. The risk analysis may incorporate complex phenomena such as the domino effect and possible impacts on vulnerable material and human elements. The methodology was applied to the San Juanico tragedy that occurred in Mexico in 1984.     

设计初期化工过程本质安全化设计策略

该文提出了一种在设计初期进行化工过程本质安全化设计的策略。首先进行危险物质与危险能量两类共计11种危险类型的危险辨识。针对辨识出的危险类型,通过与相应的临界条件比较进行快速的危险评价,对于不可接受的危险必须采取本质安全化措施,可接受的危险可有选择性地进行本质安全化设计。在设计初期可以使用的本质安全化原则主要是消除、最小化、替代和缓和,针对11种危险类型可以应用不同的本质安全化设计模型,以使实际进行本质安全化设计时更加简单与快捷。该文把提出的本质安全化设计策略应用到一个甲苯硝化制硝基甲苯的工艺,形成了多种本质安全化措施,可以用来在设计初期消除或减少危险。