Affected Ignorance And Animal Suffering: Why Our Failure To Debate Factory Farming Puts Us At Moral Risk

It is widely recognized that our social and moral environments influence our actions and belief formations. We are never fully immune to the effects of cultural membership. What is not clear, however, is whether these influences excuse average moral agents who fail to scrutinize conventional norms. In this paper, I argue that the lack of extensive public debate about factory farming and, its corollary, extreme animal suffering, is probably due, in part, to affected ignorance. Although a complex phenomenon because of its many manifestations, affected ignorance is morally culpable because it involves a choice not to investigate whether some practice in which one participates in might be immoral. I contend further that James Montmarquet’s set of intellectual virtues can provide a positive account of what it means to act as a responsible moral agent while immersed in a meat eating culture; they also represent the moral and epistemic framework for the kind of public discourse that should be taking place.     

Naturalness: Beyond Animal Welfare

There is an ongoing debate in animalethics on the meaning and scope of animalwelfare. In certain broader views, leading anatural life through the development of naturalcapabilities is also headed under the conceptof animal welfare. I argue that a concern forthe development of natural capabilities of ananimal such as expressed when living freelyshould be distinguished from the preservationof the naturalness of its behavior andappearance. However, it is not always clearwhere a plea for natural living changes overinto a plea for the preservation of theirnaturalness or wildness. In the first part ofthis article, I examine to what extent theconcerns for natural living meet ``theexperience requirement.' I conclude that someof these concerns go beyond welfare. In thesecond part of the article. I ask whether wehave moral reasons to respect concernsfor the naturalness of an animal's living thattranscend its welfare. I argue that the moralrelevance of such considerations can be graspedwhen we see animals as entities bearingnon-moral intrinsic values. In my view the``natural' appearance and behavior of an animalmay embody intrinsic values. Caring for ananimal's naturalness should then be understoodas caring for such intrinsic values. Intrinsicvalues provide moral reasons for action iffthey are seen as constitutive of the good lifefor humans. I conclude by reinterpreting,within the framework of a perfectionist ethicaltheory, the notion of indirect dutiesregarding animals, which go beyond andsupplement the direct duties towardsanimals.     

A Defense of Animal Rights

I argue that animals have rights in the sense of having valid claims, which might turn out to be actual rights as society advances and new scientific-technological developments facilitate finding alternative ways of satisfying our vital interests without using animals. Animals have a right to life, to liberty in the sense of freedom of movement and communication, to subsistence, to relief from suffering, and to security against attacks on their physical existence. Animals’ interest in living, freedom, subsistence, and security are of vital importance to them, and they do not belong to us; they are not the things we have already possessed by virtue of our own nature.     

No Room at the Zoo: Management Euthanasia and Animal Welfare

The practice of ‘management euthanasia’, in which zoos kill otherwise healthy surplus animals, is a controversial one. The debate over the permissibility of the practice tends to divide along two different views in animal ethics—animal rights and animal welfare. Traditionally, those arguments against the practice have come from the animal rights camp, who see it as a violation of the rights of the animal involved. Arguments in favour come from the animal welfare perspective, who argue that as the animal does not suffer, there is no harm in the practice and it is justified by its potential benefits. Here, I argue that an expansion of the welfare view, encompassing longevity and opportunities for positive welfare, give stronger considerations against management euthanasia, which then require greater benefits to justify its use.     

The ethics and politics of the caged layer hen debate in New Zealand

Changes in attitudes toward animal welfare, with a greater emphasis on the importance of allowing animals to express normal patterns of behavior has led to an examination of the practice of keeping hens in battery cages. There is widespread scientific consensus that the conditions of confinement and the barren nature of battery cages severely restrict hens’ behavioral repertoire, and are thus detrimental to their welfare. The New Zealand Animal Welfare Act 1999, stipulates that animals must have “the opportunity to display normal patterns of behaviour.” In spite of this provision, the New Zealand government has not acted in phasing out battery cages, arguing instead that there is insufficient evidence that welfare will be improved by a phase-out. There is evidence of strong industry pressure on the government, and the use of tactics common in policy considerations where changes are resisted by powerful interests. It is important that policy processes are better managed so that welfare changes are based on both public preferences and scientific knowledge, and ways of doing this are discussed.     

A Pluralist–Expressivist Critique of the Pet Trade

Elizabeth Anderson’s “pluralist–expressivist” value theory, an alternative to the understanding of value and rationality underlying the “rational actor” model of human behavior, provides rich resources for addressing questions of environmental and animal ethics. It is particularly well-suited to help us think about the ethics of commodification, as I demonstrate in this critique of the pet trade. I argue that Anderson’s approach identifies the proper grounds for criticizing the commodification of animals, and directs our attention to the importance of maintaining social practices and institutions that respect the social meanings of animals. Her theory alone, however, does not adequately address the role of the state in this project. Drawing on social contract theory to fill this gap, I conclude that the state’s role in regulating the pet trade should be limited to ensuring the welfare of animals in the stream of commerce, not prohibiting their mass marketing altogether.     

The Great Lake’s future at a cross road

Some argue that a collective vision for the future of the Laurentian Great Lakes is embodied in the␣Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (GLWQA). The GLWQA is a binational agreement, first signed in 1972 by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and President Richard Nixon, wherein the two countries (the Parties) commit to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the waters of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem.” Article X of the Agreement states that the Parties shall conduct a comprehensive review of the operation and effectiveness of this Agreement following every third biennial report of the [International Joint] Commission (IJC). The IJC’s 12th Biennial Report, released in 2004, triggered this important science, program, and policy review which commenced May 2006. This essay makes the case for a rigorous review, that explores deliberately the future scope of the Agreement to protect the world’s largest surface freshwater resource, and calls for innovation in the governance regime of this binational ecosystem.     

The Concept of Farm Animal Welfare: Citizen Perceptions and Stakeholder Opinion in Flanders, Belgium

Several attempts to conceptualize farm animal welfare have been criticized for diverging reasons, among them often the failure to incorporate the public concern and opinion. This paper’s objective is to develop a conception of farm animal welfare that starts from the public’s perception and integrates the opinion of different stakeholder representatives, thus following a fork-to-farm approach. Four qualitative citizen focus group discussions were used to develop a quantitative questionnaire, which has been completed by a representative sample of Flemish citizens (n = 459). Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses were applied to develop a conception of farm animal welfare starting from an extended list of aspects that relate to animal production and associate with farm animal welfare in the public’s perception. In depth interviews with stakeholder representatives were used to match and adapt the structure of the animal welfare conception model. The resulting conception revealed seven dimensions grouped in two different levels. Three dimensions were animal-based: “Suffering and Stress,” “Ability to Engage in Natural Behavior,” and “Animal Health.” Four dimensions were resource-based: “Housing and Barn climate,” “Transport and Slaughter,” “Feed and Water,” and “Human-Animal Relationship.” This conception is distinct from earlier attempts since it is based on public perceptions; it addresses the opinion of different stakeholders, and it distinguishes empirically between animal-based and resource-based dimensions in the conceptualization of farm animal welfare. The relevancy of a popular definition is supported by the present demand oriented economy, in which animal welfare is a non-trade concern, and mainly left to the market where consumers still mainly act as individuals who calculate and weigh pros and cons.     

Animal Rights: Autonomy and Redundancy

Even if animal liberation were to be adopted, would rights for animals be redundant – or even deleterious? Such an objection, most prominently voiced by L. W. Sumner and Paul W. Taylor, is misguided, risks an anthropocentric and anthropomorphic conception of autonomy and freedom, overly agent-centered rights conceptions, and an overlooking of the likely harmful consequences of positing rights for humans but not for nonhuman animals. The objection in question also stems from an overly pessimistic construal of autonomy-infringements thought to result from extending rights to animals, and also, of confusions that supposedly may ensue from ascribing animal rights. Whether or not a case for animal liberation and/or animal rights can cogently be made, the redundancy-or-worse objection to animal rights need pose no barrier.     

The Five Freedoms of Animal Welfare are Rights

In this paper I defend a theory of welfare rights for nonhuman animals. I do this by demonstrating that a well-established framework for protecting the interests of farm animals, the ‘Five Freedoms of Animal Welfare’, is already functioning just as a set of rights. To support this claim I adopt a common approach to detecting evidence for deontological reasoning and look at the structural features of rights. I first consider Hohfeld’s system of legal rights and consider whether the Five Freedoms may be understood as liberties or claim rights, before making a more successful comparison with side constraints and an interest theory of rights as understood by Nozick and Raz. I also respond to a likely objection that it is not possible to have some welfare rights without a right to freedom from exploitation. The argument therefore contributes to breaking down the stubborn division between ‘animal welfare’ and ‘animal rights’.     

动物伦理学研究

为了构建动物伦理学，笔者考察并概括了西方动物伦理研究的本质和关键问题，认为：动物伦理学是关于人与动物关系的伦理信念、道德态度和行为规范的理论体系，是一门尊重动物的价值和权利的新的伦理学说。它的产生具有坚实的科学基础、伦理基础和现实迫切性。     

Can natural behavior be cultivated? The farm as local human/animal culture

Although the notion of natural behavior occurs in many policy-making and legal documents on animal welfare, no consensus has been reached concerning its definition. This paper argues that one reason why the notion resists unanimously accepted definition is that natural behavior is not properly a biological concept, although it aspires to be one, but rather a philosophical tendency to perceive animal behavior in accordance with certain dichotomies between nature and culture, animal and human, original orders and invented artifacts. The paper scrutinizes the philosophy of natural behavior as it developed in the organic movement in response to a perceived contrast between industrialized and traditional agriculture. There are two reasons for focusing on the organic movement: (i) the emphasis on “the natural” is most accentuated there and has a long history, (ii) everyday life on organic farms presupposes human/animal interplay, which conflicts with the philosophical tendency to separate nature from culture. This mismatch between theory and practice helps us see why, and how, the philosophy of natural behavior needs to be reconsidered. The paper proposes that we understand farms as local human/animal cultures, and asks what we can mean my natural behavior in such contexts. Since domestic animals adapt to agricultural environments via interaction with caretakers, such interplay is analyzed as “hub” in these animals’ natural behavior.     

Legitimacy &; Canadian Farm Animal Welfare Standards Development: The Case of the National Farm Animal Care Council

Awareness of farm animal welfare issues is growing in Canada, as part of a larger food movement. The baseline Canadian standards for farm animal welfare—the Recommended Codes of Practice for the Care and Handling of Farm Animals—are up for revision. The success of these standards will depend in part on perceived legitimacy, which helps determine whether voluntary code systems are adopted, implemented, and accepted by target audiences. In the context of the Codes, legitimacy will also hinge on whether the standards-developers marshal narratives about farm animals that accord with their audiences’ expectations. The aim of this paper is to catalogue factors that influence legitimacy in farm animal welfare standard-setting, including which narratives of animal welfare are emphasized by standard-setters. Drawing upon the example of the baseline Canadian standards, and the National Farm Animal Care Council, the paper will present a theoretical and methodological framework for analyzing legitimacy in the context of animal welfare standards-development and discuss associated policy considerations.     

What is Speciesism?

In spite of the considerable literature nowadays existing on the issue of the moral exclusion of nonhuman animals, there is still work to be done concerning the characterization of the conceptual framework with which this question can be appraised. This paper intends to tackle this task. It starts by defining speciesism as the unjustified disadvantageous consideration or treatment of those who are not classified as belonging to a certain species. It then clarifies some common misunderstandings concerning what this means. Next, it rejects the idea that there are different kinds of speciesism. Such an idea may result from confusion because there are (1) different ways in which speciesism can be defended; and (2) different speciesist positions, that is, different positions that assume speciesism among their premises. Depending on whether or not these views assume other criteria for moral consideration apart from speciesism, they can be combined or simple speciesist positions. But speciesism remains in all cases the same idea. Finally, the paper examines the concept of anthropocentrism, the disadvantageous treatment or consideration of those who are not members of the human species. This notion must be conceptually distinguished from speciesism and from misothery (aversion to nonhuman animals). Anthropocentrism is shown to be refuted because it either commits a petitio principia fallacy or it falls prey to two arguments: the argument from species overlap (widely but misleadingly known as “argument from marginal cases”) and the argument from relevance. This rebuttal identifies anthropocentrism as a speciesist view.     

Human Diets and Animal Welfare: the Illogic of the Larder

Few moral arguments have been made against vegetarian diets. One exception is the “Logic of the Larder:” We do animals a favor by purchasing their meat, eggs, and milk, for if we did not purchase these products, fewer animals would exist. This argument fails because many farm animals have lives that are probably not worth living, while others prevent a significant number of wild animals from existing. Even if this were not so, the purchase of animal products uses resources that could otherwise be used to bring a much greater number of animals into existence.     

Animal Care Ethics, ANZCCART, and Public Perceptions of Animal Use Ethics

The public attitude to animal use in Australia and New Zealandcan be inferred from survey results and political activity. The publicis concerned about the rights of animals as far as any uses causing painare concerned, but takes a more utilitarian view of the taking of lifewhere no suffering is involved. Many of the participants in two recentANZCCART conferences fall short in their knowledge of and attitudetoward these concerns. Animal welfare legislation and standards need tobe reformed so that painful animal use is eliminated, even if economicgrowth suffers as a result.     

Riverbanks and the law: The arbitrary nature of river boundaries in New South Wales,Australia

Key aspects of environmental management exist within a legislative framework. The Rivers and Foreshores Improvement Act 1948 (NSW) and several Regional Environmental Plans created under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) make reference to ‘the top of the bank’ for defining areas of protected land adjacent to rivers, within which development consent may be required. It is an arbitrary term and its use within the Rivers and Foreshores Improvement Act 1948 (NSW) leads to confusion. This paper examines the range of definitions of ‘the top of the bank’ in respect of natural watercourses and aims to provide a more lucid and effective definition that will clarify existing ambiguities in legal interpretation. The paper examines the historical origins of the phrase ‘top of the bank’, finding that stereotyped Eurocentric views of what a river ‘should look like’ have impaired the legal definition for Australian rivers, thereby influencing common law and the development of statutory definitions. Judicial applications of the phrase ‘top of the bank’ are examined from a geomorphological perspective, demonstrating the misconceptions of the term in a legal context. The paper identifies the existence of widespread support for the need to protect land adjacent to rivers in the interests of environmental, economic and social sustainability. It concludes by calling for legislative reform that is both tailored to the individual site and consistent with overarching goals at the catchment scale.     

Phytocapping: An alternative technique to reduce leachate and methane generation from municipal landfills

Avoiding percolation of water into refuse is the key function of landfill covers. ‘Phytocapping’ has been considered as an effective, economical and environment-friendly technique for landfill remediation. In this technique, trees are established on a layer of soil cap placed over the refuse. Soil cover acts as a ‘storage’ and trees act as ‘bio-pump and filters’. For effective functioning of this technique, it is critical that an ‘optimum’ depth of soil is placed over the refuse, and ‘suitable’ plant species are used as plant cover. Preliminary results of a phytocapping trial (using 21 tree species and two depths of soil layers) show that the established trees can remove more water than that received via rainfall and rainfall interception can reduce up to 20% of the rain reaching the soil in a 1.5 year old plantation. The study is also trialling an US numeric model ‘STOMP’ (Subsurface Transport over Multiple Phases), to calculate daily water balance, to identify suitable plant species and to optimise thickness of the soil cover to be used in phytocapping.     

Inspiring Respect for Animals Through the Law? Current Development in the Norwegian Animal Welfare Legislation

Over the last years, Norway has revised its animal welfare legislation. As of January 1, 2010, the Animal Protection Act of 1974 was replaced by a new Animal Welfare Act. This paper describes the developments in the normative structures from the old to the new act, as well as the main traits of the corresponding implementation and governance system. In the Animal Protection Act, the basic animal ethics principles were to avoid suffering, treat animals well, and consider their natural needs and instincts. In addition, a principle for balancing our duties towards animals with the needs and interests of humans was expressed by the formulation “unnecessary suffering.” These principles (only with slightly different formulations) are retained in the new act. The novelty of the new act is shown by its explicit intention to promote respect for animals and its recognition of animals’ intrinsic value. Whereas intrinsic value is only given a symbolic function, the notion of respect is intended to have practical consequences. One interpretation of respect for animals is taking the animal’s integrity—and not only welfare—into account. Another is to see the introduction of respect as a call to animal keepers to provide animals with welfare exceeding the minimum requirements. In several respects, the legal system now seems to leave more responsibility to the individual animal keeper—and to citizens in general. I argue that if the authorities really do want to promote respect for animals, they must at the same time initiate activities to achieve this. In my perspective the challenge is to provide adequate measures to achieve in practice the intended respect for animals expressed in the new act.