《资源开发与市场》投稿须知

《资源开发与市场》是四川省科学技术厅主管,四川省自然资源科学研究院主办的综合性自然科学学术性期刊,涵盖自然科学的各个学科,月刊,国内外公开发行。本刊重点刊登国内以自然资源     

《资源开发与市场》投稿须知

《资源开发与市场》是四川科学技术厅主管,四川省自然资源科学研究院主办的综合性自然科学学术期刊,涵盖自然科学的各个领域,月刊,国内外公开发行。本刊童点刊登以自然资源为主,兼顾社     

资源开发与市场（月刊）

《资源开发与市场》是由四川省科技厅主管，四川省自然资源科学研究院主办的自然科学类学术期刊，涵盖自然科学的众多领域。本刊创刊于1985年，国内外公开发行。本刊重点刊登国内外以自然资源为主的科学理论研究的创新成果，以及资源开发和保护中的新技术、新方法与新工艺，开辟有实验研究、研究方法、资源与环境、旅游资源等多个精品栏目，是国家机关工作人员、科研单位研究人员及大专院校师生的良师益友。     

科技进步在农业自然资源利用中的作用——以鄱阳湖区为例

以建国后鄱阳湖区农业自然资源利用的演变过程为对象,阐述了传统计划经济体制下的鄱阳湖区农业科技应用,分析了农业科技在以市场改革为导向的湖区农业自然资源利用中的作用。在此基础上,应用索洛余值法对湖区不同历史阶段的农业技术进步贡献率进行了评估,结论表明以市场改革为导向的制度创新是科技进步发挥作用的关键性因素。     

《资源开发与市场》投稿须知

《资源开发与市场》是四川省科学技术厅主管，四川省自然资源科学研究院主办的综合性自然科学学术期刊，涵盖自然科学的各个学科，月刊，国内外公开发行。     

自然资源开发利用的环境补偿问题初探

自然资源开发利用的环境补偿是指政府向开发利用自然资源的生产者和消费者直接证收费用，同时用于补偿或恢复开发利用过程中造成的环境破坏。在《关于出席联合国环境与发展大会的情况及有关对策的报告》中指出“各级政府应更好地运用经济手段来达到保护环境的目的，按照资源有偿使用的原则，要逐步开征资源利用补偿费，开展对环境税的研究…”。发达国家在这方面主要采取价格干预和建立有效的财产权市场等措施。美国国会正在研究在水和森林等自然资源领域建立水市场和取消低于生产成本的木材销售补贴政策的可行性。在我国已有17个省市地方不…     

观点

正党的十八届三中全会指出,市场在资源配置中起决定性作用,如果自然资源要通过市场来配置的话,那么首先就必须给自然资源赋予产权。我们可以把自然资源分为资源性产品、可再生能源、生态产品、可再生生物资源及废弃物吸收能力这五大类。但是,这些资源类型不完全具有稀缺性,如果不确     

浅谈自然资源及其开发与保护

本文从自然资源的含义谈起，说明了不仅自然资源的有用性对人类很重要，而且其所具有的生态环境功能更重要。提出了摆脱生态环境危机，首先要转变人们对自然资源根深蒂固的认识，坚持自然资源的开发与保护并重，走可持续利用自然资源之路。     

论动物权属制度

近年来，学界对自然资源权属制度多有探讨，野生动物资源也不例外，本文主要论证了野生动物资源必须实行国家所有权才能保证其生态效用的实现，而对饲养繁殖的动物实行私人所有权和所有权交易制度，则可以激活饲养繁殖市场，间接保护野生动物。     

资源开发与市场（月刊）

《资源开发与市场》是由四川省科技厅主管,四川省自然资源科学研究院主办的自然科学类学术期刊,涵盖自然科学的众多领域。本刊创刊于1985年,国内外公开发行。本刊重点刊登国内外以自然资源为主的科学理论研究的创新成果,以及资源开发和保护中的新技术、新方法与新工艺,开辟有实验研究、研究方法、资源与环境、旅游资源等多个精品栏目,是国家机关工作人员、科研单位研究人员及大专院校师生的良师益友。     

Complex property rights and Coasean bargaining in natural resource management

ABSTRACT

This paper contributes to the debate on whether private or common property rights are better for advancing the sustainable management of natural resources. This contest between public and private ownership is often exaggerated, we claim, because in the real world, complex entitlements with varying degrees of privateness/publicness prevail. Property rights belonging to families, companies, clubs, corporations, and communities are simultaneously common to the members/shareholders and private to the entities. We call these entitlements private-common entitlements. When we acknowledge this complexity, it becomes evident that neither private nor common ownership rights are alone responsible for resource depletion. Instead, depletion is caused by freeriding or evading the payment of the full price of natural resources. This invites Coase’s solution to resource allocation. Therefore, the key problem is whether and how Coasean bargaining is employed to allocate ownership over resources threatened by depletion. We contribute to the debate by showing that Coase’s approach promotes not only economically efficient but also ecologically sustainable resource management. Often, this approach would lead to the establishment of largely private property or control rights by largely collective/public entities. We apply this theoretical framework to the development of a ski resort in Pirin Mountain, Bulgaria.     

The development of first-possession rules in US mining, 1872–1920: theory, evidence, and policy implications

This paper applies a property rights framework to federal mineral lands in the western United States from the enactment of the Mining Law in 1872 until the enactment of the Mineral Leasing Act for fossil fuels in 1920. There are two principal findings. First, the Mining Law appears to have been an effective means for assigning rights to mineral stocks on public lands (at least through 1920). This conclusion is supported by evidence from claim disputes in the West. Second, the impetus for the Mineral Leasing Act did not derive from the different physical characteristics of hardrock minerals and petroleum. The relevance of these conclusions to contemporary mineral policy is also discussed.     

Nature of property rights and motivation for blue growth: An empirical evidence from the fisheries industry

If unauthorized resource use is prevented, managing marine resources by allocating property rights may match economic and environmental conservation incentives. However, because of the developing exploitation of marine resources and accompanying pollution, species' living conditions in Europe's waters are changing more quickly than before. By considering the roles of fisheries productivity, intellectual property rights, intellectual capital rights, market size, governance, and economic growth from 1990 to 2022, this paper aims to investigate the dynamic effect of property rights factors on the sustainability of the fisheries industry in 27 European countries. At higher quantiles, the findings showed a significant positive association between governance and fisheries sustainability adopting a new method, the MMQR with fixed effects, the Method of Moments Quantile Regression. In addition, in EU27 nations, the impact of intellectual property rights was favorable and statistically significant from the first to ninth quantiles. The findings show that the EU14 developed nations have more excellent governance and intellectual capital rights than the EU13 developing countries, significantly benefiting fisheries sustainability. In the same way that market size and economic growth condense fisheries sustainability in EU14 developed and EU13 developing countries, it has been discovered that intellectual property rights do the same across all quantiles, supporting the growth hypothesis for fisheries-producing countries. The findings specifically show that the beneficial solid impact of intellectual property rights, market size, and economic development on the sustainability of fisheries is more significant in EU13 developing nations than in EU14 developed countries. These results provide policymakers with helpful information for promoting property rights aspects in EU14 and EU13 nations via effective green technologies in the fisheries sector to meet sustainable development objectives.     

TREATING WATER INSTITUTIONS AS ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES: DEMONSTRATION OF A CONCEPTUAL MODEL1

ABSTRACT: Institutional innovation is central to many water resource problems. (In this context “institutions” refers to the laws and regulations governing water allocation and use.) Yet, typically, economic analyses treat institutions as exogenous and fixed. Unfortunately, this conventional assumption does not allow economists to address many modern problems. This paper develops an economic framework in which institutions are treated as endogenous. The model accounts for (1) factors that stimulate calls for formal institutional change, (2) the role of interest groups in policymaking, and (3) actual institutional change as it impacts choice domains and thus economic performance. The model is compared to a specific case of change in Colorado's water institutions, namely, instream water rights legislation in the 1970's. The empirical evidence is generally consistent with model hypotheses. The model promises to be useful to scholars and policymakers interested in institutional innovation.     

PRIVATIZING THE GROUND WATER RESOURCE: INDIVIDUAL USE AND ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS1

ABSTRACT: While most inquiries into improving the efficiency of ground water allocation have focused upon various schemes involving centralized management, recently the focus has shifted towards exploring private property solutions to these problems. However, most of these studies, when modeling ground water use, have equated behavior under private property to that under common property conditions. This leads to the possibly mistaken conclusion that private property rights do not promote more efficient ground water use, because these models assume that producers ignore the future effects of current pumping. This paper attempts to correct this deficiency by formally modeling ground water use under common property, central management, and private property scenarios. Moreover, there are many ways that property rights can be defined over ground water, some establishing more exclusivity over the resource than others. Four specifications of property rights are analyzed for their likely effects on allocative efficiency: full stock-flow, partial stock-flow, limited stock-flow, and pure flow rights.     

流域管理:权力产权的外部性问题

水资源的自然、经济和社会属性要求政府对流域的开发和利用进行管理,以解决个体使用者的外部性问题.但实际上由于政府并不是只有单一目标的统一组织,在分权体制下,不同区域、部门的政府单元掌握着实际权力.由于权力也存在外部性,各管理区域、部门之间存在利益冲突,导致政府的管理失效.解决政府权力外部性的办法:一是要转变政府职能,改变政府的激励机制;二是严格界定各政府单元的权力界限,对流域进行统一管理.     

关于中国农村土地制度的产权经济思考──兼论我国农村土地的复合所有制

本文首先运用现代产权经济理论对我国农村现行土地制度进行了分析,进而提出我国农村土地宜实行复合所有制,并从土地特征、我国现实情况、土地印度的历史变迁,农地制度改革的风险和成本、各国土地制度变迁的趋势等方面进行了论证.     

INVESTOR OWNED VS. PUBLICLY OWNED WATER AGENCIES: AN EVALUATION OF THE PROPERTY RIGHTS THEORY OF THE FIRM1

ABSTRACT: The property rights theory of the firm is evaluated by comparing the cost structures of a sample of water agencies under two alternative modes of ownership - public and investor owned. On the basis of the sample, investor owned water agencies appear to have lower cost structures.     

AN ALTERNATIVE TO WATER POLLUTION CONTROLS1

ABSTRACT: A hypothetical, although realistic, water pollution problem was studied from a property rights viewpoint. Theoretical and economic justifications were developed. A fully-liable, private owner was found to be financially profitable while improving the water quality and providing recreational potential. The example confirmed that property rights provides an answer to stream pollution problems, but contradicted the view that water pollution control must be justified by recreational benefits.     

浅析环境利益保护视阈下《物权法》的完善

环境利益是人类从环境中获取的维持生命延续与自我发展的效用,以及能动地利用自然环境所形成的各种利益。在环境问题与环境危机的影响下,环境利益的实现必定受到阻碍。《物权法》规定了自然资源物权和环境保护相邻权,却忽视环境利益保护的理念,在物权客体范围与相邻关系等方面亦存在明显局限。应将"环境利益"纳入民事立法,尤其是《物权法》中,通过确立环境物权,丰富环境容量使用权、环境保护相邻权的相关内容,实现对《物权法》的完善,促进环境利益的民事法律保护与救济。