Dynamic risk analysis of offloading process in floating liquefied natural gas (FLNG) platform using Bayesian Network

The growing demand for natural gas has pushed oil and gas exploration to more isolated and previously untapped regions around the world where construction of LNG processing plants is not always a viable option. The development of FLNG will allow floating plants to be positioned in remote offshore areas and subsequently produce, liquefy, store and offload LNG in the one position. The offloading process from an FLNG platform to a gas tanker can be a high risk operation. It consists of LNG being transferred, in hostile environments, through loading arms or flexible cryogenic hoses into a carrier which then transports the LNG to onshore facilities. During the carrier's offloading process at onshore terminals, it again involves risk that may result in an accident such as collision, leakage and/or grounding. It is therefore critical to assess and monitor all risks associated with the offloading operation. This study is aimed at developing a novel methodology using Bayesian Network (BN) to conduct the dynamic safety analysis for the offloading process of an LNG carrier. It investigates different risk factors associated with LNG offloading procedures in order to predict the probability of undesirable accidents. Dynamic failure assessment using Bayesian theory can estimate the likelihood of the occurrence of an event. It can also estimate the failure probability of the safety system and thereby develop a dynamic failure assessment tool for the offloading process at a particular FLNG plant. The main objectives of this paper are: to understand the LNG offloading process, to identify hazardous events during offloading operation, and to perform failure analysis (modelling) of critical accidents and/or events. Most importantly, it is to evaluate and compare risks. A sensitivity analysis has been performed to validate the risk models and to study the behaviour of the most influential factors. The results have indicated that collision is the most probable accident to occur during the offloading process of an LNG carrier at berth, which may have catastrophic consequences.     

LNG as a potential alternative fuel - Safety and security of storage facilities

The aim of this article is to summarize the safety and security aspects of storing of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) as a potential alternative fuel. The contribution deals with possible scenarios of accidents associated with LNG storage facilities and with a methodology for the assessment of vulnerability of such facilities. The protection of LNG storage facilities as element of critical infrastructure should also be a matter of interest to the state. The study presents the results of determination of hazardous zones around LNG facilities in the event of various sorts of release. For calculations, the programs ALOHA, EFFECTS and TerEx were used and results obtained were compared. Scenarios modelled within this study represent a possible approach to the preliminary assessment of risk that should be verified by more detailed modelling (CFD). These scenarios can also be used for a quick estimation of areas endangered by an incident or accident. The results of modelling of the hazardous zones contribute to a reduction in risk of major accidents associated with these potential alternative energy sources.     

LNG船舶进出港航行移动安全区宽度定量计算分析

为保障液化天然气(LNG)船舶进出港通航安全,提出一种基于LNG船舶碰撞事故概率和风险的LNG船舶移动安全区宽度界定方法。该方法以船舶碰撞概率模型、船舶碰撞损害模型和LNG池火危害模型为基础,计算LNG船舶在航行过程中的事故概率和风险,并根据其分布特征,结合事故概率与风险可接受标准,定量界定LNG船舶移动安全区的宽度。研究表明,LNG船舶移动安全区宽度与通航水域交通流分布、事故船舶的排水量、航行速度等相关。在水上交通管理应用中,可根据LNG船舶及应用水域交通的实际情况确定LNG船舶进出港航行移动安全区的宽度。     

Safety study of an LNG regasification plant using an FMECA and HAZOP integrated methodology

A safety analysis was performed to determine possible accidental events in the storage system used in the liquefied natural gas regasification plant using the integrated application of failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) and hazard and operability analysis (HAZOP) methodologies. The goal of the FMECA technique is the estimation of component failure modes and their major effects, whereas HAZOP is a structured and systematic technique that provides an identification of the hazards and the operability problems using logical sequences of cause-deviation-consequence of process parameters. The proposed FMECA and HAZOP integrated analysis (FHIA) has been designed as a tool for the development of specific criteria for reliability and risk data organisation and to gain more recommendations than those typically provided by the application of a single methodology. This approach has been applied to the risk analysis of the LNG storage systems under construction in Porto Empedocle, Italy. The results showed that FHIA is a useful technique to better and more consistently identify the potential sources of human errors, causal factors in faults, multiple or common cause failures and correlation of cause-consequence of hazards during the various steps of the process.     

Backtracking and prospect on LNG supply chain safety

The safety issues of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) in production, storage, loading/unloading, transportation/shipping, and re-gasification have became a major concern, since an accident in the LNG industry would be very costly. Understanding the threat of LNG not only contributes to the process safety and reliability in the research and development (R&D) system, but improves the efficiency of loss prevention, fire protection and emergency responses. As of April 2019, in order to obtain the present status and trend of LNG safety research, basing 1122 documents of the Web of Science database about safety research of LNG as a data source, CiteSpace and VOS viewer were used for network knowledge map analysis. A comprehensive knowledge map of LNG safety field was obtained from several research aspects including scientific research power, research hot spots and trends, research knowledge base and frontier. According to the study results, the development of LNG safety research was divided into four stages from 1970s to 2019, China and South Korea made a lot of contributions, and the United States is the most influential. Among them, the research from 2005 to 2019 was the most representative. Current research results indicate that a combination of Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) methodology and Dynamic Procedure for Atypical Scenarios Identification (DyPASI) will fully identify risks; The PHAST and TerEx programs quickly define safety zones. Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) software package can provide accurate quantitative data for the study of LNG safety. Research on quantitative risk assessment (QRA) and LNG evaporated gas (BOG) has been a hot topic and trend in this field. The application of expansion foam in LNG accident mitigation covers most of the research content in this field, and the optimization of LNG liquefaction process has a great influence on this industry. As the international demand for LNG energy output increases, floating liquefied natural gas (FLNG) will have considerable development, and increasingly researchers attach vital importance to the safety of LNG offshore production integrated unit.     

基于灰色关联分析的LNG接收终端人因事故辨识方法

陆岸LNG接收终端是LNG海上进口系统中的重要设施。针对我国LNG接收终端人因事故不断增多的现状，基于航空事故调查分析中的HFACS事故致因分析模型，将人因事故的影响因素归纳为个人因素、人际因素、环境因素、监督因素和组织因素五大类，结合灰色理论中的灰色关联分析，得到了LNG接收终端人因事故辨识方法。最后，运用该方法对某LNG接收终端人因事故进行辨识，通过灰关联度的计算，找出其最主要的不安全事件来自“个人因素”中的个人“安全意识不强”。此方法克服了小样本事故数据带来的弊端，对保障LNG接收终端的安全运行具有一定的指导意义。     

Preliminary risk analysis for LNG tankers approaching a maritime terminal

LNG ships may represent a remarkable risk source, especially when approaching a land terminal, not only due to the possible occurrence of maritime accident, but also since they may represent a suitable target for terrorist attacks. A preliminary risk analysis for LNG ships approaching the Panigaglia terminal is carried out: based on literature data and on the characteristics of the location, a spill originated from a sea accident can be excluded; on the contrary, intentional damages may cause the release of a large amount of LNG, giving rise to a pool fire. Consequence analysis shows that dangerous thermal effects are expected within a radius of 700–1500 m; in the location under exam, the impact on resident population will be negligible, for the most probable attack site, and marginal for an occasionally used anchorage, which should be no longer allowed.     

Risk analysis in Natech events: State of the art

Natech events (Natural Hazard Triggering Technological Disasters) are industrial accidents caused by natural events such as hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, tsunamis, and so on. In recent decades, the probability of these events occurring has increased, activating the interest of researchers in the study of new methods of risk analysis to prevent and mitigate possible damage to people, the environment, and processing facilities. On the other hand, the concept of multi-hazard is summarized in the combination of two or more threat factors manifested in isolated, simultaneous manner, or by chain reaction, to produce a trigger event of a disaster, where hazardous events can be one or more natural events. Considering that, it is essential to know the progress in risk analysis for Natech events, to identify the gaps for future research. Therefore, in this paper, a systematic review of the Natech events literature with single and multi-hazard approaches was developed. The review was conducted by searching the Science Direct, Web of Science, and Scopus databases for scientific documents. Subsequently, the words Natech and Multi-hazard were taken as keywords, and 208 results were obtained. Then, some management documents were consulted in international organizations to compare academic literature and industrial risk management. In conclusion, the risk analysis methods revised are specific to a particular hazard and apply mainly to earthquakes, floods, and lightning. Regarding a multi-hazard approach, the methods focus on risk mitigation in urban areas without taking into account Natech risk. In the case of industrial risk assessment, some methodologies were found that briefly consider Natech risk in risk assessment processes in industry.     

基于QRA角度评价LNG储罐类型的选择

为提高LNG储存的安全性,基于QRA(定量风险评价),利用应急危险定位分析软件分别进行了LNG中小型储罐及大型储槽泄漏事故分析和LNG带压储罐充注压力专项对比分析。结果表明:立式圆柱常压储罐应选择高径比接近于1的罐体而压力罐的选择受高径比的影响很小;当对常压储罐高度有要求时,球形罐是比立式圆柱罐更好的选择;在大型LNG储槽中,常压储槽自身压力很大,可以起到抑制BOG(蒸发气体)产生的作用;在饱和状态下,压力罐的充注压力并非越小越好,需进行针对性分析计算,选取最适合的充注与设计压力。掌握LNG储罐事故后果与罐体形状与类型之间的关系可加强并丰富对其储罐类型选择的认识,可较好的为提高其储存安全性提供数据支撑与理论基础。     

Quantitative risk analysis of fire and explosion on the top-side LNG-liquefaction process of LNG-FPSO

Since the massive use and production of fuel oil and natural gas, the excavating locations of buried energy-carrying material are moving further away from onshore, eventually requiring floating production systems like floating production, storage and offloading (FPSO). Among those platforms, LNG-FPSO will play a leading role to satisfy the global demands for the natural gas in near future; the LNG-FPSO system is designed to deal with all the LNG processing activities, near the gas field. However, even a single disaster on an offshore plant would put the whole business into danger. In this research, the risk of fire and explosion in the LNG-FPSO is assessed by quantitative risk analysis, including frequency and consequence analyses, focusing on the LNG liquefaction process (DMR cycle). The consequence analysis is modeled by using a popular analysis tool PHAST. To assess the risk of this system, 5 release model scenarios are set for the LNG and refrigerant leakages from valves, selected as the most probable scenarios causing fire and explosion. From the results, it is found that the introduction of additional protection methods to reduce the effect of fire and explosion under ALARP criteria is not required, and two cases of the selection of independent protection layers are recommended to meet the SIL level of failure rate for safer design and operation in the offshore environment.     

Uncertainty techniques in liquefied natural gas (LNG) dispersion calculations

The dynamic development of the LNG sector increases the risk of major accidents. Uncontrolled releases of LNG during the processes of manufacturing, distribution, storage, and regasification can pose a serious threat to people, facilities, and the environment. Therefore, an important goal is to determine hazard zones and the extent of potential consequences associated with a release of LNG. The key issue is to estimate these with the least level of uncertainty. The largest part of uncertainty comes from the modeling of LNG release sources and performing dispersion calculations. It is connected with the application of different mathematical models, the adoption of a number of simplifying assumptions, approximations, empirical relations, constants, and a lack of knowledge.This paper proposes a general procedure for calculating the release rate and duration time of the LNG release, pool spreading, vaporization, as well as dispersion, taking into consideration the uncertainty. The procedure consists of two parts. The first part concerns the sensitivity analysis to identify the most uncertain parameters of the LNG source term and dispersion models. The second part applies to two techniques used to include the uncertainty aspects of fuzzy sets and the Monte Carlo method for calculating hazard zones. In order to provide a basis for comparison between these two approaches, the shape of the membership functions used in the fuzzy methods are the same as the shape of the probability density function used in the Monte Carlo simulation. The case study, concerning an LNG release, illustrates the application of the proposed techniques.     

Fire and explosion risk assessment for large-scale oil export terminal

Now in Russian Federation and other countries large-scale oil terminals (volume of one tank exceeds 100 000 m³, total volume of tanks exceeds 300 000 m³) are designed and constructed. Therefore fire safety of such objects becomes a very important task, solution of which is hardly possible without detail fire risk assessment. This study is aimed to a solution of this problem. Potential, individual and social risks were calculated. The potential risk was defined as a frequency of occurrence of hazardous factors of fires and explosions in a given point of space (the so-called risk contours). The individual risk was defined as a frequency of injuring a given person by hazardous factors of fires and explosions. Time of presence of this person in hazardous zones (near the hazardous installation) is taken into account during calculations of the individual risk. Social risk was defined as a dependence of frequency of injuring a given number of people by hazardous factors of fires and explosions on this number. In practice the social risk is usually determined on injuring not less than 10 people.

The oil terminal under consideration includes the following main parts: crude oil storage consisting of three tanks of volume 100 000 m³ each, input crude oil pipeline of diameter 0.6 m, crude oil pumps, output crude oil pipeline of diameter 0.8 m, auxiliary buildings and facilities. The following main scenarios of tank fires have been considered: rim seal fire, pool fire on a surface of a floating roof, pool fire on a total cross-section surface of the tank, pool fire in a dyke, explosions in closed or semiclosed volumes. Fires and explosions in other parts of the terminal are also taken into account. Effects of escalation of accidents are considered.

Risk contours have been calculated both for the territory of the terminal and for the neighbouring space. The potential risk for the storage zone is near 10⁻⁴–10⁻⁵ year⁻¹, and at a distance 500 m from the terminal the potential risk values do not exceed 10⁻⁶ year⁻¹. The values of the individual risk for various categories of workers are in the range of 10⁻⁵–10⁻⁶ year⁻¹. Because of low number of the workers on the terminal and large distances to towns and villages the social risk value is negligible. These risk values are consistent with practice of the best oil companies, and fire hazard level of the terminal can be accepted as tolerable.     

Acoustic analysis of blast waves produced by rapid phase transition of LNG released on water

Massive offshore and onshore storage of fuel have led the international community to raise questions about the hazards on the surrounding installations and people. Among the possible accidental scenarios when cryogenic gas as liquefied natural gas (LNG) is spilled on water at a very fast rate, the phenomenon of rapid phase transition (RPT) may occur: large amounts of energy are released during phase transition which can generate explosions. The related consequences should be added to the possible consequences of fire in terms of flash fire, fireball, pool fire, and vapour cloud explosion for confined and congested geometry surrounding the release point.In this paper, the analysis of RPT of LNG has been studied from the point of view of blast wave production, through ab initio acoustic analysis for monopole source. Maximum overpressures, as calculated at the source point and along the blast pathway are compared with results of large scale experiments. Safety distances are given for the sake of comparison with threshold distances reported in the open literature.     

液化天然气燃料动力船舶定量风险分析

近年来航运耗油产生的CO2排放量很大,发展液化天然气替代原有船舶动力成为需要。在中国天然气开发应用较晚,试点改造船舶存在安全隐患。分析了危险事件的一般导致原因,确定危害影响因子对改造船舶的设计和操作有指导作用。基于个人风险,分析了各类事故发生概率,选择了合适的后果模型,考察了长江气象条件,以芜湖某试点改造船进行了定量风险计算,得到了个人风险等值线,确定船体距离河道两边高敏感或特殊高密度场所不应小于20m,指出改用天然气作为船舶燃料后满足安全推荐标准要求。     

Risk-based siting considerations for LNG terminals – Comparative perspectives of United States & Europe

Siting regulations and industrial standards for liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals are evolving along different paths within Europe and the United States (U.S.). The 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 190 continues to delineate the United States process to adopt and revise safety regulations pertaining to LNG terminals and peak shaving plant sitting.¹ Embodied in these regulations are rich legal and regulatory traditions that are unique to the U.S. perspective. For example, the public is encouraged to petition existing regulations and to comment on regulatory proposals. Litigation within the U.S. court system is another means by which industry and the public may seek regulatory change. This approach promotes public involvement in governmental oversight and creates a distinctive obligation and accountability for U.S. regulatory agencies, which uniquely shape technical, safety, risk mitigation, and societal risk perspectives for siting LNG terminals.European traditions shape siting regulations for LNG terminals as well. Though American siting guidance includes references to the National Fire Protection Association’s NFPA 59A and 49 CFR, Part 193, European developers also apply the guidance within EN 1473 – a risk-based case-by-case analysis directive.^{2, 3 and 4} The NFPA 59A standard is applied for a basis to examine property line spacing as they pertain or may relate to off-site hazard impacts. The European approach applies the assessment and suitability of code compliance and the application of accepted engineering practices. In addition the approach incorporates the application of empirical risk assessments and computational modeling to reach an understanding of risk exposures. European policies set limits on the population’s cumulative exposure to facility risks and require LNG facility developers not to exceed established risk criteria.This paper describes how the U.S. and Europe site LNG terminals, identifies key differences in their risk-based approaches, and explains why these differences exist. This discussion also examines historical precedents that have influenced regulations and approval processes for siting LNG terminals within each continent.     

印染行业特种设备的风险评价与责任保险研究

特种设备在印染行业的广泛应用带来经济效益的同时也伴随着事故和风险,政府部门一直探寻有效的风险管理手段。近年来,保险作为转移风险的有效方式在安全生产方面备受关注,然而其在印染行业的特种设备中的应用还不够成熟。因此,文章根据印染行业特种设备的风险特点,着重从人、机、环、管四个方面分析其风险,并运用作业危险性评价法(LEC)评估作业人员的风险等级、计算事故最大可能损失(MPL)、运用等级系数安全评价法评估企业的安全性,从而量化印染企业的责任风险,应用于责任保险的保费费率浮动计算中。     

A study of storage tank accidents

This paper reviews 242 accidents of storage tanks that occurred in industrial facilities over last 40 years. Fishbone Diagram is applied to analyze the causes that lead to accidents. Corrective actions are also provided to help operating engineers handling similar situations in the future. The results show that 74% of accidents occurred in petroleum refineries, oil terminals or storage. Fire and explosion account for 85% of the accidents. There were 80 accidents (33%) caused by lightning and 72 (30%) caused by human errors including poor operations and maintenance. Other causes were equipment failure, sabotage, crack and rupture, leak and line rupture, static electricity, open flames etc. Most of those accidents would have been avoided if good engineering have been practiced.     

Predicting the flammable region reach of propane vapor clouds

Liquified gas fuels are widely used around the world, and the growth of LNG and LPG consumption continues to increase. However, using these fuels can lead to accidents if they are released to the environment. Consequently, the challenge to control and predict such hazards has become an objective in emergency planning and risk analysis. In a previous article the “Dispersion Safety Factor” (DSF) was proposed, defined as the ratio between the distance at which the lower flammability limit concentration occurs and that corresponding to the visible contour of a vapor cloud. Its interest was demonstrated by applying it to the specific case of an LNG spill. With the appropriate modifications, this factor may be applied to the dispersion of other substances; in this communication it is applied to the atmospheric dispersion of propane, and two expressions are proposed to estimate it. Due to the similarity between the properties of both gases, these expressions could probably be applied as well to the dispersion of propylene.     

Validation of FLACS against experimental data sets from the model evaluation database for LNG vapor dispersion

The siting of facilities handling liquefied natural gas (LNG), whether for liquefaction, storage or regasification purposes, requires the hazards from potential releases to be evaluated. One of the consequences of an LNG release is the creation of a flammable vapor cloud, that may be pushed beyond the facility boundaries by the wind and thus present a hazard to the public. Therefore, numerical models are required to determine the footprint that may be covered by a flammable vapor cloud as a result of an LNG release. Several new models have been used in recent years for this type of simulations. This prompted the development of the “Model evaluation protocol for LNG vapor dispersion models” (MEP): a procedure aimed at evaluating quantitatively the ability of a model to accurately predict the dispersion of an LNG vapor cloud.This paper summarizes the MEP requirements and presents the results obtained from the application of the MEP to a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) model – FLACS. The entire set of 33 experiments included in the model validation database were simulated using FLACS. The simulation results are reported and compared with the experimental data. A set of statistical performance measures are calculated based on the FLACS simulation results and compared with the acceptability criteria established in the MEP. The results of the evaluation demonstrate that FLACS can be considered a suitable model to accurately simulate the dispersion of vapor from an LNG release.