Safety management in different high-risk domains – All the same?

In view of safety management being introduced in more and more industries, the aim of this paper is to discuss what different high-risk industries can learn from each other and what limits for generalizing safety management methods within and across industries exist. After presenting core components of safety management, three attributes crucial to any organization’s functioning are described, which also affect the way safety management systems should be designed, run, and assessed. These attributes are (1) the kinds of safety to be managed, (2) the general approach to managing uncertainty as a hallmark of organizations that manage safety, and (3) the regulatory regime within which safety is managed. By discussing safety management in the context of these three attributes, contingencies are outlined that can help decision-makers in companies to tailor safety management to their own situation and support regulators in drawing up and evaluating safety management requirements for different industries while also promoting learning between different high-risk domains. Standards and procedures, safety training, incident reporting and investigation, and safety culture are taken as examples to illustrate why and how different aspects of organizational functioning should be taken into account when designing and evaluating safety management systems or elements thereof.     

A summary and synthesis of procedural regulations and standards—Informing a procedures writer's guide

Well-written procedures are an integral part of any industrial organization for safe operation, managing risks, and continuous improvement. Regulatory bodies around the world require industries to have current, accurate, and appropriate procedures for most processes. Although the importance of procedures is recognized by all industries in general, significant incidents still occur due to procedural breakdowns. Some of the procedural breakdowns come from obvious problems such as the procedure not being available or the procedure being wrong. However, some incidents have occurred when correct procedures were available and the operator used those procedures. In these instances, the reason workers do not follow procedures correctly may be attributable the procedure being presented or designed in a manner that does not sufficiently communicate the information in a manner that is easily and quickly understood. This indicates that procedure writers may need more guidance on how to write and design procedures so they accomplish this. To effectively manage risk, procedures need to be technically correct (and regulatory compliant) and usable. As part of this, the current work is focused on developing a systematic approach to a procedure writer's guide that includes a regulatory compliant component. The work presented here consists of an effort to identify procedure-writing practices necessary to ensure regulatory compliance by summarizing a large sample of regulations and standards from several industries. The regulations and standards were organized to reflect common ideas and the implications in terms of human factors needs for procedure design were identified. This information will be used as part of the development of a writer's guide that accounts for human factors (HF) that includes explanations of HF implications and empirical support for each of the guidelines. The novelty of the method and information presented here is in the idea of leveraging the cumulative information available regarding procedures in regulations and standards. Incorporating this information into a procedure's writers guide in this manner may not only facilitate procedure being regulatory compliant for facilities in different geographies of the world, but could also support their being written with considerations for human performance.     

The influence of organizational factors on safety in Taiwanese high-risk industries

Organizational theorists have recently begun to pay research attention to the workforces of emerging countries in Asia, especially the greater China regions. However, little research has focused on the influence of organizational factors on safety in these countries. This study hypothesized that organizational factors, characterized as safety leadership perspective (management commitment, blame culture) and safety climate perspective (harmonious relationships), would influence group-level safety management, which would in turn influence individual level safety awareness and practices. To test this hypothesis, a safety climate questionnaire was distributed to ten Taiwanese plants in high-risk industries. Structural equation modeling (SEM) was used to analyze the linkages among organizational level factors, work-group-level factors, and workers’ safety awareness and practices. We found that safety leadership style and organizational harmony in Taiwanese high-risk industries can exert significant influences on work-group processes, which in turn have greater effects on individual safety awareness and practices. These findings and implications can serve as a basis for safety improvement in areas of the greater China region.     

Measuring safety culture in healthcare: A case for accurate diagnosis

Recent concern regarding the safety of patients in Western healthcare systems has resulted in the adoption of safety management techniques used in high-risk industries. One such method is the use of safety climate questionnaries to survey workforce perceptions and attitudes towards both worker and patient safety in healthcare organizations. Many of the earliest healthcare safety climate measures did not appear to meet accepted psychometric standards. The theoretical foundation of the relationship between perceptions of safety climate and workers’ behaviour is not well specified in this literature and a model derived from industry research is proposed.     

Exploring oil and gas industry workers’ knowledge and information needs

Many incident reports and much research literature have concluded that incident rates in high-hazard industries can be reduced by enhancing the knowledge and information sources available to workers. However, a sparsity of published research reporting workers' perspectives on the value of information and knowledge sources in different operational situations potentially limits the effectiveness of interventions aimed at improving human responses to process safety performance. In response, this work seeks to understand how frontline oil and gas industry workers, responsible for managing process safety and other risks in their hazardous workplaces, rely on their own knowledge, the knowledge of others and information provided to manage different operating scenarios. A set of open and closed-ended survey questions were distributed to workers at several upstream and downstream oil and gas companies. Statistical analysis of 133 responses revealed interesting insights relating to participants’ experience levels, decision making practices and perceptions on the importance of various information and knowledge sources in different operating circumstances. The data revealed differences in the sources of knowledge relied upon by experienced and less experienced workers. Experienced workers rely on their own knowledge in both routine and potentially high-impact scenarios. Less experienced workers also rely on their own knowledge for routine decisions however they reported seeking out external knowledge and information in potentially high-impact scenarios. The data suggests that interventions to improve safety by enhancing the availability of knowledge and information sources are less likely to affect experienced workers and alternate strategies might be needed. However, such interventions might be effective if they are focused on supporting newer workers.     

Coordinability and consistency: Application of systems theory to accident causation and prevention

Recent works in the safety literature report several fruitful attempts to introduce mathematically rigorous results from systems and control theory to bear upon accident prevention and system safety. Previously, we discussed the implications on safety of the systems theoretic principles of coordinability and consistency, and we identified the lack of coordinability and/or consistency as fundamental failure modes in hierarchical multilevel systems. In this work, we further develop system safety analysis techniques based on these principles. We demonstrate that these principles not only provide a domain-independent vocabulary for expressing the results of post-mortem accident analyses, but they can also be applied to guide design and operational choices for accident prevention and system safety. We develop these ideas with the help of an illustrative case study. This case study represents a broad class of systems where operational policies and procedures of individual stakeholders in the system interact with physical processes such that new system behaviors emerge, and unanticipated safety issues arise. We argue, and illustrate our arguments using this case study, that the coordinability and consistency principles can be developed to deliver a threefold impact on accident analysis and prevention: firstly, these principles provide domain-independent procedural templates and vocabulary for post-mortem accident analysis. Secondly, these principles provide theoretical safety specifications to be met during system design and operation. Finally, these safety specifications can precipitate the formulation of a series of questions directly related to safety-oriented choices in the design, operation, and control of systems.     

Does company size matter? Validation of an integrative model of safety behavior across small and large construction companies

Introduction: Previous safety climate studies primarily focused on either large construction companies or the construction industry as a whole, while little is known about whether company size has significant effects on workers' understanding of safety climate measures and relationships between safety climate factors and safety behavior. Thus, this study aims to: (a) test the measurement equivalence (ME) of a safety climate measure across workers from small and large companies; (b) investigate if company size alters the causal structure of the integrative model developed by Guo, Yiu, and González (2016). Method: Data were collected from 253 construction workers in New Zealand using a safety climate measure. This study used multi-group confirmatory factor analyses (MCFA) to test the measurement equivalence of the safety climate measure and structure invariance of the integrative model. Results: Results indicate that workers from small and large companies understood the safety climate measure in a similar manner. In addition, it was suggested that company size does not change the causal structure and mediational processes of the integrative model. Conclusions: Both measurement equivalence of the safety climate measure and structural invariance of the integrative model were supported by this study. Practical applications: Findings of this study provided strong support for a meaningful use of the safety climate measure across construction companies in different sizes. Safety behavior promotion strategies designed based on the integrative model may be well suited for both large and small companies.     

From safety culture to safety orientation: Validation and simplification of a safety orientation scale using a sample of seafarers working for Norwegian ship owners

Measuring safety performance is becoming increasingly important in many high-risk industries such as atomic power, the chemical industry, offshore oil production, air traffic control and construction. Much has been done to study the antecedents/factors that shape the safety culture and safety climate in these types of industries, but almost no research has been conducted into another high-risk industry – shipping. Based on the safety orientation model (SOM) and a review of items and scales used in surveys of safety climate and safety culture, a safety orientation scale (SOS) was developed and refined through the use of multivariate statistics. This study was conducted with a sample of seafarers sailing on Norwegian-owned vessels. A total of 2558 questionnaires were returned from 141 vessels and 16 shipping companies, giving a calculated response rate of 70%.The study showed that replicating previous studies on the sample of seafarers demonstrated a large degree of stability in scales and items across both industries and nations.Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) is the most commonly adopted approach to the development of scales of safety climate and culture scale reported in the literature, and factor retention seems to be the most important decision in EFA. In the present study several rules to determine the number of factors and items retained are applied, and a comparison is made of a short form of latent root criterion (SFLRC) and parallel criterion (PC). SFLRC is found to be the superior method for the present data set.Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) did not support the preliminary SOM of 12 dimensions (13 dimensions, since one of the 12 dimensions was split during the CFA procedure); however, a re-specification of the model on the basis of the CFA for four different behavioural measures gave a simplified and well-defined model with seven factors and 22 items.     

石化企业安全文化建设

随着国企改制的不断深化,安全管理显现出许多薄弱环节,尤其是在能源勘探开发过程中发生的重特大事故,不断给安全生产发出了黄牌警告.近年来,多种因素导致员工"三违",造成恶性事故不断,其原因是由于企业缺乏安全文化氛围和员工缺乏必要的自我安全保护意识,盲目蛮干导致事故高发.因此,加强企业安全文化建设是提高全员安全意识的一种行之有效的方法,并可以进一步促进和提高员工的自我安全保护意识和安全技术素质.本文阐述了企业安全文化建设在新形势下的重要意义,并针对石化企业开展安全文化建设提出几点建议.     

Site managers and safety leadership in the offshore oil and gas industry

Management commitment to safety is recognised as a fundamental component of an organisation's safety culture (Reason, 1997. Managing the Risks of Organisational Accidents. Ashgate, Aldershot, UK). However, the role and experiences of site managers in relation to safety have rarely been examined. A survey questionnaire was conducted of 200 Offshore Installation Managers (OIMs) from 157 offshore oil and gas installations belonging to 36 organisations operating on the United Kingdom Continental Shelf. The questionnaire gathered data relating to OIMs' level of experience and style of leadership as well as their knowledge and experience of safety and leadership within the industry. The aims of the study are twofold. The first aim is to investigate the relationship between managers' level of experience and style of leadership with their safety attitudes and behaviour. The second aim is to investigate managers' perceptions of best practice in safety leadership and their beliefs about the key outstanding safety issues. Findings suggest that experience is not the dominant factor in determining leadership style or attitudes to safety, however, the less experienced OIMs and those with more directive styles of leadership were found to overestimate their ability to influence and motivate the workforce. It seems that although managers are aware of best practice in safety leadership, they do not always act in ways consistent with this. They report having considerable difficulty in motivating and controlling some safety crucial aspects of workforce behaviour such as getting workers to accept ownership of safety and getting workers to report near misses. In terms of outstanding safety issues, it appears that improvements still need to be made in a number of areas such as the standardisation of safety culture; the harmonisation of safety practices and procedures across the industry; improved workforce competency and increased workforce involvement in safety activities and decision making.     

How do organizational practices relate to perceived system safety effectiveness? Perceptions of safety climate and co-worker commitment to safety as workplace safety signals

Introduction: Integrating safety climate research with signaling theory, we propose that individual perceptions of safety climate signal the importance of safety in the organization. Specifically, we expect that three work-related organizational practices (training effectiveness, procedure effectiveness, and work pressure) relate to the broader risk control system in the workplace via individual perceptions of safety climate as a broad management signal. Further, we expect this broad management signal interacts with a local environmental signal (co-worker commitment to safety) to amplify or diminish perceived system safety effectiveness. Method: In a field study of oil and gas workers (N = 219; Study 1), we used mediation modeling to determine the relationships between work-related organizational practices, perceived safety climate, and perceived safety system effectiveness. In a field study of railway construction workers (N = 131; Study 2), we used moderated mediation modeling to explore the conditional role of co-worker commitment to safety. Results: We found that training effectiveness, procedure effectiveness, and work pressure predicted perceived system safety effectiveness indirectly via perceived safety climate (Studies 1 and 2) and that these indirect paths are influenced by co-worker commitment to safety (Study 2). Conclusions: Findings suggest that perceived safety climate is driven in part by work practices, and that perceived safety climate (from managers) and co-worker commitment to safety (from the local environment) interact to shape workplace safety system effectiveness. Practical applications: The insight that training, procedures, and work pressure are meaningful predictors of perceived safety climate as a signal suggests that organizations should be cognizant of the quality of work-related practices for safety. The insight we offer on the competing versus complimentary nature of managerial safety signals (perceived safety climate) and co-worker safety signals (co-worker commitment to safety) could also be used by safety personnel to develop safety interventions directed in both areas.     

Management of change: Lessons learned from staff reductions in the chemical process industry

Increasing global competition and shareholder pressure are causing major changes in the chemical industry. Over the last decade companies have been continuously improving staff efficiency. As a result, most modern chemical plants can be regarded as lean. Plans to further reduce the number of staff have come under increasing criticism by personnel for safety reasons, and there is strong resistance to further staff reductions. It is clear that management and workers often have conflicting viewpoints for more than just safety reasons; technologists and safety engineers also have different points of view. This results in complex decision-making processes and makes it difficult to realize changes.What can the chemical industries learn from their experiences of decision-making and management with regard to staff reductions?In our exploratory research that used four case studies, we were able to identify and analyse three distinct patterns, with some variations:

• •Fragmented and incomplete decision-making.
• •Unintended and undesirable side effects generated by the decision-making and management of change.
• •Development of difficult dilemmas and ambiguous issues.

In this paper, we present a conceptual model that includes factors important for optimizing shifts. This model can serve as a common frame of reference for all agents involved in the decision-making and management process with regard to staffing.The present study was based on four cases, which means our findings serve to form rather than test hypotheses. At this early stage it is not yet possible to generalize from or validate the results, but we plan to go beyond these preliminary results in future research.     

Safety Climate in Finnish- and Swedish-Speaking Companies

The aim of this study was to compare assessments made by Finnish- and Swedish-speaking workers in Finland about the safety climate in their companies, because an earlier study showed that the accident frequency of Swedish-speaking workers was one third lower than that of Finnish-speaking workers. 148 Finnish-speaking and 138 Swedish-speaking workers from 14 small and medium-sized companies participated in this study. They filled out a Finnish safety climate questionnaire, the reliability of which was above the acceptable level. There were no differences between the language groups in the total variables of safety climate and safety action. Based on the differences in single items, we interpreted that Swedish-speaking workers stressed collective safety more, whereas Finnish-speaking workers put more emphasis on their personal responsibility for safety.     

Safety climate in Finnish- and Swedish-speaking companies.

The aim of this study was to compare assessments made by Finnish- and Swedish-speaking workers in Finland about the safety climate in their companies, because an earlier study showed that the accident frequency of Swedish-speaking workers was one third lower than that of Finnish-speaking workers. 148 Finnish-speaking and 138 Swedish-speaking workers from 14 small and medium-sized companies participated in this study. They filled out a Finnish safety climate questionnaire, the reliability of which was above the acceptable level. There were no differences between the language groups in the total variables of safety climate and safety action. Based on the differences in single items, we interpreted that Swedish-speaking workers stressed collective safety more, whereas Finnish-speaking workers put more emphasis on their personal responsibility for safety.     

Preventive activity in the greenhouse-construction industry of south-eastern Spain

Preventive action in companies is one of the bases of ergonomic intervention. Therefore, in the present work, the preventive activity of greenhouse-construction companies in south-eastern Spain is characterized. A sample was taken by means of a questionnaire structured in four groups of variables: general characteristics of the company, characteristics of safety and health in the construction procedures, characteristics of prevention and management in safety and health, and characteristics of the coordination during the execution of the work. The results indicate that the prevention is very poor, not adopting any preventive-management model for internationally recognized work hazards so that the information and training in preventive matters of companies and workers is insufficient. In addition, the companies have been classified into three clusters, correlating the company size and prevention management of labour hazards, revealing that the companies with higher gross income and number of workers showed better prevention management.     

Dynamic management of human error to reduce total risk

Safety management in companies at the limit of risk criteria must be implemented in order to survive in the very aggressive and competitive environment of modern society. It implies that the risk in process industries is crossing the limit of safe practices. Most major accidents consist of human errors and mechanical component failures, and cannot be explained by a stochastic coincidence of independent events. This work focuses on the coincidence of human error and mechanical failure to introduce a concept of dynamic management of human error. By the dynamic management of human error during a short period, when a mechanical component is temporarily unavailable during periodic testing or maintenance, the probability of a major accident may be reduced significantly without additional investment on improving safety. For the periodically-tested standby component, the majority of total average unavailability of the component may be recognized by operators or workers as well as maintenance mechanics. During this short period, an appropriate dynamic management of human error for improving human performance temporarily may be very effective in reducing total risk in industries. The dynamic management of human error may be a useful method to prevent loss effectively in the process industries     

高危行业企业安全文化成熟度测度研究

为了更为客观、全面地评估高危行业中企业的安全文化建设真实状况,分析哪些方面有进一步提高空间。在构建高危行业企业安全文化评价指标体系基础上,提出AHP-云模型组合测度模型,并以某集团为实例进行研究,结果表明该集团企业安全文化等级为可管理级,安全价值和安全制度2个维度的表现差强人意,下一步需要着重进行改善。研究结果表明:提出的评价体系与测度模型兼具科学性与可操作性,可为同类高危行业企业的安全文化建设工作提供参考和借鉴。     

打造零事故的建筑安全文化

在研讨安全文化和建筑安全文化内涵,分析国内外建筑安全文化研究与国内实施现状的基础上,研究了5家国际建筑企业的安全创新活动,包括:企业背景、方案、实施过程等。结合利害关系者原理、风险管理和安全知识管理,笔者提出:要实现安全行为,应注重塑造员工的安全信念、态度和承诺;应有高层管理人员强有力的支持,将整个建筑业供应链的利害关系者都纳入到安全管理中,风险管理和安全知识管理的运用可促进零事故安全文化的形成。同时提出构建在我国实现零事故的建筑安全文化的流程,即承认-启动-执行-监督-更新的步骤,给出了一种提高员工安全知识、坚定员工安全信念、塑造员工安全态度、形成安全行为并最终打造健全安全文化的整体策略。     

The role of safe work method statements in the Australian construction industry

The aim of this study was to determine how managers and workers interpret and use safe work method statements (SWMS) in the Australian construction industry in order to explore if there was a gap between work as imagined and work as performed. Despite recent improvements in its safety performance, the Australian construction industry continues to be among the top four most dangerous industries within which to work. SWMS are a key strategy relied upon by the construction industry to reduce this toll. However, few, if any studies have looked at the role of SWMS in creating a safe workplace. This ethnographic study focused on the role of SWMS at two commercial construction sites in Australia. The researcher spent 6 months ‘getting to know’ the organisation before conducting 18 semi-structured interviews spanning labourers, supervisors and managers. The researcher also collected examples of completed SWMS. This study found: (1) that SWMS are important for safety, particularly for tasks that are out of the ordinary; (2) that social interaction as well as SWMS are important for safety; (3) gaps do exist between work as imagined in a SWMS and work as performed in practice, but in the minds of those on site, there were no unresolved gaps; (4) therefore construction companies must identify and resolve the gaps between SWMS, practice and task demands to make construction sites a safer place to work.     

Calculating the benefit to workers of averting a radiation exposure lasting longer than the working lifetime

The J-value method enables health and safety schemes aimed at preserving or extending life to be assessed on a common, objective basis for the first time, irrespective of industrial sector. For this it requires an estimate of the improvement in life expectancy that the health and safety scheme will bring about. This paper extends the range of nuclear-safety-system lifetimes for which it is possible to calculate the increased life expectancy amongst nuclear-plant workers whose radiation exposure the safety system has reduced. Whereas the previous mathematical technique was able to cater for a nuclear-safety-system lifetime up to the working lifetime of the nuclear-plant workers (typically between 45 and 50 years), the new method extends without limit the range of tractable, safety-system lifetimes. This is important now that the design lifetime of nuclear power stations can be up to 60 years. The development will also facilitate the assessment of safety systems and procedures to protect workers on long-term nuclear decommissioning and waste sites; in the latter case, the service life-time could be hundreds of years. The case when the safety-system lifetime is greater than the working lifetime is addressed by splitting the workforce into a set of three cohorts, one for existing workers and two for new recruits. The discounted life expectancy is found for each cohort, and then a weighted average is used to give the overall value. An additional mathematical device is then used to reduce the number of cohorts required from three to two, namely existing workers and new recruits. A similar mathematical device is applied (in Appendix A) to reduce from three to two the number of workforce cohorts needed when the length of the safety system's service lifetime is less than the working lifetime. Finally, a further mathematical instrument is incorporated in the model equations, which allows a unified treatment to be applied to each of the cohorts, existing workers and new recruits, across all possible service lifetimes of a nuclear safety system. Since new results on gain in life expectancy may be fed into a J-value analysis, this development extends significantly the range of nuclear-safety systems for which the J-value technique may be used to measure cost-effectiveness.