The environment as a factor of production

This paper uses firm-level data about electric utilities to develop an empirical model of how electric utilities use and bank SO₂ pollution permits under the Acid Rain Program. The empirical model considers emissions, fuels, and labor as variable inputs with quasi-fixed stocks of permits and capital. Consequently, substitution possibilities between the environment and other production factors can be measured and tested. The results reveal substantial substitution between emissions, permit stocks, capital, fuel, and labor. The empirical findings also indicate that firms bank permits primarily as a hedge against uncertainty and for other firm-specific reasons. Overall, the results suggest that cap-and-trade approaches can reduce the cost of meeting environmental goals by providing a mechanism for addressing regulatory and market risks and by signaling an appropriate price for factor use, especially irreversible capital investments.     

The environment as a factor of production

This paper uses firm-level data about electric utilities to develop an empirical model of how electric utilities use and bank SO₂ pollution permits under the Acid Rain Program. The empirical model considers emissions, fuels, and labor as variable inputs with quasi-fixed stocks of permits and capital. Consequently, substitution possibilities between the environment and other production factors can be measured and tested. The results reveal substantial substitution between emissions, permit stocks, capital, fuel, and labor. The empirical findings also indicate that firms bank permits primarily as a hedge against uncertainty and for other firm-specific reasons. Overall, the results suggest that cap-and-trade approaches can reduce the cost of meeting environmental goals by providing a mechanism for addressing regulatory and market risks and by signaling an appropriate price for factor use, especially irreversible capital investments.     

Enforcement and price controls in emissions trading

This paper examines how enforcement affects the structure and performance of emissions trading programs with price controls under uncertainty about firms' abatement costs. The analysis highlights how an enforcement strategy can cause abatement-cost risk to be transmitted to enforcement costs via the price of permits. When this occurs, accommodating the effect of abatement-cost risk with an optimal policy results in higher expected emissions and lower expected permit price than their second-best optimal values. However, it is possible to design an enforcement strategy that shields enforcement costs from abatement-cost risk by tying sanctions directly to permit prices. This enforcement strategy stabilizes enforcement effort, the optimal permit supply and price controls are independent of enforcement costs, and the policy produces the second-best optimal outcome.     

Emission reduction and profit-neutral permit allocations

The present paper addresses two policy objectives: to implement a market for pollution permits and to make regulation acceptable for businesses. Profit-neutral permit allocations are defined as the number of permits that the regulator should give for free so that post-regulation profits (i.e. a firm's profits in the products market plus the value of the allowances granted for free) are equal to pre-regulation profits. The proposed model is developed by assuming that firms use polluting technologies and compete “à la Cournot”. The paper demonstrates that a low number of free allowances is sufficient to meet these two goals. Moreover, the regulator can fully offset losses, even when the reduction in emissions is high, provided that the sectors concerned are not monopolies, both for isoelastic and linear demand functions.     

Modeling the impact of uncertainty in emissions trading markets with bankable permits

The various forms of uncertainty that firms may face in bankable emission permit trading markets will affect firms’ decision making as well as their market performance. This research explores the effect of increased uncertainty over future input costs and output prices on the temporal distribution of emission. In a dynamic programming setting, the permit price is a convex function of stochastic prices of coal and electricity. Increased uncertainty about future market conditions increases the expected permit price and causes a risk neutral firm to reduce ex ante emissions in order to smooth out marginal abatement costs over time. Finally, safety valves, both low-side and high-side, are suggested to reduce the impact of uncertainty in bankable emission trading markets.     

The Economics of Pollution Permit Banking in the Context of Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments

This paper presents a model of the collective emission permit banking behavior of electricity-generating units affected by Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. A rigorous treatment of the constraint that pollution permits cannot be borrowed from future allocations is introduced. This approach enables an analysis of the impact of future changes in electricity demand, regulations, and technologies on the present permit price and emissions level. The effect of uncertainty on the banking behavior is also explored.     

An experimental analysis of compliance in dynamic emissions markets

Two important design elements for emission trading programs are whether and to what extent firms are able to bank emissions permits, and how these programs are to be enforced. In this paper we present results from laboratory emissions markets designed to investigate enforcement and compliance when these markets allow permit banking. Banking is motivated by a decrease in the aggregate permit supply in the middle of multi-period trading sessions. Consistent with theoretical insights, our experiments suggest that high permit violation penalties have little deterrence value in dynamic emissions markets, and that the main challenge of enforcing these programs is to motivate truthful self-reports of emissions.     

An experimental analysis of compliance in dynamic emissions markets

Two important design elements for emission trading programs are whether and to what extent firms are able to bank emissions permits, and how these programs are to be enforced. In this paper we present results from laboratory emissions markets designed to investigate enforcement and compliance when these markets allow permit banking. Banking is motivated by a decrease in the aggregate permit supply in the middle of multi-period trading sessions. Consistent with theoretical insights, our experiments suggest that high permit violation penalties have little deterrence value in dynamic emissions markets, and that the main challenge of enforcing these programs is to motivate truthful self-reports of emissions.     

Stochastic Pollution, Permits, and Merger Incentives

Pollution permit regulations introduce nonlinearities into the objective function of a polluting firm. We develop a microeconomic model to show the effects these nonlinearities might have upon firm decisions when emissions are stochastic. Under perfect competition the fraction of planned pollution covered by permits is shown to be separable from planned production. We also demonstrate that permit management incentives may motivate a merger of otherwise independent firms. Incentives to petition for “bubble” coverage are also considered. The model is studied under risk neutrality and risk aversion. Imperfectly competitive situations in the output and permit markets are also analyzed.     

Risk aversion and CO2 regulatory uncertainty in power generation investment: Policy and modeling implications

We consider a simulation of risk-averse producers when making investment decisions in a competitive energy market, who face uncertainty about future regulation of carbon dioxide emissions. Investments are made under regulatory uncertainty; then the regulatory state is revealed and producers realize returns. We consider anticipated taxes, grandfathered permits and auctioned permits and show that some anticipated policies increase investment in the relatively dirty technology. Beliefs about the policy instrument that will be used to price carbon may be as important as certainty that carbon will be priced. More generally, a failure to consider risk aversion may bias policy analysis for the power sector.     

Carbon trading across sources and periods constrained by the Marrakesh Accords

We examine the potential effects on permit prices and abatement costs of four compliance rules governing emissions trade across sources and periods in the Kyoto Protocol: The banking rule that allows excess permits to be used later; the restoration rate rule that penalizes borrowing; the commitment period reserve rule that limits sales; and finally, the suspension rule that restricts borrowing and sales. Our framework is a two-period model where parties may be out of compliance in the Kyoto period, but are assumed to comply at a later time. Under varying assumptions about market power and US participation, we find that the rules may have pronounced effects on individual costs, but overall efficiency is not severely affected.     

Emissions Trading with Shares and Coupons when Control over Discharges Is Uncertain

Two important decisions in designing markets for tradable emissions permits are whether to allow banking of permits (coupons) and whether to allow trading in entitlements to future permits (shares). Banking is predicted to reduce price instability when firms trade in a reconciliation market after the quantity of emissions has been determined. Tradable shares are a common feature in proposals for emissions trading in Canada. We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate how bankable coupons and tradable shares affect efficiency and prices under uncertainty. Cognitive demands on the subjects are reduced by computerized advice on the optimal allocation of coupons across periods and the implied marginal values of coupons and shares. Banking, share trading, and uncertainty conditions are introduced in a complete factorial design with three observations per cell. High efficiencies are observed across all treatments. Uncertainty in the control of emissions leads to substantial price instability when banking is not allowed. Banking virtually eliminates the instability, but reduces the efficiency of the market institution. Share trading reduces trading volumes, increases price stability, and improves efficiency.     

Testing the feasibility of a hypothetical whaling‐conservation permit market in Norway

A cap‐and‐trade system for managing whale harvests represents a potentially useful approach to resolve the current gridlock in international whale management. The establishment of whale permit markets, open to both whalers and conservationists, could reveal the strength of conservation demand, about which little is known. This lack of knowledge makes it difficult to predict the outcome of a hypothetical whale permit market. We developed a bioeconomic model to evaluate the influence of economic uncertainty about demand for whale conservation or harvest. We used simulations over a wide range of parameterizations of whaling and conservation demands to examine the potential ecological consequences of the establishment of a whale permit market in Norwegian waters under bounded (but substantial) economic uncertainty. Uncertainty variables were slope of whaling and conservation demand, participation level of conservationists and their willingness to pay for whale conservation, and functional forms of demand, including linear, quadratic, and log‐linear forms. A whale‐conservation market had the potential to yield a wide range of conservation and harvest outcomes, the most likely outcomes were those in which conservationists bought all whale permits.     

A Model of Intertemporal Emission Trading, Banking, and Borrowing

This paper provides a general treatment of emission trading, banking, and borrowing in an intertemporal, continuous-time model. Using optimal-control theory, the decentralized behavior of firms is shown to lead to the least-cost solution attainable under joint-cost minimization. Explicit solutions for the time paths of emissions and permit prices are derived when firms are allowed to both bank and borrow and when firms are only allowed to bank emission permits. The policy implications of emission banking and borrowing are discussed.     

Tying enforcement to prices in emissions markets: An experimental evaluation

We present results from laboratory emissions permit markets designed to investigate the transmission of abatement cost risk to firms' compliance behavior and regulatory enforcement strategies. With a fixed expected marginal penalty, abatement cost shocks produced significant violations and emissions volatility as predicted. Tying the monitoring probability to average permit prices effectively eliminated noncompliance, but transmitted abatement cost risk to monitoring effort. Tying the penalty to average prices reduced violations, but did not eliminate them. Some individuals in these treatments sold permits at low prices, presumably in an attempt to weaken enforcement. While tying sanctions directly to prevailing permit prices has theoretical and practical advantages over tying monitoring to prices, our results suggest that tying sanctions to prices may not be as effective as predicted without additional modifications.     

Economic Growth and Biodiversity Loss in an Age of Tradable Permits

Abstract:  Tradable permits are increasingly becoming part of environmental policy and conservation programs. The efficacy of tradable permit schemes in addressing the root cause of environmental decline—economic growth—will not be achieved unless the schemes cap economic activity based on ecological thresholds. Lessons can be learned from the largest tradable permit scheme to date, emissions trading now being implemented with the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol caps neither greenhouse gas emissions at a level that will achieve climate stability nor economic growth. If patterned after the Kyoto Protocol, cap-and-trade schemes for conservation will not ameliorate biodiversity loss either because they will not address economic growth. In response to these failures to cap economic growth, professional organizations concerned about biodiversity conservation should release position statements on economic growth and ecological thresholds. The statements can then be used by policy makers to infuse these positions into the local, national, and international environmental science-policy process when these schemes are being developed. Infusing language into the science-policy process that calls for capping economic activity based on ecological thresholds represents sound conservation science. Most importantly, position statements have a greater potential to ameliorate biodiversity loss if they are created and released than if this information remains within professional organizations because there is the potential for these ideas to be enacted into law and policy.     

Cost-Effective Policies to Improve Urban Air Quality in Santiago, Chile

This paper examines the applicability of market-based incentives for controlling emissions of particulate matter from fixed sources, in a developing-country context. It uses Santiago, Chile as a case study. A linear programming model has been developed to establish the costs of achieving different air quality targets using marketable permits and command-and-control (CAC) policies. The main conclusion is that an ambient permit system (APS) substantially reduces compliance costs of achieving a given air quality target at each receptor location in the city. Consequently, the use of permits is warranted. However, spatial differentiation of permits is required, thus complicating the design and use of such an instrument. Moreover, the reduction in compliance costs under APS is significantly less when the air quality targets imposed for each receptor location are the same as those achieved by other CAC policies.     

Marketable permits for the prevention of environmental deterioration

This paper develops a modified system of marketable emission permits that promises both savings in abatement costs to sources and improved environmental quality relative to an initial command-and-control (CAC) outcome. Using a model of TSP emissions for the Baltimore Air Quality Control Region (AQCR), a series of simulation exercises indicates that such a permit system could generate large cost savings while inducing significant reductions in TSP concentrations as compared to the existing CAC regime in Baltimore.     

The optimal pricing of pollution when enforcement is costly

We consider the pricing of a uniformly mixed pollutant with a model of optimal, possibly firm-specific, emissions taxes and their enforcement under incomplete information about firms’ abatement costs, enforcement costs, and pollution damage. We argue that optimality requires an enforcement strategy that induces full compliance by every firm, except possibly when a regulator can base the probabilities of detecting individual violations on observable correlates of violators’ actual emissions. Moreover, optimality requires discriminatory taxes, except when a regulator is unable to use observable firm-level characteristics to gain some information about the variation in firms’ abatement costs or monitoring costs.     

Nitrogen source apportionment—a comparison between a dynamic and a statistical model

A dynamic model, HBV-N, and a statistical model, MESAW, for nitrogen source apportionment were compared regarding model performance, model uncertainty and user applicability. The HBV-N model simulates continuous series of nitrogen concentrations with meteorological data and sub-basin characteristics as input. Diffuse nitrogen emissions are defined as regional model parameters which are calibrated by comparison of observed and simulated nitrogen data. The MESAW model uses nitrogen loads for a fixed time interval at each monitoring site as response variable and sub-basin characteristics as explanatory variables to estimate diffuse nitrogen emissions through non-linear regression analysis. The two models were applied in the Matsalu Bay watershed (3640 km²) in Estonia and the same land use and point sources data were used as input. Both models gave similar levels of diffuse total nitrogen emissions and retention rates, which also fit well with previous estimates made in Estonia and Scandinavia. A sensitivity analysis of the model parameters also showed similar uncertainty levels, which indicated that the model uncertainty was more dependent on the availability of nitrogen data and land cover distribution than the choice of model. Furthermore, the sensitivity analysis showed a parameter interdependency in both models, which implied the risk of compensation between estimated diffuse emissions and retention. In conclusion, however, the study showed that both models were capable of estimating nitrogen leakage from the dominating land classes and giving reliable source apportionment from the available input data. The study indicated that the HBV-N model has its advantage in assessments where detailed outputs are needed and when run-off data are limited, while the statistical MESAW model has its advantage in extensive studies since it is easily applied to large watersheds that have dense monitoring networks.