Concerns and future preparedness plans of a vulnerable population in New Jersey following Hurricane Sandy

Knowing how people prepare for disasters is essential to developing resiliency strategies. This study examined recalled concerns, evacuation experiences, and the future preparedness plans of a vulnerable population in New Jersey, United States, following Hurricane Sandy in 2012. Understanding the responses of minority communities is key to protecting them during forthcoming disasters. Overall, 35 per cent of respondents were not going to prepare for an event. Intended future preparedness actions were unrelated to respondents' ratings of personal impact. More Blacks and Hispanics planned on preparing than Whites (68 versus 55 per cent), and more Hispanics planned on evacuating than did others who were interviewed. A higher percentage of respondents who had trouble getting to health centres were going to prepare than others. Respondents' concerns were connected to safety and survival, protecting family and friends, and having enough food and medicine, whereas future actions included evacuating earlier and buying sufficient supplies to shelter in place.     

Superstorm Sandy and voter vulnerability in the 2012 US Presidential Election: a case study of New Jersey and Connecticut

Superstorm Sandy was an unprecedented meteorological event that devastated the Caribbean and the Northeastern Coast of the USA in October 2012. While many research efforts will focus on the atmospheric conditions that led to the creation and unusual track of the storm, this study evaluates the impact of Sandy on voter turnout in the 2012 US Presidential Election. The goals of this paper are to (1) determine if any alterations in voter turnout occurred, (2) assess the extent to which Sandy was responsible for any voter turnout changes and (3) investigate if the influence of Sandy on voter turnout was contingent upon social vulnerability. To accomplish these goals, voter turnout change between the 2008 and 2012 US Presidential Elections was analysed at the county and municipal level for both New Jersey and Connecticut. The notable decreases in voter turnout discovered in both states were likely due to the election occurring in the aftermath of Superstorm Sandy. The correlation, spatial clustering analysis, analysis of variance and multiple regression results all suggest that storm surge was more likely to be responsible for reduced voter turnout in New Jersey than in Connecticut. Specifically in New Jersey, the findings indicate that storm surge coverage, rather than height, was influential in reducing voter turnout and that this relationship was contingent upon the racial composition of the municipalities. Overall, understanding how Sandy affected voter turnout will help improve the resiliency of electoral systems to future natural disasters.     

The inside story: timeline of events and communication leading up to superstorm sandy from the emergency manager perspective

During impending storms, emergency managers (EMs) are tasked with various decisions and challenges, particularly whether to issue evacuation orders for their area. This study aims to understand the timeline of decisions made and actions taken leading up to Superstorm Sandy’s landfall from the EM perspective. A total of 23 in-depth interviews was conducted in New Jersey and New York. All municipal EMs interviewed first heard about what would become Superstorm Sandy between one and two weeks prior to landfall. From then on, municipal EMs monitored the storm using a variety of sources. The communication and information trail is top-down, starting with higher EM levels (i.e. federal and state) and ending with municipal, or local, EMs. Typically, voluntary evacuation orders were issued on Friday or Saturday, while mandatory evacuation orders began being issued on Saturday, two days before landfall, and continued until the day of landfall. Who issued the various evacuation orders depended on location. In New York City, the Mayor has full control of whether an evacuation is ordered, while in New Jersey, the local EMs generally have the authority. Understanding the timeline of decisions is the first step into fully assessing the EM process during events such as Sandy.     

Developing indicators to measure post‐disaster community recovery in the United States

Disaster recovery is a key capability of federal, state, and local government. To support this capability effectively practitioners need useful and validated metrics to document how well a community is recovering from a particular disaster. This study developed and categorised recovery indicators according to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)'s Recovery Support Functions and Recovery Mission Area Core Capabilities through a literature review, an evaluation of the pre‐disaster recovery plans for 87 coastal jurisdictions, and a case study of two communities (New Hanover County, North Carolina, and the City of Hoboken, New Jersey). Metrics identified in the literature were validated through the recovery plan review and the case study. The research team also identified sources for both baseline and current status data. Based on these findings, a user‐friendly checklist for practitioners was established, which will be piloted with practice partners during a future disaster recovery initiative.     

Local government,political decentralisation and resilience to natural hazard-associated disasters

Natural hazards affect development and can cause significant and long-term suffering for those affected. Research has shown that sustained long-term disaster preparedness combined with appropriate response and recovery are needed to deliver effective risk reductions. However, as the newly agreed Sendai framework recognises, this knowledge has not been translated into action. This research aims to contribute to our understanding of how to deliver longer term and sustained risk reduction by evaluating the role of political decentralisation in disaster outcomes. Specifically, we investigate whether countries which devolve power to the local level experience reduced numbers of people affected by storms and earthquakes, and have lower economic damage. Using regression analysis and cross-country data from 1950 to 2006, we find that, in relation to both storms and earthquakes, greater transfers of political power to subnational tiers of government reduce hazard impacts on the population. The downside is that more politically decentralised countries, which are usually wealthier countries, can increase the direct economic losses associated with a natural hazard impact after the storm or earthquake than those which are more centralised. However, overall, it seems advantageous to give subnational governments more authority and autonomy in storm and earthquake risk planning.     

A national and local media perspective on responsibility for and solutions to storm-related power outages in the northeastern United States

Major storms in the northeastern United States in 2011 and 2012 caused widespread power outages, bringing attention to the vulnerability of utility infrastructure as a result of extreme weather and environmental change. Media coverage of such focusing events provides context for and can affect government and public response. Our objective was to analyze gatekeeping, agenda setting, and framing in the New York Times (NYT) and local newspapers covering power outages related to large storm events in 2011 and 2012 (Tropical Storm Irene, October snowstorm, Hurricane Sandy). Government and utility officials focused on structural solutions to mitigate future storm impacts, whereas residents and businesses targeted individual actions. NYT interviews included residents more frequently than local newspapers, influencing coverage of impacts and solutions. Geographic differences between NYT and local newspapers’ foci may relate to coverage of solutions to and responsibility for outages. Our findings demonstrate the importance of collective action toward shared solutions.     

Hurricanes and agriculture: Losses and remedial actions*

Hurricanes cause serious and long-term damage to the Agricultural sectors of Caribbean countries. Bananas and tree crops are defoliated, snapped or uprooted and food crops may be flooded or washed away. Recovery takes time and money as both the production bases and the infrastructure are damaged or destroyed. National economies do not have the resources to expedite recovery without aid. An account is given of the actions taken to estimate losses and prepare rehabilitation plans after Hurricanes David (1979) in Dominica and Allen (1980) in St. Lucia and St. Vincent. The implementation of funding agency-assisted agricultural rehabilitation programmes is also described. Some steps that farmers can take to reduce loss of food are suggested.     

气候变化和人类活动对天津海岸带影响综述

21世纪全球海平面上升和区域地面沉降叠加所致的相对海平面上升速率存在加快趋势,将加剧天津沿海地区风暴潮、洪涝灾害和土地淹没的危害,影响沿海地区的城市抗灾功能、建筑物安全及生态资源。为此,本文综合讨论了气候变化导致的海平面上升和地面沉降对天津沿海风暴潮、海岸侵蚀以及港口码头的影响。建议滨海新区建设要高度重视海洋灾害的监测预警,提高沿海地区防潮和防汛工程的设计标准和城市抗灾能力,以有效实现滨海新区经济和社会可持续发展。     

The recovery of schools from earthquake effects: Lessons from Mexico City

Much work has been done to prepare schools and institutions for the immediate effects of earthquakes and other disasters. This paper looks at the preparation needed for medium to long term recovery from the physical and psychological effects of earthquakes. Colegio Madrid, a school of 3,000 students that suffered major damage in the September 1985 Mexico City earthquake serves as the focus of this study. The experiences and actions of faculty, staff, students and parents at this school provide lessons for not only schools, but all institutions and communities which may face the prospect of reconstructing themselves following a disaster.     

Friends and family vs. government: who does the public rely on more to prepare for natural disasters?

This paper examines what organizations and groups individuals rely on to help prepare for natural disasters and how reliance differs vis-à-vis demographic characteristics. Using data gathered from 2,008 individuals employed in the United States, the results revealed that individuals are significantly more likely to rely on friends and family than government organizations at the local, state, and federal level. The findings also suggest that this reliance varies across demographic groups. For example, data from the present study suggest that women and minority groups as well as individuals who are older and less educated are significantly more likely to rely on organizations to help prepare for natural disasters. This study contributes to the disaster management and risk communication literatures by offering key insights into the organizations and groups the American public in general, and certain demographic groups in particular, rely on when it comes to preparing for natural disasters. Knowledge about the organizations and groups that individuals rely on to help prepare for natural disasters can help policymakers and practitioners target those organizations as conduits to deliver critical preparedness information, as well as other information related to disaster mitigation, response, and recovery.     

Impediments to recovery in New Orleans' Upper and Lower Ninth Ward: one year after Hurricane Katrina

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, a rapid succession of plans put forward a host of recovery options for the Upper and Lower Ninth Ward in New Orleans. Much of the debate focused on catastrophic damage to residential structures and discussions of the capacity of low-income residents to repair their neighbourhoods. This article examines impediments to the current recovery process of the Upper and Lower Ninth Ward, reporting results of an October 2006 survey of 3,211 plots for structural damage, flood damage and post-storm recovery. By examining recovery one year after Hurricane Katrina, and by doing so in the light of flood and structural damage, it is possible to identify impediments to recovery that may disproportionately affect these neighbourhoods. This paper concludes with a discussion of how pre- and post-disaster inequalities have slowed recovery in the Lower Ninth Ward and of the implications this has for post-disaster recovery planning there and elsewhere.     

Deconstruction of destruction stories: narrative,inequality, and disasters

A commonly‐held belief is that natural disasters do not discriminate. This paper, though, poses the following theoretical question: what does the elision of race, class, and gender in the news media say about disasters in the neoliberal era? It draws on the author's analysis of two prominent newspapers—The New York Times and USA Today—and their coverage of the recovery process after devastating tornadoes in two towns in the United States (Tuscaloosa, Alabama, and Joplin, Missouri) in 2011. The study asserts that the narrative of the news media is one with which people are familiar and that it fits into larger ‘formula stories’. It utilises theoretical treatments of narrative to demonstrate how differences are erased and how they lead to complicity in hegemonic representations. Critical theory is used to elucidate why this occurs, and the paper sources Goldberg (2002) in suggesting that the news media employs ‘fantasies of homogenisation’ when representing post‐disaster communities.     

Permanent post-disaster housing in honduras: aspects of vulnerability to future disasters

To some degree it is unfair to evaluate a post-disaster housing program as to its effectiveness in decreasing vulnerability and preventing future disasters. As Burton states, "With rare exceptions, administrators and techniques have been trained to cope with disaster rather than to prevent it" [reference (2), p.197]. These were certainly not goals articulated by the agency responsible for constructing housing after Fifi. However, the authors feel that failure to evaluate specific projects by persons knowledgeable of the projects functioning, will only forestall the shift which Cuny calls for, "… from disaster response to disaster mitigation and prevention" [reference (4), p.123). In doing this we hope to add some specific case study data to the growing literature on disaster mitigation and prevention. Disaster vulnerability in Honduras is overwhelmingly related to flooding. More crucial than the materials and construction of housing is the issue of siting. If appropriately sited, houses made of bajarique, wood, or concrete block are able to withstand the heavy rains associated with a hurricane. Regarding the siting of the projects, the Honduras Project clearly has one positive and one negative accomplishment in the cases of Santa Rica and Flores, respectively. San Jose is less clear but is certainly a much safer site than those formerly occupied by the residents, in that there is no danger of flooding. The present site was not flooded during Fifi nor did it experience mudslides. However, the future is not so clear regarding the latter. Within the village proper a large amount of vegetation has been added which will tend to stabilise the soil on the steeper slopes. The streets, however, are seriously eroded and probably can not be maintained for vehicle usage, which does not pose a serious problem to the residents as none possess automobiles or trucks. One large gully bisects the village and receives run-off from the adjacent hills. It has been expanding, which would suggest that the slopes above the village could prove problematic in case of a Fifi-sized storm. Flores is located on a very poor site in reference to prevention and mitigation. It is located in a portion of the Sula Valley which is prone to flooding and, as mentioned before, was inundated by over 2m of water during hurricane Fifi. No prevention techniques were possible by NAEA/HEA and the houses were built on earthen mounds barely adequate to keep water out during the rainy season. The nearby dike which could possibly provide protection is non-functional due to poor maintainance. Given a storm of Fifi's magnitude, or possibly smaller, this site will again be flooded. Santa Rica is clearly well sited concerning flooding: it did not experience flooding during Fifi and is not flood prone. However, houses did experience some wall damage due to earthquakes following and associated with the Guatemalan quake of 1976. Due to the size and nature of the latter much "re-adjustment" occurred in the neighbouring fault system; however, damage to the houses was all superficial. We feel the residents were vocal about their concern due to the severity of the Guatemalan disaster and their lack of experience with concrete block houses. That the two sites (particularly Flores and partially San Jose) are vulnerable to future disasters cannot be considered solely the fault of an outside agency without local knowledge and understanding. In the engineering report issued during the construction it was explicitly stated that in Flores, "Future flooding remains a danger," [reference (6), p.49]. The future residents of Flores had gained access to the land from the National Agrarian Institute and were anxious to receive assistance in building homes. In fact, CARE, which had previously given these people tin roofing for houses, was threatening to take it back since the people had not yet started building. NAEA/HEA were responding to people in a rather desperate situation. But, on the other hand, they were responding to people who had been promised (not given) land by an agency of the Honduran national government which would be cognizant of the potential flooding at this site. Likewise, in San Jose, where mudslides and erosion remain a threat, the land was provided by a local government agency, the municipality. Although our goal in this discussion has not been to establish blame, we feel it imperative to mention the sequence of events that resulted in the questionable siting of Flores and San Jose. It is very easy and often accurate to place blame on outsiders who lack sophistication and knowledge about such matters. In this case local input did not result in post-disaster planning that is actually precautionary. This, we feel, illustrates the extreme complexity of cross-cultural aid, especially in the post-disaster period. It also points to the need for precautionary planning with reference to permanent post-disaster reconstruction.     

Humanitarian aid and local responses: the aftermath of the rebuilding effort on Tongoa island,Vanuatu

Cyclone Pam swept through the archipelago of Vanuatu on 13–14 March 2015, with wind speeds exceeding those recorded anywhere in the South Pacific since the 1980s. Southern and central parts of the country were particularly affected. Material damage on Tongoa, one of the most afflicted islands, was extensive, but no deaths were reported. During the storm, villagers found shelter in their kitchen, in what is considered locally as a ‘lifeboat’. The aftermath was managed and mitigated by international aid organisations. On Tongoa, this included a ‘Shelter Cluster’ programme, under which villagers were given house rebuilding kits. Elaborating upon extensive ethnographic investigations on site between 2011 and 2018, this paper explores and reveals the ways in which this aid generated confusion among the local population. In a larger context of regular disasters triggered by natural hazards, locals have found endogenous ways of dealing with such extreme climatic events, for the most part without any external assistance.     

Using computer graphics to reveal temporal changes in urban population density patterns

Population distributions change substantially over time in major metropolitan areas. Knowledge of these variations by time of day, day of the week and other time periods can be helpful to disaster planners who need to prepare response plans to earthquakes and other disasters that will injure and kill large numbers of people. Computer graphics can display data that describe these changing population patterns in ways that can be more easily comprehended than page after page of printed numbers. Several different illustrations of 3-D population density maps drawn by the ASPEX computer program are presented. Each illustrates a guideline that can be used to prepare maps that deal with the many ways of looking at urban population density distributions and their temporal changes. Those maps can help disaster planners gain a realistic perception of population density distributions by enabling them to see what cannot be seen from the actual physical structure of a large metropolitan region.     

Disaster journalism: fostering citizen and community disaster mitigation,preparedness, response,recovery, and resilience across the disaster cycle

Natural and human‐caused disasters pose a significant risk to the health and well‐being of people. Journalists and news organisations can fulfil multiple roles related to disasters, ranging from providing warnings, assessing disaster mitigation and preparedness, and reporting on what occurs, to aiding long‐term recovery and fostering disaster resilience. This paper considers these possible functions of disaster journalism and draws on semi‐structured interviews with 24 journalists in the United States to understand better their approach to the discipline. A thematic analysis was employed, which resulted in the identification of five main themes and accompanying subthemes: (i) examining disaster mitigation and preparedness; (ii) facilitating recovery; (iii) self‐care and care of journalists; (iv) continued spread of social media; and (v) disaster journalism ethics. The paper concludes that disaster journalism done poorly can result in harm, but done well, it can be an essential instrument with respect to public disaster planning, management, response, and recovery.     

Lessons for long-term social recovery following the 2004 tsunami: Community,livelihoods, tourism and housing

The Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 galvanized world attention like no other natural disaster before. Unprecedented amounts of aid were given and a record number of international aid agencies were involved in relief and recovery operations. Major reviews of the response to the disaster have suggested that the immediate relief effort was better than expected. However, weaknesses in the longer term recovery work were identified within months of the disaster and yet the same weaknesses were being confirmed four and five years later. Even though many studies have been published on the tsunami disaster there are still many lessons to be learnt, particularly in relation to social recovery as distinct from the restoration of destroyed or damaged infrastructure. This paper presents an overview of the findings of a study that was conducted over a period of four years across five different tsunami-affected local areas of Sri Lanka and southern India. The study focused on lessons to be learnt in relation to rebuilding community, restoring livelihoods, recreating an appropriate tourism industry and providing relevant housing and planned settlements for disaster survivors. The paper argues that ‘build back better’ is possible, but only if ‘asset replacement’ strategies are replaced by integrated physical and social planning to address local needs in culturally appropriate ways. Much of what the authors advocate may seem to be little more than ‘common sense’ and many of our findings echo those of many other post-tsunami evaluations. Yet patient and well-integrated approaches to disaster recovery are all too rare in a world that is experiencing so many natural disasters. Because the 2004 tsunami evoked an unprecedented global response it is important to ensure that the lessons of the recovery effort are clearly learnt and this paper aims to convert research findings into a clear strategy for long-term social recovery.     

Social capital's role in recovery: evidence from communities affected by the 2010 Pakistan floods

Pakistan suffered large‐scale flooding in summer 2010 that caused damage amounting to approximately USD 43 billion, claimed the lives of at least 1,700 people, and negatively affected some 20 million others. Observers have debated the degree to which social capital plays a role in recovery after a catastrophe of this magnitude. Using new survey data on 450 residents impacted by the disaster, this study found that, controlling for various confounding factors, the social capital levels of victims serve as robust correlates of life recovery. Other important variables connected with recovery include education and income, family size, occupation, material damage suffered, stability of home, and trauma experience. The findings point to a number of relevant policy recommendations, most notably that during and following major shocks, disaster managers should work to keep the social networks of victims intact so that they can benefit from interaction with family, friends, and neighbours.     

Comparing reactions to two severe tornadoes in one Oklahoma community

The authors compared the effect of the 3 May 1999 F5 and 8 May 2003 F3 tornadoes on the community of Moore, Oklahoma, by canvassing damaged areas after both tornadoes and surveying residents. Significantly more 1999 than 2003 residents reported property damage and injuries. Television and tornado sirens were the most common warnings each year, however, more 1999 residents received and responded to television warnings. Importantly, storm shelters were used more frequently in 2003. Fifty-one per cent of residents who experienced both tornadoes took the same amount of protective action in 2003 as they had in 1999; 22% took less; and 27% took more. Residents who took less action said that the reason for doing so was inadequate warning and shelter. First-hand experience of tornadoes prompts people to heed warnings when adequate notification is received and to take effective protective action when adequate shelter is available.     

Predictors for people's response to a tornado warning: Arkansas, 1 March 1997

On 1 March 1997, powerful tornadoes touched down in Arkansas (USA) on a Saturday afternoon. Twenty-six fatalities and 400 non-fatal injuries were reported. We performed a population-based cross-sectional study to determine factors associated with appropriate responses to tornado warnings. Of 146 survey participants, 140 (96 per cent) knew the difference between 'tornado watch' and 'tornado warning' and were aware of when the warning was announced. Of those 140 participants, 64 (45.7 per cent) responded to the warning by seeking shelter, and 58 (90.6 per cent) of those 64 acted within five minutes of hearing the warning. Four factors were positively associated with those seeking shelter: having graduated from high school (OR = 4.2, 95 per cent CI = 1.1-15.5); having a basement in one's house (OR = 3.8, 95 per cent exact CI = 1.1-17.1); hearing a siren (OR = 4.4, 95 per cent CI = 1.3-18.9); and having prepared a household plan of response when tornadoes occur (OR = 2.6, 95 per cent CI = 1.1-6.3). On the basis of these findings, we recommend: first, that people who live in tornadoprone areas have a personal plan of action to help them respond immediately to warnings; second, public-health education officials in areas with frequent tornadic activity should do more to educate the public about what they can do to protect themselves from a tornado; and third, that emergency-management officials planning protection measures for vulnerable communities should consider that most people have limited time (our study documented five minutes) in which to respond to a tornado warning. Thus, shelters in tornado-prone areas should be quickly accessible by residents.