Calculating overpressure from BLEVE explosions

Although a certain number of authors have analyzed the prediction of boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE) and fireball effects, only very few of them have proposed methodologies for predicting the overpressure from such explosions. In this paper, the methods previously published are discussed and shown to introduce a significant overestimation due to the erroneous thermodynamic assumptions—ideal gas behaviour and isentropic vapour expansion—on which they are based (in fact, they give the maximum value of overpressure which can be caused by a BLEVE). A new approach is proposed, based on the—more realistic—assumption of an adiabatic and irreversible expansion process; the real properties of the substance involved in the explosion are used. The two methods are compared through the application to a given case.     

Influence of ignition position and obstacles on explosion development in methane–air mixture in closed vessels

The paper outlines an experimental study of influence of the ignition position and obstacles on explosion development in premixed methane–air mixtures in an elongated explosion vessel. As the explosion vessel, 1325 mm length tube with 128.5 mm diameter was used. Location of the ignition was changeable, i.e., fitted in the centre or at one of ends of the tube, when the tube was in a horizontal position. When it was in a vertical position, three locations of the ignition (bottom, centre and top) were used. In the performed study, the influence of obstacles on the course of pressure was investigated. Two identical steel grids were used as the obstacles. They were placed 405 mm from either end of the tube. Their blockage ratio (grid area to tube cross-section area) was determined as 0.33 for most of experiments. A few additional experiments (with smaller blockage ratio—0.16) were also conducted in order to compare the influence of the blockage ratio on the explosion development. Also some experiments were conducted in a semi-cylindrical vessel with volume close to 40 l.

All the experiments were performed under stabilized conditions, with the temperature and pressure inside the vessel settled to room values and controlled by means of electronic devices. The pressure–time profiles from two transducers placed in the centreline of the inner wall of the explosion vessel were obtained for stoichiometric (9.5%), lean (7%) and rich (12%) methane–air mixture. The results obtained in the study, including maximum pressures and pressure–time profiles, illustrate a quite distinct influence of the above listed factors upon the explosion characteristics. The effect of ignition position, obstacles location and their BR parameters is discussed.

The additional aim of the performed experiments was to find the data necessary to validate a new computer code, developed to calculate an explosion hazard in industrial installations.     

Simple devices to prevent dust explosion propagation in charge chutes and pipes

This paper is a report of an experimental programme of work to develop inexpensive dust explosion propagation prevention devices. Two types of device were investigated: one is intended for use with charge chutes attached to process vessels and one is intended for use with pipes attached to process vessels. Three dusts were used with K_St values up to 308 bar m s^-1. Both devices were found to be effective and resulted in the elimination or significant reduction in the flame from the charge chute or the pipeline.     

Explosibility of hydrogen–graphite dust hybrid mixtures

To evaluate the hazard of combined hydrogen/dust explosions under severe accident conditions in International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER), standard method of 20-L-sphere was used to measure the explosion indices of 4-μm fine graphite dust in lean hydrogen/air mixtures. The mixtures were ignited by a weak electric spark. The tested fuel concentrations were 8–18 vol% H₂ and 25–250 g/m³ dust. If the hydrogen content is higher than 10 vol%, the dust constituent can be induced to explode by the hydrogen explosion initiated by a weak electric spark. Depending on the fuel component concentrations, the explosions proceed in either one or two stages. In two-stage explosions occurring at low hydrogen and dust concentrations, the mixture ignition initiates first a fast hydrogen explosion followed by a slower phase of the dust explosion. With increasing dust concentration, the dust explodes faster and can overlap the hydrogen-explosion stage. At higher hydrogen concentrations, the hybrid mixtures explode in one stage, with hydrogen and dust reacting at the same time scale. Maximum overpressures of hybrid explosions are higher than those observed with hydrogen alone; maximum rates of pressure rise are lower in two-phase explosions and, generally, higher in one-stage explosions, than those characteristic of the corresponding H₂/air mixtures.     

On the response of 500 gal propane tanks to a 25% engulfing fire

This paper presents detailed data on the thermal response of two 500 gal ASME code propane tanks that were 25% engulfed in a hydrocarbon fire. These tests were done as part of an overall test programme to study thermal protection systems for propane-filled railway tank-cars.

The fire was generated using an array of 25 liquid propane-fuelled burners. This provided a luminous fire that engulfed 25% of the tank surface on one side. The intent of these tests was to model a severe partially engulfing fire situation.

The paper presents data on the tank wall and lading temperatures and tank internal pressure. In the first test the wind reduced the fire heating and resulted in a late failure of the tank at 46 min. This tank failed catastrophically with a powerful boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE). In the other test, the fire heating was very severe and steady and this tank failed very quickly in 8 min as a finite rupture with massive two-phase jet release. The reasons for these different outcomes are discussed. The different failures provide a range of realistic outcomes for the subject tank and fire condition.     

Explosion temperatures and pressures of metals and other elemental dust clouds

The Pittsburgh Research Laboratory of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) conducted a study of the explosibility of various metals and other elemental dusts, with a focus on the experimental explosion temperatures. The data are useful for understanding the basics of dust cloud combustion, as well as for evaluating explosion hazards in the minerals and metals processing industries. The dusts studied included boron, carbon, magnesium, aluminum, silicon, sulfur, titanium, chromium, iron, nickel, copper, zinc, niobium, molybdenum, tin, hafnium, tantalum, tungsten, and lead. The dusts were chosen to cover a wide range of physical properties—from the more volatile materials such as magnesium, aluminum, sulfur, and zinc to the highly “refractory” elements such as carbon, niobium, molybdenum, tantalum, and tungsten. These flammability studies were conducted in a 20-L chamber, using strong pyrotechnic ignitors. A unique multiwavelength infrared pyrometer was used to measure the temperatures. For the elemental dusts studied, all ignited and burned as air-dispersed dust clouds except for nickel, copper, molybdenum, and lead. The measured maximum explosion temperatures ranged from 1550 K for tin and tungsten powders to 2800 K for aluminum, magnesium, and titanium powders. The measured temperatures are compared to the calculated, adiabatic flame temperatures.     

A quantitative risk assessment tool for the external safety of industrial plants with a dust explosion hazard

A quantitative risk assessment (QRA) tool has been developed by TNO for the external safety of industrial plants with a dust explosion hazard. As a first step an industrial plant is divided into groups of modules, defined by their size, shape, and constructional properties. Then the relevant explosion scenarios are determined, together with their frequency of occurrence. These include scenarios in which one module participates, as well as domino scenarios. The frequency is partly based on casuistry.

A typical burning velocity is determined depending on the ignition type, the dust properties and the local conditions for flame acceleration. The resulting pressure development is predicted with the ‘thin flame model’. Module failure occurs when the explosion load exceeds thresholds, which are derived from single degree of freedom (SDOF) calculations for various types of modules. A model has been developed to predict the process of pressure venting after module failure and the related motion of launched module parts.

The blast effects of the primary explosion are based on results from calculations with BLAST3D. The blast and flame effects of the secondary external explosion due to venting are calculated using existing models. The throw of fragments and debris is quantified with a recently developed model. This model is based on trajectory calculations and gives the impact densities, velocities, and angles as output. Furthermore the outflow of bulk material is taken into account. The consequences for external objects and human beings are calculated using existing models. Finally the risk contours and the Societal risk (FN curve) are calculated, which can be compared to regulations.     

铅酸蓄电池室燃爆事故分析及其安全对策

通过对铅酸蓄电池室燃爆事故树定性分析 ,找出了可能导致铅酸蓄电池室燃爆事故发生的基本原因事件 ,即无通风设施 ,通风设施损坏 ,未及时送、排风 ,使用不防爆电器 ,防爆电器损坏 ,电气连接处接触不良 ,人体静电放电 ,室内吸烟 ,室内动火。为了预防铅酸蓄电池室燃爆事故的发生 ,关键是 :一要采取有效的通风措施 ,保持蓄电池室通风良好 ,使氢气浓度不能达到爆炸极限 ;二要采取防止火源发生的措施 ,使蓄电池室无点火源 ,只要蓄电池室内无火源 ,即使氢气浓度达到爆炸极限 ,也不可能发生燃爆。为了达到上述两个要求 ,就必须在防火防爆技术和管理方面采取相应的安全措施     

油页岩利用过程粉尘爆炸研究现状及趋势分析

在石油资源日益紧张的形势下,我国油页岩资源的开发利用正得到前所未有的重视,但其利用过程潜在的粉尘爆炸危险性并未引起关注。对国内外有关油页岩粉尘着火、爆炸的文献进行了综述,约旦学者对油页岩粉尘爆炸下限、着火温度及惰化粉尘对下限的影响进行了持续性的研究。国内学者多涉及油页岩利用工艺的研究,只注重页岩油蒸气的爆炸风险,多采用经验公式的方法进行分析,具有较大的局限性。根据爆炸风险控制原理,提出了油页岩粉尘防爆安全需要进一步进行的基础研究工作,突出了加强油页岩粉尘和蒸气杂混物爆炸机理研究的重要性。     

Confined vapor explosion in Kaohsiung City – A detailed analysis of the tragedy in the harbor city

On the midnight of July 31st, 2014, a catastrophic vapor explosion occurred in the downtown of Kaohsiung city. The incident was initiated from a leak of an underground pipeline transporting pressurized propylene liquid. Analysis of pipeline operation logs and pipeline break release modeling suggested that at least 90,000 kg of propylene leaked, entered the underground trench and spread into the trench 4.5 km in distance before meeting an ignition source some three hours later after the leak. The ignition caused a significant confined vapor explosion which blew out the road above the underground trench, damaged more than one hundred vehicles on the road with thirty two fatalities and more than three hundred injuries. This article will first describe the background of the pipeline installation follows by an in-depth look at the explosion incident covering the events leading to the explosion, explosion damage, cause of the leak, spread of the leak, identification of a probable ignition source, and root causes in safety culture. Finally, lessons learnt and recommendations are given to prevent and mitigate the occurrence of similar incidents.     

Measuring the violence of dust explosions with the “20 l sphere” and with the standard “ISO 1 m vessel”: Systematic comparison and analysis of the discrepancies

On the basis of a systematic testwork with a number of different dusts, the explosion indices as determined within the 20 l sphere and with the ISO-VDI 1 m³ vessel have been compared. The repeatability has been assessed and since some systematic deviations appear a refined physical analysis of the explosion processes is developed. It appears in particular that the cube root law supposed to link both vessels is not verified. A striking illustration of this appears when a dust with a significant explosion severity inside the 20 l sphere is not even explosible in the larger vessel. It is strongly suggested that the ignition energy is forcing very significantly the explosion in the smaller vessel inducing several tens of Celsius degrees of preheating. It is shown also that the inner level of turbulence is decreasing very fast in the 20 l sphere during the flame development so that difficult-to-ignite mixtures would tend to burn at a lower combustion rate. It is further demonstrated that the major bias between the chambers can be explained and quantified with these elements. A correlation with the standard 1 m³ vessel and a grid of interpretation of the data is proposed.     

天然气管道泄漏爆炸后果评价模型对比分析

天然气管道失效可能导致多种严重后果,爆炸灾害给周围的人员和建筑物造成重大的危害,对其爆炸危害范围的评价进行研究具有重要现实意义。笔者综合分析蒸气云爆炸(VCE)定量评价模型和API pub 581后果评价模型;并以某输气管道为实例对爆炸后果进行了定量模拟评价;得到死亡区域与泄漏时间的关系,确定了其爆炸事故的伤害范围;对两种模型的评价结果进行了对比分析。爆炸后果评价模型的研究与其对比探讨,为今后输气管线的定量风险后果评价模型选取提供参考依据。     

BLEVE: A new approach to the superheat limit temperature

Several methods proposed for calculating the value of the superheat limit temperature were analysed. The results obtained indicate that the procedures based on the thermodynamic stability approach introduce a significant uncertainty into the final values, depending on which equation of state is used. We propose a new approach based on the energy balance in the initial liquid mass just before the explosion. The temperature obtained using this method, T_sl−E, corresponds to the situation in which the energy transferred adiabatically between the cooling liquid and the vaporising liquid fractions is at its maximum. This leads to a minimum content of energy in the remaining liquid. Although these two approaches are equivalent—the procedures based on the thermodynamic stability approach use also the minimum energy state as a criterion—the new proposed method only uses the properties of the substance to obtain T_sl−E. Thus, T_sl−E represents the behaviour of each substance as a function of its molecular structure, while this influence is lost if a simple equation of state is used. Finally, some considerations are made on the limitations of the superheat limit temperature as a criterion for establishing whether an explosion is or is not a BLEVE.     

Determination of the maximum effective burning velocity of dust–air mixtures in constant volume combustion

The reactivity of a combustible dust cloud is traditionally characterized by the so-called K_St value, defined as the maximum rate of pressure rise measured in constant volume explosion vessels, multiplied with the cube root of the vessel volume. The present paper explores the use of an alternative parameter, called the maximum effective burning velocity (u_eff,max), which also is derived from pressure–time histories obtained in constant volume explosion experiments. The proposed parameter describes the reactivity of fuel–air mixtures as a function of the dispersion-induced turbulence intensity. Procedures for estimating u_eff,max from tests in both spherical and cylindrical explosion vessels are outlined, and examples of calculated values for various fuel–air mixtures in closed vessels of different sizes and shapes are presented. Tested fuels include a mixture of 7.5% methane in air, and suspensions of 500 g/m³ cornstarch in air and 500 g/m³ coal dust in air. Three different test vessels have been used: a 20-l spherical vessel and two cylindrical vessels, 7 and 22 l. The results show that the estimated maximum effective burning velocities are less apparatus dependent than the corresponding K_St values.     

The multi-energy critical separation distance

Devastating vapour cloud explosions can only develop under appropriate (boundary) conditions. The record of vapour cloud explosion incidents from the past demonstrates that these conditions are readily met by the congestion by process equipment at (petro-) chemical plant sites. Therefore, the possibility of an accidental release of a flammable and a subsequent vapour cloud explosion is a major hazardous scenario considered in any risk assessment with regard to the process industries.If an extended flammable vapour cloud at a chemical plant site extends over more than one process unit, which are separated by lanes of sufficient width, the vapour cloud explosion on ignition develops the same number of separate blasts. If, on the other hand, the separation between the units is insufficient, the vapour cloud explosion develops one big blast. The critical separation distance (SD) is the criterion that allows discriminating in this matter for blast modelling purposes.This paper summarises some major results of an experimental research programme with the objective to develop practical guidelines with regard to the critical SD. To this end, a series of small-scale explosion experiments have been performed with vapour clouds containing two separate configurations of obstacles. Blast overpressures at various stations around have been recorded while the SD between the two configurations of obstacles was varied.The experimental programme resulted in some clear indications for the extent of the critical SD between separate areas of congestion. On the basis of safety and conservatism, these indications have been rendered into a concrete guideline. Application of this guideline would allow a greater accuracy in the modelling of blast from vapour cloud explosions.     

The effect of vent size and congestion in large-scale vented natural gas/air explosions

A typical building consists of a number of rooms; often with windows of different size and failure pressure and obstructions in the form of furniture and décor, separated by partition walls with interconnecting doorways. Consequently, the maximum pressure developed in a gas explosion would be dependent upon the individual characteristics of the building. In this research, a large-scale experimental programme has been undertaken at the DNV GL Spadeadam Test Site to determine the effects of vent size and congestion on vented gas explosions. Thirty-eight stoichiometric natural gas/air explosions were carried out in a 182 m³ explosion chamber of L/D = 2 and K_A = 1, 2, 4 and 9. Congestion was varied by placing a number of 180 mm diameter polyethylene pipes within the explosion chamber, providing a volume congestion between 0 and 5% and cross-sectional area blockages ranging between 0 and 40%. The series of tests produced peak explosion overpressures of between 70 mbar and 3.7 bar with corresponding maximum flame speeds in the range 35–395 m/s at a distance of 7 m from the ignition point. The experiments demonstrated that it is possible to generate overpressures greater than 200 mbar with volume blockages of as little as 0.57%, if there is not sufficient outflow through the inadvertent venting process. The size and failure pressure of potential vent openings, and the degree of congestion within a building, are key factors in whether or not a building will sustain structural damage following a gas explosion. Given that the average volume blockage in a room in a UK inhabited building is in the order of 17%, it is clear that without the use of large windows of low failure pressure, buildings will continue to be susceptible to significant structural damage during an accidental gas explosion.     

Effects of vent layout and vent area on dynamic characteristics of premixed methane-air explosion in a tube with two side-vented ducts

To further elucidate the influence mechanism of side vents on the dynamic characteristics of gas explosions in tubes is helpful to design more reasonable vent layouts. In this paper, 9.5% methane-air explosion experiments were conducted in a tube with two side-vented ducts, and the effects of vent layouts and vent areas on the dynamic characteristics of explosion overpressure and flame propagation speed were investigated. The results demonstrate that under the same condition with a single vent area of 100 mm × 100 mm, when only the end vent is open, the maximum explosion overpressure and the maximum flame propagation speed are the highest among the five vent layouts. When the side vents 1 and 2 and the end vent are open, the maximum explosion overpressure is the lowest, and an unusual discovery is that the flame front changes into a hemispherical shape, finger shape, quasi-plane shape, tulip shape and wrinkled structure. When only side vent 1 is open, a unique Helmholtz oscillation occurs, and a new discovery is that there is a consistent oscillation relationship among the overpressure, flame propagation speed and flame structure. Helmholtz oscillation occurs only when a single vent area is 100 mm × 100 mm–60 mm × 60 mm, and the oscillation degree decreases with decreasing vent area. During the vent failure stage, the maximum explosion overpressure is generated, the flame front begins to appear irregular shape, and the flame propagation speed shows a prominent characteristic peak. After the vent failure stage, the driving effect of the end vent on the flame is higher than that of the side vent on the flame. Furthermore, the correlation equations of the mathematical relationships among the maximum explosion overpressure P_red, the static activation pressure P_stat and the vent coefficient K_v under four vent layouts are established, respectively.     

Ignitability characteristics of aluminium and magnesium dusts that are generated during the shredding of post-consumer wastes

The authors investigated the ignitability of aluminium and magnesium dusts that are generated during the shredding of post-consumer waste. The relations between particle size and the minimum explosive concentration, the minimum ignition energy, the ignition temperature of the dust clouds, etc. the relation between of oxygen concentration and dust explosion, the effect of inert substances on dust explosion, etc. were studied experimentally.

The minimum explosive concentration increased exponentially with particle size. The minimum explosive concentrations of the sample dusts were about 170 g/m³ (aluminium: 0–8 μm) and 90 g/m³ (magnesium: 0–20 μm). The minimum ignition energy tended to increase with particle size. It was about 6 mJ for the aluminium samples and 4 mJ for the magnesium samples. The ignition temperature of dust clouds was about 750 °C for aluminium and about 520 °C for magnesium. The lowest concentrations of oxygen to produce a dust explosion were about 10% for aluminium and about 8% for magnesium. A large mixing ratio (more than about 50%) of calcium oxide or calcium carbonate was necessary to decrease the explosibility of magnesium dust. The experimental data obtained in the present investigation will be useful for evaluating the explosibility of aluminium and magnesium dusts generated in metal recycling operations and thus for enhancing the safety of recycling plants.     

Process loss prevention of petrochemical process: A case study of the flashing accident of the storage tank on acrylonitrile-butadiene-styrene powder in Taiwan

Qualitative analysis, process hazard analysis, thermal evaluation, and fault tree analysis were applied to a flashing accident involving a storage tank that contained acrylonitrile-butadiene-styrene (ABS) powder in Taiwan. The accident was caused by combustible powder attached to the inner wall of the tank reaching a high temperature and then melting. Thereafter, the molten powder became glue-like and dropped onto the ABS powder, burning at the tank bottom, causing decomposition of the styrene and butadiene derivatives as well as other combustible gases. The high concentration of combustible powder and low ignition temperature triggered the powder, initiating a dust explosion. Finally, we analyzed the findings of each method and examined the properties of ABS powder, realizing that the root cause of the accident included an insufficient understanding of the characteristics of ABS and the failure to comply with the management procedures of hot work. Recommendations and countermeasures were proposed that could proactively ameliorate process safety.     

Explosion properties of highly concentrated ozone gas

The explosive self-decomposition characteristics of gaseous ozone with a concentration of up to almost 100 vol% were quantitatively investigated using a closed system with an electric spark device. The lower self-decomposition (explosion) limit for ozone diluted with oxygen at room temperature and atmospheric pressure was 10–11 vol%, and so ozone at more than 10–11 vol% will lead to an explosive chain decomposition reaction leading to its complete conversion to oxygen in a vessel. The lower explosion limit shifts to a higher concentration with a decrease in pressure. The limit was about 80 vol% under a reduced pressure of 10 Torr. We also confirmed that explosion trigger energy (minimum ignition energy) is strongly dependent on ozone concentration and pressure. For example, the minimum trigger energy for 15 vol% ozone at a pressure of 76 Torr (about 220 mJ) was more than 20-fold that at atmospheric pressure (about 10 mJ), and that for 13 vol% ozone (about 580 mJ) was approximately 30 times higher than that for 20 vol% (about 20 mJ) at the same pressure of 76 Torr. Moreover, the physical characteristics of the trigger energy sources (e.g. spark gap and electrode tip angle) leading to the decomposition (explosion) of ozone were investigated under various conditions.