Reinventing risk politics: reflexive modernity and the European BSE crisis

The recent BSE crisis in Europe is an example of a new kind of risk in late-modern society. Conventional risk politics are no longer considered suitable for such new risks, leading to a new kind of risk politics. In answering the question whether a new kind of risk politics is developing and what this looks like, this contribution studies how several countries of Western Europe (the UK, the Netherlands, France and Germany) as well as the EU dealt with the BSE crisis. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Precautionary Approach to Genetically Modified Organisms: Challenges and Implications for Policy and Science

The commercial introduction of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) has revealed a broad range of views among scientists and other stakeholders on perspectives of genetic engineering (GE) and if and how GMOs should be regulated. Within this controversy, the precautionary principle has become a contentious issue with high support from skeptical groups but resisted by GMO advocates. How to handle lack of scientific understanding and scientific disagreement are core issues within these debates. This article examines some of the key issues affecting precaution as a legal standard and as an approach to the use of science in decision-making processes. It is pointed out that there is a need for reflection over the level of scientific evidence required for applying the precautionary principle as well as who should have the burden of proof when there are uncertainties. Further, an awareness of the broader scientific uncertainties found in GMO risk assessment implies that a precautionary approach must be elaborated: both for acknowledging uncertainties and for identification of scientific responses. Since precaution is an important issue within the sustainable development framework, it is suggested that sustainability can provide a normative standard that can help to reveal the influence and negotiate the importance of the various forms of uncertainty. Wise management of uncertainties and inclusion of normative aspects in risk assessment and management may help to ensure sustainable and socially robust GMO innovations at present and in the future.     

The Homiletics of Risk

Today there is considerable disagreement between the US and the EU with respect to food safety standards. Issues include GMOs, beef hormones, unpasteurized cheese, etc. In general, it is usually asserted that Europeans argue for the precautionary principle (with exceptions such as the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement where ``substantial equivalence,' a form of familiarity, is used) while Americans defend risk analysis or what is sometimes described as the familiarityprinciple. This is not to suggest that EUmember countries agree on how the precautionaryprinciple should be applied; considerabledifferences exist among nations as will benoted below.In this paper I review both positionsarguing that they are best understood asvariants of the homiletics of risk rather thanas differing scientific positions. I concludethat while science must necessarily enter intothe formulation of food and agriculturalstandards, state policy, private economicinterests, and the interface between the two(e.g., when democratic states are successfullylobbied to support particular privateinterests), play important roles in determininghow particular risks will be treated. Moreover,I argue that the role of science mustnecessarily be limited if its credibility is tobe preserved.     

“The Moral Difference between Intragenic and Transgenic Modification of Plants”

Public policy on the development and use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) has mainly been concerned with defining proper strategies of risk management. However, surveys and focus group interviews show that although lay people are concerned with risks, they also emphasize that genetic modification is ethically questionable in itself. Many people feel that this technology “tampers with nature” in an unacceptable manner. This is often identified as an objection to the crossing of species borders in producing transgenic organisms. Most scientists reject these opinions as based on insufficient knowledge about biotechnology, the concept of species, and nature in general. Some recent projects of genetic modification aim to accommodate the above mentioned concerns by altering the expression of endogenous genes rather than introducing genes from other species. There can be good scientific reasons for this approach, in addition to strategic reasons related to greater public acceptability. But are there also moral reasons for choosing intragenic rather than transgenic modification? I suggest three interrelated moral reasons for giving priority to intragenic modification. First, we should respect the opinions of lay people even when their view is contrary to scientific consensus; they express an alternative world-view, not scientific ignorance. Second, staying within species borders by strengthening endogenous traits reduces the risks and scientific uncertainty. Third, we should show respect for nature as a complex system of laws and interconnections that we cannot fully control. The main moral reason for intragenic modification, in our view, is the need to respect the “otherness” of nature.     

Fusing strategic risk and futures methods to inform long-term strategic planning: case of water utilities

Risks and futures methods have complementary strengths as tools for managing strategic decisions under uncertainty. When combined, these tools increase organisational competency to evaluate and manage long-term risks, improving the flexibility and agility of the organisation to deal with gross uncertainties. Here, we set out a framework to guide the assessment of strategic risks for long-term business planning, based on its application at Portugal’s largest water utility, Empresa Portuguesa das Águas Livres. Our approach extends strategic risk assessment by incorporating scenario planning—a futures approach used to help the utility move beyond single point forecast of risks to focus on critical dimensions of uncertainty that are fundamental to the resilience of corporate objectives and their vulnerability to external pressures. We demonstrate how we combine two complementary approaches—risk and futures—and use them to assess (i) how a set of baseline strategic risks for a water utility evolves under alternative futures, (ii) the aggregate corporate-level risk exposure, and (iii) the process and responses needed to manage multiple, interdependent strategic risks. The framework offers a corporate approach to evolving strategic risks and improves a utility’s (i) knowledge of uncertainties, (ii) ability to assess the impacts of external developments over long time horizons and the consequences of actions and (iii) degree of flexibility to adapt to possible future challenges. The framework supports risk managers in their long-term strategic planning, through the appraisal and management of multiple, interdependent long-term strategic risks and can be replicated in other organisational contexts to bridge operational and corporate perspectives of enterprise risk.

     

BSE in the UK: Why the Risk Communication Strategy Failed

The 2000 BSE Inquiry report points out that the most serious failure of the UK Government was one of risk communication. This paper argues that the government's failure to communicate the risks BSE posed to humans to a large degree can be traced back to a lack of transparency in the first risk assessment by the Southwood Working Party. This lack of transparency ensured that the working party's risk characterization and recommendations were ambiguous and thus hard to interpret. It also meant that uncertainties were not addressed in a satisfactory way. In the recommendations, the attitude to uncertainty was implicit rather than explicit.The risk communication based on the report amplified these flaws. Most importantly, it did not address the uncertainty at all. Apparently, the reason for this was fear of overreaction by the public. However, the result was counter-productive, because the risk communication did not then appear trustworthy. Later risk assessments and risk communication omitted to correct these flaws. Indeed, the fact that, following receipt of new information, advisory experts and policy makers had changed their views of the risk to humans was never clearly communicated to the public. There seemed to be little faith in the public's ability to reach a balanced judgment regarding the uncertainties.In the concluding section of the paper, this analysis is compared with the food standards agency's (FSA's) approach to BSE. The intervention of this agency was seen as one of the more important efforts to restore consumer confidence in British beef. And the agency certainly appears to be committed to openness and to addressing scientific uncertainty. However, using the risk of BSE in sheep as a case study, the paper shows that transparency – i.e., the clear presentation of factual and normative claims and assumptions underlying advice, and openness about the reasoning based on these claims and assumptions – is less than fully achieved in the FSA's work.     

The Precautionary Principle: Scientific Uncertainty and Omitted Research in the Context of GMO Use and Release

Commercialization of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) have sparked profound controversies concerning adequate approaches to risk regulation. Scientific uncertainty and ambiguity, omitted research areas, and lack of basic knowledge crucial to risk assessmentshave become apparent. The objective of this article is to discuss the policy and practical implementation of the Precautionary Principle. A major conclusion is that the void in scientific understanding concerning risks posed by secondary effects and the complexity ofcause-effect relations warrant further research. Initiatives to approach the acceptance or rejection of a number of risk-associated hypotheses is badly needed. Further, since scientific advice plays a key role in GMOregulations, scientists have a responsibility to address and communicate uncertainty to policy makers and the public. Hence, the acceptance of uncertainty is not only a scientific issue, but is related to public policy and involves an ethical dimension.     

The US’ Food and Drug Administration, Normativity of Risk Assessment, GMOs, and American Democracy

The process of risk assessment of biotechnologies, such as genetically modified organisms (GMOs), has normative dimensions. However, the US’ Food and Drug Administration (FDA) seems committed to the idea that such evaluations are objective. This essay makes the case that the agency’s regulatory approach should be changed such that the public is involved in deciding any ethical or social questions that might arise during risk assessment of GMOs. It is argued that, in the US, neither aggregative nor deliberative (representative) democracy ought to be used to make such determinations. Instead, participatory (deliberative) democracy should be the means by which members of the polity decide which normative concerns ought to underlie FDA’s assessment of GMOs. This paper uses a hypothetical case involving a new GM seed to make that argument.     

Science and values in risk assessment: The case of deliberate release of genetically engineered organisms

To make more responsible decisions regarding risk and to understand disagreements and controversies in risk assessments, it is important to know how and where values are infused into risk assessment and how they are embedded in the conclusions. In this article an attempt is made to disentangle the relationship of science and values in decision-making concerning the deliberate release of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) into the environment. This exercise in applied philosophy of science is based on Helen Longino's contextual empiricism which attempts to reconcile the objectivity of science with its social and cultural construction. Longino distinguishes different levels of research on which values apparently contextual with respect to a given research program can shape the knowledge emerging from that program. Her scheme is applied for locating and identifying the values that affect environment risk assessments of the field experiments with GMOs. The article concludes with some provisional suggestions for the decision process and the role of scientists in it.     

Assessment of GM Crops in Commercial Agriculture

The caliber of recent discourse regarding geneticallymodified organisms (GMOs) has suffered from a lack of consensuson terminology, from the scarcity of evidence upon which toassess risk to health and to the environment, and from valuedifferences between proponents and opponents of GMOs. Towardsaddressing these issues, we present the thesis that GM should bedefined as the forcible insertion of DNA into a host genome,irrespective of the source of the DNA, and exclusive ofconventional or mutation breeding.Some defenders of the commercial use of GMOs have referred to thescientific work of GMO critics as ``junk science.' Such a claim isfalse and misleading, given that many papers critical of both theutility and safety of GMOs have been published in peer reviewedjournals by respected scientists. In contrast, there is a dearthof peer reviewed work to substantiate the frequently heardassertions of either safety or utility in GMOs. The polarity,which now characterizes much of the public discourse on GMOs,reflects not simply scientific disagreement, but alsodisagreement in underlying value assumptions. Value differencesstrongly affect the assessment of both benefit and harm fromGMOs.The concept of substantial equivalence occupies a pivotalposition in the GMO risk assessment process that is used in bothCanada and the US. A GMO judged to be substantially equivalent toa conventional product – as have all submissions to date – ispresumed to be safe enough for commercialization. The conclusionof safety – from both human health and environmental perspectives– should be based on scientific evidence, corroborated by actualexperimentation. However, regulators infer safety largely fromassumptions-based reasoning, with little or no experimentalvalidation. The judgement of safety because of substantialequivalence is a dubious argument by analogy.     

Can food safety policy-making be both scientifically and democratically legitimated? If so,how?

This paper provides an analysis of the evolution of thinking and talking about the role of scientific knowledge and expertise in food safety policy-making, and in risk policy-making more generally from the late 19th century to the present day. It highlights the defining characteristics of several models that have been used to represent and interpret the relations between policy-makers and expert scientific advisors and between scientific and political considerations. Both conceptual and empirical strengths and weaknesses of those models are identified, focusing in particular on the ways in which they deal with scientific uncertainties and social choices. By drawing on both empirical evidence and conceptual analysis, a novel and more realistic model is provided along with an account of some conditions for food safety policy-making achieving both scientific and democratic legitimacy.     

Troubles on the way: An analysis of the challenges faced by multi-stakeholder platforms

Multi‐stakeholder platforms (MSPs) have been widely promoted as a promising means of resolving conflicts over natural resources, first in developed countries and, more recently, as a global good practice. However, many MSPs have been implemented in an unfavourable context — primarily of social inequities — and have not met initial high expectations. The article analyzes the challenges MSPs face in an unfavourable context, and identifies five main issues:

• ? Power relationships;
• ? Platform composition;
• ? Stakeholder representation and capacity to participate meaningfully in the debates;
• ? Decision‐making power and mechanisms; and finally
• ? Cost of setting up an MSP.

The analysis is mainly based on two case studies of MSPs set up under inauspicious conditions. The first focuses on water user associations in South Africa, the second on a negotiation platform set up to resolve conflicts over a water and sanitation project in Bolivia. It is argued that MSPs should be seen less as an ideal communication process, and more as a negotiation process — always imperfect — but where positive outcomes may nevertheless outweigh negative ones, if and when the above‐mentioned issues are adequately taken into account.     

GMOs and Global Justice: Applying Global Justice Theory to the Case of Genetically Modified Crops and Food

Proponents of using genetically modified (GM) crops and food in the developing world often claim that it is unjust not to use GMOs (genetically modified organisms) to alleviate hunger and malnutrition in developing countries. In reply, the critics of GMOs claim that while GMOs may be useful as a technological means to increase yields and crop quality, stable and efficient institutions are required in order to provide the benefits from GMO technology. In this debate, the GMO proponents tend to rely on a simple utilitarian type of calculus that highlights the benefits of GMOs to the poor, but that overlooks the complex institutional requirements necessary for GMO production. The critics, recognizing the importance of institutional conditions, focus primarily on the negative impacts of institutional deficiencies, thereby overlooking the basically Rawlsian claim that institutions per se may generate claims to justice. This article investigates how GMOs might generate claims to global justice and what type of justice is involved. The paper argues that the debate on GMOs and global justice can be categorized into three views, i.e., the cosmopolitan, the pluralist, and the sceptic. The cosmopolitan holds that GMOs can and should be used for alleviating global hunger, whereas the sceptic rejects this course of action. I will argue here for a moderately cosmopolitan approach, relying on the pluralist view of institutions and the need to exploit the benefits of GMOs. This argument rests on the premise that global cooperation on GMO production provides the relevant basis for assessing the use of GMOs by the standard of global distributive justice.     

The supervision of environmental risk: The case of HCB waste or Botany/Randwick?

The governance activities of capital and the state include attempts to control the timing and spacing of social activities such as the production of environmental risks and settlement of different social groups. The supervisory activities that have shaped the environmental and social history of the Botany/Randwick area are identified here, to examine how the HCB waste risk developed in that community. The analysis shows that multiple environmental risks and an ethnically diverse, working class community have been brought together in space to create environmental injustice. Analysing the governance of one environmental risk like hexachlorobenzene (HCB) waste may not increase understanding about communities facing multiple environmental risks or the supervisory processes that lead to the unfair accumulation of risks for particular places or social groups. Lessons from the environmental justice movement suggest that reframing problems like HCB waste management at Botany/Randwick as distributive justice issues may contribute to governance arrangements that better manage multiple risks and pollution sources in space affecting marginalised communities.     

Enhancing climate technology transfer through greater public–private cooperation: Lessons from Thailand and the Philippines

This article contributes to debates about climate change policy and technology transfer by analyzing the success factors underlying collaboration between private companies and communities in developing countries. To date, much attention to capacity building for enabling environments — including public–private collaboration — under the climate change convention has focused on state‐led initiatives and on the innovation and development of technologies. This article, instead, focuses on how private‐sector investors and host communities may collaborate in the diffusion of technologies, by reducing the costs of technology transfer, and making technology more appropriate to developing countries. The article describes cases of collaboration concerning waste management and waste‐to‐energy in Thailand and the Philippines. The article argues that successful public–private partnerships between investors and communities depends on minimizing transaction costs, strengthening collaborative (or assurance) mechanisms, and in maximizing public trust and accountability of partnerships. Lessons are then drawn for enhancing capacity building for technology transfer under the climate change convention and applications such as the Clean Development Mechanism.     

Interests and values in national nutrition policy in the united states

When scientists consider the interaction of science and value judgments, debates often occur. When public policy grows out of science, disagreements between scientists can become even more spirited. This paper examines the case of nutrition policy in the United States, which has been both at the interface between agriculture and medicine and the object of serious discord concerned with the strength and validity of the scientific evidence and the responsibility for action. The development of indirect intervention policies, designed to educate and inform the public on diet and health, is traced as a practical demonstration of the effects of involvements of nutritional scientists of different disciplines and philosophic bents. Controversies centered mainly on the issues of diet and coronary heart disease and of diet and cancer in nutritional guidelines for Americans and the recommended dietary allowances (RDAs). But the arguments turned on a complex web of values and interests as well as scientific questions. A remarkable turnaround by animal agriculture and its scientific support occurred, changing from a defensive, rightist stance to one that appears to recognize a moral responsibility to the public health. The convincing point was likely the changing market. Nutritional scientists, however, remained divided on the issue of whether a public health strategy keyed to public education should replace a strategy to identify persons of high risk and modify the risk by treatment. Our analysis suggests that the tension between libertarian and utilitarian social values of scientists is at least as important as disagreements relative to validity and strengths of the scientific evidence.     

The acceptability of CO2 capture and storage (CCS) in Europe: An assessment of the key determining factors: Part 2. The social acceptability of CCS and the wider impacts and repercussions of its implementation

In Part 1, we presented the findings of the EU ACCSEPT project (2006–2007) with regards to scientific, technical, legal and economic issues. In Part 2, we present the analysis of social acceptability on the part of both the lay public and stakeholders. We examine the acceptability of CO₂ capture and geological storage (CCS) within the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol. The debate over the inclusion of CCS within the CDM is caught-up in a set of complex debates that are partly technical and partly political and, therefore, difficult, and time-consuming, to resolve. We explore concerns that support for CCS will detract from support for other low-carbon energy sources. We can find no evidence that support for CCS is currently detracting from support for renewable energy sources, though it is probably too early to detect such an effect. Efforts at understanding, engaging with, and communicating to, the lay public and wider stakeholder community (not just business) in Europe are currently weak and inadequate, despite well-meaning statements from governments and industry.     

Bottom-Up Risk Regulation? How Nanotechnology Risk Knowledge Gaps Challenge Federal and State Environmental Agencies

Nanotechnologies have been called the "Next Industrial Revolution." At the same time, scientists are raising concerns about the potential health and environmental risks related to the nano-sized materials used in nanotechnologies. Analyses suggest that current U.S. federal regulatory structures are not likely to adequately address these risks in a proactive manner. Given these trends, the premise of this paper is that state and local-level agencies will likely deal with many "end-of-pipe" issues as nanomaterials enter environmental media without prior toxicity testing, federal standards, or emissions controls. In this paper we (1) briefly describe potential environmental risks and benefits related to emerging nanotechnologies; (2) outline the capacities of the Toxic Substances Control Act, the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act to address potential nanotechnology risks, and how risk data gaps challenge these regulations; (3) outline some of the key data gaps that challenge state-level regulatory capacities to address nanotechnologies' potential risks, using Wisconsin as a case study; and (4) discuss advantages and disadvantages of state versus federal approaches to nanotechnology risk regulation. In summary, we suggest some ways government agencies can be better prepared to address nanotechnology risk knowledge gaps and risk management.     

Ethics in the Societal Debate on Genetically Modified Organisms: A (Re)Quest for Sense and Sensibility

Via a historical reconstruction, this paper primarily demonstrates how the societal debate on genetically modified organisms (GMOs) gradually extended in terms of actors involved and concerns reflected. It is argued that the implementation of recombinant DNA technology out of the laboratory and into civil society entailed a “complex of concerns.” In this complex, distinctions between environmental, agricultural, socio-economic, and ethical issues proved to be blurred. This fueled the confusion between the wider debate on genetic modification and the risk assessment of transgenic crops in the European Union. In this paper, the lasting skeptical and/or ambivalent attitude of Europeans towards agro-food biotechnology is interpreted as signaling an ongoing social request – and even a quest – for an evaluation of biotechnology with Sense and Sensibility. In this (re)quest, a broader-than-scientific dimension is sought for that allows addressing the GMO debate in a more “sensible” way, whilst making “sense” of the different stances taken in it. Here, the restyling of the European regulatory frame on transgenic agro-food products and of science communication models are discussed and taken to be indicative of the (re)quest to move from a merely scientific evaluation and risk-based policy towards a socially more robust evaluation that takes the “non-scientific” concerns at stake in the GMO debate seriously.     

Experts under the microscope: the Wivenhoe Dam case

Prosecution of experts in the wake of disasters has emerged as common in the context of increasing social intolerance of risk. This paper examines expert blame using as a case study the decisions of engineers who operated Wivenhoe Dam during the Queensland floods in January 2011 and the criticisms of those decisions by the subsequent Commission of Inquiry. Our analysis draws on the literature on organisational safety, organisational learning and expertise to examine the relevance of the criteria against which the engineers were judged, the relevant competence of those who made this assessment and the broader implications of such exercises. Our analysis shows that lay judgements of expert practice can be misleading, as evidenced by the Commission of Inquiry’s misguided focus on procedural adherence. We argue that such inquiries—where the focus is on assigning blame—detract from opportunities to learn from incidents and can negatively impact on professional practices. If the aim is to make future disasters less likely, then inquiries that take this approach may be failing in this endeavour, or at least not maximising their contribution.