Cost-effective unilateral climate policy design: Size matters

Given the bleak prospects for a global agreement on mitigating climate change, pressure for unilateral abatement is increasing. A major challenge is emissions leakage. Border carbon adjustments and output-based allocation of emissions allowances can increase effectiveness of unilateral action but introduce distortions of their own. We assess antileakage measures as a function of abatement coalition size. We first develop a partial equilibrium analytical framework to see how these instruments affect emissions within and outside the coalition. We then employ a computable general equilibrium model of international trade and energy use to assess the strategies as the coalition grows. We find that full border adjustments rank first in global cost-effectiveness, followed by import tariffs and output-based rebates. The differences across measures and their overall appeal decline as the abatement coalition grows. In terms of cost, the coalition countries prefer border carbon adjustments; countries outside the coalition prefer output-based rebates.     

The principal–agent model with multilateral externalities: An application to climate agreements

We consider contracting of a principal with an agent if multilateral externalities are present. The motivating example is that of an international climate agreement given private information about the willingness-to-pay (WTP) for emissions abatement. Due to multilateral externalities the principal uses her own emissions besides subsidies to incentivize the agent and to assure his participation. Optimal contracts equalize marginal abatement costs and, thus, can be implemented by a system of competitive permit trading. Moreover, optimal contracts can include a boundary part (i.e., the endogenous, type dependent participation constraint is binding), which is not a copy of the outside option of no contract. Compared to this outside option, a contract can increase emissions of the principal for types with a low WTP, and reduce her payoff for high types. Subsidies can be constant or even decreasing in emission reductions, and turn negative so that the agent reduces emissions and pays the principal.     

Environmental policy with upstream pollution abatement technology firms

This paper examines how the existence of an upstream abatement technology sector affects optimal environmental policy. We explore whether the policy should be especially stringent in order to spur a successful export industry based on abatement technology. Furthermore, we investigate if a stringent policy can be used to increase competition in the upstream sector. Our point of departure is a three-stage game between a government in a country with a polluting downstream industry, and a limited number of upstream firms supplying abatement technologies. The government moves first, and may use its environmental policy strategically to influence the behavior of the upstream technology firms. We find that an especially stringent environmental policy towards the polluting downstream sector may be well founded, as it increases competition between the technology suppliers, leading to lower abatement costs. However, to our surprise, an especially stringent environmental policy is not a particularly good industrial policy with respect to developing successful new export sectors based on abatement technology.     

The effects on electricity prices in england and wales of notional sulphur dioxide emission standards for power stations

Reducing emissions of sulphur dioxide from the electricity industry in England and Wales would require application of abatement technology and raise electricity prices through increases in marginal supply costs. Capital and operating costs of alternative abatement techniques and their application under possible long-term investment and retirement plans for the industry are discussed. An approximate halving of projected emissions is found to have an effect of the order of 5% on prices under the existing tariff structure. Reductions of up to one-fifth are found to have an effect of under 1% on electricity prices.     

Reduction of CO2 emission by optimally tracking a pre-defined target

The recent global financial crisis has highlighted the need for balanced and efficient investments in the reduction of the greenhouse effect caused by emissions of CO₂ on a global scale. In a previous paper, the authors proposed a mathematical model describing the dynamic relation of CO₂ emission with investment in reforestation and clean technology. An efficient allocation of resources to reduce the greenhouse effect has also been proposed. Here, this model is used to provide estimates of the investments needed in land reforestation and in the adoption of clean technologies for an optimum emission and abatement of CO₂, for the period of 1996–2014. The required investments are computed to minimize deviations with respect to the emission targets proposed in the Kyoto Protocol for European Countries. The emission target can be achieved by 2014 with investments in reforestation peaking in 2004, and a reduction of the expected GDP of 42%, relative to 2006. Investments in clean technology should increase between 2008 and 2010 with maximum transfer figures around 70 million American dollars. Total (cumulative) costs are, however, relatively high depending on the price of carbon abatement and the rate at which the expected CO₂ concentration in the atmosphere should be reduced. Results highlight the advantages for policy makers to be able to manage investments in climate policy more efficiently, controlling optimum transfers based on a portfolio of actions that tracks a pre-defined CO₂ concentration target.     

Tying enforcement to prices in emissions markets: An experimental evaluation

We present results from laboratory emissions permit markets designed to investigate the transmission of abatement cost risk to firms' compliance behavior and regulatory enforcement strategies. With a fixed expected marginal penalty, abatement cost shocks produced significant violations and emissions volatility as predicted. Tying the monitoring probability to average permit prices effectively eliminated noncompliance, but transmitted abatement cost risk to monitoring effort. Tying the penalty to average prices reduced violations, but did not eliminate them. Some individuals in these treatments sold permits at low prices, presumably in an attempt to weaken enforcement. While tying sanctions directly to prevailing permit prices has theoretical and practical advantages over tying monitoring to prices, our results suggest that tying sanctions to prices may not be as effective as predicted without additional modifications.     

Carbon leakage: Grandfathering as an incentive device to avert firm relocation

Emission allowances are sometimes distributed for free in an early phase of a cap-and-trade scheme to reduce adverse effects on the profitability of firms. This paper investigates whether grandfathering can also be used to avert the relocation of firms to countries with lower carbon prices. We show that under certain conditions, relocation can be averted in the long run, even if the grandfathering scheme is phased out over time and immediate relocation is profitable in its absence. This requires that the permit price triggers sufficient investments into low-carbon technologies or abatement capital that create a lock-in effect which makes relocation unprofitable.     

On reducing the windfall profits in environmental subsidy programs

Investment subsidies are widely used to induce adoption of new technologies that can lower the (marginal) cost of reducing emissions. To economize on these subsidies, governments would like to distinguish between firms that need to receive a subsidy to adopt a new technology, and firms that would adopt that technology even without subsidies. We show that policies consisting of a menu of emission taxes and investment subsidies can potentially induce firms to self-select.     

Unintended consequences of price controls: An application to allowance markets

Price controls established in a cap-and-trade allowance market are intended to reduce cost uncertainty by constraining allowance prices between a ceiling and floor; however, they could provide opportunities for strategic actions by firms that would lower government revenue and increase emissions. In particular, when the ceiling price is supported by introducing new allowances into the market, firms could choose to buy allowances at the ceiling price, regardless of the prevailing market price, in order to lower the equilibrium price of all allowances. Those purchases could either be transacted by firms intending to manipulate the market price or be induced through the introduction of inaccurate information about the cost of emissions abatement. Theory and simulations using allowance elasticity estimates for U.S. firms suggest that the manipulation could be profitable under the stylized setting and assumptions evaluated in the paper, although in practice many other conditions will determine its use.     

Modeling the impact of uncertainty in emissions trading markets with bankable permits

The various forms of uncertainty that firms may face in bankable emission permit trading markets will affect firms’ decision making as well as their market performance. This research explores the effect of increased uncertainty over future input costs and output prices on the temporal distribution of emission. In a dynamic programming setting, the permit price is a convex function of stochastic prices of coal and electricity. Increased uncertainty about future market conditions increases the expected permit price and causes a risk neutral firm to reduce ex ante emissions in order to smooth out marginal abatement costs over time. Finally, safety valves, both low-side and high-side, are suggested to reduce the impact of uncertainty in bankable emission trading markets.     

Development of a low-carbon economy in China

Under the pressures of climate change, many countries are trying to adapt to a low-carbon economy. In this paper, we review the development pattern of the low-carbon economy of major countries and its impact on the world economy. We then argue that economic development and abatement of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in China should be balanced. The challenges that China faces should also be considered carefully. It is necessary for China to find an approach to solve the issues of climate change, which should include new technologies and establishing incentive mechanisms and reform-oriented policies. These guidelines can adjust the structure of the economy and energy use, improve energy efficiency, promote the development of alternative and renewable energy, enhance the potential of carbon sinks, and develop advanced technology to perfect a 'Clean Development Mechanism' and sustainable development through international cooperation.     

Does more stringent environmental regulation induce or reduce technology adoption? When the rate of technology adoption is inverted U-shaped

We show that for a broad class of technologies the relationship between policy stringency and the rate of technology adoption is inverted U-shaped. This happens when the marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves of conventional and new technologies intersect, which invariably occurs when emissions are proportional to output and technological progress reduces emissions per output. This outcome does not result from policy failure. On the contrary, in social optimum, the relationship between the slope of the marginal damage curve and the rate of technology adoption is also inverted U-shaped. Under more general conditions, these curves can look even more complicated (e.g., such as inverted W-shaped).     

Does more stringent environmental regulation induce or reduce technology adoption? When the rate of technology adoption is inverted U-shaped

We show that for a broad class of technologies the relationship between policy stringency and the rate of technology adoption is inverted U-shaped. This happens when the marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves of conventional and new technologies intersect, which invariably occurs when emissions are proportional to output and technological progress reduces emissions per output. This outcome does not result from policy failure. On the contrary, in social optimum, the relationship between the slope of the marginal damage curve and the rate of technology adoption is also inverted U-shaped. Under more general conditions, these curves can look even more complicated (e.g., such as inverted W-shaped).     

Incentives and prices in an emissions trading scheme with updating

Emissions trading schemes where allocations are based on updated baseline emissions give firms less incentive to reduce emissions for a given quota (or allowance) price. Nevertheless, according to Böhringer and Lange [On the design of optimal grandfathering schemes for emission allowances, Europ. Econ. Rev. 49 (2005) 2041–2055], such allocation schemes are cost-effective if the system is closed and allocation rules are identical across firms. In this paper, we show that the cost-effective solution may be infeasible if marginal abatement costs grow too fast. Moreover, if a price cap or banking/borrowing is introduced, the abatement profile is no longer the same as in the case with an auction (or lump-sum allocation). In addition, we show that with allocation based on updated emissions, the quota price will always exceed marginal abatement costs, possibly misguiding policy makers and investors about abatement costs. Numerical simulations indicate that the quota price most likely will be several times higher than marginal abatement costs, unless a significant share of allowances is auctioned.     

Instrument Choice When Regulators and Firms Bargain

We compare outcomes with an emissions tax and an emissions standard when a firm and regulator engage in cooperative bargaining over the stringency of the regulation. Bargaining is motivated by giving the firm a choice of abatement technologies. If the firm's preferred technology differs from the regulator's, the first-best outcome is not an equilibrium of the traditional noncooperative game in which the regulator is a Stackelberg leader. The regulator may therefore choose to offer the firm a more lenient regulation if it agrees to switch technologies. We find that the resulting bargaining outcomes differ for a tax and a standard even though information is symmetric, and we identify conditions under which each instrument yields lower social costs.     

Facilitating sustainable development in Chile: a survey of suitable energy technologies

Sustainable development in developing countries is the main aim of the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). However, in the present context, uncertainty prevails as to whether the CDM is actually achieving its aims in terms of achieving sustainable development and to what extent. Chile has several renewable energy and energy efficiency options with significant greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions abatement potential that are not yet financially and economically competitive. In order to be able to identify potential CDM projects and to formulate a series of possible investment strategies with a sustainable development component, it is crucial to establish a clear understanding of the host country's needs and priorities and the suitable sustainable energy technologies to meet these needs. The main scope of this paper is to present results obtained from an elaborated stakeholder assessment on Chile's high priority energy needs and sustainable energy technologies fulfilling these needs in order to assist Chile in finding ways of encouraging technology transfer that would contribute to low-carbon sustainable energy development.     

Flattening the carbon extraction path in unilateral cost-effective action

Internalizing the global negative externality of carbon emissions requires the flattening of the extraction path of world fossil energy resources (=world carbon emissions). We consider governments with sign-unconstrained emission taxes at their disposal and seeking to prevent world emissions from exceeding some binding aggregate emission ceiling in the medium term. Such a ceiling policy can be carried out either in full cooperation or by a sub-global climate coalition. Unilateral action has to cope with carbon leakage and high costs, which makes a strong case for choosing a policy that implements the ceiling in a cost-effective way. In a two-country, two-period general equilibrium model with a non-renewable fossil-energy resource, we characterize the unilateral cost-effective ceiling policy and compare it with its fully cooperative counterpart. We show that with full cooperation there exists a cost-effective ceiling policy in which only first-period emissions are taxed at a rate that is uniform across countries. In contrast, the cost-effective ceiling policy of a sub-global climate coalition is characterized by emission regulation in both periods. The share of the total stock of energy resources owned by the sub-global climate coalition turns out to be a decisive determinant of the sign and magnitude of unilateral cost-effective taxes.     

Pollution Taxes and Pollution Abatement in an Oligopoly Supergame

This paper investigates the effects of an emissions tax on the incentives for oligopolists to acquire alternative pollution abatement technologies. The analysis is conducted in terms of a repeated game and it is demonstrated that there are circumstances in which the firms may reject the option of acquiring the pollution abatement equipment, even when this lowers their production costs.     

Dynamic Incentives of Environmental Regulations: The Effects of Alternative Policy Instruments on Technology Diffusion

We develop a framework for comparing empirically the effects of alternative environmental policy instruments on the diffusion of new technology. "Market-based" and "command-and-control" approaches can he quantitatively compared by estimating the economic penalty that firms, through their actions, reveal to be associated with violation of standards. In the context of concerns about global climate change, we empirically examine the likely effects of Pigouvian taxes, technology adoption subsidies, and technology standards. We employ state-level data on the diffusion of thermal insulation in new home construction, comparing the effects of energy prices, insulation cost, and building codes.     

PM2.5: global progress in controlling the motor vehicle contribution

It is well established that ambient particles in the size range of 2.5 microns or less case a wide variety of adverse health effects. According to a recent study from the World Health Organization, in 2010 these effects resulted in approximately 3.2million premature deaths with vehicles being one of the significant contributors. Diesel vehicle particulate emissions which are virtually all smaller than 2.5 microns raise additional special concerns due to their carcinogenicity and high ratio of black carbon （BC） to organic carbon; black carbon has recently been found to be the second most important contributor to climate change after carbon dioxide. Other pollutants emitted by diesels and other vehicles such as the oxides of nitrogen and volatile organic compounds also contribute to ambient particulate matter smaller than 2.5 microns in size （PM2.5） after undergoing secondary transformations in the atrno- sphere. Technologies have dramatically reduce vehicle been developed that can emissions when clean, low sulfur fuels are available and these technologies are being phased in throughout the industrialized world resulting in a global decrease in particulate matter （PM） and BC emissions from vehicles. However the vehicle population is growing rapidly in the developing world, leading to increases in emissions in many countries. Unless these rapidly industrializing countries move to state of the art vehicles and clean fuels, global PM, BC and NOx emissions from road vehicles will start to turn up over the next 10 to 15 years.