An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements

Much of the literature on international environmental agreements (IEAs) uses static models, although most important transboundary pollution problems involve stock pollutants. The few papers that study IEAs using models of stock pollutants do not allow for the possibility that membership of the IEA may change endogenously over time. In this paper we analyse a simple infinite-horizon version of the static model of self-enforcing IEAs, in which damage costs increase with the stock of pollution, and countries decide each period whether to join an IEA. Using a quadratic approximation of the value function of the representative country we show that there exists a steady-state stock of pollution with corresponding steady-state IEA membership, and that as the stock rises towards steady state the IEA membership falls. Moreover, we find that the greater is the cost of damage, and hence the greater are the potential gains from cooperation, the smaller is the membership of a self-enforcing IEA.     

博弈论在环境保护中的应用

阐述了博弈论的基本理论在环境保护中的应用,分析结果指出应结合市场机制和政府政策改变博弈方的收益,使博弈达到有利于环境保护的纳什均衡,提高环境保护效率;并探讨了博弈论在环境保护中应用的关键技术与策略。     

Climate treaties and approaching catastrophes

If the threshold that triggers climate catastrophe is known with certainty, and the benefits of avoiding catastrophe are high relative to the costs, treaties can easily coordinate countries' behavior so as to avoid the threshold. Where the net benefits of avoiding catastrophe are lower, treaties typically fail to help countries cooperate to avoid catastrophe, sustaining only modest cuts in emissions. These results are unaffected by uncertainty about the impact of catastrophe. By contrast, uncertainty about the catastrophic threshold normally causes coordination to collapse. Whether the probability density function has “thin” or “fat” tails makes little difference.     

Do voluntary international environmental agreements work?

We consider the effects of international environmental agreements using the 1988 Sofia Protocol on the reduction of nitrogen oxides. Panel data on 23 European countries for the period 1985–96 is used to evaluate the impact on emissions by dividing countries into participants and non-participants: that is, those that did and those that did not ratify the Sofia Protocol. Using a difference in difference estimator and controlling for country-specific variables, we find that signing the treaty had a significant positive impact on emission reduction. The estimated yearly reduction in emissions is approximately 2.1% greater than it would have been without the Sofia Protocol.     

Gaining Traction: Retreading the Wheels of Marine Conservation

Abstract:  A number of international treaties address the conservation of marine resources. The declining state of the world's oceans suggests that these treaties are not succeeding and could use improvement. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) is increasingly embracing the conservation of marine species. We examine the evolution of marine species protection under CITES and illuminate some of the mechanisms used and challenges faced in implementing CITES protection. We found that clarification is needed on when and where CITES applies and how CITES should work with other treaties and institutions. The Society for Conservation Biology (SCB) can contribute to increased effectiveness of CITES for marine conservation. Foremost, the SCB community could foster dialogue on creating a broad vision of how CITES should apply to marine species and how it can synergistically interact with other important marine-conservation treaties and institutions. More specific contributions could focus on defining listing criteria for marine species, improving the science behind the nondetriment finding, and offering technical guidance on species proposals. A future role for SCB could be to contribute to the enhanced effectiveness of other marine conservation agreements such as the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, the International Whaling Commission, and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea .     

Fish wars and cooperation maintenance

In this paper, a discrete-time game model related to a bioresource management problem (fish catching) is considered. We divide a fishery into regions, which are exploited by single players. The center (referee) shares a reservoir between the competitors. The players (countries), which harvest the fish stock are the participants of this game.We assume that there are migratory exchanges between the regions of the reservoir. Therefore, the stock in one region depends not only on the previous stock and catch in the region, but also on the stock and catch in neighboring regions. We derive the Nash and cooperative equilibria for an infinite planning horizon.We consider two ways to maintain the cooperation: incentive equilibrium and time-consistent imputation distribution procedure. We investigate the cooperative incentive equilibrium in the case when the center punishes players for a deviation.Also we consider the case when the center is a player and find the Shapley value and time-consistent imputation distribution procedure. We introduce a new condition which offers an incentive to players to keep cooperating.     

14C of grasses as an indicator of fossil fuel CO2 pollution

Measuring the amount of fossil fuel carbon stored in the vegetation is now crucial to understand the mechanisms ruling climate changes. In this respect, highly polluted areas such as major towns represent “natural” laboratories because fossil fuel CO₂ (¹⁴C-free) is isotopically distinct from mean atmospheric CO₂ (¹⁴C-labeled). Here, a¹⁴C study of urban grasses near a major highway in Paris, France, shows that plants store up to 13% of fossil fuel carbon. The ¹⁴C composition of urban grasses is thus a novel parameter to assess the fossil fuel CO₂ pollution.     

Domestic politics and the formation of international environmental agreements

We investigate the effect of domestic politics on international environmental policy by incorporating into a classic stage game of coalition formation the phenomenon of lobbying by special-interest groups. In doing so, we contribute to the theory of international environmental agreements, which has overwhelmingly assumed that governments make decisions based on a single set of public-interest motivations. Our results suggest that lobbying on emissions may affect the size of the stable coalition in counterintuitive ways. In particular, a powerful business lobby may increase the government's incentives to sign an agreement, by providing it with strong bargaining power with respect to that lobby at the emission stage. This would result in lower total emissions when the number of countries involved is not too large. We also show that things change radically when lobbying bears directly on the membership decisions, suggesting that both the object and timing of lobbying matter for the way in which membership decisions, emissions and welfare are affected.     

Strategic implications of counter-geoengineering: Clash or cooperation?

Solar geoengineering has received increasing attention as an option to temporarily stabilize global temperatures. A key concern is that heterogeneous preferences over the optimal amount of cooling combined with low deployment costs may allow the country with the strongest incentive for cooling, the so-called free-driver, to impose a substantial externality on the rest of the world. We analyze whether the threat of counter-geoengineering technologies capable of negating the climatic effects of solar geoengineering can overcome the free-driver problem and tilt the game in favour of international cooperation. Our game-theoretical model of countries with asymmetric preferences allows for a rigorous analysis of the strategic interaction surrounding solar geoengineering and counter-geoengineering. We find that counter-geoengineering prevents the free-driver outcome, but not always with benign effects. The presence of counter-geoengineering leads to either a climate clash where countries engage in a non-cooperative escalation of opposing climate interventions (negative welfare effect), a moratorium treaty where countries commit to abstain from either type of climate intervention (indeterminate welfare effect), or cooperative deployment of solar geoengineering (positive welfare effect). We show that the outcome depends crucially on the degree of asymmetry in temperature preferences between countries.     

Build it,but will they come? Evidence from consumer choice between gasoline and sugarcane ethanol

How consumers might switch from gasoline and diesel to alternative energy sources is not known, since the availability of alternatives is currently very limited. To bridge this gap, we exploit exogenous variation in ethanol prices at Brazil's pumps and uncover substantial consumer heterogeneity in the choice between long-established gasoline and an alternative that is similarly available and usable: sugarcane ethanol. We observe roughly 20% of flexible-fuel motorists choosing gasoline when gasoline is priced 20% above ethanol in energy-adjusted terms ($/mile) and, similarly, 20% of motorists choosing ethanol when ethanol is priced 20% above gasoline. We use transaction-level data to explore “non-price” characteristics which differentiate the two goods in the minds of different groups of consumers. Our findings suggest—and a counterfactual illustrates—that switching away from gasoline en masse, should this be desired, would require considerable price discounts to boost voluntary adoption, in the US and elsewhere.     

Knowledge-based decision-making model for the management of transit system alternative fuel infrastructures

Energy-efficient and environmentally sustainable public transportation systems are within the solution space provided by alternative fuel vehicles. Given the large revenue service potential of alternative fuel buses within the urban space, they are good candidates for emissions reductions when they are employed as part of a comprehensive urban transit planning process. The determination of the most appropriate alternative fuel bus asset for a given application is not necessarily that straightforward. The typical bus fleet is developed over a broad time horizon with each asset being acquired to meet a certain agency need or to close a perceived gap in the delivery of public transportation service. Therefore, as new assets are considered, it is critical for the fleet manager to consider as many factors of the fleet infrastructure to better ensure the positive impact that the newly acquired asset will have on fleet performance relative to the overall service goals and objectives of the fleet. This study investigates a broad range of alternative fuel bus technologies and the associated factors that will inform the decision-making process. Further, this work utilizes the inventory and understanding of the range of technology factors and leverages the perspective knowledge of industry experts on each of these factors to develop an expert systems decision-making philosophy to aid in the adoption of industry standards, best practices, consistency and sustainability in fleet asset management over time.