The additionality problem with offsets: Optimal contracts for carbon sequestration in forests

Carbon offsets are a frequently discussed tool for reducing the costs of an emissions reduction policy. However, offsets have a basic problem stemming from asymmetric information. Sellers of offsets have private information about their opportunity costs, leading to concerns about whether offsets are additional. Non-additional offsets can undermine a cap-and-trade program or, if the government purchases them directly, result in enormous government expenditures. We analyze contracts for carbon sequestration in forests that mitigate the asymmetric information problem. Landowners are offered a menu of two-part contracts that induces them to reveal their type. Under this scheme, the government is able to identify ex post how much additional forest each landowner contributes and minimize ex ante its expenditures on carbon sequestration. To explore the performance of the contracting scheme, we conduct a national-scale simulation using an econometric model of land-use change. The results indicate that for an increase in forest area of 61 million acres, government expenditures are $5.3 billion lower under the contracting approach compared to a uniform subsidy offered to all landowners. This compares to an increase in private opportunity costs of just $110 million dollars under the contracts. Thus, the contracting scheme is preferable from society's perspective.     

Tell the truth or not? The montero mechanism for emissions control at work

We experimentally test the truth-telling mechanism proposed by Montero (2008) for eliciting firms' abatement costs. We compare this mechanism with two well-known alternative allocation mechanisms, free and costly allocation of permits at the Pigouvian price. Controlling for the number of firms and the firms' maximal emissions, we find that, in line with the theoretical predictions, firms over-report their maximal emissions under free allocation of permits and under-report these under costly allocation of permits. Under Montero's mechanism, by contrast, firms almost always report their maximal emissions truthfully. However, in terms of efficiency, the difference between Montero's mechanism and costly allocation disappears with industries including more than one firm.     

Verifiable and non-verifiable anonymous mechanisms for regulating a polluting monopolist

Optimal regulation of a polluting natural monopolist must correct for both external damages and market power to achieve a social optimum. Existing non-Bayesian regulatory methods require knowledge of the demand function, while Bayesian schemes require knowledge of the underlying cost distribution. We introduce mechanisms adapted to use less information. Our Price-based Subsidy (PS) mechanisms give the firm a transfer that matches or approximates the incremental surplus generated each period. The regulator need not observe the abatement activity or know the demand, cost, or damage functions of the firm. All of the mechanisms induce the firm to price at marginal social cost, either immediately or asymptotically.     

Spatial economic theory of pollution control

In February 1972 the Nixon Administration proposed a tax on sulfur oxide emissions, beyond the Federal standards, of electric power plants. It was hoped that such a tax would discourage power plant locations in heavily polluted areas like urban areas. Assuming that such a tax varies over space because pollution is not invariant over space, the spatial theory of the firm is presented in this paper cast doubt on the efficacy of such a polltuion tax to achieve the desired goal of the administration. In particular it is shown that the cost-minimizing spatial firm would abate its pollution in response to a tax by either changing its location or by reducing waste through process change or by using a transportable abatement good if the tax savings due to the change in marginal abatement through location change per unit change in abatement is greater than or equal to transport rate on the abatement good. If the goal of the firm is to maximize profits, the desired outcome would follow if in addition to the fulfillment of the above condition the percentage change in the delivered price of raw material (situated at one end of the linear location space) per unit distance is greater than or equal to the percentage change in net marginal revenue, i.e., marginal revenue net of transport cost per unit of output. In simple terms, the conclusions of this paper raise doubts regarding the effectiveness of a pollution tax in curtailing pollution of a firm which is operating in a space economy. This outcome is peculiar to a spatial firm. Sufficient conditions also have been obtained when land input is included in the production function of the firm.     

Verifiable and non-verifiable anonymous mechanisms for regulating a polluting monopolist

Optimal regulation of a polluting natural monopolist must correct for both external damages and market power to achieve a social optimum. Existing non-Bayesian regulatory methods require knowledge of the demand function, while Bayesian schemes require knowledge of the underlying cost distribution. We introduce mechanisms adapted to use less information. Our Price-based Subsidy (PS) mechanisms give the firm a transfer that matches or approximates the incremental surplus generated each period. The regulator need not observe the abatement activity or know the demand, cost, or damage functions of the firm. All of the mechanisms induce the firm to price at marginal social cost, either immediately or asymptotically.     

Investment in cleaner technology and signaling distortions in a market with green consumers

I analyze the pricing and investment behavior of a firm that signals the environmental attributes of its production technology through its price to uninformed environmentally conscious consumers. I then analyze the effect of change in environmental regulation on the signaling outcome and the firm's ex ante incentive to invest in cleaner technology. When regulation is weak, a firm signals cleaner technology through higher price; in this case, the firm earns lower profit when it has cleaner technology and thus, has no incentive to invest in cleaner technology. The price charged by the clean firm declines sharply beyond a critical level of regulation. When regulation is sufficiently stringent, the firm with cleaner technology charges lower price but earns higher signaling profit, and ex ante the firm has positive incentive to invest in cleaner technology. With weak regulation, the incentive of the firm to directly disclose its environmental performance rather than signal it through price is increasing in the level of regulation; the opposite holds when regulation is sufficiently stringent.     

Investment in cleaner technology and signaling distortions in a market with green consumers

I analyze the pricing and investment behavior of a firm that signals the environmental attributes of its production technology through its price to uninformed environmentally conscious consumers. I then analyze the effect of change in environmental regulation on the signaling outcome and the firm's ex ante incentive to invest in cleaner technology. When regulation is weak, a firm signals cleaner technology through higher price; in this case, the firm earns lower profit when it has cleaner technology and thus, has no incentive to invest in cleaner technology. The price charged by the clean firm declines sharply beyond a critical level of regulation. When regulation is sufficiently stringent, the firm with cleaner technology charges lower price but earns higher signaling profit, and ex ante the firm has positive incentive to invest in cleaner technology. With weak regulation, the incentive of the firm to directly disclose its environmental performance rather than signal it through price is increasing in the level of regulation; the opposite holds when regulation is sufficiently stringent.     

Entry Deterrence and Signaling in a Nonrenewable Resource Model

We analyze a nonrenewable resource model in which an incumbent firm faces potential entry from a rival firm. The incumbent has private information about its stock size but the rival can observe extraction. With observable extraction and unobservable stock, the rival can use extraction as a signal about stock, from which it can infer whether entry is likely to be profitable. We characterize the necessary conditions for pooling and separating perfect Bayesian equilibria in a signaling game of resource extraction and provide examples of each. We show that the incumbent will often prefer pooling to separating even though welfare is higher in separating equilibrium.     

Equilibrium Prices in a Vertically Coordinated Fishery

Competition among processing firms is analyzed in a fishery that is managed under a total allowable catch constraint. Firms compete first in the ex-vessel market for round fish and then in the downstream consumer market. Nash equilibrium prices are characterized at each stage of the vertical market. When the number of processors is sufficiently large, equilibrium prices are approximately Walrasian. The ex-vessel price is close to the processor marginal valuation of the round fish and the consumer price clears the total quantity of processed fish. Implications for market structure, conduct and performance, and fisheries management policy are drawn.     

The Role of Prices in Conserving Critical Natural Capital

Abstract: Until recent decades, economic decision makers have largely ignored the nonmarket benefits provided by nature, resulting in unprecedented threats to ecological life‐support functions. The economic challenge today is to decide how much ecosystem structure can be converted to economic production and how much must be conserved to provide essential ecosystem services. Many economists and a growing number of life scientists hope to address this challenge by estimating the marginal value of environmental benefits and then using this information to make economic decisions. I assessed this approach first by examining the role and effectiveness of the price mechanism in a well‐functioning market economy, second by identifying the issues that prevent markets from pricing many ecological benefits, and third by focusing on problems inherent to valuing services generated by complex and poorly understood ecosystems subject to irreversible change. I then focus on critical natural capital (CNC), which generates benefits that are essential to human welfare and have few if any substitutes. When imminent ecological thresholds threaten CNC, conservation is essential and marginal valuation becomes inappropriate. Once conservation needs have been met, remaining ecosystem structure is potentially available for economic production. Demand for this available supply will determine prices. In other words, conservation needs should be price determining, not price determined. Conservation science must help identify CNC and the quantity and quality of ecosystem structure required to ensure its sustained provision.     

The Weitzman price corner

The standard theoretical approach to comparing price and quantity policies is strictly interior. We extend the comparison to account for the possibility of corner outcomes, where a polluting industry responds to a tax by abating either completely or not at all. We show that, when the uncertainty in marginal costs is high, the inclusion of corner outcomes confers an extra and unnoticed advantage upon an emissions tax. In situations where the standard approach would recommend a quantity policy, the possibility of corners can reverse that recommendation.     

Prices vs quantities with multiple pollutants

We examine the choice of policy instruments (price, quantity or a mix of the two) when two pollutants are regulated and firms' abatement costs are private information. Whether abatement efforts are complements or substitutes is key determining the choice of policies. When pollutants are complements, a mixed policy instrument with a tax on one pollutant and a quota on another is sometimes preferable even if the pollutants are identical in terms of benefits and costs of abatement. Yet, if they are substitutes, the mixed policy is dominated by taxes or quotas.     

Modeling the impact of uncertainty in emissions trading markets with bankable permits

The various forms of uncertainty that firms may face in bankable emission permit trading markets will affect firms’ decision making as well as their market performance. This research explores the effect of increased uncertainty over future input costs and output prices on the temporal distribution of emission. In a dynamic programming setting, the permit price is a convex function of stochastic prices of coal and electricity. Increased uncertainty about future market conditions increases the expected permit price and causes a risk neutral firm to reduce ex ante emissions in order to smooth out marginal abatement costs over time. Finally, safety valves, both low-side and high-side, are suggested to reduce the impact of uncertainty in bankable emission trading markets.     

Environmental policy à la carte: Letting firms choose their regulation

Under uncertainty, the optimal choice between price and quantity instruments depends on the technology of the regulated firms, which is often private information. We consider an environmental policy that delegates the prices-versus-quantities decision to the firms by offering them the choice between an emissions tax and permit trading. Such an approach is currently used in Swiss climate policy. We provide a detailed characterization of the optimal policy and show that this approach reduces expected social costs compared to a pure tax or permit-trading regime. We demonstrate that an optimal allocation of firms to instruments can be achieved despite substantial informational constraints, and that all firms gain from the introduction of the instrument choice compared to optimally designed single-instrument policies. Furthermore, we discuss the conditions under which this approach is likely to be preferable to a hybrid regulation.     

Locational pricing of an environmental input

This paper models the joint production of outputs and heterogeneous effluents for firms exogenously located along a river. We derive location-specific water quality standards that reflect the nonsymmetric impact of upstream discharge relative to that same discharge further downstream. Depending on the type of sequential firm interdependence, a water control agency may or may not be able to insure efficient input choices by decentralizing these choices to the firms. Under certain conditions we can derive site-specific price aggregates to reflect the social imputed value of a particular type effluent released at a given site. If each firm is assigned responsibility for cumulative water quality just below its drain pipe, then water quality control may be modeled as an application of nonsymmetric recursive decision making.     

Implementing optimal taxes using tradable share permits

This paper presents a simple system for efficient regulation under asymmetric information. Each firm's income is controlled by a tax that depends on the firm's own output and on a parameter construed as a share permit. These “shares of total expected output” lower a firm's tax burden and are acquired in a competitive market. By employing this scheme, the planner only requires knowledge of marginal damage to induce the first-best outcome. Relative to a traditional cap-and-trade approach the system increases expected social welfare.     

Regulation with direct benefits of information disclosure and imperfect monitoring

We model the optimal design of programs requiring heterogeneous firms to disclose harmful emissions when disclosure yields both direct and indirect benefits. The indirect benefit arises from the internalization of social costs and resulting reduction in emissions. The direct benefit results from the disclosure of previously private information which is valuable to potentially harmed parties. Previous theoretical and empirical analyses of such programs restrict attention to the former benefit while the stated motivation for such programs highlights the latter benefit. When disclosure yields both direct and indirect benefits, policymakers face a tradeoff between inducing truthful self-reporting and deterring emissions. Internalizing the social costs of emissions, such as through an emissions tax, will deter emissions, but may also reduce incentives for firms to truthfully report their emissions.     

Implementing optimal taxes using tradable share permits

This paper presents a simple system for efficient regulation under asymmetric information. Each firm's income is controlled by a tax that depends on the firm's own output and on a parameter construed as a share permit. These “shares of total expected output” lower a firm's tax burden and are acquired in a competitive market. By employing this scheme, the planner only requires knowledge of marginal damage to induce the first-best outcome. Relative to a traditional cap-and-trade approach the system increases expected social welfare.     

Do environmental right-to-know laws affect markets? Capitalization of information in the toxic release inventory

This paper investigates how information contained in the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) program, one of the largest environmental right-to-know programs, affects prices in the housing market. I use a strengthening of the reporting requirements for the chemical lead in 2001 as exogenous variation to test for housing price changes near existing firms who must now report. Using a difference-in-differences specification, I find that listing an existing firm in the Toxic Release Inventory lowers housing prices up to 11% within approximately 1 mile. The results suggest that housing market participants do capitalize into prices at least some information conveyed by the TRI program.     

The value of information in resource exploration: The interaction of strategic plays and institutional rules

Several characteristics of information used in resource exploration have led to conjectures that the private market will provide a suboptimal amount of such information. A public information provision has been proposed as a remedy, both for problems of underproduction and overproduction of private information. This paper demonstrates that, barring exceptional conditions, public provision of information cannot be guaranteed to be a generic solution to the private information overprovision problem. In fact, an example is developed to demonstrate the possibility that public information exacerbates the private overprovision problem.