Tax evasion and optimal environmental taxes

This paper introduces a new argument to the debate about the role of environmental taxes in modern tax systems. Some environmental taxes, particularly taxes on gasoline or electricity, are more difficult to evade than taxes on labor or income. When the tax base is shifted in a revenue-neutral manner toward these environmental taxes, the result is a net reduction in the amount of tax evasion. Using a carbon tax as a motivating example, the “tax evasion effect” is shown to sharply reduce the welfare cost of controlling emissions. A simple computable general equilibrium model suggests that the impact of considering tax evasion can be large: costs are lowered by 28% in the United States, by 89% in China, and by 97% in India. In countries with high levels of pre-existing tax evasion, a carbon tax will pay for itself through improvements in the efficiency of the tax system.     

Market equilibrium and welfare effects of a fuel tax in China: The impact of consumers' response through driving patterns

We investigate the market equilibrium and welfare effects of a fuel tax in China relative to an alternative policy instrument that rations the number of new automobile sales through auctioned quotas. Unlike those of previous studies, our modeling approach incorporates both household car purchase and utilization decisions, the latter of which have been ignored in previous studies on China's fuel tax. Ignoring this margin of choice will underestimate the fuel tax's ability to mitigate externalities. Using detailed household-level panel data and a fixed effects econometric specification, we estimate the fuel price elasticity of vehicle miles traveled is −0.59 on average. The results of the counterfactual analysis suggest that a 51% increase in tax-inclusive gasoline prices will reduce car sales by 24.9% but increase social welfare to a degree that depends on vehicles' lifetime. We find that compared to auctioned quotas, the fuel tax results in greater car sales but higher social welfare.     

Effects of Carbon Taxes in an Economy with Prior Tax Distortions: An Intertemporal General Equilibrium Analysis

This paper analyzes the costs of carbon taxes in a model that recognizes interactions between this tax and pre-existing taxes. First we examine the extent to which costs of a U.S. carbon tax are reduced when its revenues finance cuts in income taxes. Such use of revenues significantly reduces, but does not eliminate, the overall policy costs. The positive overall costs reflect the carbon tax′s focus on intermediate inputs and its relatively narrow base in comparison with income taxes. We also examine the sensitivity of the carbon tax′s costs to the level of pre-existing taxes. For any given use of revenues, welfare costs rise significantly with pre-existing tax rates, indicating that models disregarding pre-existing taxes may substantially understate the costs of new environmental tax initiatives.     

Optimal policy instruments for externality-producing durable goods under present bias

When consumers exhibit present bias, the standard solution to market failures caused by externalities—Pigouvian pricing—is suboptimal. I investigate policies aimed at externalities for present-biased consumers. Optimal policy includes an instrument to correct the externality and an instrument to correct the present bias. Either instrument can be an incentive-based policy (e.g. a tax on fuel economy) or a command-and-control policy (e.g. a fuel economy mandate). Under consumer heterogeneity, a command-and-control policy may dominate an incentive-based policy. Calibrated to the US automobile market, simulation results suggest that the second-best gasoline tax is 3–30% higher than marginal external damages. The optimal price policy includes a gasoline tax set about equal to marginal external damages and a fuel economy tax that increases the price of an average non-hybrid car by about $550–$2200 relative to the price of an average hybrid car.     

Carbon abatement in the fuel market with biofuels: Implications for second best policies

A carbon tax on fuel would penalize carbon intensive fuels like gasoline and shift fuel consumption to less carbon intensive alternatives like biofuels. Since biofuel production competes for land with agricultural production, a carbon tax could increase land rents and raise food prices. This paper analyzes the welfare effect of a carbon tax on fuel consisting of gasoline and biofuel in the presence of a labor tax, with and without a biofuel subsidy. The market impacts of a carbon tax are also compared with that of a subsidy. Findings show that if a carbon tax increases biofuel demand, the tax interaction effect due to higher fuel prices is exacerbated by higher land rent and food prices and greater erosion of the carbon tax base. Thus, the second best optimal carbon tax for fuel is lower with biofuel in the fuel mix, especially if biofuel is subsidized.     

Vertical fiscal externalities and the environment

We show that imposition of a state-level environmental tax in a federation crowds out pre-existing federal taxes. We explain how this vertical fiscal externality can lead unilateral state-level environmental policy to generate a welfare gain in the implementing state, at the expense of other states, even absent any environmental benefits. Using a computable general equilibrium model of the Canadian federation, we show that vertical fiscal externalities can be the major determinant of the welfare change following environmental policy implementation by a state government. Our numerical simulations indicate that – as a consequence of vertical fiscal externalities – state governments can reduce greenhouse gas emissions by over 20 percent without any net cost to themselves.     

Pigou meets Mirrlees: On the irrelevance of tax distortions for the second-best Pigouvian tax

This paper extends the Mirrlees (1971) model of optimal income redistribution with optimal corrective taxes to internalize consumption externalities. Using general utility structures and exploring both linear and non-linear taxes, it is demonstrated that the optimal second-best tax on an externality-generating good should not be corrected for the marginal cost of public funds, since it equals one in the optimal tax system. In the optimum, distortions of income taxes are equal to marginal redistributional gains. If the government does not have access to a non-distortionary marginal source of finance, the marginal cost of public funds can be either larger or smaller than one depending on subjective preferences for income redistribution. The optimal second-best corrective tax is then either higher or lower than the Pigouvian level. The findings in this paper generalize and amend prior results based on representative-agent models, shedding new light on the weak double-dividend hypothesis, and on the welfare gains of recycling revenue from environmental taxes.     

Efficiency of pollution taxation and market structure

This paper looks at the performance of a uniform pollution tax in achieving a given level of pollution abatement at least cost. It is shown that market structure is an important consideration in this performance and that in general least-cost abatement will not result from a pollution tax uniformly applied. The pattern of pollution taxes that will achieve least-cost abatement when differing degrees of market power exist among polluters is developed and discussed.     

Tax versus emissions trading scheme in the long run

In this paper we compare the performance of emission taxes and tradable permits under free market entry when firms face idiosyncratic ex ante cost uncertainty. We show that under auctioned permits insufficient entry occurs, while under a linear emission tax scheme, depending on parameters, market entry can be either excessive or insufficient. Our long-run analysis thus contrasts with Spulber׳s (1985) equivalence result and also modifies Weitzman׳s result in favor of an ETS in that the superiority of a tax over an ETS is not guaranteed, even when the Weitzman condition favors a tax. We also show that an ETS is superior to a tax scheme when the entry cost is low and the magnitude of uncertainty/asymmetric information and the size of the output market are large.     

Incomplete International Cooperation to Reduce CO2 Emissions: The Case of Price Discrimination

This paper analyzes the effect of introducing a fuel tax in some countries, but not all, when the world fuel market is monopolistic. Based on the observation that price discrimination becomes possible in these circumstances, it is shown that the fuel price in countries not levying the tax may increase, in contrast to common views.     

Energy taxes and endogenous technological change

This paper studies the effects of a tax on energy use in a growth model where market structure is endogenous and jointly determined with the rate of technological change. Because this economy does not exhibit the scale effect (a positive relation between TFP growth and aggregate R&D), the tax has no effect on the steady-state growth rate. It has, however, important transitional effects that give rise to surprising results. Specifically, under the plausible assumption that energy demand is inelastic, there may exist a hump-shaped relation between the energy tax and welfare. This shape stems from the fact that the reallocation of resources from energy production to manufacturing triggers a temporary acceleration of TFP growth that generates a √-shaped time profile of consumption. If endogenous technological change raises consumption sufficiently fast and by a sufficient amount in the long run, and households are sufficiently patient, the tax raises welfare despite the fact that—in line with standard intuition—it lowers consumption in the short run.     

The effect of diesel fuel on common vetch (Vicia sativa L.) plants

When petroleum hydrocarbons contaminate soil, the carbon:nitrogen (C:N) ratio of the soil is altered. The added carbon stimulates microbial numbers but causes an imbalance in the C:N ratio which may result in immobilization of soil nitrogen by the microbial biomass, leaving none available for plant growth. As members of Leguminosae fix atmospheric nitrogen to produce their own nitrogen for growth, they may prove more successful at growing on petroleum hydrocarbon contaminated sites. During a wider study on phytoremediation of diesel fuel contaminated soil, particular attention was given to the performance of legumes versus other plant species. During harvesting of pot experiments containing leguminous plants, a recurring difference in the number and formation of root nodules present on control and contaminated Common vetch (Vicia sativa L.) plants was observed. The total number of nodules per plant was significantly reduced in contaminated plants compared to control plants but nodules on contaminated plants were more developed than corresponding nodules on control plants. Plant performance of Common vetch and Westerwold's ryegrass (Lolium multiflorum L.) was compared to illustrate any difference between the ability of legumes and grasses to grow on diesel fuel contaminated soil. Common vetch was less affected by diesel fuel and performed better in low levels of diesel fuel contaminated soil than Westerwolds ryegrass. The total amount of diesel fuel remaining after 4 months in Common vetch planted soil was slightly less than in Westerwolds ryegrass planted soil.     

Redistribution and pollution taxes with non-linear Engel curves

This paper analyses optimal corrective taxation and optimal income redistribution. The Pigouvian pollution tax is higher if pollution damages disproportionally hurt the poor due to equity weighting of pollution damages. Moreover, under general utility functions, optimal pollution taxes should be set below the Pigouvian tax if the poor spend a disproportionate fraction of their income on polluting goods. However, if Engel curves are linear, optimal pollution taxes should follow the first-best rule for the Pigouvian corrective tax even if the government wants to redistribute income and the poor spend a disproportional part of their income on polluting goods. The often-used quasi-linear, CES and Stone-Geary utility functions all have linear Engel curves. If Engel curves are linear, and if pollution taxes are not optimised, Pareto-improving green tax reforms exist that move the pollution tax closer to the Pigouvian tax. Simulations demonstrate that optimal corrective taxes should be Pigouvian if the demand for polluting goods is derived from a LES demand system, but deviate from the Pigouvian taxes if demand for polluting goods demand is derived from a PIGLOG demand system.     

A comparative study of particle size distribution from two oxygenated fuels and diesel fuel

Oxygenated fuels are known to reduce particulate matter (PM) emissions from diesel engines. In this study, 100% soy methyl ester (SME) biodiesel fuel (B100) and a blend of 10% acetal denoted by A-diesel with diesel fuel were tested as oxygenated fuels. Particle size and number distributions from a diesel engine fueled with oxygenated fuels and base diesel fuel were measured using an Electrical Low Pressure Impactor (ELPI). Measurements were made at ten steady-state operational modes of various loads at two engine speeds. It was found that the geometric mean diameters of particles from SME and Adiesel were lower than that from base diesel fuel. Compared to diesel fuel, SME emitted more ultra-fine particles at rated speed while emitting less ultra-fine particles at maximum speed. Ultra-fine particle number concentrations of A-diesel were much higher than those of base diesel fuel at most test modes.     

Fuel consumption and gasoline prices: The role of assortative matching between households and automobiles

Analyses of policies to reduce gasoline consumption have focused on two effects, a compositional effect on the fuel economy of the automotive fleet and a utilization effect on how much people drive. However, the literature has missed a third effect: a matching effect, in which policies change how high-utilization households are matched to fuel-efficient vehicles in equilibrium. We show that higher gas prices should lead to stronger assortative matching. Empirical estimates using US micro-level data are consistent with this hypothesis. We find a $0.50 increase in the gas tax would reduce US gas consumption by 0.8% through the matching effect alone, bringing annual environmental benefits of about $1.7 billion.     

Is there a double-dividend from anti-sprawl policies?

This paper examines the welfare effects of anti-sprawl policies, such as development tax, in a simple spatial explicit urban model with two market failures - urban decline at the city core and underprovision of open space amenities at the urban fringe - and pre-existing distortionary property tax, used to fund public services and improvements to mitigate urban decline. Consistent with prior double-dividend literature, there is a tax interaction effect that occurs between the development tax and the pre-existing property tax. However, there are two fundamental differences between the tax interaction effect identified here and that of prior literature. Ours one has two components: First, there is a cost-side tax interaction effect that is ‘spatially’ concentrated at the urban fringe, as only agents at the urban fringe alter their behavior in response to the development tax. Second, there is also a benefit-side tax interaction effect, as increases in open space at the urban fringe are capitalized into housing prices throughout the city. In contrast to prior literature, we find that the empirical importance of the combined tax interaction effect is of substantially less importance and, as a consequence, the likelihood of a ‘double-dividend’ is higher than in prior studies. Further, we show that the development tax should be part of the local tax system, even in the absence of open space benefits.     

Oil Exploration under Climate Treaties

In this paper we focus on how an international climate treaty will influence the exploration of oil in non-OPEC countries. We present a numerical intertemporal global equilibrium model for the fossil fuel markets. The international oil market is modelled with a cartel (OPEC) and a competitive fringe on the supply side, following a Nash–Cournot approach. An initial resource base for oil is given in the non-OPEC region. However, the resource base changes over time due to depletion, exploration, and discovery. When studying the effects of different climate treaties on oil exploration, two contrasting incentives apply. If an international carbon tax is introduced, the producer price of oil will drop compared to the reference case. This gives an incentive to reduce oil production and exploration. However, the oil price may increase less rapidly over time, which gives an incentive to expedite production and exploration. In fact, in the case of a rising carbon tax we find the last incentive to be the strongest, which means that an international climate treaty may increase oil exploration in non-OPEC countries for the coming decades and reduce OPEC's market share.     

Salience of carbon taxes in the gasoline market

We demonstrate that the carbon tax imposed by the Canadian province of British Columbia caused a decline in short-run gasoline demand that is significantly greater than would be expected from an equivalent increase in the market price of gasoline. That the carbon tax is more salient, or yields a larger change in demand than equivalent market price movements, is robust to a range of specifications. As a result of the large consumer response to the tax, we calculate that during its first four years, the tax reduced carbon dioxide emissions from gasoline consumption by 2.4 million tonnes.     

Strategic pollution control and capital tax competition

In an analytical model of symmetric countries with mobile capital and local or transboundary pollution we investigate whether competition in emissions taxes (or emissions caps) and capital taxes leads to efficient outcomes when governments act strategically. When they have capital taxes and emissions caps at their disposal, they refrain from taxing capital and set their caps inefficiently lax [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. When they have the option to tax capital and emissions, capital is subsidized [untaxed] and emissions taxes are inefficiently low [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. In case of transboundary pollution emissions caps are Pareto-superior to emissions taxes. That holds regardless of whether the environmental policy is applied as stand-alone policy or combined with capital tax competition.     

Substituting pollution taxation for general taxation: Some implications for efficiency in pollutions taxation

Earlier papers have recognized that nonenvironmental benefits will be realized if pollution taxes are substituted for other taxes which impose efficiency losses on society. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the importance of these nonenvironmental benefits for the design of an efficient pollution tax. It is found that the efficient tax may be higher or lower than that conventionally defined as optimal, and that the net benefit from unrestrained pollution can have important implications for the size of the tax.