Who can be morally obligated to be a vegetarian?

Kathryn Paxton George has recently argued that vegetarianism cannot be a moral obligation for most human beings, even if Tom Regan is correct in arguing that humans and certain nonhuman animals are equally inherently valuable. She holds that Regan's liberty principle permits humans to kill and eat innocent others who have a right to life, provided that doing so prevents humans from being made worse off. George maintains that obstaining from meat and dairy products would in fact make most humans worse off. I argue that Regan's liberty principle either contradicts his equal rights view or does not permit the slaughter of another for food. I show that a different view recognizing the moral rights of nonhumans but according them less value than normal adult humans, the unequal rights view, would permit such action if human survival or health depended upon it. However, it would also permit the slaughter of innocent humans in the same circumstances. Finally, I argue that current nutritional research does not support George's contention that most humans would suffer if they ceased eating other animals and their products.     

On vegetarianism,morality, and science: A counter reply

I recently took issue with Kathryn George's contention that vegetarianism cannot be a moral obligation for most human beings, even assuming that Tom Regan's stringent thesis about the equal inherent value of humans and many sentient nonhumans is correct. I argued that both Regan and George are incorrect in claiming that his view would permit moral agents to kill and eat innocent, non-threatening rights holders. An unequal rights view, by contrast, would permit such actions if a moral agent's health or life is at stake. I then argued that current nutritional research does not support Professor George's claim that some wealthy adult males (and many fewer wealthy women) are the only persons whose health does not require the consumption of nonhuman animals and their products. In her 1992 response to my critique, George did not address my moral argumentation. She concentrated her entire paper on a wholesale rejection of my discussion of nutrition. Although she now takes a somewhat more moderate position on who can safely contemplate strict vegetarianism, she still believes that most people are not in a position to follow such a diet. In my counter-reply, I argue that her rejection is based upon numerous distortions, omissions, and false charges of fallacy. She even devotes a substantial section of her paper to criticizing me for saying the opposite of what I actually wrote. As I did in my earlier paper, I cite current research, including George's own preferred source on the topic of vegetarianism, to support my view. I conclude that Professor George has still not shown that for most human beings it is dangerous to follow a diet that omits nonhuman animals and their products. Moral agents who take the rights of humansand nonhumans seriously will find vegetarianism well worth considering.     

The Least Harm Principle May Require that Humans Consume a Diet Containing Large Herbivores, Not a Vegan Diet

Based on his theory of animalrights, Regan concludes that humans are morallyobligated to consume a vegetarian or vegandiet. When it was pointed out to him that evena vegan diet results in the loss of manyanimals of the field, he said that while thatmay be true, we are still obligated to consumea vegetarian/vegan diet because in total itwould cause the least harm to animals (LeastHarm Principle, or LHP) as compared to currentagriculture. But is that conclusion valid? Isit possible that some other agriculturalproduction alternatives may result in leastharm to animals? An examination of thisquestion shows that the LHP may actually bebetter served using food production systemsthat include both plant-based agriculture and aforage-ruminant-based agriculture as comparedto a strict plant-based (vegan) system. Perhapswe are morally obligated to consume a dietcontaining both plants and ruminant(particularly cattle) animal products.     

The use and abuse of scientific studies

In response to Evelyn Pluhar'sWho Can Be Morally Obligated to Be a Vegetarian? in this journal issue, the author has read all of Pluhar's citations for the accuracy of her claims and had these read by an independent nutritionist. Detailed analysis of Pluhar's argument shows that she attempts to make her case by consistent misappropriation of the findings and conclusions of the studies she cites. Pluhar makes sweeping generalizations from scanty data, ignores causal explanations given by scientists, equates hypothesis with fact, draws false cause conclusions from studies, and in one case claims a conclusion opposite of what the scientist published. Such poor reasoning cannot be the basis of an argument for moral vegetarianism. A broader search of the literature and attention to reviews and textbooks in nutrition shows that each of Pluhar's claims is suspect or incorrect. Pluhar has not undermined my central claims: even if animals have certain rights and well-planned vegetarian diets are safe in complex industrialized societies, these diets cannot be so regarded if the presuppositions of high levels of wealth, education, and medical care do not exist; and, women, children, the aged and some ill persons are at greater risk on restrictive vegan diets. Thus, any duty of moral vegetarianism is not categorical but provisional in nature.     

Use and abuse revisited: Response to Pluhar and Varner

In her recent Counter-Reply to my views, Evelyn Pluhar defends her use of literature on nutrition and restates her argument for moral vegetarianism. In his Vegan Ideal article, Gary Varner claims that the nutrition literature does not show sufficient differences among women, men, and children to warrant concern about discrimination. In this response I show how Professor Pluhar continues to draw fallacious inferences: she begs the question on equality, avoids the main issue in my ethical arguments, argues from irrelevancies, misquotes her sources, equivocates on context, confuses safety with morality, appeals to fear, confuses correlation with cause, fails to evaluate scientific studies, draws hasty conclusions from insufficient data, ignores a large amount of data which would call her views into question, does not follow good scientific or moral argumentation, objectionably exceeds the limits of her expertise, and resorts to scapegoating. I also argue that Professor Varner fails to make his case because he offers virtually no evidence from scientific studies on nutrition, relies on outdated and fallacious sources, makes unsupported claims, ignores evidence that would contravene his claims, draws hasty conclusions based on weakly supported hypotheses rather than facts, employs a double standard, appeals to ignorance, does not evaluate arguments from his sources, and makes anad hominem attack on a respected nutritionist when his focus should be on evaluating the evidence and arguments from the scientific studies themselves. Neither Varner nor Pluhar have responded sufficiently to the real issue in my arguments, that of discrimination and bias in the vegan ideal.     

In defense of the vegan ideal: Rhetoric and bias in the nutrition literature

Much of the scientific literature on vegetarian nutrition leaves one with the impression that vegan diets are significantly more risky than omnivorous ones, especially for individuals with high metabolic demands (such as pregnant or lactating women and children). But nutrition researchers have tended to skew their study populations toward new vegetarians, members of religious sects with especially restrictive diets and tendencies to eschew fortified foods and medical care, and these are arguably the last people we would expect to thrive on vegan diets. Researchers also have some tendency to play up weakly confirmed risks of vegan dietsvis-à-vis equally weakly confirmed benefits. And, in spite of these methodological and rhetorical biases, for every nutrient which vegans are warned to be cognizant of, there is reason to believe that they are not at significantly greater risk of nutritional deficiency than omnivores.     

When is it morally acceptable to kill animals?

Professor Hugh Lehman has recently argued that the rights view, according to which nonhuman animals have a prima facie right to life, is compatible with the killing of animals in many circumstances, including killing for food, research, or product-testing purposes. His principle argument is an appeal to life-boat cases, in which certain lives should be sacrificed rather than others because the latter would allegedly be made worse-off by death than the former. I argue that this reasoning would apply to so-called inferior humans just as much as to animals, and that this appeal is unsuccessful in any case. I distinguish two versions of the rights view: the equal and the unequal rights views. Although the unequal rights view, unlike the equal rights view, would sanction the killing of animals (and some humans) for food under severely restricted circumstances, neither rights view sanctions the raising of animals for their meat. Moreover, neither rights view would sanction the killing of animals for research or product-testing purposes. I conclude with a brief discussion of the merits of phasing out the meat production industry.     

Utilitarian killing,replacement, and rights

The ethical theory underlying much of our treatment of animals in agriculture and research is the moral agency view. It is assumed that only moral agents, or persons, are worthy of maximal moral significance, and that farm and laboratory animals are not moral agents. However, this view also excludes human non-persons from the moral community. Utilitarianism, which bids us maximize the amount of good (utility) in the world, is an alternative ethical theory. Although it has many merits, including impartiality and the extension of moral concern to all sentient beings, it also appears to have many morally unacceptable implications. In particular, it appears to sanction the killing of innocents when utility would be maximized, including cases in which we would deliberately kill and replace a being, as we typically do to animals on farms and in laboratories. I consider a number of ingenious recent attempts by utilitarians to defeat the killing and replaceability arguments, including the attempt to make a place for genuine moral rights within a utilitarian framework. I conclude that utilitarians cannot escape the killing and replaceability objections. Those who reject the restrictive moral agency view and find they cannot accept utilitarianism's unsavory implications must look to a different ethical theory to guide their treatment of humans and non-humans.     

Discrimination and bias in the vegan ideal

The vegan ideal is entailed by arguments for ethical veganism based on traditional moral theory (rights and/or utilitarianism) extended to animals. The most ideal lifestyle would abjure the use of animals or their products for food since animals suffer and have rights not to be killed. The ideal is discriminatory because the arguments presuppose a male physiological norm that gives a privileged position to adult, middle-class males living in industrialized countries. Women, children, the aged, and others have substantially different nutritional requirements and would bear a greater burden on vegetarian and vegan diets with respect to health and economic risks, than do these males. The poor and many persons in Third World nations live in circumstances that make the obligatory adoption of such diets, where they are not already a matter of sheer necessity, even more risky.Traditional moral theorists (such as Evelyn Pluhar and Gary Varner whose essays appear in this issue) argue that those who are at risk would beexcused from a duty to attain the virtue associated with ethical vegan lifestyles. The routine excuse of nearly everyone in the world besides adult, middle-class males in industrialized countries suggests bias in the perspective from which traditional arguments for animal rights and (utilitarian) animal welfare are formulated.     

Agricultural technology,wealth, and responsibility

Responsibility as a dual to human rights is presented as a moral alternative to extended, complex systems of animal and ecological rights. This simple idea of responsibility is then applied to four levels of agricultural technology: animal (nature) rights, conservation, organization of agriculture, and people versus planet relationships. The stewardship argument is freed from at least some of the complications of animal rights and ecology, but leaves responsibility with humans to do the right thing.The views expressed are the author's and do not necessarily represent policies or views of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.     

The development of first-possession rules in US mining, 1872–1920: theory, evidence, and policy implications

This paper applies a property rights framework to federal mineral lands in the western United States from the enactment of the Mining Law in 1872 until the enactment of the Mineral Leasing Act for fossil fuels in 1920. There are two principal findings. First, the Mining Law appears to have been an effective means for assigning rights to mineral stocks on public lands (at least through 1920). This conclusion is supported by evidence from claim disputes in the West. Second, the impetus for the Mineral Leasing Act did not derive from the different physical characteristics of hardrock minerals and petroleum. The relevance of these conclusions to contemporary mineral policy is also discussed.     

Agriculture,ethics, and restrictions on property rights

The argument in this essay is twofold. (1) Procedural justice requires,in particular cases, that we restrict property rights in natural resources, e.g., California agricultural land or Appalachian coal land. (2) Conditions imposed by Locke's political theory and by dense population require,in general, that we restrict property rights in finite or non-renewable natural resources such as land. If these arguments are correct, then we have a moral imperative to use land-use controls (such as taxation, planning, zoning, and acreage limitations) to restructure land ownership and land use in a far more radical way than has ever been accomplished in the past.     

Public Health,Ethics, and Functional Foods

Functional foods aim to provide a positive impact on health and well-being beyond their nutritive content. As such, they are likely candidates to enhance the public health official’s tool kit. Or are they? Although a very small number of functional foods (e.g., phytosterol-enriched margarine) show such promise in improving individual health that Dutch health insurance companies reimburse their costs to consumers, one must not draw premature conclusions about functional foods as a group. A large number of questions about individual products’ safety, efficacy, and affordability need to be answered before they might become an important part of the public health agenda. More importantly, though, the costs and benefits of functional foods relative to alternative mechanisms of public health improvement need to be ascertained. Alternative scenarios that warrant investigation are mainly the supply of nutraceutical ingredients in pill form targeting “at risk” groups and consumer education on diet and lifestyle.     

Environmental planning,ecosystem science,and ecosystem approaches for integrating environment and development

Currently popular concepts such as sustainable development and sustainability seek the integration of environment and development planning. However, there is little evidence that this integration is occurring in either mainstream development planning or environmental planning. This is a function of the history, philosophies, and evolved roles of both. A brief review of the experience and results of mainstream planning, environmental planning, and ecosystem science suggests there is much in past scientific and professional practice that is relevant to the goal of integrated planning for environment and development, but still such commonly recommended reforms as systems and multidisciplinary approaches, institutional integration, and participatory, goal-oriented processes are rarely achieved. “Ecosystem approaches,” as developed and applied in ecology, human ecology, environmental planning, anthropology, psychology, and other disciplines, may provide a more transdisciplinary route to successful integration of environment and development. Experience with ecosystem approaches is reviewed, their advantages and disadvantages are discussed, and they are compared to traditional urban and regional planning, environmental planning, and ecosystem science approaches. Ultimately a synthesis of desirable characteristics for a framework to integrate environment and development planning is presented as a guide for future work and a criterion for evaluating existing programs.     

Animal Care Ethics, ANZCCART, and Public Perceptions of Animal Use Ethics

The public attitude to animal use in Australia and New Zealandcan be inferred from survey results and political activity. The publicis concerned about the rights of animals as far as any uses causing painare concerned, but takes a more utilitarian view of the taking of lifewhere no suffering is involved. Many of the participants in two recentANZCCART conferences fall short in their knowledge of and attitudetoward these concerns. Animal welfare legislation and standards need tobe reformed so that painful animal use is eliminated, even if economicgrowth suffers as a result.     

The Supreme Court,the commerce clause,and natural resources

The Supreme Court's interpretation of the commerce clause controls the balance of power between state and federal governments in the United States. An understanding of the relationship between the different government levels is essential for resource managers concerned with resource and environmental issues. This study examines selected Supreme Court decisions between 1976 and 1988 to answer three questions raised by the commerce clause: (1) Is the regulated item an article of commerce? (2) Do state laws burden interstate commerce? (3) Is federal commerce regulation limited? The balance of power among the justices and the commerce clause theories affecting the federal role in resource management are also examined. Since ratification of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has continuously increased federal power, but states have power to act independently as long as contradictory federal laws do not exist and state law does not impermissively affect commerce. If Congress regulates an individual's use of resources, their power is unquestioned. Future Court decisions will not significantly reduce the federal role in resource management even if the Court's membership changes. Even the supporters of states' rights on the Court realize increased federal power is a necessary part of the country's evolution. The purpose of the commerce clause is to create a national economic unit with free location principles. The Court supports this purpose today and will in the future.     

Transfer of development rights,growth management,and landscape conservation in Virginia

Urban sprawl in Virginia has led to the loss of wildlife habitat and agricultural land, reduced water quality, and to severe traffic congestion. We conducted a survey to identify the tools being used by the state's localities to manage growth and protect land from development, and the factors that influence interest in particular planning goals and strategies. More specifically, we sought to explore the level of interest in using the transfer of development rights (TDR). Almost every locality in Virginia has stated goals of protecting green space and agricultural land but very few have pursued a TDR programme since it became legal to do so in 2006. However, the main tools being used by planning departments are of limited effectiveness, particularly with regard to ensuring permanent or even long-term land preservation. More broadly, they are reflective of a reactive response to individual development proposals rather than a proactive, comprehensive approach to planning.     

Time preference,the environment and the interests of future generations

The behavior of individuals currently living will generally have long-term consequences that affect the well-being of those who will come to live in the future. Intergenerational interdependencies of this nature raise difficult moral issues because only the current generation is in a position to decide on actions that will determine the nature of the world in which future generations will live. Although most are willing to attach some weight to the interests of future generations, many would argue that it is not necessary to treat these interests as equivalent to those of the current generation. A common approach in this context is to use a system of discounting to evaluate future benefits and harms. This paper assesses the logic of discounting drawing on the writings of economists and philosophers. Much of the economic literature concerns the choice of an appropriate social discount rate. The social discount rate can be taken to reflect beliefs about the rights of future generations, a subject that has been extensively debated in the phioosophic literature. The writings of both economists and philosophers concerned with the weight to attach to the interests of future generations are reviewed and evaluated in this paper and the implications for environmental policy are discussed.     

Property rights integrity,tenure security and forestland rental market participation: Evidence from Jiangxi Province,China

The decentralization of property rights is the focus of the forest tenure reforms in several developing countries. In China, it was achieved by the launch of a new round of collective forest tenure reform beginning in 2003, which provided farmers with more integrated and secure forestland rights. Drawing on household data collected in Jiangxi province in 2011 and 2013, this paper examines the impacts of households’ recognition of property rights and improved tenure security on forestland rental activities. Our empirical results show that households with higher perceptions of more complete use rights and mortgage rights have a lower probability and intensity of renting‐in land, while households with lower expectations of future forestland redistribution or expropriation are more likely to rent in forestland and more of it. These results imply that the development of a forestland rental market leading to better forest management requires an integrated forestland management approach consisting of decentralization of property rights and village governance. In particular, the central government may further clarify the rights and obligations affiliated to forestland ownership, contractual rights, and management rights; while the village collective may shift from direct intervention in the integrity and security of forestland rights to the supervision and protection of decentralized forestland rights to increase efficiency from the decentralization of property rights.     

Land Conversion for Suburban Housing: A Study of Urbanization Around Warsaw and Olsztyn,Poland

In Poland of the 1990s, urban demand for housing land around city agglomerations increased rapidly. The decreasing profitability of agricultural production also caused farmers to become interested in the sale of agricultural land for nonagricultural purposes, and new land legislation granted them the right to sell their land. Polish counties simultaneously received self-governing status, which allowed them to define the priorities for local development. Counties received additional responsibility for land management and quickly demonstrated strong support for land conversion, which was perceived as a factor of local development. This paper argues that decentralization and the extension of private control over land have led to a loss of rural landscapes in Poland because farmers, county governments, and rural society in general gained from the conversion of agricultural to housing land. Rapid urbanization has significantly reduced the availability of open space around cities and threatened valuable landscapes, for it has occurred in the absence of environmental safeguards. This paper reports findings from research in two counties, located in regions with diverse economic growth rates. Decentralization is particularly problematic if tax regulations and intergovernmental fiscal relations reward local authorities for urbanization but not environmental protection. Note: This version was published online in June 2005 with the cover date of August 2004.