A dynamic simulation model to support reduction in illegal trade within legal wildlife markets

Sustainable wildlife trade is critical for biodiversity conservation, livelihoods, and food security. Regulatory frameworks are needed to secure these diverse benefits of sustainable wildlife trade. However, regulations limiting trade can backfire, sparking illegal trade if demand is not met by legal trade alone. Assessing how regulations affect wildlife market participants’ incentives is key to controlling illegal trade. Although much research has assessed how incentives at both the harvester and consumer ends of markets are affected by regulations, little has been done to understand the incentives of traders (i.e., intermediaries). We built a dynamic simulation model to support reduction in illegal wildlife trade within legal markets by focusing on incentives traders face to trade legal or illegal products. We used an Approximate Bayesian Computation approach to infer illegal trading dynamics and parameters that might be unknown (e.g., price of illegal products). We showcased the utility of the approach with a small-scale fishery case study in Chile, where we disentangled within-year dynamics of legal and illegal trading and found that the majority (∼77%) of traded fish is illegal. We utilized the model to assess the effect of policy interventions to improve the fishery's sustainability and explore the trade-offs between ecological, economic, and social goals. Scenario simulations showed that even significant increases (over 200%) in parameters proxying for policy interventions enabled only moderate improvements in ecological and social sustainability of the fishery at substantial economic cost. These results expose how unbalanced trader incentives are toward trading illegal over legal products in this fishery. Our model provides a novel tool for promoting sustainable wildlife trade in data-limited settings, which explicitly considers traders as critical players in wildlife markets. Sustainable wildlife trade requires incentivizing legal over illegal wildlife trade and consideration of the social, ecological, and economic impacts of interventions.     

Legal ivory trade in a corrupt world and its impact on African elephant populations

Illegal hunting of African elephants (Loxodonta africana) for ivory is causing rapid declines in their populations. Since 2007, illegal ivory trade has more than doubled. African elephants are facing the most serious conservation crisis since 1989, when international trade was banned. One solution proposed is establishment of a controlled legal trade in ivory. High prices for ivory mean that the incentives to obtain large quantities are high, but the quantity of tusks available for trade are biologically constrained. Within that context, effective management of a legal ivory trade would require robust systems to be in place to ensure that ivory from illegally killed elephants cannot be laundered into a legal market. At present, that is not feasible due to corruption among government officials charged with implementing wildlife‐related legislation. With organized criminal enterprises involved along the whole commodity chain, corruption enables the laundering of illegal ivory into legal or potentially legal markets. Poachers and traffickers can rapidly pay their way out of trouble, so the financial incentives to break the law heavily outweigh those of abiding by it. Maintaining reliable permitting systems and leak‐proof chains of custody in this context is challenging, and effective management breaks down. Once illegal ivory has entered the legal trade, it is difficult or impossible for enforcement officers to know what is legal and illegal. Addressing corruption throughout a trade network that permeates countries across the globe will take decades, if it can ever be achieved. That will be too late for wild African elephants at current rates of loss. If we are to conserve remaining wild populations, we must close all markets because, under current levels of corruption, they cannot be controlled in a way that does not provide opportunities for illegal ivory being laundered into legal markets. Comercio Legal de Marfil en un Mundo Corrupto y su Imapacto sobre Poblaciones de Elefantes     

Threats of illegal,unregulated, and unreported fishing to biodiversity and food security in the Republic of the Congo

Illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing poses a major threat to effective management of marine resources, affecting biodiversity and communities dependent on these coastal resources. Spatiotemporal patterns of industrial fisheries in developing countries are often poorly understood, and global efforts to describe spatial patterns of fishing vessel activity are currently based on automatic identification system (AIS) data. However, AIS is often not a legal requirement on fishing vessels, likely resulting in underestimates of the scale and distribution of legal and illegal fishing activity, which could have significant ramifications for targeted enforcement efforts and the management of fisheries resources. To help address this knowledge gap, we analyzed 3 years of vessel monitoring system (VMS) data in partnership with the national fisheries department in the Republic of the Congo to describe the behavior of national and distant-water industrial fleets operating in these waters. We found that the spatial footprint of the industrial fisheries fleet encompassed over one-quarter of the Exclusive Economic Zone. On average, 73% of fishing activity took place on the continental shelf (waters shallower than 200 m). Our findings highlight that VMS is not acting as a deterrent or being effectively used as a proactive management tool. As much as 33% (13% on average) of fishing effort occurred in prohibited areas set aside to protect biodiversity, including artisanal fisheries resources, and the distant-water fleet responsible for as much as 84% of this illegal activity. Given the growth in industrial and distant-water fleets across the region, as well as low levels of management and enforcement, these findings highlight that there is an urgent need for the global community to help strengthen regional and national capacity to analyze national scale data sets if efforts to combat IUU fishing are to be effective.     

Policy options for toxics disposal: Laissez-faire,subsidization, and enforcement

This paper evaluates three second-best policies for dealing with the problem of illegal hazardous-waste disposal. The first is a laissez-faire policy; the second is a policy under which legal disposal of hazardous waste is subsidized; the third is a policy that discourages illegal disposal by increasing the expected penalty associated with illegal disposal. Using a simple computational model, I compute the optimum subsidy and the optimum enforcement budget, and determine the conditions under which each policy option is superior to others.     

Poaching, enforcement, and the efficacy of marine reserves.

Marine reserves are promoted as an effective supplement to traditional fishery management techniques of harvest quotas and effort limitation. However, quantitative fishery models have ignored the impact of noncompliance (poaching). Here we link a model of a harvested fish population to a game-theoretic representation of fisherman behavior to quantify the effect of poaching on fishery yield and the enforcement effort required to maintain any desired level of reserve effectiveness. Although higher fish densities inside reserves will typically entice fishermen to poach, we show that the initial investment in enforcement efforts provides the greatest return on maintaining the benefits of the reserve to the fishery. Furthermore, we find that poaching eliminates the positive effect of fish dispersal on yield that is predicted by traditional models that ignore fisherman behavior. Our results broaden a fundamental insight from previous models of marine reserves, the effective equivalence of the harvest quota and reserve fraction, to the more realistic scenario in which fishermen attempt to maximize their economic payoffs.     

Perceptions of the local community on the outcome of community fishery management in Krala Peah village,Cambodia

Since fishery resources are regarded as an important source of income and food security, these resources need to be protected and conserved for sustainable use. To do this, the government of Cambodia has revised its policies, shifting management and responsibility to the local level. In response to government policy, Krala Peah village community fishery was established to manage resources within the area. The purpose of this study was to assess the outcome of community fishery management. Moreover, community fishery management was assessed through face-to-face interview and a participatory approach. The major findings of this study indicate that community fishery has led to a more equitable and efficient fishery within Krala Peah village. Although it has not led to improvements in fishing habitats and fish catch, it has reduced some factors that adversely affected sustainability. Furthermore, it has caused a reduction in illegal fishing, which was the main objective of the fishers.     

Status of Southeast Asia's marine sharks and rays

In Southeast Asia, elasmobranchs are particularly threatened. We synthesized knowledge from the peer-reviewed and gray literature on elasmobranchs in the region, including their fisheries, status, trade, biology, and management. We found that 59% of assessed species are threatened with extinction and 72.5% are in decline; rays were more threatened than sharks. Research and conservation is complicated by the socioeconomic contexts of the countries, geopolitical issues in the South China Sea, and the overcapacity and multispecies nature of fisheries that incidentally capture elasmobranchs. The general paucity of data, funds, personnel, and enforcement hinders management. Reduced capacity in the general fishery sector and marine protected areas of sufficient size (for elasmobranchs and local enforcement capabilities) are among recommendations to strengthen conservation.     

Accounting for enforcement costs in the spatial allocation of marine zones

Marine fish stocks are in many cases extracted above sustainable levels, but they may be protected through restricted‐use zoning systems. The effectiveness of these systems typically depends on support from coastal fishing communities. High management costs including those of enforcement may, however, deter fishers from supporting marine management. We incorporated enforcement costs into a spatial optimization model that identified how conservation targets can be met while maximizing fishers’ revenue. Our model identified the optimal allocation of the study area among different zones: no‐take, territorial user rights for fisheries (TURFs), or open access. The analysis demonstrated that enforcing no‐take and TURF zones incurs a cost, but results in higher species abundance by preventing poaching and overfishing. We analyzed how different enforcement scenarios affected fishers’ revenue. Fisher revenue was approximately 50% higher when territorial user rights were enforced than when they were not. The model preferentially allocated area to the enforced‐TURF zone over other zones, demonstrating that the financial benefits of enforcement (derived from higher species abundance) exceeded the costs. These findings were robust to increases in enforcement costs but sensitive to changes in species’ market price. We also found that revenue under the existing zoning regime in the study area was 13–30% lower than under an optimal solution. Our results highlight the importance of accounting for both the benefits and costs of enforcement in marine conservation, particularly when incurred by fishers. Justificación de los Costos de Aplicación en la Asignación Espacial de Zonas Marinas     

Managing Protected Woodlands: Fuelwood Collection and Law Enforcement in Lake Malawi National Park

Abstract: We examined the decisions women make in their collection of fuelwood within a protected area in Malawi. We used law enforcement data and behavioral observations of fuelwood harvesting practices to examine the risk of detection and penalties posed by law enforcement activities. Our results indicate that, at their current levels, law enforcement patrols have little effect on wood collection practices. The low risk of detection and light penalties appear to favor illegal wood collection, which is practiced by the majority of women. Alternative strategies should be pursued to enhance the conservation of the woodland and its management as a fuelwood resource for local communities.     

Optimal fishery policy with artificial enhancement through stocking: California's white sturgeon as an example

Although optimal fishery policy has been derived from different kinds of economic and biological models, the interaction of fishing policy with artificial stocking policy has not been explicitly considered. We here determine optimal size limits, fishing effort, and stocking rate for three cases of interest: (1) recruitment-limited population, pre-recruitment stocking; (2) adult biomass-limited population, post-recruitment stocking; and (3) adult biomass-limited and recruitment-limited population, post-recruitment stocking. Results show that lower size limits should be set at the size at which the current market value exceeds the total future value of an individual, both to the fishery and to reproduction. Imposition of upper size limits is rarely optimal. Stocking is advisable when the hatchery cost times the relative contribution of stocking to recruitment is less than the contribution to the value of the catch. Optimal policy ranges from infinite effort at a specific size limit with maximum stocking when the cost of stocking is zero, to lower values of size limit and effort as stocking costs increase, the amount of stocking decreases, and more natural reproduction is optimal. Thus, as hatchery costs decline (or value of captured fish increases), optimal stocking/fishery policy varies from an unstocked fishery to a “put and take” fishery. The results are applied to the sturgeon fishery in the San Francisco Bay Estuary as an example. They imply that a reduced lower size limit and greater fishing mortality together with stocking would be optimal, but that current levels are conservative. The stocking decision depends critically on the values of parameters that are currently poorly known, such as: hatchery costs, survival to the fishery and the mechanisms controlling the sturgeon population.     

Harvest in a fluctuating environment and conservative harvest for the Fox surplus production model

Relations between optimal yield and abundance in a fluctuating environment and conditions for a conservative level of harvest were obtained for the Fox surplus production model and compared with those for the logistic surplus production model. Environmental variation was included in the optimization of harvest with the Fox surplus production model to obtain a relation in which the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) and biomass at the MSY varied as the environment varied. The relation can be applied for management of fisheries at the optimum levels in a fluctuating environment. For both models there is only one maximum sustainable yield under equilibrium conditions, but in a variable environment the maximum sustainable yield and optimum biomass and effort vary as the environment varies. The results were applied to the blue crab (Callinectes sapidus) fishery of the Chesapeake Bay. Although several numerical results for the logistic and Fox models were similar, the parameter estimates were different and the Fox model predicted a much larger decrease in population abundance at the MSY. Harvesting at a conservative level with either the Fox model or the logistic model could increase blue crab abundance substantially with little decrease in harvest. At a conservative level of harvest, there is a 20% increase in biomass with a 6% decrease in yield for the logistic model and a 37% increase in biomass with a 9% decrease in yield for the Fox model. Both the Fox and the logistic surplus production models indicate that the blue crab fishery has been consistently over harvested.     

Changing legislative thinking in China to better protect wild animals and human health

The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the inadequacy of China's legal protection of wildlife. Long-standing illegal wildlife trade in China and worldwide increases the risk of zoonotic infectious diseases. We sought to improve the understanding of China’ legal system for the protection of wildlife, which has at its core the wildlife protection law, by systematically evaluating the laws and regulations of China's Wildlife Protection Framework. We examined how existing legal documents (e.g., the Wildlife Protection Law 2018) are directly or indirectly related to wildlife conservation. The inherent defects of wildlife protection legislation include a narrow scope of protection, insufficient public participation, and inconsistent enforcement among responsible agencies. Solutions to improve China's Wildlife Protection Law include expanding the legal protection of wildlife, and improving monitoring of wildlife protection. Strengthening legislation will be the basis for effective regulation of the use of wild animals. We advocate the establishment of a sound wildlife protection legal system for resolving conflicts between humans and wild animals and preventing zoonotic disease, such a system will have a profound impact on the sustainable development of China's wildlife resources.     

Salience of law enforcement: A field experiment

We conduct a field experiment to examine whether the deterrent effect of law enforcement depends on the salience of law enforcement activity. Our focus is on illegal disposal of household garbage in residential areas. At a random subset of 56 locations in a mid-sized city, law enforcement officers supplemented their regular enforcement activities by the practice of putting brightly-colored warning labels on illegally disposed garbage bags. This treatment made the existing enforcement activities suddenly much more apparent to residents. We find evidence for a substantial reduction in illegal disposal of garbage in response to the treatment.     

Illegal fishing and territorial user rights in Chile

Illegal fishing poses a major threat to conservation of marine resources worldwide. However, there is still limited empirical research that quantifies illegal catch levels. We used the randomized response technique to estimate the proportion of divers and the quantities of loco (Concholepas concholepas) they extracted illegally. Loco have been managed for the past 17 years through a territorial user rights for fisheries system (TURFs) in Chile. Illegal fishing of loco was widespread within the TURFs system. Official reported landings (i.e., legal landings) accounted for 14–30% of the total loco extraction. Our estimates suggest that ignoring the magnitude of illegal fishing and considering only official landing statistics may lead to false conclusions about the status and trends of a TURFs managed fishery. We found evidence of fisher associations authorizing their members to poach inside TURFs, highlighting the need to design TURFs systems so that government agencies and fishers’ incentives and objectives align through continuous adaptation. Government support for enforcement is a key element for the TURFs system to secure the rights that are in place.     

Identification of policies for a sustainable legal trade in rhinoceros horn based on population projection and socioeconomic models

Between 1990 and 2007, 15 southern white (Ceratotherium simum simum) and black (Diceros bicornis) rhinoceroses on average were killed illegally every year in South Africa. Since 2007 illegal killing of southern white rhinoceros for their horn has escalated to >950 individuals/year in 2013. We conducted an ecological–economic analysis to determine whether a legal trade in southern white rhinoceros horn could facilitate rhinoceros protection. Generalized linear models were used to examine the socioeconomic drivers of poaching, based on data collected from 1990 to 2013, and to project the total number of rhinoceroses likely to be illegally killed from 2014 to 2023. Rhinoceros population dynamics were then modeled under 8 different policy scenarios that could be implemented to control poaching. We also estimated the economic costs and benefits of each scenario under enhanced enforcement only and a legal trade in rhinoceros horn and used a decision support framework to rank the scenarios with the objective of maintaining the rhinoceros population above its current size while generating profit for local stakeholders. The southern white rhinoceros population was predicted to go extinct in the wild <20 years under present management. The optimal scenario to maintain the rhinoceros population above its current size was to provide a medium increase in antipoaching effort and to increase the monetary fine on conviction. Without legalizing the trade, implementing such a scenario would require covering costs equal to approximately $147,000,000/year. With a legal trade in rhinoceros horn, the conservation enterprise could potentially make a profit of $717,000,000/year. We believe the 35‐year‐old ban on rhinoceros horn products should not be lifted unless the money generated from trade is reinvested in improved protection of the rhinoceros population. Because current protection efforts seem to be failing, it is time to evaluate, discuss, and test alternatives to the present policy.     

Breaking the Vicious Circle of Illegal Logging in Indonesia

The government of Indonesia, which presides over 10% of the world's tropical forests, has set ambitious targets to cut its high deforestation rates through an REDD+ scheme (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation). This will require strong law enforcement to succeed. Yet, strategies that have accomplished this are rare and, along with past failures, tend not to be documented. We evaluated a multistakeholder approach that seeks to tackle illegal logging in the carbon‐rich province of Aceh, Sumatra. From 2008 to 2009, Fauna & Flora International established and supported a community‐based informant network for the 738,000 ha Ulu Masen ecosystem. The network reported 190 forest offenses to local law enforcement agencies, which responded with 86 field operations that confiscated illicit vehicles, equipment, and timber, and arrested 138 illegal logging suspects. From 45 cases subsequently monitored, 64.4% proceeded to court, from which 90.0% of defendants received a prison sentence or a verbal warning for a first offense. Spatial analyses of illegal logging and timber storage incidents predicted that illegal activities would be more effectively deterred by law enforcement operations that targeted the storage sites. Although numerous clusters of incidents were identified, they were still widespread reflecting the ubiquity of illegal activities. The multistakeholder results were promising, but illegal logging still persisted at apparently similar levels at the project's end, indicating that efforts need to be further strengthened. Nevertheless, several actions contributed to the law enforcement achievements: strong political will; strong stakeholder support; and funding that could be promptly accessed. These factors are highlighted as prerequisites for achieving Indonesia's ambitious REDD+ goals. Rompiendo el Círculo Vicioso de la Tala Ilegal en Indonesia     

Detecting deterrence from patrol data

The threat posed to protected areas by the illegal killing of wildlife is countered principally by ranger patrols that aim to detect and deter potential offenders. Deterring poaching is a fundamental conservation objective, but its achievement is difficult to identify, especially when the prime source of information comes in the form of the patrols’ own records, which inevitably contain biases. The most common metric of deterrence is a plot of illegal activities detected per unit of patrol effort (CPUE) against patrol effort (CPUE-E). We devised a simple, mechanistic model of law breaking and law enforcement in which we simulated deterrence alongside exogenous changes in the frequency of offences under different temporal patterns of enforcement effort. The CPUE-E plots were not reliable indicators of deterrence. However, plots of change in CPUE over change in effort (ΔCPUE-ΔE) reliably identified deterrence, regardless of the temporal distribution of effort or any exogenous change in illegal activity levels as long as the time lag between patrol effort and subsequent behavioral change among offenders was approximately known. The ΔCPUE-ΔE plots offered a robust, simple metric for monitoring patrol effectiveness; were no more conceptually complicated than the basic CPUE-E plots; and required no specialist knowledge or software to produce. Our findings demonstrate the need to account for temporal autocorrelation in patrol data and to consider appropriate (and poaching-activity-specific) intervals for aggregation. They also reveal important gaps in understanding of deterrence in this context, especially the mechanisms by which it occurs. In practical applications, we recommend the use of ΔCPUE-ΔE plots in preference to other basic metrics and advise that deterrence should be suspected only if there is a clear negative slope. Distinct types of illegal activity should not be grouped together for analysis, especially if the signs of their occurrence have different persistence times in the environment.     

An economic analysis of sardine fishing in the Gulf of Valencia (Spain)

The optimal management of a particular fishery is illustrated. Using data describing previous fishery exploitation, relevant biological and economic relationships are estimated, then the optimum levels of catches, effort, and stock are calculated. The prices that, if implemented, would ensure the current efficient exploitation of the fishery are also calculated. Finally, the welfare gains that can be achieved by a movement from the freemarket equilibrium to the socially optimum solution are demonstrated.     

Understanding why consumers in China switch between wild,farmed, and synthetic bear bile products

An important rationale for legally farmed and synthetic wildlife products is that they reduce illegal, wild-sourced trade by supplying markets with sustainable alternatives. For this to work, more established illegal-product consumers must switch to legal alternatives than new legal-product consumers switch to illegal wild products. Despite the widespread debate on the magnitude and direction of switching, studies among actual consumers are lacking. We used an anonymous online survey of 1421 traditional Chinese medicine consumers in China to investigate switching among legal farmed, synthetic, and illegal wild bear bile. We examined the past consumption behavior, applied a discrete choice experiment framed within worsening hypothetical disease scenarios, and used latent class models to investigate groups with shared preferences. Bear bile consumers (86% respondents) were wealthier, more likely to have family who consumed bile, and less knowledgeable about bile treatments than nonconsumers. Consumer preferences were heterogenous, but most consumer preferences switched between bile types as disease worsened. We identified five distinct latent classes within our sample: law-abiding consumers (34% respondents), who prefer legal products and were unlikely to switch; two all-natural consumer groups (53%), who dislike synthetics but may switch between farmed and wild; and two nonconsumer groups (12%), who prefer not to buy bile. People with past experience of bile consumption had different preferences than those without. Willingness to switch to wild products was related to believing they were legal, although the likelihood of switching was mediated by preferences for cheaper products sold in legal, familiar places. We found that consumers of wild bile may switch to legal alternatives, given the availability of a range of products, whereas legal-product consumers may switch to illegal products if the barriers to doing so are small. Understanding preferences that promote or impede switching should be a key consideration when attempting to predict consumer behavior in complex wildlife markets.     

Building a global taxonomy of wildlife offenses

Most countries have many pieces of legislation that govern biodiversity, including a range of criminal, administrative, and civil law provisions that state how wildlife must be legally used, managed, and protected. However, related debates in conservation, such as about enforcement, often overlook the details within national legislation that define which specific acts are illegal, the conditions under which laws apply, and how they are sanctioned. Based on a review of 90 wildlife laws in 8 high-biodiversity countries with different legal systems, we developed a taxonomy that describes all types of wildlife offenses in those countries. The 511 offenses are organized into a hierarchical taxonomy that scholars and practitioners can use to help conduct legal analyses. This is significant amidst competing calls to strengthen, deregulate, and reform wildlife legislation, particularly in response to fears over zoonotic threats and large-scale biodiversity loss. It can be used to provide more nuance legal analyses and facilitate like-for-like comparisons across countries, informing processes to redraft conservation laws, review deregulation efforts, close loopholes, and harmonize legislation across jurisdictions. We applied the taxonomy in a comparison of sanctions in 8 countries for hunting a protected species. We found not only huge ranges in fines (US$0 to $200,000) and imprisonment terms (1.5 years to life imprisonment), but also fundamentally different approaches to designing sanctions for wildlife offenses. The taxonomy also illustrates how future legal taxonomies can be developed for other environmental issues (e.g., invasive species, protected areas).