总量控制下流域初始排污权分配的竞争性混合决策方法

中国排污权交易市场尚不完善,若初始排污权的分配结果与现有排污量差异过大,排污方不能及时调整生产方式或结构与之相适应,同时又无法顺利在市场上购买到所必须的排污权量,排污方的经济社会发展将会受到阻碍。基于此,提出了总量控制下流域初始排污权的竞争性混合分配方式:一部分排污权按照现状排污比例进行分配,另一部分排污权实行竞争性分配。重点研究了排污权的竞争性分配决策:提出了由排污管理者制定柔性决策参数,排污方在柔性参数约束下进行自主竞争的初始排污权配置机制;建立了总量控制下初始排污权分配的竞争性决策模型,模拟排污方在排污管理者的总体控制下以"自身排污配比最大化"为目标通过交互评价的方式参与初始排污权的分配过程。柔性决策参数的构建反映了排污权管理者对初始排污权分配的公平性、高效性原则的整体把握;排污方在柔性权重下以"自评"和"它评"为主要形式进行交叉评价,体现了排污方在排污权分配中的"发言权"和"参与权";排污权管理者对排污方交叉评价结果的集结,实质上是对排污方之间的"利益"进行协调。在初始排污权的竞争性混合分配方式中,竞争性分配的排污权比例取决于流域内排污方的经济社会发展对排污量变化的"敏感度",排污方经济社会发展对排污量变化的"敏感度"越高,竞争性分配的比例的取值宜越小,反之越大。同时,可根据排污交易市场的建设进度,逐步提高竞争性分配排污权的比例,分阶段实现流域排污权的动态分配,最终达到对排污权进行高效、公平分配的目标。以北江流域为例进行了分析,给出了排污权分配总量中竞争性分配比例取不同值时,北江流域6个城市排污权分配的动态结果。     

面向异质水污染物排污权初始分配的在线拍卖机制

为探索不同种类水污染物排污权的在线初始分配方法,根据不同水污染物的特性,基于水环境容量价值,描述了一种可随时对多种水污染物排污权进行不同数量报价的投标语言.针对每家企业关于多种排污权组合的需求,构建了在线拍卖机制设计模型,提出了赢家判决流程和支付计算流程,获得了在线拍卖机制.该机制可在完全未知将来投标序列的情况下,立即对当前投标做出是否分配某种排污权组合的决策,并在企业离开前做出支付决策.理论分析表明,所提出机制可吸引更多的企业自愿参与,激励企业报告真实的到达时间、单位水环境容量估值及离开时间.相比于完全信息下的有效分配,该机制在社会福利、企业成交率和排污权利用率等方面能取得良好的效果.该文机制有助于制定公平、有效的异质水污染物排污权的初始分配方案.     

湖域工业初始排污权纳什议价模型研究——以江苏省太湖流域纺织行业为例

针对湖域工业初始排污权定价问题,文章从多利益相关者合作视角出发,结合我国现阶段基本国情,利用合作博弈理论构建了基于多利益相关者合作的湖域工业初始排污权纳什议价(Nash-Bargaining)定价模型。即在满足湖域水环境排污权总量控制及区域产业规划调整方案的前提下,通过政府主体与行业主体之间考虑议价能力系数λ影响的Nash-Bargaining,求解符合价格约束的行业初始排污权价格的最大满意解。其中,价格约束通过求解行业治污成本函数的Aumann-Shapley值给出。并以江苏省太湖流域纺织染整行业为例,针对湖域工业点源氨氮初始排污权定价问题,对比分析了Nash-Bargaining定价模型与江苏省太湖流域现行氨氮类资源价格,结果表明:议价能力系数λ对Nash-Bargaining定价模型影响显著,λ的合理区间为0.5≤λ≤0.7,现行氨氮初始排污权价格对应于0.3<λ<0.4时的情况,不利于初始排污权资源的可持续利用;现行氨氮初始排污权价格的标准化系数ξ=0.91,以λ=0.6时的价格为例,Nash-Bargaining定价模型所给出的价格的标准化指数ξ=0.85,具有比现行价格更强的资源补偿性能,考虑到太湖流域污染现状,Nash-Bargaining定价模型所得价格可行性更强。因此,建议适当调高氨氮初始排污权价格。     

鄱阳湖流域排污权初始分配模式的比较研究

排污权初始分配是排污权交易的起点和基础,在分配模式和实证研究方面需要加强。采用地区人口法、经济总量法、历史排污量法、环境容量法和综合分配法5种模式研究了鄱阳湖流域11个地市水污染物化学需氧量(COD)与氨氮的初始排污权分配。结果表明:COD和氨氮初始排污权在地市之间的分配格局相似;南昌、新余与鹰潭3市按经济总量模式分配的排污量明显高于其它模式,上饶、吉安两市人口分配模式高于其它模式,景德镇、九江两市历史排污量模式高于其它模式,赣州市环境容量模式高于其它模式,宜春市综合模式高于其它模式。综合分配模式为赣州市排污权总量最高,南昌、九江、吉安、宜春、抚州和上饶6市次之,景德镇、萍乡、新余、鹰潭4市最低。总体来看,排污权配额因分配模式不同而有所差异,综合分配模式得到的初始排污权最为合理。建议鄱阳湖流域严格执行综合分配模式下的各地市初始排污权分配额度,确保区域经济社会与生态环境的协调发展。     

湖域工业点源初始排污权配置定额模型与算法研究

针对湖域工业点源初始排污权定额配置问题,以“公平、效率、可行”为配置原则,通过引入权重系数的字典序最小化最大值方法,构建了基于多主体多种初始排污权多期配置的字典序定额模型,并给出求解算法。进而以江苏省太湖流域27类主要工业行业的初始氨氮排污权单期配置为例,从行业初始排污权短缺率与行业治污效益两方面,对比分析了基于等短缺率定额模型、等环境容量比例定额模型、字典序定额模型计算得到的3种定额配置方案效果。结果表明：相对于另外两种定额模型,字典序定额模型所得配置方案可实现平均行业短缺率最小(4613%),平均行业治污效益最大。研究也表明在“公平、效率、可行”配置原则下,字典序定额配置方法能够更为有效的促进企业治污技术提标升级和区域产业结构升级     

流域初始水权分配研究进展

当前我国水资源存在短缺和使用效率低下等问题,其最核心的解决办法就是建立水权市场,而其中的关键在于界定初始水权。通过界定初始水权,在各流域行政区域之间合理地分配。简要介绍了流域初始水权分配的最新研究进展和动态,主要包括分配原则、分配指标体系、分配方法和分配机制等方面。对这些研究进行了评述并且指出了存在的问题。由于水资源分配的特殊性,涉及到水量、水质和其它一些因素,单纯的分配水权难以获得成功。在此基础上,探讨了流域初始水权分配的未来研究方向,即在考虑到了水权、排污权和林权等集成的基础上,综合考虑初始水权分配的原则、指标体系和机制等,并且在分配方法上由单一目标模型向多目标模型发展,不确定性和模糊优化模型是未来流域水资源分配模型的发展方向。     

基于纳污能力控制的省区初始排污权ITSP配置模型

省区初始排污权配置具有多阶段性、复杂性及不确定性特征。面向水功能区限制纳污红线约束,根据省区初始排污权配置的基本假设,引入区间数和随机数来描述不确定性信息,以因省区初始排污权配置产生的经济效益为第1个阶段,以因承担减排责任而可能产生的治污损失为第2个阶段,设计实现流域经济效益最优的目标函数,并以配置结果能够体现社会效益、生态环境效益和社会经济发展连续性为约束条件,构建基于纳污能力控制的省区初始排污权区间两阶段随机规划(ITSP)配置模型,分水污染物类别确定不同减排情形下的省区初始排污权配置方案。在三种减排情形下,2020年太湖流域各省区的初始排污权配置结果表明:1江苏省、浙江省和上海市的COD初始排污权配置区间量没有明显变化,其NH3-N和TP初始排污权配置区间量总体呈上升或递增趋势;2太湖流域各省区因初始排污权的配置产生的总体经济效益最优区间数分别为[335.35,399.75]亿元、[336.63,401.11]亿元和[339.08,402.74]亿元,最优区间数的下限值、上限值及期望值总体呈上升或递增趋势。分类确定不同减排情形下的配置方案,并提出方案实施的政策建议,为排污权配置决策提供更为准确的决策空间。     

湖域工业初始排污权合作配置体系构建——以太湖流域为例

针对湖泊流域工业初始排污权配置问题,在分析太湖流域工业初始排污权配置背景基础上,结合我国基本国情,从多利益相关者合作的角度出发,构建了一种政策型政府主体监管、经营型政府主体主导、多利益相关者参与的太湖流域工业初始排污权政府限额定价合作配置体系。并构建了合作配置体系的概念结构,以及合作配置路径结构,给出实现合作配置路径结构的工作流程结构。进而针对实际情况,提出保障太湖流域工业初始排污权合作配置体系应用的政策建议     

基于演化博弈的初始水权分配中的冲突分析

初始水权分配极易导致流域上下游、左右岸之间引发冲突。本文分析这种冲突存在的根源是因为部分区域分配的水权过多,而部分区域分配的水权过少。从而建立"水权过多区"群体和"水权过少区"群体间的演化博弈模型,并分析各群体的复制动态和演化稳定策略,以及演化博弈系统的稳定性,得到两个主要结论:如果"水权过少区"群体少分配的水权占其实际分配到的水权的比重较小时,博弈系统的演化稳定策略为:(不同意放弃Δq的水权,不暴发冲突);如果"水权过少区"群体少分配的水权占其实际分配到的水权的比重较大,超出其心理承受范围时,博弈系统的演化稳定策略为:(同意放弃Δq的水权,暴发冲突)。研究表明,根据演化稳定策略调整各区域的水权,可以有效化解初始水权分配中的冲突,从而构造和谐有序的用水环境。     

Models for Initial Allocation of Emission Permits in a River Basin During Industrial Development： A Case Study of Huaihe River Basin, China

At present,water pollutant emission trading plays an increasingly important role in pollution control in many foreign countries,and its pilot studies and demonstration have also been started in China.In order to solve the problem of initial allocation of emission permits: premise and basis of emission trading in a river basin,basic principles on initial allocation of actual emission permits in China are put forward.And it is thought that local development stage of industry should be taken into full account for initial allocation model of emission permits.There are five different allocation models in different development stages of industry,including models like distribution according to needs,improved same-rate reduction,performance,integration and environmental capacity,etc.The initial allocation of emission permits in various basins should choose a suitable model in accordance with their respective development stages.It is suggested in this article that integrated allocation model should be a main choice for current development stage of industry in China.     

Application of Tradable Emission Permits in Europe

The purpose of this study is merely to review the current situation in the designing and implementation of the emission trading programs in Europe. Historical data show that although there is a series of shortcomings in their current functioning, employing such instruments for GHG reduction policy making is strongly expected to be efficient and effective. The European Union Emission Trading Scheme （EU ETS）, Clean Development Mechanism （CDM） and Joint Implementation （JI） are just a few examples of the ambitious EU initiative that heavily relies on such instruments. We dwell on their operations and achievements by far and all the content in this article is expected to convince the Chinese government and regional public authorities to take positive actions and attitudes in promoting these instruments.     

Application of Tradable Emission Permits in Europe

Abstract

The purpose of this study is merely to review the current situation in the designing and implementation of the emission trading programs in Europe. Historical data show that although there is a series of shortcomings in their current functioning, employing such instruments for GHG reduction policy making is strongly expected to be efficient and effective. The European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) are just a few examples of the ambitious EU initiative that heavily relies on such instruments. We dwell on their operations and achievements by far and all the content in this article is expected to convince the Chinese government and regional public authorities to take positive actions and attitudes in promoting these instruments.     

南水北调东线水资源配置中的期权契约研究

针对南水北调东线实际和传统水资源配置方法的局限性。借鉴金融工程的理念。引入水期权契约作为市场机制下水资源配置的一种方式．用以提高干旱年水供给保证率、规避水价波动风脸,从而提高东线水资源使用价值。分析期权契约理论用于南水北调水资源配置的可行性。并根据东线受水区流域水资源供求缺口的影响因素分析．得出水价的均值回复特性。在上述分析基础上引入多次执行期权契约。考虑应用动态规划方法对期权价值进行求解。并通过算例分析验证了该方法的可行性．最后根据南水北调东线实际构建了水期权契约在东线的应用流程。     

政府强互惠激励下跨界流域一级水权分散优化配置模型

我国跨界流域水资源冲突问题较严重,一级水权集中配置方案因其过于理想化而实施效率低下,难以应对冲突。提出应在规划和决策的前期给予各类主体充分的利益表达机会,创新一级水权配置模式,构建政府强互惠激励政策协调下的多用水主体分散优化配置模型。首先将分散优化与集中优化进行对比,分析政府强互惠激励下的分散优化协调机制对提高跨界流域水资源的配置效率和配置方案的可操作性的作用;基于分散优化的基本模型,加入政府强互惠节水激励政策,通过节水激励水价这一因子代替原分散优化模型的自利因子,构建一般的一级水权分散优化模型和政府强互惠激励下的一级水权分散优化模型;以漳河流域为例,对模型进行计算及对比分析。研究结果表明:一般分散优化配置模式中,主体的自利性使得流域整体利益受损,尤其是在来水极少的年份;政府强互惠激励下的分散优化配置模式能够兼顾流域宏观和微观的利益。来水量对于跨界流域一级水权配置模式有重要影响,来水量充裕时,政府可放手用水主体进行自主治理,降低行政管理成本;来水量短缺时,政府必须注意改变管理模式,对不同用水主体实施差异化政策激励,加强主体的节水动力;来水量越少,政府强互惠激励下的分散优化配置模式优势越明显。由于既充分考虑各用水主体的利益又能体现流域统一管理理念,因此,政府强互惠激励下的跨界流域一级水权分散优化配置模式在当前流域统一管理和区域分块管理相结合的管理体制下避免了权力冲突。     

市场转型对中国环境治理结构的影响——国家污染物减排指标的分配机制研究

国家统计局数据显示,2006年我国节能减排任务均远未实现国家十一五规划开局之年的目标,特别是主要污染物排放总量不降反升.本文在分析了中国环境治理体系和国家十一五规划主要污染物减排指标分配机制的基础上,研究了市场转型对中国环境治理结构的影响.中国的市场转型可以抽象为以分权让利、市场化和工业化为主要特征的结构演进过程.文中提出,中国市场转型过程对环境治理结构造成了重大影响,而环境治理的各项措施反过来也应与市场转型相适应.当前中国主要污染物减排指标没有实现达标的重要原因是国家污染物减排指标的分配机制无法适应我国市场转型的要求.为此,本文提出一系列国家主要污染物减排指标分配机制的政策建议.     

CO_2 Emission Induced by Urban Household Consumption in China

Household consumption is one of the important factors that induce COL emission. Based on input-output model, this article calculated the intensity of CO2 emission of different income groups and seven provinces in China, and then estimated total CO2 emission induced by urban household consumption from 1995 to 2004 in China based on statistic data of household living expenditure. The results show that CO2 emission per capita induced by household consumption had increased from 1583 to 2498 kg CO2 during 1995-2004. The ratio of consumption-induced CO2 emission to total CO2 emission had risen from 19% to 30% in the past decade. Indirect CO2 emission accounted for an important part of the consumption-induced emission, the ratio of indirect emission to consumption-induced emission had risen from 69% to 79% during the same period. A significant difference in consumption-induced CO2 emission across different income groups and different regions has been observed. COs emission per capita of higher income groups and developed regions increased faster than that of lower income groups and developing regions. Changing lifestyle has driven significant increase in CO2 emission. Especially, increases in private transport expenditure （for example, vehicle expenditure） and house building expenditure are key driving factors of growth in consumption-induced COL emission. There are big differences in the amount of CO2 emission induced by change in lifestyle across different income groups and provinces. It can be expected that lower income households and developing regions will increase consumption to improve their livings with income growth in the future, which may induce much more CO2 emission. A reasonable level of CO2 emission is necessary to satisfy human needs and to improve living standard, but a noticeable fact is that CO2 emission per capita induced by household consumption in developed areas of China had reached a quite high level. Adjustment in lifestyle towards a low-carbon society is in urgent need.     

国际碳减排活动中的利益博弈和中国策略的思考

博弈论能够解释许多经济活动和国际关系中出现的现象和问题。利用博弈论的相关理论。对《京都议定书》各利益集团之间的利益争斗进行了分析。指出各利益集团之间斗争的内在原因。并对中国在新一轮谈判中的策略提出了一些建议：由于《京都议定书》生效,而美国仍拒绝批准《京都议定书》。并同时抛出自己的减排方案。这必然会引起新一轮的减排博弈。面对美国等一些国家施加的压力,中国在这场新的博弈中要有所准备。提出具有建设性的建议和意见。既要维护中国和大多数发展中国家的利益。又要有助于减排。     

Characteristics of Carbon Emission in China and Analysis on Its Cause

From the history of human economic development, it is known that there is a close relationship between economic development and environment quality. Thus, in this study a factor decomposition model of carbon emission in China is built and the contributions that economic scale, industrial structure, and carbon emission intensity make to carbon emission quantitatively from 1990 to 2005 are analyzed, in other words—scale effect, structural effect, and technical effect—using the decomposition method of average distribution cushion which is based on the environmental Kuznets curves model is studied. The result suggests that the average of the effect changes of carbon emission in China is 19.55%, the effects brought by economic scale, industrial structure, and carbon emission intensity are 15.76%, −0.86%, and 4.65%, respectively. In general, the relation between carbon emission and China's economy was more like an “N” curve; Economy scale is a primary drive factor and has incremental effect to carbon emission. Since otherness of different industry is getting bigger, the industrial restructure has certain decremental effect to carbon emission, but the restrictive function is not obvious, the industrial structure still need to be further optimized; the technical effect is positive and its volatility is large. From the perspective of reducing carbon emission, the current technology has not played to its advantages. This study will promote the understanding of the theory about the relationship between carbon emission and economy development and provide reference value by all means to the adjustment of industrial development.