Defining an ecological baseline for restoration and natural resource damage assessment of contaminated sites: The case of the Department of Energy

Retrospective ecological risk assessment, restoration, natural resource damage assessment (NRDA) and managing ecosystems all require having a baseline. This policy and practice paper explores the factors that influence baseline selection, and it is suggested that ecological resources would best be served by: (1) integrating NRDA considerations into both future land-use planning and remediation/restoration; (2) selecting a baseline for NRDA that approximates the land-use conditions at the time of occupation (or a preferred ecosystem); and (3) integrating both the positive and negative aspects of industrial occupation into restoration decisions, baseline selection and NRDA. Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response and Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), natural resource damages are assessed for injuries incurred since 1980 due to releases, but the release itself may have occurred before 1980. The paper uses the Department of Energy as a case study to examine NRDA and the management of ecosystems. Releases occurred at many DOE sites from the 1950s to the 1980s during nuclear bomb production. It is suggested that the DOE has been responsible not only for injuries to natural resources that occurred as a result of releases, but for significant ecosystem recovery since DOE occupation, because some lands were previously farmed or industrialized. Natural resource injuries due to releases occurred simultaneously with ecosystem recovery that resulted from DOE occupation. While the 1980 date is codified in CERCLA law as the time after which damages can be assessed, baseline can be defined as the conditions the natural resources would have been in today, but for the release of the hazardous substance. It is also suggested that NRDA considerations should be incorporated into the remediation and restoration process at DOE sites, thereby negating the need for formal NRDA following restoration, and reducing the final NRDA costs.     

Root causes of unsatisfactory performance of large and complex remediation projects: Lessons learned from the united states department of energy environmental management programs

The Consortium for Risk Evaluation with Stakeholder Participation (CRESP) was asked by the United States Department of Energy (US DOE) to consider the root causes of remediation projects that fail to entirely achieve their goals and then to offer suggestions to assist the Department. To begin this project, CRESP held several meetings at which the group defined problematic outcomes, the early symptoms of problematic outcomes, and the root causes of failing to meet expectations. The five root causes are complex science, engineering, and technology; ambiguous economics; project management shortcomings; political processes and credibility; and history and organizational culture. This article, while focusing on the US DOE, provides a larger context for many remediation projects that have failed to entirely live up to their sponsors' expectations. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Cancer atlases: Uses and limitations

Summary Atlases of cancer mortality have recently appeared in many nations. This paper cautions environmental professionals against using them to draw cause-and-effect conclusions because of limitations of the map as a conveyor of information, and limitations of the data used in cancer atlases. Appropriate uses include, finding clues for detailed epidemiological and environmental research, places with poor data, regions requiring special equipment and personnel, and as tools for persuading the public to be less fatalistic about cancer and more supportive of public health protection and education programs.Dr Michael Greenberg is both Professor of the School of Urban and Regional Policy, and Acting Director of the Graduate Program in Public Health, at the University of Medicine and Dentistry and Rutgers University.