The 1934 floods in Tabriz, N. W. Iran

The disastrous floods of July 1934 in Tabriz are examined in the context of the history of floodinginthe city, which is crossed by a dry stream bed liable to sudden Inundation by mountain torrents from the southeast. Few details of past events have survived, suggesting that relatively little significance has been attached to them. Typically, flood dykes were inadequately maintained. This neglect, combined with a radical alteration in urban topography after 1925, when broad straight avenues were constructed through the old heart of the city, led to serious losses from flooding twice in 1929 and again in 1934. Enhanced perception of the flood risk finally found expression in the adoption of large scale engineering measures to mitigate future events, including strengthening protective dykes and widening the river channel through the city. These works have reduced vulnerability to flooding from river overflow. No long-term detrimental Impact of the 1934 flood has been observed. Some of the physical and social parameters that have influenced the vulnerability of Tabrizinthe past continue to be present both there and elsewhere in Iran, and they may be characteristic also of other regions with comparable natural environments or in a similar stage of socio-economic development.     

Permanent post-disaster housing in honduras: aspects of vulnerability to future disasters

To some degree it is unfair to evaluate a post-disaster housing program as to its effectiveness in decreasing vulnerability and preventing future disasters. As Burton states, "With rare exceptions, administrators and techniques have been trained to cope with disaster rather than to prevent it" [reference (2), p.197]. These were certainly not goals articulated by the agency responsible for constructing housing after Fifi. However, the authors feel that failure to evaluate specific projects by persons knowledgeable of the projects functioning, will only forestall the shift which Cuny calls for, "… from disaster response to disaster mitigation and prevention" [reference (4), p.123). In doing this we hope to add some specific case study data to the growing literature on disaster mitigation and prevention. Disaster vulnerability in Honduras is overwhelmingly related to flooding. More crucial than the materials and construction of housing is the issue of siting. If appropriately sited, houses made of bajarique, wood, or concrete block are able to withstand the heavy rains associated with a hurricane. Regarding the siting of the projects, the Honduras Project clearly has one positive and one negative accomplishment in the cases of Santa Rica and Flores, respectively. San Jose is less clear but is certainly a much safer site than those formerly occupied by the residents, in that there is no danger of flooding. The present site was not flooded during Fifi nor did it experience mudslides. However, the future is not so clear regarding the latter. Within the village proper a large amount of vegetation has been added which will tend to stabilise the soil on the steeper slopes. The streets, however, are seriously eroded and probably can not be maintained for vehicle usage, which does not pose a serious problem to the residents as none possess automobiles or trucks. One large gully bisects the village and receives run-off from the adjacent hills. It has been expanding, which would suggest that the slopes above the village could prove problematic in case of a Fifi-sized storm. Flores is located on a very poor site in reference to prevention and mitigation. It is located in a portion of the Sula Valley which is prone to flooding and, as mentioned before, was inundated by over 2m of water during hurricane Fifi. No prevention techniques were possible by NAEA/HEA and the houses were built on earthen mounds barely adequate to keep water out during the rainy season. The nearby dike which could possibly provide protection is non-functional due to poor maintainance. Given a storm of Fifi's magnitude, or possibly smaller, this site will again be flooded. Santa Rica is clearly well sited concerning flooding: it did not experience flooding during Fifi and is not flood prone. However, houses did experience some wall damage due to earthquakes following and associated with the Guatemalan quake of 1976. Due to the size and nature of the latter much "re-adjustment" occurred in the neighbouring fault system; however, damage to the houses was all superficial. We feel the residents were vocal about their concern due to the severity of the Guatemalan disaster and their lack of experience with concrete block houses. That the two sites (particularly Flores and partially San Jose) are vulnerable to future disasters cannot be considered solely the fault of an outside agency without local knowledge and understanding. In the engineering report issued during the construction it was explicitly stated that in Flores, "Future flooding remains a danger," [reference (6), p.49]. The future residents of Flores had gained access to the land from the National Agrarian Institute and were anxious to receive assistance in building homes. In fact, CARE, which had previously given these people tin roofing for houses, was threatening to take it back since the people had not yet started building. NAEA/HEA were responding to people in a rather desperate situation. But, on the other hand, they were responding to people who had been promised (not given) land by an agency of the Honduran national government which would be cognizant of the potential flooding at this site. Likewise, in San Jose, where mudslides and erosion remain a threat, the land was provided by a local government agency, the municipality. Although our goal in this discussion has not been to establish blame, we feel it imperative to mention the sequence of events that resulted in the questionable siting of Flores and San Jose. It is very easy and often accurate to place blame on outsiders who lack sophistication and knowledge about such matters. In this case local input did not result in post-disaster planning that is actually precautionary. This, we feel, illustrates the extreme complexity of cross-cultural aid, especially in the post-disaster period. It also points to the need for precautionary planning with reference to permanent post-disaster reconstruction.     

CAN SCRAP SAVE US FROM DEPLETION?

Old scrap constitutes varied proportions of consumption of different metals. The authors construct a model in which the share of scrap in total supply is explained by three factors, the growth rate in overall demand for the metal; the share of metal contained in scrapped products actually recovered; and the durability of metal containing products. The model is used to study the impact on the share of scrap in total supply from changes in each of the factors. The strongest impact appears to follow from changes in the growth rate of overall demand. Inserting empirical data for copper into their model, the authors suggest, for instance, that in the long run old scrap could satisfy 100 per cent of copper demand, provided that this demand contracted by 1 per cent per year. La ferraille constitue des proportions variées d'utilisation de différents métaux. Les auteurs de cet article ont construit un modèle dans lequel la part de ferraille dans 'approvisionnement total est expliquée par le jeu de trois facteurs: le taux de croissance de la demande globale pour le métal, la part de métal contenue dans des débris de métaux effectivement récupérés et la durabilité des métaux renfermant des produits. Le modèle est utilisé pour étudier les incidences des changements dans chacun des facteurs sur la part de ferraille dans 'offre totale. L'incidence la plus importante semble provenir de modifications dans le taux de croissance de la demande globale. En introduisant des données empiriques pour le cuivre dans leur modèle, les auteurs suggèrent par exemple, qu' à longue échéance, la ferraille pourrait répondre à la demande totale en cuivre pourvu que cette demande se réduise d'un pour cent par année. El uso de chatarra representa una proporción variable del consumo de los diferentes metales. En este artículo los autores presentan un modelo en el que la proción de la chatarra en la oferta de un metal depende de tres factores: la tasa de crecimiento de la demanda global del metal, la proción del metal contenido en la chatarra recuperada, y la durabilidad o vida económica de los productos que contienen el metal en cuestión. El modelo se utiliza para estudiar el impacto sobre la proporción de chatarra en la oferta total causado por las variaciónes de cada uno de estos factores. El mayor impacto parece ocurrir debido al cambio en la tasa de crecimiento de la demands global. Al utilizar el modelo con datos para el cobre, los autores sugieren, por ejemplo, que en el largo plazo la chatarra de cobre podría satisfacer el cien por ciento de la demanda de este metal siempre que dicha demanda se contraigo en uno por ciento por año.