Agent-based analysis and support for incident management

This paper presents an agent-based approach for error detection in incident management organizations. The approach consists of several parts. First, a formal approach for the specification and hierarchical verification of both traces and properties. Incomplete traces are enriched by enrichment rules. Furthermore, a classification mechanism is presented for the different properties in incident management that is based on psychological literature. Classification of errors provides insight in the functioning of the agents involved with respect to their roles. This insight enables the provision of dedicated training sessions and allows software support to give appropriate warning messages during incident management.     

Risk on the ramble: The international transfer of risk and vulnerability

In this paper the purpose is to discuss a concept of technology that can explain how the transfer of technology implies the risk of new failures, misuse, accidents and unhealthy workplaces. Production technologies are often transformed through a steady stream of incremental changes appropriate to their social context, and the technology will therefore gradually acquire some contextually dependent preconditions for use. These preconditions will most probably be revealed when a technology is transferred from one context to another. Thus, a technology transfer project may trigger a long process of re-innovations just to make the technology fully operational in its new context. In a transfer process, technological risks may arise due to incomplete transfer of mastering capacity; mismatch between transferred technology and the environment; transfer of latent conditions for failure; and the transformation of latent conditions or known risks when the technology is installed in a new environment. Longitudinal data from the Norwegian petroleum industry indicates that the first phases in a transfer process will create high technological risks. It will take many years before the transferred technologies are adapted to the new context and the risk level has been normalised.     

Some unusual case histories from personal experience

Is protection of equipment the only consideration when setting the relieving pressures of safety relief valves? I will show you a case where other factors should have been considered and suggest that you might give your safety valve set pressures a second thought.Do you have side-by-side pieces of identical equipment? If so, you must consider that operating or maintenance personnel may become confused, and the results maybe catastrophic. A PVC reactor incident will demonstrate this point.Does your process contain materials that could decompose? After thirty years of safe operation in butadiene units, there was a vinyl acetylene decomposition. Could it happen to you?It is my hope that these three unique and unusual cases will provide valuable information for operations and maintenance personnel, managers, safety professionals, and engineers.