• Municipal solid waste (MSW) was fermented, screened, gasified, then co-processed.• Co-processing MSW in cement kilns could cause excessive pollutant emissions.• Bypass flue gas can be disposed of through the main flue system.• Popular MSW co-processing methods do not affect cement quality. Cement kiln co-processing techniques have been developed in the past 20 years in China, and more than 60 factories now use fermentation, screening, and gasification pre-treatment techniques to co-process municipal solid waste (MSW). There three complete MSW pre-treatment techniques, co-processing procedures, and environmental risk assessments have been described in few publications. In this study, we assessed the effectiveness of each technique. The results suggested that the pollutant content released by each pre-treatment technology was lower than the emission standard. To reveal the mechanisms of pollutant migration and enrichment, the substances in the kiln and kiln products are investigated. The input of co-processing materials (Co-M) produced by fermentation caused formation of polychlorinated dibenzo-p-dioxins and dibenzofuran (PCDD/Fs) in the bypass flue gas (By-gas) in excess of the regulatory standard. The Co-M input produced by the screening and gasifier technologies caused the total organic carbon (TOC) concentration to exceed the standard. In addition, the NOx, TOC, and PCDD/Fs in the By-gas exceeded the regulatory standard. Raw meal was the primary chlorine and heavy metals input stream, and clinker (CK) and cement kiln dust (CKD) accounted for>90% of the total chlorine output stream. Flue gas and CKD were the primary volatile heavy metal (Hg) output streams. Greater than 70% of the semi-volatile heavy metals (Cd, Pb, Tl and Se) distributed in hot raw meal and bypass cement kiln dust. The low-volatility heavy metals were concentrated in the CK. These results indicated that co-processing techniques used in China still require improvement. 相似文献
This work was to study composition characteristics and the subsequent effect on the lead (Pb) binding properties of dissolved organic matter (DOM) derived from seaweed-based (SWOF) and chicken manure organic fertilizers (CMOF) during a one-year field incubation experiment using the excitation-emission matrix-parallel factor (EEM-PARAFAC) and two-dimensional correlation spectroscopy (2DCOS) analysis. Results showed that high aromatic and hydrophobic fluorescent substances were enriched in CMOF-derived DOM and SWOF-derived DOM and enhanced over time. And phenolic groups in the fulvic-like substances for SWOF-derived DOM and carboxyl groups in the humic-like substances for CMOF-derived DOM had the fastest responses over time, respectively. Moreover, both non-fluorescent polysaccharides and fluorescent humic-like substances or fulvic-like substances with aromatic (C=C) groups first participated in the binding process of Pb to SWOF-derived DOM on day 0 and 180 during the lead binding process. In contrast, humic-like substances associated with aromatic (C=C) and phenolic groups gave a faster response to Pb binding on day 360. Regarding CMOF-derived DOM, the fulvic-like substances associated with aromatic (C=C) and carboxylic groups displayed a faster response to Pb ions on day 0. Nonetheless, polysaccharides and humic-like associated with phenolic groups had a faster response on days 180 and 360. It is noteworthy that the polysaccharides, which participated in Pb binding to CMOF-derived DOM, posed a higher risk of Pb in the environment after 360 days. Therefore, these findings gave new insights into the long-term applications of commercial organic fertilizers for the amendment of soil. 相似文献
The Bhopal tragedy was a defining moment in the history of the chemical industry. On December 3, 1984, a runaway reaction within a methyl isocyanate storage tank at the Union Carbide India Limited pesticide plant released a toxic gas cloud that killed thousands and injured hundreds of thousands. After Bhopal, industrial chemical plants became a major public concern. Both the public and the chemical industry realized the necessity of improving chemical process safety.
Bhopal served as a wake-up call. To prevent the same event from occurring in the United States, many legislative and industrial changes were invoked—one of which was formation of the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB). The ultimate goal of CSB is to use the lessons learned and recommendations from its investigations to achieve positive change within the chemical industry—preventing incidents and saving lives.
Although it seems clear that the lessons learned at Bhopal have improved chemical plant safety, CSB investigations indicate that the systemic problems identified at Bhopal remain the underlying causes of many incidents. These include:
• Lack of awareness of reactive hazards.
• Lack of management of change.
• Inadequate plant design and maintenance.
• Ineffective employee training.
• Ineffective emergency preparedness and community notification.
• Lack of root cause incident investigations and communication of lessons learned.
The aim of this paper is to present common themes from recent cases investigated by CSB and to discuss how these issues might be best addressed in the future.
This paper has not been independently approved by the Board and is published for general informational purposes only. Any material in the paper that did not originate in a Board-approved report is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not represent an official finding, conclusion, or position of the Board. 相似文献