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661.
In a recent issue of this Journal, Sandler and Smith developed an analysis from which they concluded that discounting is Pareto inefficient in an intertemporal context. This comment questions the validity of that conclusion and demonstrates the essential role played by the discount rate in achieving intertemporal Pareto efficiency within a market economy.  相似文献   
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Melville CP 《Disasters》1983,7(2):107-117
The disastrous floods of July 1934 in Tabriz are examined in the context of the history of floodinginthe city, which is crossed by a dry stream bed liable to sudden Inundation by mountain torrents from the southeast. Few details of past events have survived, suggesting that relatively little significance has been attached to them. Typically, flood dykes were inadequately maintained. This neglect, combined with a radical alteration in urban topography after 1925, when broad straight avenues were constructed through the old heart of the city, led to serious losses from flooding twice in 1929 and again in 1934. Enhanced perception of the flood risk finally found expression in the adoption of large scale engineering measures to mitigate future events, including strengthening protective dykes and widening the river channel through the city. These works have reduced vulnerability to flooding from river overflow. No long-term detrimental Impact of the 1934 flood has been observed. Some of the physical and social parameters that have influenced the vulnerability of Tabrizinthe past continue to be present both there and elsewhere in Iran, and they may be characteristic also of other regions with comparable natural environments or in a similar stage of socio-economic development.  相似文献   
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Snarr DN  Brown EL 《Disasters》1979,3(3):287-292
To some degree it is unfair to evaluate a post-disaster housing program as to its effectiveness in decreasing vulnerability and preventing future disasters. As Burton states, "With rare exceptions, administrators and techniques have been trained to cope with disaster rather than to prevent it" [reference (2), p.197]. These were certainly not goals articulated by the agency responsible for constructing housing after Fifi. However, the authors feel that failure to evaluate specific projects by persons knowledgeable of the projects functioning, will only forestall the shift which Cuny calls for, "… from disaster response to disaster mitigation and prevention" [reference (4), p.123). In doing this we hope to add some specific case study data to the growing literature on disaster mitigation and prevention. Disaster vulnerability in Honduras is overwhelmingly related to flooding. More crucial than the materials and construction of housing is the issue of siting. If appropriately sited, houses made of bajarique, wood, or concrete block are able to withstand the heavy rains associated with a hurricane. Regarding the siting of the projects, the Honduras Project clearly has one positive and one negative accomplishment in the cases of Santa Rica and Flores, respectively. San Jose is less clear but is certainly a much safer site than those formerly occupied by the residents, in that there is no danger of flooding. The present site was not flooded during Fifi nor did it experience mudslides. However, the future is not so clear regarding the latter. Within the village proper a large amount of vegetation has been added which will tend to stabilise the soil on the steeper slopes. The streets, however, are seriously eroded and probably can not be maintained for vehicle usage, which does not pose a serious problem to the residents as none possess automobiles or trucks. One large gully bisects the village and receives run-off from the adjacent hills. It has been expanding, which would suggest that the slopes above the village could prove problematic in case of a Fifi-sized storm. Flores is located on a very poor site in reference to prevention and mitigation. It is located in a portion of the Sula Valley which is prone to flooding and, as mentioned before, was inundated by over 2m of water during hurricane Fifi. No prevention techniques were possible by NAEA/HEA and the houses were built on earthen mounds barely adequate to keep water out during the rainy season. The nearby dike which could possibly provide protection is non-functional due to poor maintainance. Given a storm of Fifi's magnitude, or possibly smaller, this site will again be flooded. Santa Rica is clearly well sited concerning flooding: it did not experience flooding during Fifi and is not flood prone. However, houses did experience some wall damage due to earthquakes following and associated with the Guatemalan quake of 1976. Due to the size and nature of the latter much "re-adjustment" occurred in the neighbouring fault system; however, damage to the houses was all superficial. We feel the residents were vocal about their concern due to the severity of the Guatemalan disaster and their lack of experience with concrete block houses. That the two sites (particularly Flores and partially San Jose) are vulnerable to future disasters cannot be considered solely the fault of an outside agency without local knowledge and understanding. In the engineering report issued during the construction it was explicitly stated that in Flores, "Future flooding remains a danger," [reference (6), p.49]. The future residents of Flores had gained access to the land from the National Agrarian Institute and were anxious to receive assistance in building homes. In fact, CARE, which had previously given these people tin roofing for houses, was threatening to take it back since the people had not yet started building. NAEA/HEA were responding to people in a rather desperate situation. But, on the other hand, they were responding to people who had been promised (not given) land by an agency of the Honduran national government which would be cognizant of the potential flooding at this site. Likewise, in San Jose, where mudslides and erosion remain a threat, the land was provided by a local government agency, the municipality. Although our goal in this discussion has not been to establish blame, we feel it imperative to mention the sequence of events that resulted in the questionable siting of Flores and San Jose. It is very easy and often accurate to place blame on outsiders who lack sophistication and knowledge about such matters. In this case local input did not result in post-disaster planning that is actually precautionary. This, we feel, illustrates the extreme complexity of cross-cultural aid, especially in the post-disaster period. It also points to the need for precautionary planning with reference to permanent post-disaster reconstruction.  相似文献   
668.
In the control of pollution, two apparently important facts are often negelected: (1) removal of a particular pollutant from a particular source and location may merely result in transforming it into a pollutant, or pollutants of different forms, in other locations; (2) the activity of pollution control itself requires inputs, the production of which may generate additional pollutants. In order to achieve positive environmental control, these two facts must be considered in selecting control processes and in determining optimum control standards. It is necessary that an integrated approach to pollution control be taken, making allowances for ecological inter-relations. As practiced today, pollution control is handled as separate problems of disposing gas, liquid and solid wastes. This paper proposes a model for evaluating the total environmental impact of a pollution control process or method. Theoretical criteria for determining an optimum control level with or without resource constraint are also derived.  相似文献   
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A fish‐consumption advisory is currently in effect in a seven‐mile stretch of the Grasse River in Massena, New York, due to elevated levels of PCBs in fish tissue. One remedial approach that is being evaluated to reduce the PCB levels in fish from the river is in situ capping. An in‐river pilot study was conducted in the summer of 2001 to assess the feasibility of capping PCB‐containing sediments of the river. The study consisted of the construction of a subaqueous cap in a seven‐acre portion of the river using various combinations of capping materials and placement techniques. Optimal results were achieved with a 1:1 sand/topsoil mix released from a clamshell bucket either just above or several feet below the water surface. A longer‐term monitoring program of the capped area commenced in 2002. Results of this monitoring indicated: 1) the in‐place cap has remained intact since installation; 2) no evidence of PCB migration into and through the cap; 3) groundwater advection through the cap is not an important PCB transport mechanism; and 4) macroinvertebrate colonization of the in‐place cap is continuing. Additional follow‐up monitoring in the spring of 2003 indicated that a significant portion of the cap and, in some cases, the underlying sediments had been disturbed in the period following the conclusion of the 2002 monitoring work. An analysis of river conditions in the spring of 2003 indicated that a significant ice jam had formed in the river directly over the capping pilot study area, and that the resulting increase in river velocities and turbulence in the area resulted in the movement of both cap materials and the underlying sediments. The pilot cap was not designed to address ice jam–related forces on the cap, as the occurrence of ice jams in this section of the river had not been known prior to the observations conducted in the spring of 2003. These findings will preclude implementation of the longer‐term monitoring program that had been envisioned for the pilot study. The data collected immediately after cap construction in 2001 and through the first year of monitoring in 2002 serve as the basis for the conclusions presented in this article. It should be recognized that, based on the observation made in the spring of 2003, some of these conclusions are no longer valid for the pilot study area.The occurrence of ice jams in the lower Grasse River and their importance on sediments and PCBs within the system are currently under investigation. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.  相似文献   
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