Establishing Representative No-Take Areas in the Great Barrier Reef: Large-Scale Implementation of Theory on Marine Protected Areas

Abstract:  The Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, an area almost the size of Japan, has a new network of no-take areas that significantly improves the protection of biodiversity. The new marine park zoning implements, in a quantitative manner, many of the theoretical design principles discussed in the literature. For example, the new network of no-take areas has at least 20% protection per "bioregion," minimum levels of protection for all known habitats and special or unique features, and minimum sizes for no-take areas of at least 10 or 20 km across at the smallest diameter. Overall, more than 33% of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park is now in no-take areas (previously 4.5%). The steps taken leading to this outcome were to clarify to the interested public why the existing level of protection was inadequate; detail the conservation objectives of establishing new no-take areas; work with relevant and independent experts to define, and contribute to, the best scientific process to deliver on the objectives; describe the biodiversity (e.g., map bioregions); define operational principles needed to achieve the objectives; invite community input on all of the above; gather and layer the data gathered in round-table discussions; report the degree of achievement of principles for various options of no-take areas; and determine how to address negative impacts. Some of the key success factors in this case have global relevance and include focusing initial communication on the problem to be addressed; applying the precautionary principle; using independent experts; facilitating input to decision making; conducting extensive and participatory consultation; having an existing marine park that encompassed much of the ecosystem; having legislative power under federal law; developing high-level support; ensuring agency priority and ownership; and being able to address the issue of displaced fishers.     

Structural Change in the Metals Industry: A Quantitative Assessment

This study examines the major changes that have occurred in the metals industry over the past 35 years. A quantitative assessment of the impact of these changes on consumption and production is provided. The study finds that the slowing down in industrial activity in the metals-using sector, which began in the early 1970s, is the major factor behind the weak growth in metals consumption. The structural changes which have affected demand are minor in comparison. On the supply side, the dominant factor behind relatively high production is the overhang of mine capacity that had been built in aicipation of much higher metals consumption. Again, the structural factors are relatively unimportant.     

THE POLITICS OF RESOURCE NEGOTIATION: THE TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATION AND THE JAMAICAN BAUXITE LEVY

Analysts examining disputes between transnational corporations and national governments over apportionment of benefits and rights of control in exploiting natural resources tend to confine themselves to structural characteristics of such conflicts. Such approaches assume that conflict resolution is final and traditionally place a major emphasis on control issues. This research explores the dominant issues in conflict in resource industries through use of a behavioural model. It looks at the strategies that both a major bauxite producing nation and the aluminium transnational corporations used to resolve the conflicts which arose as a result of the unilateral imposition of a bauxite levy by Jamaica. This article argues that the values, expectations and preferences of parties to a conflict situation are crucial to understanding its resolution. It further suggests that resource control is not necessarily a desirable goal for the host country but that it should acknowledge competing considerations of revenue maximization, revenue stability and lessening dependence on a natural resource base need to be considered. It shows further that settlement of such situations is always open to disturbance. Les analystes qui étudient les désaccords entre les sociétés transnationales et les gouvernements au sujet de la répartition des bénéfices et du droit de contrôle de l'exploitation des ressources naturelles ont tendance à ne considérer que les caractéristiques structurales de tels conflits. Cette attitude suppose que le conflit est résolu une fois pour toute et traditionnellement met l'accent principal sur les questions de contrôle. Cette étude examine les questions principales qui sont en conflit dans ces industries au moyen d'un modèle de relation. El le examine les stratégies utilisées à la fois par une des principales nations productrices de bauxite et par une compagnie transnationale productrice d'aluminium pour résoudre les conflits qui se sont élevés en conséquence de la fixation unilatérale d'une taxe sur la bauxite par la Jamaïque. Cet article prétend que les valeurs, espérances et préférences des parties en conflit doivent être parfaitement comprises pour pouvoir résoudre celui-ci. De plus, l'article suggère que le contrôle des ressources n'est pas nécessairement un but souhaitable pour le pays hôte mais que celui-ci devrait reconnaître qu'il faut tenir compte des considérations de maximisation des revenus, de la stabilité des revenus et d'une moindre dépendance vis-à-vis de la ressource naturelle. Cet article montre de plus que le règlement de telles situations est toujours sujet à des troubles. Los analistas que examinan las disputas entre empresas multinacionales y los gobiernos sobre la distribución de beneficios y derechos de control en la explotación de recursos naturales, tienden a limitarse a las características estructurales de dichos conflictos. Tal enfoque asume que la solución del conflicto es definitiva y ponen normalmente el mayor énfasis al aspecto de control. Esta investigación explora los elementos dominantes en conflicto en la explotación de recursos a través de modelos de comportamiento. Examina las estrategias que se usaron por los países productores mayores de bauxita y las transnacionales de la industria del aluminio para resolver los conflictos que resultaron como consecuencia de la imposición unilateral tributaria sobre la bauxita por Jamaica. Este artículo sostiene que los valores, expectativas y preferencias de las partes en conflicto son importantes para entender las soluciones. Se sugiere además que el aspecto de control del recurso no es necesariamente un objetivo deseable para el país dueño del recurso sino que éste debe considerar objetivos alternativos tales como maximización del ingreso, estabilidad de ingreso y disminución de la dependencia del país de los recursos naturales. El artículo muestra además que las soluciones de tales situaciones están siempre expuestos a alteraciones.