Sex linkage among genes controlling sexually selected traits

Using literature data on reciprocal crosses I estimated the influence of sex-chromosomal genes on morphological and behavioral traits. To determine a special role of the sex chromosomes for sexually selected traits, I compared the estimated influence of X-chromosomal genes on sexually selected traits with their estimated influence on traits not under sexual selection. About one-third of the phenotypic variation in sexually selected traits is caused by X-chromosomal genes. There was, in contrast, no significant influence of X-chromosomal genes on traits that were classified as not sexually selected. Sexually selected traits thus seem to be influenced significantly more by X-chromosomal genes than traits not under sexual selection. Though this differential influence of X-chromosomal genes cannot readily be explained with current theoretical knowledge, it may shed some light on X-linked hybrid sterility and on the discussion between arbitrary and good-gene models for the evolution of female choice. Received: 30 January 1998 / Accepted after revision: 20 June 1998     

Cost-effective unilateral climate policy design: Size matters

Given the bleak prospects for a global agreement on mitigating climate change, pressure for unilateral abatement is increasing. A major challenge is emissions leakage. Border carbon adjustments and output-based allocation of emissions allowances can increase effectiveness of unilateral action but introduce distortions of their own. We assess antileakage measures as a function of abatement coalition size. We first develop a partial equilibrium analytical framework to see how these instruments affect emissions within and outside the coalition. We then employ a computable general equilibrium model of international trade and energy use to assess the strategies as the coalition grows. We find that full border adjustments rank first in global cost-effectiveness, followed by import tariffs and output-based rebates. The differences across measures and their overall appeal decline as the abatement coalition grows. In terms of cost, the coalition countries prefer border carbon adjustments; countries outside the coalition prefer output-based rebates.