WORLD PETROLEUM RESOURCE ESTIMATES AND PRODUCTION FORECASTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT POLICY

Resource estimates alone will not give advance warning of encroaching production difficulties. An analysis of the general stages in the evolution of petroleum production and discovery and of industry statistics provides an estimate of when the stage characterised by increasing production in the market economy countries outside the United States and Canada will end. The analysis indicates that the year of maximum production will be in the 1990s. Economic growth aggravates the difficulties accompanying the production decline by advancing the date of peak production and by increasing the adjustments that must be made as oil production declines. Des prévisions de ressources à elles seules ne constituent pas des signes précurseurs de difficultés croissantes de production. Une analyse des étapes générales marquant l'evolution de la découverte et de la production du pétrole ainsi que des statistiques industrielles nous permet de prévoir l'époque à laquelle prendra fin la phase de production accrue dans les pays à économie de marché en dehors des Etats-Unis et du Canada. Cette analyse révèle que l'année de production maximale se situera dans les années 90. La croissance économique accentue les difficultés qui accompagnent le déclin de la production de pétrole en avancant la date à laquelle cell-ci atteindra son plafond et en augmentant le nombre d'ajustements qui s'avèrent nécessaires au fur et à mesure qu'elle baisse. Las evaluaciones de recursos no dan por si solas un aviso anticipado de las dificultades de producción. Un análisis de las etapas principales en la evolución del descubrimiento y producción de petróleo y de las estadísticas industriales provee un estimado de cuando va a terminar la etapa caracterizada por un crecimiento de producción en los paises de economias de mercado otros que Estados Unidos y Canada. El análisis indica que el año de producción máxima se hallará en la década del 90. El crecimiento económico agrava las dificultades debidas a la declinación de la producción al adelantar la fecha de máxima producción (pico) y al aumentar los ajustes que deven hacerse cuando la producción de petróleos disminuye.     

An examination of health data following two major earthquakes in Russia

Thus the hazards to health observed from these two earthquakes can be summarised as follows: (a) massive immediate damage, the main victims being women and children; (b) the seriously injured suffer mainly from fractures (17%), head injuries (15-30%) and soft tissue conusions with haemhorrage; (c) a change in the physical features of a country which unfavourably affect the environment; (d) some time after the earthquake the appearance of communicable disease; (e) increases in cases of cardiovascular disease neuroses and psychoses.     

FRONTIER AREAS, RESOURCES, AND DEVELOPING NATIONS: THE CASE OF GUATEMALA

The conscientious and planned integration of frontier areas into the national economy can at least partially alleviate both environmental and economic problems that are common to many developing countries. Full development of the agricultural potential of frontier areas can lessen the environmental deterioration often found in traditionally settled regions. Exploitation of mineral resources, in particular energy resources, can lessen economic burdens associated with increased costs of imported energy. The authors examine how recent international developments have spurred the government of Guatemala to undertake measures designed to develop a previously underutilized region. The short term negative consequences of increased costs for imported grains and petroleum may well have a positive result in the long term insofar as they lead to more balanced and rational use of land and resources.     

Permanent post-disaster housing in honduras: aspects of vulnerability to future disasters

To some degree it is unfair to evaluate a post-disaster housing program as to its effectiveness in decreasing vulnerability and preventing future disasters. As Burton states, "With rare exceptions, administrators and techniques have been trained to cope with disaster rather than to prevent it" [reference (2), p.197]. These were certainly not goals articulated by the agency responsible for constructing housing after Fifi. However, the authors feel that failure to evaluate specific projects by persons knowledgeable of the projects functioning, will only forestall the shift which Cuny calls for, "… from disaster response to disaster mitigation and prevention" [reference (4), p.123). In doing this we hope to add some specific case study data to the growing literature on disaster mitigation and prevention. Disaster vulnerability in Honduras is overwhelmingly related to flooding. More crucial than the materials and construction of housing is the issue of siting. If appropriately sited, houses made of bajarique, wood, or concrete block are able to withstand the heavy rains associated with a hurricane. Regarding the siting of the projects, the Honduras Project clearly has one positive and one negative accomplishment in the cases of Santa Rica and Flores, respectively. San Jose is less clear but is certainly a much safer site than those formerly occupied by the residents, in that there is no danger of flooding. The present site was not flooded during Fifi nor did it experience mudslides. However, the future is not so clear regarding the latter. Within the village proper a large amount of vegetation has been added which will tend to stabilise the soil on the steeper slopes. The streets, however, are seriously eroded and probably can not be maintained for vehicle usage, which does not pose a serious problem to the residents as none possess automobiles or trucks. One large gully bisects the village and receives run-off from the adjacent hills. It has been expanding, which would suggest that the slopes above the village could prove problematic in case of a Fifi-sized storm. Flores is located on a very poor site in reference to prevention and mitigation. It is located in a portion of the Sula Valley which is prone to flooding and, as mentioned before, was inundated by over 2m of water during hurricane Fifi. No prevention techniques were possible by NAEA/HEA and the houses were built on earthen mounds barely adequate to keep water out during the rainy season. The nearby dike which could possibly provide protection is non-functional due to poor maintainance. Given a storm of Fifi's magnitude, or possibly smaller, this site will again be flooded. Santa Rica is clearly well sited concerning flooding: it did not experience flooding during Fifi and is not flood prone. However, houses did experience some wall damage due to earthquakes following and associated with the Guatemalan quake of 1976. Due to the size and nature of the latter much "re-adjustment" occurred in the neighbouring fault system; however, damage to the houses was all superficial. We feel the residents were vocal about their concern due to the severity of the Guatemalan disaster and their lack of experience with concrete block houses. That the two sites (particularly Flores and partially San Jose) are vulnerable to future disasters cannot be considered solely the fault of an outside agency without local knowledge and understanding. In the engineering report issued during the construction it was explicitly stated that in Flores, "Future flooding remains a danger," [reference (6), p.49]. The future residents of Flores had gained access to the land from the National Agrarian Institute and were anxious to receive assistance in building homes. In fact, CARE, which had previously given these people tin roofing for houses, was threatening to take it back since the people had not yet started building. NAEA/HEA were responding to people in a rather desperate situation. But, on the other hand, they were responding to people who had been promised (not given) land by an agency of the Honduran national government which would be cognizant of the potential flooding at this site. Likewise, in San Jose, where mudslides and erosion remain a threat, the land was provided by a local government agency, the municipality. Although our goal in this discussion has not been to establish blame, we feel it imperative to mention the sequence of events that resulted in the questionable siting of Flores and San Jose. It is very easy and often accurate to place blame on outsiders who lack sophistication and knowledge about such matters. In this case local input did not result in post-disaster planning that is actually precautionary. This, we feel, illustrates the extreme complexity of cross-cultural aid, especially in the post-disaster period. It also points to the need for precautionary planning with reference to permanent post-disaster reconstruction.