The use of amino compounds for binding 2,4,6-trinitrotoluene in water

Sites polluted with 2,4,6-trinitrotoluene (TNT) constitute a worldwide problem. In this work, chemical reactions for binding TNT to amino-compounds are proposed as an initial step for developing new remediation techniques to clean-up groundwater and soils contaminated with TNT. Indeed, addition of aniline and an amino acid-like cysteine caused a decrease in free TNT of 86% and 68-100%, respectively. Using 13C-NMR spectroscopy, it was shown that TNT chemically forms a Meisenheimer complex with cysteine and aniline in 1/1 (by vol.) H2O/d6-acetone.     

Fundamental Moral Attitudes to Animals and Their Role in Judgment: An Empirical Model to Describe Fundamental Moral Attitudes to Animals and Their Role in Judgment on the Culling of Healthy Animals During an Animal Disease Epidemic

In this paper, we present and defend the theoretical framework of an empirical model to describe people’s fundamental moral attitudes (FMAs) to animals, the stratification of FMAs in society and the role of FMAs in judgment on the culling of healthy animals in an animal disease epidemic. We used philosophical animal ethics theories to understand the moral basis of FMA convictions. Moreover, these theories provide us with a moral language for communication between animal ethics, FMAs, and public debates. We defend that FMA is a two-layered concept. The first layer consists of deeply felt convictions about animals. The second layer consists of convictions derived from the first layer to serve as arguments in a debate on animal issues. In a debate, the latter convictions are variable, depending on the animal issue in a specific context, time, and place. This variability facilitates finding common ground in an animal issue between actors with opposing convictions.     

Beyond the Prevention of Harm: Animal Disease Policy as a Moral Question

European animal disease policy seems to find its justification in a “harm to other” principle. Limiting the freedom of animal keepers—e.g., by culling their animals—is justified by the aim to prevent harm, i.e., the spreading of the disease. The picture, however, is more complicated. Both during the control of outbreaks and in the prevention of notifiable, animal diseases the government is confronted with conflicting claims of stakeholders who anticipate running a risk to be harmed by each other, and who ask for government intervention. In this paper, we first argue that in a policy that aims to prevent animal diseases, the focus shifts from limiting “harm” to weighing conflicting claims with respect to “risks of harm.” Therefore, we claim that the harm principle is no longer a sufficient justification for governmental intervention in animal disease prevention. A policy that has to deal with and distribute conflicting risks of harm needs additional value assumptions that guide this process of assessment and distribution. We show that currently, policies are based on assumptions that are mainly economic considerations. In order to show the limitations of these considerations, we use the interests and position of keepers of backyard animals as an example. Based on the problems they faced during and after the recent outbreaks, we defend the thesis that in order to develop a sustainable animal disease policy other than economic assumptions need to be taken into account.     

为不确定的未来实施洪水风险管理战略:荷兰,与莱茵河洪水共生存

无论从经济还是从自然保护角度,冲积平原和三角洲的社会压力都很大.随着经济的发展及大坝增高,由于预期的损失上升和更深的洪水,洪水风险在逐渐增加.全球变化,社会需求变化了,人们的观念也变化了,需要修订长期的洪水风险管理战略.而修订洪水风险管理战略应以柔性战略替代过去以加高大坝为主的刚性战略.柔性战略为主的洪水风险管理就意味着允许洪水临时性大面积泛滥,通过改变土地利用方式减少洪水灾害损失.这样的战略是基于风险管理和"与洪水共生存"的理念提出的,完全替代了过去的灾害控制观念.荷兰三角洲地区是世界人口密度最大区域之一,在这里,灵活的柔性洪水风险管理战略水文功能和"可持续的标准"被详细阐述和评估.     

Intrinsic Value and Direct Duties: From Animal Ethics towards Environmental Ethics?

Three types of concern for animal welfare are widelyheld: Animals should feel well, they should function well, andthey should lead natural lives. The paper deals with a well-knownanswer to the question of why such concerns are morallyappropriate: Human beings have direct duties towards animals,because animals are beings that can flourish, the flourishing ofanimals is intrinsically or inherently valuable, and that whichis conducive to their flourishing is a legitimate object of moralconcern. Looking for a tenable conception of direct dutiestowards animals, the following questions are discussed: Whatshould we take it to mean that ``animal flourishing isintrinsically or inherently valuable?'' Under what conditions doesa living being's ability to flourish create direct duties towardsthis being? Is awareness or sentience required for there to bedirect duties towards a living being? Does such a requirementimply that moral concerns for animals would be limited to theirfeeling well, or does it also give way to having moral concernsfor their functioning well and leading natural lives? Can onetake into account considered judgements that claim that towardsdifferent animals we have moral duties that differ in kind and/orstrength? If environmental ethics cannot be based on theconception of direct duties here discussed, should one draw adistinction between duties towards ourselves, our fellow humanbeings, or animals, and duties regarding plants, or collectiveentities such as populations, species, and ecosystems?