Self-fertilisation in Celleporella hyalina

The accumulation of parasites in a fish host is modelled as a function of the total amount of prey consumed. The accumulated parasite load is then expressed as a function of fish length so that the asymptotic growth, L , of any population of commonly infected fish can be estimated. Estimates of L are obtained for orange roughy (Hoplostethus atlanticus), albacore tuna (Thunnus alalunga) and the New Zealand southern arrow squid (Nototodarus sloanii).     

Prey selection by larval weakfish (Cynoscion regalis): the effects of prey size,speed, and abundance

We examined feeding by larval weakfish, Cynoscion regalis (Bloch and Schneider), in laboratory experiments conducted during the 1991 spawning season. under natural conditions weakfish larval development is ca. 3 wk, and we ran separate experiments with larvae of five different ages (5, 8, 11, 14, and 17 d post-hatching). We used two different size classes of rotifers (Brachionus plicatilis) and brine shrimp nauplii (Artemia sp.) as prey organisms. Contrary to results of previous research, weakfish larvae did not select prey based on size alone. When prey abundance was above 100 itemsl^-1 weakfish, larvae always chose large rotifers (length = 216 m) over small rotifers (length = 160 m). At 11 d post-hatching, larvae switched their diet from large rotifers to small brine shrimp nauplii (length = 449 m); however, when fed small rotifers and small brine shrimp nauplii the change in diet occurred at 14 d post-hatching. This pattern of selectivity was maintained in each larval age class. Early-stage larvae (5 and 8 d post-hatching) did not feed selectively when prey abundance was less than 100 itemsl^-1. Late-stage larvae (17 d post-hatching) fed selectively at abundances ranging from 10 to 10000 items^-1. Lwimming speeds of prey items, which ranged from 1 to 6 mms^-1, had no consistent effect on prey selection. These results suggest that weakfish larvae are able to feed selectively, that selectivity changes as larvae age, and that selectivity is also influenced by prey abundance.     

Dry deposition of nitrogen and sulfur to Ponderosa and Jeffrey pine in the San Bernardino national forest in Southern California

Little is known about the concentrations, deposition rates, and effects of nitrogenous and sulfurous compounds in photochemical smog in the San Bernardino National Forest (SBNF) in southern California. Dry deposition of NO(3)(-) and NH(4)(+) to foliage of ponderosa pine (Pinus ponderosa Laws.) and Jeffrey pine (Pinus jeffreyi Grev. & Balf.) was correlated (R = 0.83-0.88) with historical average hourly O(3) concentations at 10 sites across an O(3) gradient in the SBNF. Mean deposition fluxes of NO(3)(-) to ponderosa and Jeffrey pine branches were 0.82 nmol M(-2)s(-1) at Camp Paivika (CP), a high-pollution site, and 0.19 nmol m(-2) s(-1) at Camp Osceola (CAO), a low-pollution site. Deposition fluxes of NH(4)(+) were 0.32 nmol m(-2) s(-1) at CP and 0.17 nmol m(-2) s(-1) at CAO, while mean values for SO(4)(2-) were 0.03 at CP and 0.02 nmol m(-2) s(-1) at CAO. Deposition fluxes to paper and nylon filters were higher in most cases than fluxes to pine branches at the same site. The results of this study suggest that an atmospheric concentration and deposition gradient of N and S compounds occurs along with the west-east O(3) gradient in the SBNF. Annual stand-level dry deposition rates for S and N at CP and CAO were estimated. Further studies are needed to determine if high N deposition loads in the SBNF significantly affect plant/soil nutrient relations, tree health, and the response of ponderosa pine to ozone.     

POLITICAL ECONOMICS OF OFFSHORE OIL

The exploration of offshore areas for hydrocarbons has involved new technical and economic considerations and has posed new problems, not the least of which has been the changing relationship between companies and governments. In this article, the authors present an analysis of the different perspectives and policies which emanate from national governments on the one hand and from transnational oil companies on the other. The issues examined include the considerations involved in establishing exploration legislation, post-discovery problems, the impact on revenues of increased production, the interests of companies in developing fields and the overall economic environment within which decisions have to be agreed.     

Traceability in low-level radioactivity measurements

Various suggested definitions of the term “traceability” are discussed from the standpoint of proposed adoption and use of the concept by the International Organization of Legal Metrology.     

Deposition velocities for full-scale corn and soybean canopies: A wind tunnel simulation

Deposition velocities have been determined for corn and soybeans in the first 4–6 weeks of growth in a full-scale study of canopy flow in a wind tunnel. Particles of 1, 5, 10 and 15 μm aerodynamic diameter made of sodium florescein were injected into the Environmental Wind Tunnel Facility at Colorado State University. Deposition velocities were determined as a function of free stream velocity (183, 305 and 610 cm/s) and approach flow turbulence intensity (～1% and 8%). Plants were arranged in realistic field configurations. Hot-wire anemometer studies confirmed that the fluid velocity profiles developed in the wind tunnel were similar to the flow realized in canopies in natural fields. An increase in velocity and turbulence intensity was found to decrease the deposition velocities. A minimum deposition velocity was observed at a particle diameter of 5 μm.     

Permanent post-disaster housing in honduras: aspects of vulnerability to future disasters

To some degree it is unfair to evaluate a post-disaster housing program as to its effectiveness in decreasing vulnerability and preventing future disasters. As Burton states, "With rare exceptions, administrators and techniques have been trained to cope with disaster rather than to prevent it" [reference (2), p.197]. These were certainly not goals articulated by the agency responsible for constructing housing after Fifi. However, the authors feel that failure to evaluate specific projects by persons knowledgeable of the projects functioning, will only forestall the shift which Cuny calls for, "… from disaster response to disaster mitigation and prevention" [reference (4), p.123). In doing this we hope to add some specific case study data to the growing literature on disaster mitigation and prevention. Disaster vulnerability in Honduras is overwhelmingly related to flooding. More crucial than the materials and construction of housing is the issue of siting. If appropriately sited, houses made of bajarique, wood, or concrete block are able to withstand the heavy rains associated with a hurricane. Regarding the siting of the projects, the Honduras Project clearly has one positive and one negative accomplishment in the cases of Santa Rica and Flores, respectively. San Jose is less clear but is certainly a much safer site than those formerly occupied by the residents, in that there is no danger of flooding. The present site was not flooded during Fifi nor did it experience mudslides. However, the future is not so clear regarding the latter. Within the village proper a large amount of vegetation has been added which will tend to stabilise the soil on the steeper slopes. The streets, however, are seriously eroded and probably can not be maintained for vehicle usage, which does not pose a serious problem to the residents as none possess automobiles or trucks. One large gully bisects the village and receives run-off from the adjacent hills. It has been expanding, which would suggest that the slopes above the village could prove problematic in case of a Fifi-sized storm. Flores is located on a very poor site in reference to prevention and mitigation. It is located in a portion of the Sula Valley which is prone to flooding and, as mentioned before, was inundated by over 2m of water during hurricane Fifi. No prevention techniques were possible by NAEA/HEA and the houses were built on earthen mounds barely adequate to keep water out during the rainy season. The nearby dike which could possibly provide protection is non-functional due to poor maintainance. Given a storm of Fifi's magnitude, or possibly smaller, this site will again be flooded. Santa Rica is clearly well sited concerning flooding: it did not experience flooding during Fifi and is not flood prone. However, houses did experience some wall damage due to earthquakes following and associated with the Guatemalan quake of 1976. Due to the size and nature of the latter much "re-adjustment" occurred in the neighbouring fault system; however, damage to the houses was all superficial. We feel the residents were vocal about their concern due to the severity of the Guatemalan disaster and their lack of experience with concrete block houses. That the two sites (particularly Flores and partially San Jose) are vulnerable to future disasters cannot be considered solely the fault of an outside agency without local knowledge and understanding. In the engineering report issued during the construction it was explicitly stated that in Flores, "Future flooding remains a danger," [reference (6), p.49]. The future residents of Flores had gained access to the land from the National Agrarian Institute and were anxious to receive assistance in building homes. In fact, CARE, which had previously given these people tin roofing for houses, was threatening to take it back since the people had not yet started building. NAEA/HEA were responding to people in a rather desperate situation. But, on the other hand, they were responding to people who had been promised (not given) land by an agency of the Honduran national government which would be cognizant of the potential flooding at this site. Likewise, in San Jose, where mudslides and erosion remain a threat, the land was provided by a local government agency, the municipality. Although our goal in this discussion has not been to establish blame, we feel it imperative to mention the sequence of events that resulted in the questionable siting of Flores and San Jose. It is very easy and often accurate to place blame on outsiders who lack sophistication and knowledge about such matters. In this case local input did not result in post-disaster planning that is actually precautionary. This, we feel, illustrates the extreme complexity of cross-cultural aid, especially in the post-disaster period. It also points to the need for precautionary planning with reference to permanent post-disaster reconstruction.