Short-run allocation of emissions allowances and long-term goals for climate policy

We use economic analysis to evaluate grandfathering, auctioning, and benchmarking approaches for allocation of emissions allowances and then discuss practical experience from European and American schemes. In principle, auctions are superior from the viewpoints of efficiency, fairness, transparency, and simplicity. In practice, auctions have been opposed by important sectors of industry, which argue that carbon pricing without compensation would harm international competitiveness. In the European Union's Emissions Trading System, this concern led to grandfathering that is updated at various intervals. Unfortunately, updating gives industry an incentive to change behavior to influence future allocation. Furthermore, the wealth transferred to incumbent firms can be significantly larger than the extra costs incurred, leading to windfall profits. Meanwhile, potential auction revenues are not available to reduce other taxes. By circumscribing free allocation, benchmarking can target competitiveness concerns, incur less wealth transfer, and provide a strategy consistent with transitioning to auctions in the long run.     

How should support for climate-friendly technologies be designed?

Stabilizing global greenhouse gas concentrations at levels to avoid significant climate risks will require massive "decarbonization" of all the major economies over the next few decades, in addition to the reduced emissions from other GHGs and carbon sequestration. Achieving the necessary scale of emissions reductions will require a multifaceted policy effort to support a broad array of technological and behavioral changes. Change on this scale will require sound, well-thought-out strategies. In this article, we outline some core principles, drawn from recent social science research, for guiding the design of clean technology policies, with a focus on energy. The market should be encouraged to make good choices: pricing carbon emissions and other environmental damage, removing distorting subsidies and barriers to competition, and supporting RD&D broadly. More specific policies are required to address particular market failures and barriers. For those technologies identified as being particularly desirable, some narrower RD&D policies are available.     

Risk and cooperation: managing hazardous fuel in mixed ownership landscapes

Managing natural processes at the landscape scale to promote forest health is important, especially in the case of wildfire, where the ability of a landowner to protect his or her individual parcel is constrained by conditions on neighboring ownerships. However, management at a landscape scale is also challenging because it requires cooperation on plans and actions that cross ownership boundaries. Cooperation depends on people's beliefs and norms about reciprocity and perceptions of the risks and benefits of interacting with others. Using logistic regression tests on mail survey data and qualitative analysis of interviews with landowners, we examined the relationship between perceived wildfire risk and cooperation in the management of hazardous fuel by nonindustrial private forest (NIPF) owners in fire-prone landscapes of eastern Oregon. We found that NIPF owners who perceived a risk of wildfire to their properties, and perceived that conditions on nearby public forestlands contributed to this risk, were more likely to have cooperated with public agencies in the past to reduce fire risk than owners who did not perceive a risk of wildfire to their properties. Wildfire risk perception was not associated with past cooperation among NIPF owners. The greater social barriers to private-private cooperation than to private-public cooperation, and perceptions of more hazardous conditions on public compared with private forestlands may explain this difference. Owners expressed a strong willingness to cooperate with others in future cross-boundary efforts to reduce fire risk, however. We explore barriers to cooperative forest management across ownerships, and identify models of cooperation that hold potential for future collective action to reduce wildfire risk.     

Investigating Jacaranda mimosifolia tree as biomonitor of atmospheric trace metals

Studies on the use of tree bark as biomonitors for environmental pollutants are still very scarce. We evaluated the reliability of using Jacaranda mimosifolia, a common tree in Tshwane City of South Africa, as a suitable biomonitor of atmospheric trace metals. Bark samples were collected from ten different locations during two sampling periods. The concentrations of the metals were determined by inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry. The concentrations of the metals were 33.2–1,795 μg/g (Pb), 21.4–210 μg/g (Cu), 68.4–490 μg/g (Zn), 30.6–2,916 μg/g (Cr), 0.12–1.34 μg/g (Cd), and 6.04–68.0 μg/g (V), respectively. The differences obtained for the results from different sites were significant (p?< 0.05). A significant difference was also observed between the two sampling periods. The trace metals concentrations suggested that automobile emissions are a major source of these metals. The study also confirms the suitability of J. mimosifolia as a biomonitor of atmospheric deposition of these metals.     

How Should Support for Climate-Friendly Technologies Be Designed?

Stabilizing global greenhouse gas concentrations at levels to avoid significant climate risks will require massive “decarbonization” of all the major economies over the next few decades, in addition to the reduced emissions from other GHGs and carbon sequestration. Achieving the necessary scale of emissions reductions will require a multifaceted policy effort to support a broad array of technological and behavioral changes. Change on this scale will require sound, well-thought-out strategies. In this article, we outline some core principles, drawn from recent social science research, for guiding the design of clean technology policies, with a focus on energy. The market should be encouraged to make good choices: pricing carbon emissions and other environmental damage, removing distorting subsidies and barriers to competition, and supporting RD&D broadly. More specific policies are required to address particular market failures and barriers. For those technologies identified as being particularly desirable, some narrower RD&D policies are available.