CURRENT REFINERY PROBLEMS AND ISSUES IN PETROLEUM IMPORTING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

This article discusses the problems facing refinery operations in developing countries and possible solutions to them. The topics covered include security of crude oil supply to the developing countries; difficulties encountered in development of indigenous expertise in refinery operation; refinery capacity and the special problems of maintenance and repair facing refinery operators in the developing parts of the world; and the potential for improved refinery operation through increased international co-operation.     

Some epidemiologic features of disasters in guatemala

Epidemiological procedures can be organised under disaster conditions by means of a simple surveillance system and with few personnel.
In the aftermath of the 4 February 1976 earthquake in Guatemala, an information system was organized by which the requisite information for decision-making was obtained with adequate speed and promptness.
The initial epidemiologic informution was based on reports collected during the early days on symptoms observed at hospitals and health centers and in localities and villages in the stricken area.
At a second, post-emergency stage a more elaborate surveillance system was instituted to provide guidance in the investigntwn of outbreaks, evaluate the health activities and establish basic criteria for preventive and control measures.     

Quality control in low-level radionuclide analysis. Results of recent intercomparisons and programmes for 1979/80 of the international atomic energy agency

The results of recent IAEA intercomparison programs are reviewed.     

NATURAL GAS PROSPECTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE ROLE OF LNG TRANSPORTATION

Natural gas may provide a major contribution to the world energy supply during the next few decades. The developing countries command about 50 per cent of the world proved natural gas reserves, with gas accounting for only 6 per cent of commercial primary energy production. The challenging task of expanding gas production and utilization in the developing countries, especially through effective use of gas associated with petroleum deposits and transportation of gas in liquefied form (LNG), will require long-term technical co-operation policy commitments with regard to investment, manpower and the transfer of technology. The article is intended to analyse the basic factors involved in these problems. Au cours des prochaines décennies, le gaz naturel peut constituer un apport considérable à l'approvisionnement énergétique mondial. Les pays en développement détiennent approximativement 50 pour cent des réserves mondiales prouvées de gaz naturel, le gaz représentant seulement 6 pour cent de la production d'énergie primaire commerciale. Le défi lancé par la production et l'utilisation croissantes de gaz dans les pays en développement, particulièrement par l'utilisation efficace du gaz lié aux gisements de pétrole et le transport du gaz liquéfié (GNL), requiert des engagements à long terme en matière de politique de coopération technique dans le domaine des investissements, de la main-d'oeuvre et du transfert de technologie. Cet article a pour but d'analyser les facteurs fondamentaux à prendre en considération lorsqu'on traite de ces problèmes. El gas natural podría representar una gran contribucíon a la oferta mundial de energía dentro de las próximas décadas. Los países en desarrollo poseen cerca del 50 porciento de la reserva provada mundial de gas y solamente el 6 porciento de la producción primaria de energía comercial proviene del gas. La tarea de expandir la producción y utilización de gas en los países en desarrollo, especialmente ia utilización efectiva en forma líquida (LNG) de gas asociado al petróleo, requiere de compromisos de cooperación técnica a largo plazo en lo referente a inversiones, recursos humanos y transferencia de tecnología. Este artículo intenta analizar los factores básicos pertinentes a dicha tarea.     

Bereavement and mourning after a shipping disaster: The case for intervention

This paper describes the help given by the social services department of a shipping company to bereaved families following a shipping disaster. In the absence of clear, factual and prompt information from an authoritative source, there is a tendency for bereaved individuals to deny their loss and thereby delay the process of mourning and eventual recovery. Appropriate intervention and support can help to overcome this tendency as was seen in the Madasa case.     

The 'who' and 'what' of training far disaster relief

This paper defines the various levels within government, the voluntary agencies and the community which might benefit from training and makes suggestions as to where the emphasis should be placed. It points out that training programmes should be designed to meet the expressed needs of a particular group of trainees as well as be related to the current or potential disaster situation.     

Permanent post-disaster housing in honduras: aspects of vulnerability to future disasters

To some degree it is unfair to evaluate a post-disaster housing program as to its effectiveness in decreasing vulnerability and preventing future disasters. As Burton states, "With rare exceptions, administrators and techniques have been trained to cope with disaster rather than to prevent it" [reference (2), p.197]. These were certainly not goals articulated by the agency responsible for constructing housing after Fifi. However, the authors feel that failure to evaluate specific projects by persons knowledgeable of the projects functioning, will only forestall the shift which Cuny calls for, "… from disaster response to disaster mitigation and prevention" [reference (4), p.123). In doing this we hope to add some specific case study data to the growing literature on disaster mitigation and prevention. Disaster vulnerability in Honduras is overwhelmingly related to flooding. More crucial than the materials and construction of housing is the issue of siting. If appropriately sited, houses made of bajarique, wood, or concrete block are able to withstand the heavy rains associated with a hurricane. Regarding the siting of the projects, the Honduras Project clearly has one positive and one negative accomplishment in the cases of Santa Rica and Flores, respectively. San Jose is less clear but is certainly a much safer site than those formerly occupied by the residents, in that there is no danger of flooding. The present site was not flooded during Fifi nor did it experience mudslides. However, the future is not so clear regarding the latter. Within the village proper a large amount of vegetation has been added which will tend to stabilise the soil on the steeper slopes. The streets, however, are seriously eroded and probably can not be maintained for vehicle usage, which does not pose a serious problem to the residents as none possess automobiles or trucks. One large gully bisects the village and receives run-off from the adjacent hills. It has been expanding, which would suggest that the slopes above the village could prove problematic in case of a Fifi-sized storm. Flores is located on a very poor site in reference to prevention and mitigation. It is located in a portion of the Sula Valley which is prone to flooding and, as mentioned before, was inundated by over 2m of water during hurricane Fifi. No prevention techniques were possible by NAEA/HEA and the houses were built on earthen mounds barely adequate to keep water out during the rainy season. The nearby dike which could possibly provide protection is non-functional due to poor maintainance. Given a storm of Fifi's magnitude, or possibly smaller, this site will again be flooded. Santa Rica is clearly well sited concerning flooding: it did not experience flooding during Fifi and is not flood prone. However, houses did experience some wall damage due to earthquakes following and associated with the Guatemalan quake of 1976. Due to the size and nature of the latter much "re-adjustment" occurred in the neighbouring fault system; however, damage to the houses was all superficial. We feel the residents were vocal about their concern due to the severity of the Guatemalan disaster and their lack of experience with concrete block houses. That the two sites (particularly Flores and partially San Jose) are vulnerable to future disasters cannot be considered solely the fault of an outside agency without local knowledge and understanding. In the engineering report issued during the construction it was explicitly stated that in Flores, "Future flooding remains a danger," [reference (6), p.49]. The future residents of Flores had gained access to the land from the National Agrarian Institute and were anxious to receive assistance in building homes. In fact, CARE, which had previously given these people tin roofing for houses, was threatening to take it back since the people had not yet started building. NAEA/HEA were responding to people in a rather desperate situation. But, on the other hand, they were responding to people who had been promised (not given) land by an agency of the Honduran national government which would be cognizant of the potential flooding at this site. Likewise, in San Jose, where mudslides and erosion remain a threat, the land was provided by a local government agency, the municipality. Although our goal in this discussion has not been to establish blame, we feel it imperative to mention the sequence of events that resulted in the questionable siting of Flores and San Jose. It is very easy and often accurate to place blame on outsiders who lack sophistication and knowledge about such matters. In this case local input did not result in post-disaster planning that is actually precautionary. This, we feel, illustrates the extreme complexity of cross-cultural aid, especially in the post-disaster period. It also points to the need for precautionary planning with reference to permanent post-disaster reconstruction.