Requirements for estimation of doses from contaminants dispersed by a ‘dirty bomb’ explosion in an urban area

The ARGOS decision support system is currently being extended to enable estimation of the consequences of terror attacks involving chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological substances. This paper presents elements of the framework that will be applied in ARGOS to calculate the dose contributions from contaminants dispersed in the atmosphere after a ‘dirty bomb’ explosion. Conceptual methodologies are presented which describe the various dose components on the basis of knowledge of time-integrated contaminant air concentrations. Also the aerosolisation and atmospheric dispersion in a city of different types of conceivable contaminants from a ‘dirty bomb’ are discussed.     

Some observations on explosion development in process pipelines and implications for the selection and testing of explosion protection devices

In recent years there has been continuing interest in the potential hazards from detonations in pipelines. The interest has arisen in several instances due to the introduction of vapour recover systems, as part of measures to limit environmental emissions. These environmental pressures initially coincided with the preparation of new European-wide test procedures for explosion arrester devices and, more recently, moves to develop a new international ISO standard for the certification and approval of detonation arrester devices. It is an opportune time therefore to review current understanding of explosion development in pipelines and to consider the implications for plant design and explosion arrester selection and testing.     

Airbag for the closing of pipelines on explosions and leakages

This paper is a result of international effort aimed at the construction of a device for quick closing of pipelines in the case of explosion propagation and/or chemical leakage. Such a problem exists in industries where flammable substances are transported by pipelines. The basic solution principle was the idea to use airbags similar to those utilized in cars.

Two pipeline applications were taken into consideration: a low-pressure module able to suppress explosion propagation and a high-pressure module to stop leakages from, e.g. natural gas pipeline capable to be used for duct diameters up to 0.6 m, pressures up to 5 MPa and reaction times of 50 ms. It was necessary to construct a new airbag, capable of withstanding up to 10 bar pressure. The choice of material was critical to ensure sufficient strength and chemical resistance while retaining impermeability.

CFD modeling of the bag deployment into a pipe flow and analysis of the bag shapes was also completed. Two gas generators were constructed and tested with novel propellant materials.

Different airbag models were tested to evaluate their effectiveness. Risk analysis approach was applied to evaluate the safety and economic benefits of the new technology in different fields of application.     

重大危险源区域事故应急非结构化模糊决策应用研究

针对目前我国应对重大危险源突发事故的管理和决策主要依赖于相关领导或专家掌握的知识及经验的现状,将非结构化模糊决策方法(Non-structural Fuzzy Decision Method,NSFDM)和事故后果模拟方法相结合,以区域范围内受重大危险源潜在事故影响的企业为决策对象,以减小事故影响范围,降低事故严重程度为目标,建立起重大危险源区域事故应急决策的多准则决策方法,以期帮助安监职能部门优化配置应急救援资源,提高应急响应绩效,减少国家和人民的经济和财产损失。以广州市某公司丙烷储罐区为实例,在对其进行沸腾液体扩展蒸气爆炸(Boiling Liquid Expanding Va-por Explosion,BLEVE)事故模拟的基础上,运用非结构化模糊决策方法,对该丙烷储罐区BLEVE事故的处理,提供了应急决策支持。     

Characteristic overpressure–impulse–distance curves for the detonation of explosives, pyrotechnics or unstable substances

A number of models have been proposed to calculate overpressure and impulse from accidental industrial explosions. When the blast is produced by explosives, pyrotechnics or unstable substances, the TNT equivalent model is widely used. From the curves given by this model, data are fitted to obtain equations showing the relationship between overpressure, impulse and distance. These equations, referred to here as characteristic curves, can be fitted by means of power equations, which depend on the TNT equivalent mass. Characteristic curves allow determination of overpressure and impulse at each distance.     

甲烷-煤尘爆炸波与障碍物相互作用的数值研究

为了探讨煤矿瓦斯和煤尘爆炸的物理机制 ,基于对甲烷和煤尘爆炸传播的理论分析 ,采用数值模拟方法研究障碍物对甲烷和煤尘爆炸传播的影响 ;为了更系统地考虑颗粒相各种输运特性、相间滑移和耦合 ,采用双流体模型建立了数学模型 ,该模型的出发点是把颗粒群和气体都作为连续介质 ,两者相互渗透充满整个空间形成没有间隙的“流体”———拟流体 ,在欧拉坐标系下考虑气 -固两相流动 ,气相和颗粒相的计算网格统一 ,易于处理。数值方法采用LU分解和迎风TVD格式分别处理对流项的隐式和显式部分 ,扩散项采用中心差分 ;同时研究了不同形状的障碍物对流场的影响 ,计算结果与实验吻合较好     

关于硝酸铵爆炸事前评价的探讨

硝酸铵主要用作肥料大量使用 ,或作为制造工业炸药的重要原料 ,是一种强氧化剂 ,同时又是自反应性物质 ,国内外因对其控制或管理不当 ,曾发生多起重大爆炸事故。为防止在生产、贮存、运输以及使用过程中的爆炸事故 ,笔者探讨并提出了硝酸铵爆炸事前评价模式。这种评价方法 ,对控制和预防硝酸铵发生事故 ,有借鉴、推广和现实意义。     

矿井火区可燃性混合气体爆炸三角形判断法及其爆炸危险性分析

矿井火区可燃性混合气体爆炸危险性的判断 ,目前常用单纯的瓦斯爆炸三角形判别法。此法对实际的判断往往未综合考虑火区温度的影响。为此 ,笔者论述了矿井火区多种可燃性气体同时存在时 ,其混合气体爆炸三角形各参数的工程计算方法 :爆炸界限可用 Le Chatelier法 ,但需根据火区实测温度进行修正 ;爆炸时的临界氧浓度 ,则需用另一种三角形图示法予以确定。由此画出的混合气体爆炸三角形分析图 ,可用于矿井火区 ,尤其是矿井大面积火区的密闭和启封过程中 ,作为可燃性混合气体爆炸危险性的综合判断及其防爆措施的制定 ,都具有实用价值和指导意义     

Does your facility have a dust problem: Methods for evaluating dust explosion hazards

The hazards of dust explosions prevailing in plants are dependent on a large variety of factors that include process parameters, such as pressure, temperature and flow characteristics, as well as equipment properties, such as geometry layout, the presence of moving elements, dust explosion characteristics and mitigating measures. A good dust explosion risk assessment is a thorough method involving the identification of all hazards, their probability of occurrence and the severity of potential consequences. The consequences of dust explosions are described as consequences for personnel and equipment, taking into account consequences of both primary and secondary events.While certain standards cover all the basic elements of explosion prevention and protection, systematic risk assessments and area classifications are obligatory in Europe, as required by EU ATEX and Seveso II directives. In the United States, NFPA 654 requires that the design of the fire and explosion safety provisions shall be based on a process hazard analysis of the facility, process, and the associated fire or explosion hazards. In this paper, we will demonstrate how applying such techniques as SCRAM (short-cut risk analysis method) can help identify potentially hazardous conditions and provide valuable assistance in reducing high-risk areas. The likelihood of a dust explosion is based on the ignition probability and the probability of flammable dust clouds arising. While all possible ignition sources are reviewed, the most important ones include open flames, mechanical sparks, hot surfaces, electric equipment, smoldering combustion (self-ignition) and electrostatic sparks and discharges. The probability of dust clouds arising is closely related to both process and dust dispersion properties.Factors determining the consequences of dust explosions include how frequently personnel are present, the equipment strength, implemented consequence-reducing measures and housekeeping, as risk assessment techniques demonstrate the importance of good housekeeping especially due to the enormous consequences of secondary dust explosions (despite their relatively low probability). The ignitibility and explosibility of the potential dust clouds also play a crucial role in determining the overall risk.Classes describe both the likelihood of dust explosions and their consequences, ranging from low probabilities and limited local damage, to high probability of occurrence and catastrophic damage. Acceptance criteria are determined based on the likelihood and consequence of the events. The risk assessment techniques also allow for choosing adequate risk reducing measures: both preventive and protective. Techniques for mitigating identified explosions risks include the following: bursting disks and quenching tubes, explosion suppression systems, explosion isolating systems, inerting techniques and temperature control. Advanced CFD tools (DESC) can be used to not only assess dust explosion hazards, but also provide valuable insight into protective measures, including suppression and venting.     

Explosion hazards related to hydrogen releases in nuclear facilities

Hydrogen explosion risk needs to be carefully assessed and evaluated in nuclear facilities because of the potential catastrophic consequences: breakdown of safety equipments, failure of containment, dissemination of radioactive materials in the environment.When studying an indoor release, one possible simplification is to assume a perfect gas mixing inside the room. This assumption is effectively often used to evaluate toxic risks in the environment outside a building (Mastellone, Ponte, & Arena, 2003). However, perfect gas mixing assumption is only a rough approximation, as indoor concentrations can largely differ from mean values, due to buoyancy, recirculation zones or obstacles for example.In order to better evaluate the risk of explosion in case of an accidental release of hydrogen, IRSN conducted a numerical study using FLACS CFD software. Several parameters have been studied to identify dangerous situations and draw a representative picture of the risk: room size, position and direction of hydrogen leak, ventilation characteristics. Hydrogen release flow rates used for numerical simulations have been chosen as the highest leak rate which, by applying the assumption of perfect mixing, produces an average concentration in the room equal to hydrogen lower flammability limit (LFL).Simulation results indicate that in some particular configurations, especially for impinging hydrogen jets, hydrogen concentrations can locally be above LFL and then create explosive atmospheres with significant volumes.