What can the trove of CSB incident investigations teach us? A detailed analysis of information characteristics among chemical process incidents investigated by the CSB

Understanding the commonalities among previous chemical process incidents can help mitigate recurring incidents in the chemical process industry and will be useful background knowledge for designers intending to foster inherent safety. The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) reports provide detailed and vital incident information that can be used to identify possible commonalities. This study aims to develop a systematic approach for extracting data from the CSB reports with the objective of establishing these commonalities. Data were extracted based on three categories: attributed incident causes, scenarios, and consequences. Seventeen causal factors were classified as chemical indicators or process indicators. Twelve chemical indicators are associated with the hazards of the chemicals involved in the incidents, whereas five process indicators account for the hazards presented by process conditions at the time of the incident. Seven scenario factors represent incident sequences, equipment types, operating modes, process units, domino effects, detonation likelihood for explosion incidents, and population densities. Finally, three consequence factors were selected based on types of chemical incidents, casualties, population densities, and economic losses. Data from 87 CSB reports covering 94 incidents were extracted and analyzed according to the proposed approach. Based on these findings, the study proposes guidelines for future collection of information to provide valuable resources for prediction and risk reduction of future incidents.     

Calibrate failure-based risk assessments to take into account the type of chemical processed in equipment

Currently, failure-based risk assessments in the process industry do not empirically take into account the type of chemicals processed in equipment, mainly because chemical-specific failure rate data barely exist. This paper suggests a methodology to calibrate failure-based risk assessment predicated on the chemical being processed in equipment. The methodology uses a data mining tool known as the association rule. Specifically, the lift association rule is utilized (the Lift Methodology). By extracting equipment failure information from incident databases based on the chemical involved in the process, the Lift Methodology leads to more accurate equipment-related risk assessment.     

Dust explosions and collapsed ductwork

One of the more obvious consequences of a dust deflagration inside process equipment or a structure is the mechanical damage caused by shock (compression) waves. This overpressure damage is revealed through the displacement of equipment, the outward deformation or rupture of enclosures constructed of ductile materials, or the projection of missiles. However, a different type of damage is sometimes observed in the ductwork connecting process equipment. In particular, the ductwork is collapsed as if it were subjected to an external, rather than an internal pressure. The phenomenon that causes this collapse of thin-walled conduit is a gas dynamic process called an expansion wave. When a dust deflagration travels through a conduit, it accelerates and causes a rise in pressure. When the dust deflagration is vented (say through a deflagration vent), the discharge of the high-pressure combustion products causes the formation of an expansion wave that travels in the reverse direction of the original discharge. The expansion wave causes the pressure in the ductwork to fall below atmospheric pressure. The sub-atmospheric pressure, in turn, causes the ductwork to fail by buckling. In this study, we examine the gas dynamics of the expansion wave, demonstrate how to calculate the degree of pressure drop caused by the expansion wave, and illustrate the concept with case studies of dust explosions.