Environmental federalism considers what level of government should optimally regulate pollution. This paper addresses this question for accidental pollution, which government regulates through the ex post liability regimes of either negligence or strict liability. We find that decentralizing the choice between these regimes does not, in general, induce the socially optimal outcome. When firms can pay all damages, all regions may choose negligence and impose an overly strict standard of due care. When firms may be bankrupted by damages, all regions may choose strict liability, which induces too little care. In addition, asymmetric equilibria are possible in which some regions choose negligence, others strict liability. Combining negligence with a Pigovian tax, or strict liability with a bonding requirement can align regional authorities' incentives with those of a central government. 相似文献
Identifying source information after river chemical spill occurrences is critical for emergency responses. However, the inverse uncertainty characteristics of this kind of pollution source inversion problem have not yet been clearly elucidated. To fill this gap, stochastic analysis approaches, including a regional sensitivity analysis method, identifiability plot and perturbation methods, were employed to conduct an empirical investigation on generic inverse uncertainty characteristics under a well-accepted uncertainty analysis framework. Case studies based on field tracer experiments and synthetic numerical tracer experiments revealed several new rules. For example, the release load can be most easily inverted, and the source location is responsible for the largest uncertainty among the source parameters. The diffusion and convection processes are more sensitive than the dilution and pollutant attenuation processes to the optimization of objective functions in terms of structural uncertainty. The differences among the different objective functions are smaller for instantaneous release than for continuous release cases. Small monitoring errors affect the inversion results only slightly, which can be ignored in practice. Interestingly, the estimated values of the release location and time negatively deviate from the real values, and the extent is positively correlated with the relative size of the mixing zone to the objective river reach. These new findings improve decision making in emergency responses to sudden water pollution and guide the monitoring network design.
In this paper, a discrete-time game model related to a bioresource management problem (fish catching) is considered. We divide a fishery into regions, which are exploited by single players. The center (referee) shares a reservoir between the competitors. The players (countries), which harvest the fish stock are the participants of this game.We assume that there are migratory exchanges between the regions of the reservoir. Therefore, the stock in one region depends not only on the previous stock and catch in the region, but also on the stock and catch in neighboring regions. We derive the Nash and cooperative equilibria for an infinite planning horizon.We consider two ways to maintain the cooperation: incentive equilibrium and time-consistent imputation distribution procedure. We investigate the cooperative incentive equilibrium in the case when the center punishes players for a deviation.Also we consider the case when the center is a player and find the Shapley value and time-consistent imputation distribution procedure. We introduce a new condition which offers an incentive to players to keep cooperating. 相似文献
The aim of the work is to outline a procedure of finding force-velocity (F–V) characteristics (F = f(V)) of individual skeletal muscles of the human locomotor system. The presentation is based on an example concerning extensors of the elbow joint: the lateral and long heads of triceps brachii (TBCIat and TBCIong). The experimental part of the procedure involves a natural movement of using the upper extremity to push an external object of variable, adjustable load, engaging both the elbow and shoulder joint.Five men aged 23 took part in the experiment. Their task was to push the handle of a physical pendulum whose moment of inertia could be adjusted within the range of 58 kg m2-450 kg m2, so as to give it maximum angular velocity. During each trial the movement of the trunk, of the upper extremity and of the pendulum was video recorded and the force applied with the hand to the handle of the pendulum was measured.In order to find the F–V characteristics a simulation model SHOULDER was used, which is capable of solving the synergy problem for muscles of the arm and the shoulder girdle.It was found that despite considerable dispersion of experimental points the respective regression lines revealed a clear tendency of decreasing muscle force for increased shortening velocity of the monoarticular head (TBCIat) and of increasing muscle force for increased lengthening velocity of the biarticular head (TBCIong) of the triceps brachii muscle. 相似文献
The aim of this paper is to understand how local residents participate in the construction of local environmental problems and to evaluate a particular analytical approach in environmental sociology to study this phenomenon. The paper is based on an interview study with a sample of local residents. The analysis demonstrates how the local residents attempt to construct a local environmental problem. In particular, the study focuses on how involved actors are positioned, how different sorts of knowledge claims are used, and how the neglect the residents perceive from the authorities affects the attempt to construct a local environmental problem. The study shows that the local residents play a central role in the construction of the situation and that the evaluated model could be very helpful as an analytical tool in the investigation of local residents' participation in the construction of environmental problems. 相似文献