基于多人合作对策思想的总量控制优化治理投资费用分摊方法

分析了污染物总量控制中各排污单位公平合理分摊优化治理投资费用的必要性，并阐明了应用对策论解决优化治理投资费用分摊问题的可能性．对优化治理投资费用分摊多人合作对策模型的建立及其求解方法（Ｓｈａｐｌｅｙ值法、核心法、ＣＧＡ法、ＭＣＲＳ法等）进行了描述，并将其应用于一案例中．最后指出应用对策论于总量控制优化治理投资费用分摊中将有助于总量控制规划方案的顺利实施，有效地控制污染、改善环境，使经济得以持续发展．     

基于3S技术的环境污染治理对策论应用模型研究

探讨了基于3S技术的现代空间信息系统支持下的对策论多元合作对策费用分摊策略问题。首先．从对策论基本原理出发，分析了费用分摊对策模型。针对大气环境污染防治多元决策问题，提出了采用3S综合集成技术确定污染源及盛行污染路径、确定污染区域面积和污染损失、污染损失费用分摊分析模型与方法。介绍了模型在大气环境污染防治多元决策领域中的应用实例。3S技术为对策论模型提供科学决策数据，有效地解决对策论应用中的瓶颈问题。     

环境管制过程中的管制者与被管制者行为分析

环境污染的经济负外部性对污染者具有激励作用,因此,解决环境问题的关键是对污染者加以管制.作为管制者的政府,需要了解排污者的污染严重程度,并据此限制和惩罚排污者的负外部性,作为被管制对象的排污者,有的要隐瞒真相,逃避惩罚.本文在环境污染的经济外部性和一般消除对策分析的基础上,通过分析环境管制过程中管制者和被管制者之间的博弈对策和行为,说明了惩罚的轻重程度导致的结果决然不同.博弈的最优策略表明,只有一定数额的排污罚金才可以起到惩治的作用,高额罚金不仅可以激励排污者真实披露污染信息,为污染治理提供科学依据,还可以降低政府的检测概率,减少政府在管制过程中的交易成本,因此,以高额度的罚金管制污染者应成为政府重要的管制手段.     

协同-络合萃取法回收含酚废水中的酚类

在现有的各种回收处理高浓度含酚废水的方法中,溶剂萃取法最为有效.但现有常用脱酚萃取剂分别存在着萃取效能低等诸多缺点,萃残液中一般尚存有几十至几百mg·l~(-1)的酚类,本文提出了协同-络合萃取法,并按该法原理研制了HC-1—HC-4四类新型协同-络合萃取剂.其中HC-3和HC-4对苯酚稀溶液的萃取平衡常数分别为K_((?)C-3)=612.4和K_((?)C-4)=483.7,单级萃取可将两组中高浓度的含酚废水中酚浓度降至10mg·l~(-1)以厂,脱酚率>99%.该法为一步脱酚达标提供了可能性.     

On the optimal control of carbon dioxide emissions: an application of FUND

This paper presents the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution (FUND), an integrated assessment model of climate change, and discusses selected results. FUND is a nine‐region model of the world economy and its interactions with climate, running in time steps of one year from 1990 to 2200. The model consists of scenarios for economy and population, which are perturbed by climate change and greenhouse gas emission reduction policy. Each region optimizes its net present welfare. Policy variables are energy and carbon efficiency improvement, and sequestering carbon dioxide in forests. It is found that reducing conventional air pollution is a major reason to abate carbon dioxide emissions. Climate change is an additional reason to abate emissions. Reducing and changing energy use is preferred as an option over sequestering carbon. Under non‐cooperation, free riding as well as assurance behaviour is observed in the model. The scope for joint implementation is limited. Under cooperation, optimal emission abatement is (slightly) higher than under non‐cooperation, but the global coalition is not self‐enforcing while side payments are insufficient. Optimal emission control under non‐cooperation is less than currently discussed under the Framework Convention on Climate Change, but higher than observed in practice. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

A Stochastic Dynamic Game of Carbon Emissions Trading

This paper proposes a computable stochastic equilibrium model to represent the possible competition between Russia and China on the international market of carbon emissions permits. The model includes a representation of the uncertainty concerning the date of entry of developing countries (e.g., China) on this market in the form of an event tree. Assuming that this date of entry is an uncontrolled event, we model the competition as a dynamic game played on an event tree and we look for a solution called S-adapted equilibrium. We compare the solution obtained from realistic data describing the demand curves for permits and the marginal abatement cost curves in different countries, under different market and information structures: (i) Russia's monopoly, (ii) Russia–China competition in a deterministic framework, (iii) Russia–China competition in a stochastic framework. The results show the possible impact of this competition on the pricing of emissions permits and on the effectiveness of Kyoto and post-Kyoto agreements, without a US participation.     

基于博弈模型的水价策略与节水策略分析

在当前水资源浪费、用水效率较低的背景下,仍然有许多地区继续实行低水价政策,本文认为这是供水企业与用水企业以及政府水务部门相互博弈的结果。通过构建一个供水企业与用水企业的博弈模型,并采用演化博弈分析方法分析动态演化的结果,本文发现当前采用低水价的主要原因在于：供水企业制定水价时要同时考虑私人收益与公共节水收益,而高水价对经济产生的冲击成本不足以弥补高水价产生的公共节水收益与私人收益,从而导致有些地区供水企业不敢提高水价,一直采用低水价策略。进一步地,本文采用不完全信息动态博弈方法分析供水企业与政府关于水价的议定过程,发现提高水价对经济的冲击越大,且节水技术投入成本越大而节水的公共收益越小时,政府水务部门同意低水价的概率越大;反之,则同意高水价的概率越大。从博弈论的角度系统地分析了低水价产生的决策过程,可对提高水价、促进节约用水具有一定的指导意义。     

旧工业建筑改造工程安全监管博弈分析

通过构建博弈模型来研究旧工业建筑改造安全监管过程中政府监督管理部门和业主方的均衡战略,并分析修正后纳什均衡中的关键因素对博弈双方行为选择的影响。结果表明:增加业主方收益、减少监管成本、加大惩罚力度等可有效提高政府监督管理部门的监管效率,从而减少安全事故的发生,提高改造工程的质量。     

基于博弈论的环保数据质量影响因素分析研究

污染源产排污数据是一切环保工作的基础,确保真实可信具有十分重要的意义.为此,分析了影响污染源产排污数据质量的主要因素:受经济利益驱动的自身因素;受政绩利益驱动的管理因素和受地方保护驱动的政府因素等.在新环保法未得到充分贯彻,排污单位、环保主管部门和地方政府三者违法成本均低于守法成本的条件下,以博奕论为分析工具讨论了三种影响因素产生负面作用的必然性,并根据分析结果针对性地提出了提高数据质量的应对策略.     

Protected-Area Monitoring Dilemmas: a New Tool to Assess Success

Abstract:  Understanding factors that influence the success of protected areas in curbing unsustainable resource consumption is essential for determining best management strategies and allocating limited resources to those projects most likely to succeed. I used a law-enforcement and monitoring game-theory model from the political science literature to identify three key variables useful in predicting the success of a protected area: costs of monitoring for rule breakers, benefits of catching a rule breaker, and probability of catching a rule breaker if monitoring. Although assigning exact values for each of these variables was difficult, the variables had a strong predictive capacity even when coded as coarse ordinal values. A model in which such values were used correctly predicted the outcome of 88 of 116 protected areas sampled from the peer-reviewed literature. The model identified a critical zone of common mismatch between protected-area circumstances and management policies. In situations where the costs of monitoring were greater than the product of the probability of catching a rule breaker and the benefit of doing so, conservation was unlikely to succeed. Control of illegal use of protected resources was reported in only 8% of such cases, regardless of strategies to motivate potential users to cooperate with conservation. My model does not prescribe a best management policy for conserving natural resources; rather, it can be used as a tool to help predict whether a proposed management policy will likely succeed in a given situation.