The feasibility of concentrated rural settlement in a context of post‐disaster reconstruction: a study of China

There is growing appreciation of the use of concentrated rural settlement as an effective means of implementing infrastructure projects and helping to achieve sustainable development in rural areas. This occurs in China through the exchange of rural residential land for urban construction. However, this policy has not been effective under normal circumstances (called development‐driven conditions) as frequently farmers are reluctant to accept such an exchange. By contrast, in a time of disaster, such as after the 2008 earthquake in Sichuan Province, China, rural victims have accepted this policy of rural residential land exchange. Employing game theory, this paper identifies the reasons for the different outcomes and it contends that the implementation of concentrated rural settlement practice under disaster‐induced conditions is more effective than its introduction under development‐driven conditions. The results of the analysis indicate that, in China, concentrated rural settlement is feasible in a context of post‐disaster reconstruction.     

Fish wars and cooperation maintenance

In this paper, a discrete-time game model related to a bioresource management problem (fish catching) is considered. We divide a fishery into regions, which are exploited by single players. The center (referee) shares a reservoir between the competitors. The players (countries), which harvest the fish stock are the participants of this game.We assume that there are migratory exchanges between the regions of the reservoir. Therefore, the stock in one region depends not only on the previous stock and catch in the region, but also on the stock and catch in neighboring regions. We derive the Nash and cooperative equilibria for an infinite planning horizon.We consider two ways to maintain the cooperation: incentive equilibrium and time-consistent imputation distribution procedure. We investigate the cooperative incentive equilibrium in the case when the center punishes players for a deviation.Also we consider the case when the center is a player and find the Shapley value and time-consistent imputation distribution procedure. We introduce a new condition which offers an incentive to players to keep cooperating.     

系统操作者与管理者行为的博弈演化与收益分析*

为研究工程项目系统中,操作者安全行为与管理者奖惩行为的相互博弈情况,确定操作者和管理者收益,提出博弈演化与收益分析方法。操作者代表系统实际使用者,行为包括安全和不安全行为;管理者代表系统管理者和所有者,行为包括奖励和惩罚行为。确定方法的基本参数;研究博弈演化过程的博弈逻辑关系,从悲观和乐观角度研究二者不同行为相互作用后的收益关系,给出操作者收益和管理者收益的逻辑表达式。结果表明:方法能得到博弈过程演化结果,同时能根据收益结果表达式判断博弈胜出方。     

Optimizing a warranty–based sustainable product service system using game theory

Abstract

In recent years, the concepts of sustainability and product service system have been closely associated with each other. In today’s competitive markets, due to Extended Producer Responsibility and customer environmental awareness, producers shift from ‘product-seller’ towards ‘product-service provider’ for using the environmental and economic advantages of coupling a product with services. This paper proposes a novel approach to determine the optimal warranty period and the out-of-warranty replacement period, from the point of view of the producer and the customer to minimise the total cost of usage and end of life of product. As regards the fact that adopted strategies by producers and customers sometimes are in conflict and it affects choosing the optimal product usage period, a game theory model was developed in this study. Finally, a case study with data from chain of local notebook service centres was applied to demonstrate some practical aspects of the developed model.     

Game analysis of Chinese stakeholders in collective forest rights system reform

In the current stage of Chinese forest ownership reform, the central and local governments as well as the forest farmers play different roles with variations in their expected returns. Managing these respective relationships between the forestry stakeholders to maximize their benefits while actively engaging each stakeholder in the collective forest ownership reform process has become an important issue. This study uses the game theory methodology to analyze the relationship between the different reform stakeholders and then builds on the forest farmers’ participation in the reform model process at the reform movement micro-level. This model calculates the forest products equilibrium marketing sales and the government subsidies provided to the forest farmers, when the forest farmers willingly participate in the reform process. It will provide a reliable basis for formulation of government policies which positively impacts Chinese forestry reform.     

电力突发事件应急管理中的博弈

电力安全一直是人们关注的问题,电力系统对无法预料的灾难性突发事件表现的非常脆弱,电力突发事件的应急管理对维护电力系统安全运行具有十分重要的意义。电力突发事件的状态是在不断变化的,应急管理人员必须根据电力突发事件发展趋势动态地调整管理活动。本文分析了突发事件应急管理中＂电力突发事件＂与＂应急管理者＂之间的动态博弈过程,＂应急管理者＂会随着＂电力突发事件＂的动态演变,不断调整其管理方法,控制住＂电力突发事件＂。通过分析＂电力突发事件＂与＂应急管理者＂之间的博弈,构建了电力突发事件有效应急管理程序。＂应急管理人员＂以动态博弈的思想处理＂电力突发事件＂,结果表明该方法能更好的发挥应急处理预案的作用,更有效的处置＂电力突发事件＂。     

Designing a mixed performance measurement system for environmental supply chain management using evolutionary game theory and balanced scorecard: A case study of an auto industry supply chain

This paper proposes a mixed performance measurement system using a combination of evolutionary game theory and the balanced scorecard (BSC) in environmental supply chain management (ESCM) that measures and evaluates business operations using the four different perspectives of finance, customer, internal business process, and learning and growth. ESCM plays an important role in the supply chain which leads to the reduction, reuse and recycling of resources involved in both upstream and downstream activities. This paper presents guidance for practical managers in evaluating and measuring ESCM by developing a knowledge-based BSC and evolutionary game theory. The primary purpose of this paper is to apply the proposed method in a case study to one of Iran's biggest auto industry supply chain SAIPA Company. The results of this study indicate that the adoption of ESCM, in the absence of regulatory pressures and cost-saving measures is triggered by public pressures and its implementation is limited by organizational factors and strategic myopia.     

基于博弈分析的旅游购物市场转型升级研究

针对目前旅游购物市场存在的诸多问题,学者们提出了很多的措施,但对哪一种措施更有效却缺乏研究.以博弈论作为研究工具,通过在信息不完全状况下对旅游购物市场进行博弈分析,找出了其均衡解,得出了在信息不完全的状况下,旅游购物市场上必然会充斥大量劣质品的结论.再运用博弈论方法对旅游购物市场的两种转型升级策略进行了分析,探讨了在这两种转型升级策略下,旅游购物市场条件得到不同的改善.建议加强市场监督措施,使其更易于实施,效率更高;建立广泛的多部门综合执法的网络;鼓励大众监督.     

具有危险源性质的复杂系统安全行为演化研究

为解决具有危险源性质的复杂社会技术系统安全行为演化动力机制问题,针对系统生命周期长、影响因素多的特点,以日本福岛核泄漏事故为例,创建扩展型功能共振模型,用于描述系统内安全事故影响因素的作用过程。而后将系统相关主体分为实施方、业主方和第三方共3类,运用演化博弈方法深入研究发现,三方所承担的安全执行成本、安全处罚成本及事故成本之间的数量关系变化是系统安全行为演化发展的动力,3类成本失衡引发的监管机制失效是导致此次核泄漏事故的根源,并据此提出保持政府独立性和权威性、限制业主行为、建立项目责任主体终生追溯机制和采用立体处罚方式的建议。     

考虑恐怖袭击下危险品运输安全监管的演化博弈与稳定性分析*

为了提高恐怖袭击背景下的危险品运输安全水平和政府监管能力,首先构建政府监管部门、危险品运输企业和恐怖袭击者的三方演化博弈模型;其次引入政府动态惩罚机制和动态惩罚-补贴机制,进而采用系统动力学仿真分析动态惩罚和动态惩罚-补贴下的局中人的演化稳定策略。研究结果表明:给定情形下,引入动态惩罚机制能弥补原有模型没有稳定策略的不足;引入动态惩罚-补贴机制的模型可以演化出稳定的纯策略。