越境环境污染的经济分析

本文在介绍了越境环境污染的损害非一致性和混合非一致性特征的基础上,从外部性角度分析了越境环境问题,并着重探讨了博弈论在越境环境污染分析中的应用。指出,国际合作是解决这类问题的有效途径。     

准市场条件下的水权交易双层动态博弈定价机制实证研究

在经济新常态背景下,水资源的准公共产品特征具有更加重要的管理价值,如何依托市场与行政的两手发力,提升我国水资源管理水平,更好地服务于"两个百年"奋斗目标,具有十分重要的理论与现实意义。水权交易制度是利用市场与行政手段提高水资源利用率,解决人水冲突的重要技术手段,如何在准市场条件下构建符合我国国情的水权交易定价机制已成为实现水权交易制度的核心技术。因此,针对政府-企业-公众等多利益相关者参与下的水权交易定价问题,本文引入生态经济学理论构建了水权价值测度模型,进而引入合作博弈理论,构建了准市场条件下的水权交易双层动态博弈定价模型,主要包括买方政府和卖方政府的微分博弈模型,以及买方政府与水务公司的Nash-Bargaining合作定价模型,运用HJB条件求解多利益相关者合作框架下的水权交易均衡水价空间,进而以江西省萍乡市水权交易实践为例开展实证研究,结果表明:均衡水价主要受上级政府协调能力k、水量需求系数β影响,且均为正相关,针对萍乡实践而言,由于水量需求主要体现在中长期发展规划阶段,上级政府协调能力显著性强于水量需求系数;均衡水价随着上级政府协调能力k值增大呈现由快转慢再转快的趋势,整体服从逻辑函数分布,均衡水价随着水量需求系数β的增大呈现由快转慢趋势,整体服从对数函数分布,针对萍乡实践而言,水权交易中市场与行政力量的两手发力存在稳定状态,二者缺一不可;随着议价能力系数提高,Nash-Bargaining的水权交易价格随之升高,表明政府与公司之间的合作关系对水价具有直接的影响能力。     

从政府与农户的动态博弈分析退耕还林工程的可持续性

退耕还林工程的实施取得了一定的成绩，但是也存在一些问题，制约了工程的可持续性。其中一个重要的原因就是补偿问题。通过经济学中的博弈理论构建退耕还林动态模型，从补偿的角度分析了退耕还林工程中存在的问题，并提出工程可持续性建议，即：①对生态林和经济林实行差别补偿；②对不同地区实行差别补偿标准；③延长补偿期限，实行分年度对农户进行不同数量的补偿；④对工程区进行产业结构调整，加强农户技能培训。     

Correlates of bushmeat in markets and depletion of wildlife

We used data on number of carcasses of wildlife species sold in 79 bushmeat markets in a region of Nigeria and Cameroon to assess whether species composition of a market could be explained by anthropogenic pressures and environmental variables around each market. More than 45 mammal species from 9 orders were traded across all markets; mostly ungulates and rodents. For each market, we determined median body mass, species diversity (game diversity), and taxa that were principal contributors to the total number of carcasses for sale (game dominance). Human population density in surrounding areas was significantly and negatively related to the percentage ungulates and primates sold in markets and significantly and positively related to the proportion of rodents. The proportion of carnivores sold was higher in markets with high human population densities. Proportion of small‐bodied mammals (<1 kg) sold in markets increased as human population density increased, but proportion of large‐bodied mammals (>10 kg) decreased as human population density increased. We calculated an index of game depletion (GDI) for each market from the sum of the total number of carcasses traded per annum and species, weighted by the intrinsic rate of natural increase (r_max) of each species, divided by individuals traded in a market. The GDI of a market increased as the proportion of fast‐reproducing species (highest r_max) increased and as the representation of species with lowest r_max (slow‐reproducing) decreased. The best explanatory factor for a market's GDI was anthropogenic pressure—road density, human settlements with >3000 inhabitants, and nonforest vegetation. High and low GDI were significantly differentiated by human density and human settlements with >3000 inhabitants. Our results provided empirical evidence that human activity is correlated with more depleted bushmeat faunas and can be used as a proxy to determine areas in need of conservation action.     

Aligning science and policy to achieve evolutionarily enlightened conservation

There is increasing recognition among conservation scientists that long‐term conservation outcomes could be improved through better integration of evolutionary theory into management practices. Despite concerns that the importance of key concepts emerging from evolutionary theory (i.e., evolutionary principles and processes) are not being recognized by managers, there has been little effort to determine the level of integration of evolutionary theory into conservation policy and practice. We assessed conservation policy at 3 scales (international, national, and provincial) on 3 continents to quantify the degree to which key evolutionary concepts, such as genetic diversity and gene flow, are being incorporated into conservation practice. We also evaluated the availability of clear guidance within the applied evolutionary biology literature as to how managers can change their management practices to achieve better conservation outcomes. Despite widespread recognition of the importance of maintaining genetic diversity, conservation policies provide little guidance about how this can be achieved in practice and other relevant evolutionary concepts, such as inbreeding depression, are mentioned rarely. In some cases the poor integration of evolutionary concepts into management reflects a lack of decision‐support tools in the literature. Where these tools are available, such as risk‐assessment frameworks, they are not being adopted by conservation policy makers, suggesting that the availability of a strong evidence base is not the only barrier to evolutionarily enlightened management. We believe there is a clear need for more engagement by evolutionary biologists with policy makers to develop practical guidelines that will help managers make changes to conservation practice. There is also an urgent need for more research to better understand the barriers to and opportunities for incorporating evolutionary theory into conservation practice.     

Game theoretic analysis of environmental impact assessment system in China

Environmental impact assessment (EIA) system has been established in China since 1973. In present EIA cases, there are four participants in general: governments, enterprises, EIA organizations and the public. The public has held responsible for both social costs and social duties. The public supervises social costs produced by enterprises discharging pollutant in EIA. However public participation is mostly deputized by governments, which severely weaken the independence of the public as one participant in EIA. In this paper, EIA refers to the different attitudes of the participants whose optional strategies may be described by a proper game model. According to disfigurements in EIA, three sides (governments, enterprises, and EIA organizations) dynamic iterative game theory, dynamic game theory of incomplete information, and perfect Bayesian equilibrium theory to analyze the reciprocity relation among governments, EIA organizations and enterprises. The results show that in a short period, economic benefit is preponderant over social benefit. Governments and enterprises both do not want to take EIA to reveal social costs. EIA organizations’ income comes from enterprises and the collusions are built between them to vindicate economic benefit. In a long run, social benefit loss caused by environmental pollution must be recuperated sooner or later and environmental deterioration will influence the achievements of economic benefit, so both governments and enterprises are certain to pursue high social benefit and willing to take EIA, helpful to increase private benefit. EIA organizations will make fair assessment when their economic benefit are ensured. At present, the public as silent victims can not take actual part in EIA. The EIA system must be improved to break the present equilibrium of three sides, bringing the public to the equilibrium to exert public supervision.     

基于多人合作对策思想的总量控制优化治理投资费用分摊方法

分析了污染物总量控制中各排污单位公平合理分摊优化治理投资费用的必要性，并阐明了应用对策论解决优化治理投资费用分摊问题的可能性．对优化治理投资费用分摊多人合作对策模型的建立及其求解方法（Ｓｈａｐｌｅｙ值法、核心法、ＣＧＡ法、ＭＣＲＳ法等）进行了描述，并将其应用于一案例中．最后指出应用对策论于总量控制优化治理投资费用分摊中将有助于总量控制规划方案的顺利实施，有效地控制污染、改善环境，使经济得以持续发展．     

基于3S技术的环境污染治理对策论应用模型研究

探讨了基于3S技术的现代空间信息系统支持下的对策论多元合作对策费用分摊策略问题。首先．从对策论基本原理出发，分析了费用分摊对策模型。针对大气环境污染防治多元决策问题，提出了采用3S综合集成技术确定污染源及盛行污染路径、确定污染区域面积和污染损失、污染损失费用分摊分析模型与方法。介绍了模型在大气环境污染防治多元决策领域中的应用实例。3S技术为对策论模型提供科学决策数据，有效地解决对策论应用中的瓶颈问题。     

环境管制过程中的管制者与被管制者行为分析

环境污染的经济负外部性对污染者具有激励作用,因此,解决环境问题的关键是对污染者加以管制.作为管制者的政府,需要了解排污者的污染严重程度,并据此限制和惩罚排污者的负外部性,作为被管制对象的排污者,有的要隐瞒真相,逃避惩罚.本文在环境污染的经济外部性和一般消除对策分析的基础上,通过分析环境管制过程中管制者和被管制者之间的博弈对策和行为,说明了惩罚的轻重程度导致的结果决然不同.博弈的最优策略表明,只有一定数额的排污罚金才可以起到惩治的作用,高额罚金不仅可以激励排污者真实披露污染信息,为污染治理提供科学依据,还可以降低政府的检测概率,减少政府在管制过程中的交易成本,因此,以高额度的罚金管制污染者应成为政府重要的管制手段.     

On the optimal control of carbon dioxide emissions: an application of FUND

This paper presents the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution (FUND), an integrated assessment model of climate change, and discusses selected results. FUND is a nine‐region model of the world economy and its interactions with climate, running in time steps of one year from 1990 to 2200. The model consists of scenarios for economy and population, which are perturbed by climate change and greenhouse gas emission reduction policy. Each region optimizes its net present welfare. Policy variables are energy and carbon efficiency improvement, and sequestering carbon dioxide in forests. It is found that reducing conventional air pollution is a major reason to abate carbon dioxide emissions. Climate change is an additional reason to abate emissions. Reducing and changing energy use is preferred as an option over sequestering carbon. Under non‐cooperation, free riding as well as assurance behaviour is observed in the model. The scope for joint implementation is limited. Under cooperation, optimal emission abatement is (slightly) higher than under non‐cooperation, but the global coalition is not self‐enforcing while side payments are insufficient. Optimal emission control under non‐cooperation is less than currently discussed under the Framework Convention on Climate Change, but higher than observed in practice. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.