A Stochastic Dynamic Game of Carbon Emissions Trading

This paper proposes a computable stochastic equilibrium model to represent the possible competition between Russia and China on the international market of carbon emissions permits. The model includes a representation of the uncertainty concerning the date of entry of developing countries (e.g., China) on this market in the form of an event tree. Assuming that this date of entry is an uncontrolled event, we model the competition as a dynamic game played on an event tree and we look for a solution called S-adapted equilibrium. We compare the solution obtained from realistic data describing the demand curves for permits and the marginal abatement cost curves in different countries, under different market and information structures: (i) Russia's monopoly, (ii) Russia–China competition in a deterministic framework, (iii) Russia–China competition in a stochastic framework. The results show the possible impact of this competition on the pricing of emissions permits and on the effectiveness of Kyoto and post-Kyoto agreements, without a US participation.     

基于博弈模型的水价策略与节水策略分析

在当前水资源浪费、用水效率较低的背景下,仍然有许多地区继续实行低水价政策,本文认为这是供水企业与用水企业以及政府水务部门相互博弈的结果。通过构建一个供水企业与用水企业的博弈模型,并采用演化博弈分析方法分析动态演化的结果,本文发现当前采用低水价的主要原因在于：供水企业制定水价时要同时考虑私人收益与公共节水收益,而高水价对经济产生的冲击成本不足以弥补高水价产生的公共节水收益与私人收益,从而导致有些地区供水企业不敢提高水价,一直采用低水价策略。进一步地,本文采用不完全信息动态博弈方法分析供水企业与政府关于水价的议定过程,发现提高水价对经济的冲击越大,且节水技术投入成本越大而节水的公共收益越小时,政府水务部门同意低水价的概率越大;反之,则同意高水价的概率越大。从博弈论的角度系统地分析了低水价产生的决策过程,可对提高水价、促进节约用水具有一定的指导意义。     

旧工业建筑改造工程安全监管博弈分析

通过构建博弈模型来研究旧工业建筑改造安全监管过程中政府监督管理部门和业主方的均衡战略,并分析修正后纳什均衡中的关键因素对博弈双方行为选择的影响。结果表明:增加业主方收益、减少监管成本、加大惩罚力度等可有效提高政府监督管理部门的监管效率,从而减少安全事故的发生,提高改造工程的质量。     

基于博弈论的环保数据质量影响因素分析研究

污染源产排污数据是一切环保工作的基础,确保真实可信具有十分重要的意义.为此,分析了影响污染源产排污数据质量的主要因素:受经济利益驱动的自身因素;受政绩利益驱动的管理因素和受地方保护驱动的政府因素等.在新环保法未得到充分贯彻,排污单位、环保主管部门和地方政府三者违法成本均低于守法成本的条件下,以博奕论为分析工具讨论了三种影响因素产生负面作用的必然性,并根据分析结果针对性地提出了提高数据质量的应对策略.     

Protected-Area Monitoring Dilemmas: a New Tool to Assess Success

Abstract:  Understanding factors that influence the success of protected areas in curbing unsustainable resource consumption is essential for determining best management strategies and allocating limited resources to those projects most likely to succeed. I used a law-enforcement and monitoring game-theory model from the political science literature to identify three key variables useful in predicting the success of a protected area: costs of monitoring for rule breakers, benefits of catching a rule breaker, and probability of catching a rule breaker if monitoring. Although assigning exact values for each of these variables was difficult, the variables had a strong predictive capacity even when coded as coarse ordinal values. A model in which such values were used correctly predicted the outcome of 88 of 116 protected areas sampled from the peer-reviewed literature. The model identified a critical zone of common mismatch between protected-area circumstances and management policies. In situations where the costs of monitoring were greater than the product of the probability of catching a rule breaker and the benefit of doing so, conservation was unlikely to succeed. Control of illegal use of protected resources was reported in only 8% of such cases, regardless of strategies to motivate potential users to cooperate with conservation. My model does not prescribe a best management policy for conserving natural resources; rather, it can be used as a tool to help predict whether a proposed management policy will likely succeed in a given situation.     

A Phylogenetic Approach to Conserving Amazonian Biodiversity

Abstract: Amazonia is a highly threatened rainforest that encompasses a major proportion of Earth's biological diversity. Our main goal was to establish conservation priorities for Amazonia's areas of endemism on the basis of measures of evolutionary distinctiveness. We considered two previously identified sets of areas of endemism. The first set consisted of eight large areas used traditionally in biogeographical studies: Belém, Tapajós, Xingu, Guiana, Rondônia, Imeri, Inambari, and Napo. The second set consisted of 16 smaller areas that were subdivisions of the larger areas. We assembled a data set of 50 phylogenies that represented 16 orders and 1715 distributional records. We identified priority conservation areas for the areas of endemism according to node‐based metrics of evolutionary distinctiveness. We contrasted these results with priority areas identified on the basis of raw species richness and species endemicity. For the larger areas, we identified Guiana and Inambari as the first‐ and second‐most important areas for conservation. The remaining areas in this first group scored half (e.g., Napo) or less than Guiana and Inambari on all indices. For the smaller areas, a subdivision of Guiana (i.e., Guyana and the Brazilian states of Roraima and Amazonas) was at the top of the ranking and was followed by a subdivision of Inambari (i.e., northwestern portion of Amazonas) and then another subdivision of Guiana (i.e., Suriname, French Guiana, and the Brazilian state of Amapá). The distinctiveness‐based rankings of the priority of areas correlated directly with those derived from species richness and species endemicity. Current conservation strategies in Amazonia, although they rely on many other criteria apart from phylogeny, are focusing on the most important areas for conservation we identified here.     

生态工业园区水资源梯级利用的博弈分析

水资源是生态工业园区中最重要的资源之一,模拟自然生态系统,园区中的水资源用户也可根据功能的不同分为生产者、消费者和分解者.由于供给量的限制和国家的排污政策逐渐趋紧,生态工业园区中水资源数量和质量的分配存在利益冲突的问题,矛盾日渐凸现.本文试图运用博弈论的方法,构建一个水资源管理的梯级利用模式,探讨生态工业园区内水质要求不同的企业间如何实现水资源的合理分配,使之既符合企业的需要,又符合整个园区的供给限制,同时对环境的损害最小.之后从微观经济学的角度对各利益主体参与水资源梯级利用的动因和积极性进行了经济学上的分析,得出生态工业园区中水资源梯级利用体系能否达成“物尽其用、废物最小化”的目标,取决于不同利益者的博弈结果.水资源价格和排污收费价格的提高,可以减少新鲜水资源的购买量和最终的排污量,有利于促进园区内企业间的水资源梯级利用；而梯级利用的过程,也是各级消费者之间的一场博弈,博弈结果将决定再生水资源的售出价格.     

基于博弈论的地铁车站恐怖袭击风险定量研究

近年来发生的几起地铁重大恐怖袭击事件引起了各国政府、媒体和公众的广泛关注.地铁车站恐怖袭击可以看作博弈双方即袭击者和防御者之间的零和博弈.本文以某地铁线路上的22个车站为例,应用目标损失概率模型定量分析了恐怖袭击风险,通过防御资源变化得到了不同的目标损失概率.研究结果可以为地铁车站防御资源优化配置、防恐反恐预案编制等提供量化依据.     

环境管制政策的局限性与变革--自愿性环境政策的兴起

我国虽然基本上避免了环境质量急剧恶化的局面。但是现行环境政策并没有从根本上遏制环境状况不断恶化的趋势，我国环境政策的效率亟待摄高。究其原因，我国环境政策以行政直控的管制政策为主。具有强烈的行政管理色彩，使得政府和企业的博弈长期锁定在非合作状态。要摆脱这种困境，必须引入第三方激励、监督机制。促使双方的博弈转变为合作博弈。20世纪90年代中期自愿性环境政策的渐渐兴起，是企业和公众在产品市场上互相影响的结果。而政府起到引导激励、信号传递作用。文章从博弈论的角度对此进行了分析，自愿性环境政策缓解了环境管制成本与效果冲突的困境，是未来环境政策的一个重要的方向。     

Hunting for Sustainability in Tropical Secondary Forests

Abstract:  The interaction between land-use change and the sustainability of hunting is poorly understood but is critical for sustaining hunted vertebrate populations and a protein supply for the rural poor. We investigated sustainability of hunting in an Amazonian landscape mosaic, where a small human population had access to large areas of both primary and secondary forest. Harvestable production of mammals and birds was calculated from density estimates. We compared production with offtake from three villages and used catch-per-unit-effort as an independent measure of prey abundance. Most species were hunted unsustainably in primary forest, leading to local depletion of the largest primates and birds. The estimated sustainable supply of wild meat was higher for primary (39 kg · km⁻²· yr⁻¹) than secondary forest (22 kg · km⁻²· yr⁻¹) because four species were absent and three species at low abundance in secondary forests. Production of three disturbance-tolerant mammal species was 3 times higher in secondary than in primary forest, but hunting led to overexploitation of one species. Our data suggest that an average Amazonian smallholder would require ≥3.1 km² of secondary regrowth to ensure a sustainable harvest of forest vertebrates. We conclude that secondary forests can sustainably provide only 2% of the required protein intake of Amazonian smallholders and are unlikely to be sufficient for sustainable hunting in other tropical forest regions.