碳交易政策下的物流与制造业联动减排随机演化博弈

考虑外部环境的不确定性,构建由地方政府、制造商与物流企业构建的三方随机演化模型,对模型的稳定性进行讨论得到稳态条件,结合数值仿真方法对博弈主体策略演化进行研究.结果表明：规制成本与上级政府的倒查机制是影响地方政府策略选择的重要因素,较高的碳交易价格将促进博弈系统向（积极规制,绿色生产,绿色运输）理想策略集演化,理想策略集下初始策略选择概率的改变一定程度上影响了主体演化的速率,即便制造商在博弈初期的绿色生产策略选择概率为0.1,仍能以最快的演化速率向绿色生产稳定策略收敛.联动发展下制造商的绿色生产策略将带动物流企业选择绿色运输策略,物流企业对碳交易价格与碳配额的敏感性要大于制造商,物流企业向绿色运输演化速率与碳配额成负相关,与碳交易价格成正相关.碳交易财政收入的增加促进了地方政府的积极规制行为,但当财政收入系数增加至0.3时可能导致物流企业的策略选择不稳定.伴随着随机干扰强度的升高,制造商保持了最高的稳定性,在情形一、二中的波动幅度分别为0.4667~1与0.5618~1,而物流企业的策略选择波动性最强,在情形一、二中得波动幅度分别为0.3856~1与0.4616~1,且在演化初期长期处在不稳定状态.     

Toward a delineation of the circumstances in which cooperation can be sustained in environmental and resource problems

Play in standard laboratory Public Good games suggests that on average, humans are quite prone to cooperate. Yet cooperation is often absent in real world social dilemmas, including many environmental problems. We propose that this discrepancy arises because in the Public Good game, the worst freeriders can do is to not contribute to the public account, while in many real world environmental situations freeriders can even appropriate contributions made by others before the public good is produced. We introduce the Claim Game that modifies the Public Good game by allowing for appropriating the contributions of others before the public good is produced. The impact of such possible takings on public good production is dramatic. No public good is produced, not even in the initial stages of interaction. We link our findings to the relevance of common pool games for modeling environmental problems, and stress the need to experimentally test environmental institutions within harsher social dilemmas than the standard Public Good game.     

组合措施下政府与企业排污行为演化博弈

为研究排污企业应对不同惩罚和补贴组合措施的行为策略,将演化博弈理论与系统动力学方法结合,构建基于政府与排污企业双方的演化博弈模型.以政府和排污企业双方利益为核心,对其在不同惩罚和补贴措施下的企业行为策略和演化稳定性进行分析.结果显示,在静态惩罚补贴措施下,政府和企业策略行为无法达到演化稳定点,政府静态政策不会对企业合法排污行为产生推动作用.在动态惩罚补贴措施下,动态惩罚和动态补贴措施对推动企业合法排污行为更为有效,政府可根据排污企业行为制定双边动态策略.     

博弈视角下跨界河流水资源保护协作机制——以太湖流域太浦河为例

跨界河流水资源保护利益协调问题是流域水资源管理的难点。以太湖流域典型跨界河流太浦河为例,对比分析上下游水资源保护利益诉求,基于博弈理论,引入外部驱动（流域机构介入、激励约束政策）与内部均衡（生态补偿、断面水质考核）四种协调手段,探讨均衡太浦河上下游利益矛盾、激励上下游实现合作保护的协作机制。结果表明：（1）在引入协调手段的博弈模型中,实现了博弈系统向协作策略（达标,补偿）演化。（2）基于博弈分析结果,协作策略（达标,补偿）的实现与激励约束力度、补偿金额、水权、上游保护成本与效益等因素密切相关。（3）外部驱动机制有利于协调上下游河流功能定位需求差异,并调动上下游加强协作保护的积极性与主动性;内部均衡机制有利于弥补上游水权、产业发展等利益损失,并倒逼太浦河水质达标、保障下游取水安全。（4）构建的太浦河水资源保护协作机制,可为加快推进长三角一体化协同发展,建设流域“清水走廊”提供理论与决策支持参考。     

基于三方博弈的再生水回用市场演化路径分析

为促进再生水市场的构建,以西安市再生水回用市场发展过程为研究案例,采用演化博弈理论构建了基于政府、再生水厂商、消费者三方博弈的再生水回用市场推广模型,分析其博弈均衡及演化路径.结果表明再生水回用市场的演化过程可划分为四个阶段,不同条件下系统将演化至不同的均衡.发展初期政府支持和宣传能有效提高再生水处理量和回用量,发展中后期为了增强企业参与度和消费者接受度需要提高财政补贴、提高使用再生水效用、降低自来水效用、提升再生水厂商获利、减少政府管理成本.     

基于系统动力学的建筑安全监管博弈研究

为研究影响建筑安全的因素,探讨科学的建筑安全监管策略,在建筑企业与政府安全监管部门具有有限理性的前提下,建立建筑安全监管的演化博弈模型。对稳定状态的分析表明,模型并不总是存在演化稳定策略。在此基础上,建立系统动力学模型,借助数据仿真分析不同变量对建筑安全状况的动态影响。研究结果表明,奖惩力度、监管失误率、监管成本、安全投入、惩罚机制等因素的变化对建筑安全状况产生影响。建筑安全长效监管可从加大对监管部门的奖惩力度、减少监管部门的监管失误率、降低建筑安全监管成本、合理控制安全措施投入、设计合理的建筑企业惩罚机制等方面着手。     

Interacting Effects of Phenotypic Plasticity and Evolution on Population Persistence in a Changing Climate

Abstract: Climate change affects individual organisms by altering development, physiology, behavior, and fitness, and populations by altering genetic and phenotypic composition, vital rates, and dynamics. We sought to clarify how selection, phenotypic plasticity, and demography are linked in the context of climate change. On the basis of theory and results of recent empirical studies of plants and animals, we believe the ecological and evolutionary issues relevant to population persistence as climate changes are the rate, type, magnitude, and spatial pattern of climate‐induced abiotic and biotic change; generation time and life history of the organism; extent and type of phenotypic plasticity; amount and distribution of adaptive genetic variation across space and time; dispersal potential; and size and connectivity of subpopulations. An understanding of limits to plasticity and evolutionary potential across traits, populations, and species and feedbacks between adaptive and demographic responses is lacking. Integrated knowledge of coupled ecological and evolutionary mechanisms will increase understanding of the resilience and probabilities of persistence of populations and species.     

Combining payment for crop damages and reward for productivity to address wildlife conflict

Conflict caused by wild herbivores damaging crops is an almost universal problem in conservation. We designed and implemented a game-theory-based system for supporting farmers whose crops were being heavily damaged by wild herbivores. In this community-operated system, farmers self-report their production, which is endorsed by neighboring farmers. The average deficit in production is compensated for by a payment that is directly proportional to the average deficit in production of the group and to the individual farmer's productivity. As a result, farmers are compensated for the average damage (support) and rewarded for individual productivity (reward) (i.e., support cum reward [SuR]). The design of the game is such that only honest reporting gives maximum returns. Farmers who underreport receive less payment because the SuR amount is proportionate to their self-reported productivity. The endorsing farmers, in their own self-interest, prevent overreporting. The system involves multiple game situations, the combined result of which is a stable strategy based on honesty and hard work. In 2 villages along the western boundary of Tadoba Andhari Tiger Reserve in central India, we tested the system with 75 farmers over 6 crop seasons. After a few initial attempts to cheat, honesty prevailed throughout the group. Average crop productivity increased 2.5-fold, in spite of damage, owing to increased effort by farmers. Apart from wildlife conflict resolution, the model offers a promising alternative to crop insurance and a potential behavioral green revolution in agriculture.     

我国生态旅游利益相关者分析

发展生态旅游需要在不同利益主体之间建立一个合理的利益协调和分配机制，而利益相关者角色的错位、缺位，其间关系的交叉、矛盾是制约我国生态旅游发展的关键。为了确保生态旅游的可持续发展，需要对现有的利益相关者角色和关系进行调整。真正使政府、当地牡区，旅游企业、保护地、旅游者、非政府组织、学术界及相关机构、媒体分别扮演好调控者、参与和受益者、执行者、执行监督者、实践者。协助者、研究指导者、宣传监督者的角色。     

华南元古宙地壳演变过程研究中的几点进展

根据近两年对华南元古宙地壳演变过程的研究，提出了华南基底构造格架的划分方案；同时发现了华南陆下存在相对稳定高速高阻冷的古地幔柱的残留部分一“残烃柱”；指出华南古大洋基底蛇绿岩层序中存在斜长花岗岩等酸性组分；探讨了陆下地幔新矿物相；初步建立了华南及西太平洋壳一幔分层柱体模型；讨论了华南部分地区下地壳及上地幔的岩石流变学特征。对元古宙Cu、Au等成矿作用也作了初步的总结并提出了有希望的成矿远景区。