Demographic Stability Metrics for Conservation Prioritization of Isolated Populations

Abstract:  Systems of geographically isolated habitat patches house species that occur naturally as small, disjunct populations. Many of these species are of conservation concern, particularly under the interacting influences of isolation and rapid global change. One potential conservation strategy is to prioritize the populations most likely to persist through change and act as sources for future recolonization of less stable localities. We propose an approach to classify long-term population stability (and, presumably, future persistence potential) with composite demographic metrics derived from standard population-genetic data. Stability metrics can be related to simple habitat measures for a straightforward method of classifying localities to inform conservation management. We tested these ideas in a system of isolated desert headwater streams with mitochondrial sequence data from 16 populations of a flightless aquatic insect. Populations exhibited a wide range of stability scores, which were significantly predicted by dry-season aquatic habitat size. This preliminary test suggests strong potential for our proposed method of classifying isolated populations according to persistence potential. The approach is complementary to existing methods for prioritizing local habitats according to diversity patterns and should be tested further in other systems and with additional loci to inform composite demographic stability scores.     

政府激励企业环境技术创新的初步研究

本文分析了环境技术创新对可持续发展战略实施的重要作用，企业创新活动与政府环保目标的关系及政府激励企业环境技术创新中的博弈环节等，提出了政府激励企业环境技术创新的对策建议。     

组合措施下政府与企业排污行为演化博弈

为研究排污企业应对不同惩罚和补贴组合措施的行为策略，将演化博弈理论与系统动力学方法结合，构建基于政府与排污企业双方的演化博弈模型.以政府和排污企业双方利益为核心，对其在不同惩罚和补贴措施下的企业行为策略和演化稳定性进行分析.结果显示，在静态惩罚补贴措施下，政府和企业策略行为无法达到演化稳定点，政府静态政策不会对企业合法排污行为产生推动作用.在动态惩罚补贴措施下，动态惩罚和动态补贴措施对推动企业合法排污行为更为有效，政府可根据排污企业行为制定双边动态策略.     

不确定概率下安全控制博弈分析

为了研究建筑工程中的安全控制问题,建立不确定概率下施工企业与建筑工人之间的博弈模型,讨论博弈参与方的安全控制行为选择与收益矩阵中经济参数之间的关系。研究表明:施工企业和建筑工人的安全控制行为选择受多种因素的影响,包括双方对工程建设过程中的安全概率估计、工程顺利完成之后的收益、安全控制成本、发生事故之后的损失及赔偿以及对方的策略选择,继而建立了博弈双方策略选择与安全概率估计及经济参数之间的关系。     

Derivation of the Extrinsic Values of Biological Diversity from Its Intrinsic Value and of Both from the First Principles of Evolution

Conservation ethics have been based on 2 philosophical value systems: extrinsic value (defined broadly to include all values that derive from something external to the thing valued) and intrinsic value. Valuing biological diversity on the basis of an extrinsic value system is problematic because measurement is often difficult; extrinsic value changes as spatial or temporal scales change; extrinsic value differs on the basis of external factors; some species have trivial or negative extrinsic values; and extrinsic value varies across human cultures and societies and with such factors as socioeconomic conditions, individual experiences, and educational backgrounds. Valuing biological diversity on the basis of an intrinsic value system also poses challenges because intrinsic value can be seen as a disguised form of human extrinsic value; intrinsic value is initially ambiguous as to which objects or characteristics of biological diversity are to being valued; all aspects of biological diversity (e.g., species and ecosystems) are transitory; species and ecosystems are not static concrete entities; and intrinsic value of one species is often in conflict with the intrinsic value of other species. Extrinsic and intrinsic value systems share a common origin, such that extrinsic values are always derived from intrinsic value and life mutely expresses both intrinsic and extrinsic values—these are derived from and are products of biological evolution. Probing the values that underlie conservation helps the community clearly articulate its aims. Derivación de los Valores Extrínsecos de la Biodiversidad a Partir de sus Valores Intrínsecos y de Ambos a Partir de los Primeros Principios de la Evolución     

基于三方博弈的再生水回用市场演化路径分析

为促进再生水市场的构建,以西安市再生水回用市场发展过程为研究案例,采用演化博弈理论构建了基于政府、再生水厂商、消费者三方博弈的再生水回用市场推广模型,分析其博弈均衡及演化路径.结果表明再生水回用市场的演化过程可划分为四个阶段,不同条件下系统将演化至不同的均衡.发展初期政府支持和宣传能有效提高再生水处理量和回用量,发展中后期为了增强企业参与度和消费者接受度需要提高财政补贴、提高使用再生水效用、降低自来水效用、提升再生水厂商获利、减少政府管理成本.     

博弈视角下跨界河流水资源保护协作机制——以太湖流域太浦河为例

跨界河流水资源保护利益协调问题是流域水资源管理的难点。以太湖流域典型跨界河流太浦河为例,对比分析上下游水资源保护利益诉求,基于博弈理论,引入外部驱动（流域机构介入、激励约束政策）与内部均衡（生态补偿、断面水质考核）四种协调手段,探讨均衡太浦河上下游利益矛盾、激励上下游实现合作保护的协作机制。结果表明：（1）在引入协调手段的博弈模型中,实现了博弈系统向协作策略（达标,补偿）演化。（2）基于博弈分析结果,协作策略（达标,补偿）的实现与激励约束力度、补偿金额、水权、上游保护成本与效益等因素密切相关。（3）外部驱动机制有利于协调上下游河流功能定位需求差异,并调动上下游加强协作保护的积极性与主动性;内部均衡机制有利于弥补上游水权、产业发展等利益损失,并倒逼太浦河水质达标、保障下游取水安全。（4）构建的太浦河水资源保护协作机制,可为加快推进长三角一体化协同发展,建设流域“清水走廊”提供理论与决策支持参考。     

组合措施下政府与企业排污行为演化博弈

为研究排污企业应对不同惩罚和补贴组合措施的行为策略,将演化博弈理论与系统动力学方法结合,构建基于政府与排污企业双方的演化博弈模型.以政府和排污企业双方利益为核心,对其在不同惩罚和补贴措施下的企业行为策略和演化稳定性进行分析.结果显示,在静态惩罚补贴措施下,政府和企业策略行为无法达到演化稳定点,政府静态政策不会对企业合法排污行为产生推动作用.在动态惩罚补贴措施下,动态惩罚和动态补贴措施对推动企业合法排污行为更为有效,政府可根据排污企业行为制定双边动态策略.     

不同薪酬结构模式下煤矿安全监管合谋行为博弈分析

分别从固定工资和固定加安全绩效工资两种监理薪酬结构模式对煤矿企业与地方监管部门问的合谋行为以及中央监管部门的监督行为进行了博弈分析。研究发现,固定加安全绩效工资模式下的煤矿企业与地方监管部门合谋的最优概率较小。为了减少中央监管部门监督的概率,应当降低煤矿企业与地方监管部门合谋时的安全绩效工资。最后给出了降低合谋行为的发生和中央监管部门监督概率的应对措施。     

基于差异进化支持向量机的坑外土体沉降预测

就用支持向量机(SVM)预测基坑外土体沉降而言,通过差异进化(DE)算法构造适合的决策函数十分重要。在确定坑外土体沉降函数的基本形式下,进行参数反演。后将得到的解析式作为SVM的决策函数,再进行核函数转换,从而使SVM的曲线拟合更加快速,预测更加准确。对大连地铁湾家车站基坑坑外土体的沉降数据的分析及预测的结果表明,使用SVM-DE算法在计算数据量、计算消耗时间和预测精度方面优于2种方法单独使用。