The feasibility of concentrated rural settlement in a context of post‐disaster reconstruction: a study of China

There is growing appreciation of the use of concentrated rural settlement as an effective means of implementing infrastructure projects and helping to achieve sustainable development in rural areas. This occurs in China through the exchange of rural residential land for urban construction. However, this policy has not been effective under normal circumstances (called development‐driven conditions) as frequently farmers are reluctant to accept such an exchange. By contrast, in a time of disaster, such as after the 2008 earthquake in Sichuan Province, China, rural victims have accepted this policy of rural residential land exchange. Employing game theory, this paper identifies the reasons for the different outcomes and it contends that the implementation of concentrated rural settlement practice under disaster‐induced conditions is more effective than its introduction under development‐driven conditions. The results of the analysis indicate that, in China, concentrated rural settlement is feasible in a context of post‐disaster reconstruction.     

动态惩罚机制下企业安全生产行为演化分析

为揭示动态惩罚机制下企业安全生产行为规律,以企业成本和收益为基础,通过区域内所有企业的博弈,运用演化博弈理论研究不同策略下企业对安全生产投入达标行为演化趋势.研究结果表明:当政府监管能力有约束时,无论企业是否明确预设控制目标,均可能出现投机心理,而政府加大惩罚力度可有效改善整体安全生产水平;同时,企业明确控制目标时,通...     

天津城区夏冬季典型污染过程中BTEX变化特征及其健康风险评估

利用GC955在线气相色谱仪分别于2019年7月和2020年1月在天津市区开展苯系物（BTEX,包括苯、甲苯、乙苯、间/对-二甲苯和邻-二甲苯）实时在线观测,对典型污染过程中BTEX的浓度水平、组成及演化机制进行了研究,并运用特征物种比值法对BTEX的来源进行了定性分析,最后运用US EPA的人体暴露分析评价方法对BTEX健康风险进行评估.结果表明,臭氧和霾污染过程中BTEX体积分数平均值分别为1.32×10^-9和4.83×10^-9,其中苯的体积分数占比最大,其次是甲苯、乙苯和二甲苯占比最小.2020年1月BTEX体积分数很大程度上受到西南方向短距离传输的影响,而在2019年7月BTEX浓度受到本地排放的影响.BTEX浓度水平在2019年7月受到温度和相对湿度的共同影响,而在2020年1月当温度较低时BTEX浓度对相对湿度的变化更敏感.天津市区BTEX在霾污染过程中受生物质燃烧/化石燃料燃烧/燃煤排放的影响较大,而在臭氧污染过程中除了受到燃烧排放源影响,交通源排放在很大程度上也有影响.臭氧污染和霾污染过程中BTEX的HI分别为0.072和0.29,均处于EPA认定的安全范围内.苯的致癌风险在清洁天和污染过程中均高于EPA规定的安全阈值,需引起高度重视.     

区域联防联控挥发性有机物(VOCs)最优减排方案研究

VOCs区域性联防联控治理是当前彻底治理VOCs污染的有效手段,为了实现VOCs区域性联防联控治理,建立了以减排总量最大、减排成本最低、VOCs减排限产产生的经济影响最小为目标的多目标最优减排模型,提出了基于自适应变异率的分解多目标进化算法（Decomposition Multi-objective Evolutionary Algorithm based on Adaptive Mutation Rate,简称MOEA/DAMA）.选取关中某城市群为研究对象,将VOCs的排放数据代入到最优减排模型中,运用MOEA/DAMA算法对其求解.根据最终的优化结果与MOEA/D初始算法和NSGA-Ⅱ优化算法的优化结果进行对比,结果表明MOEA/DAMA相较于NAGA-Ⅱ和MOEA/D的Pareto解的分布性更广、解的收敛性更高.在对Pareto解的分析上融入决策者的根据实际情况的权衡,计算出更合理的VOCs最优减排方案,为长效科学治理VOCs污染提供借鉴.     

Fish wars and cooperation maintenance

In this paper, a discrete-time game model related to a bioresource management problem (fish catching) is considered. We divide a fishery into regions, which are exploited by single players. The center (referee) shares a reservoir between the competitors. The players (countries), which harvest the fish stock are the participants of this game.We assume that there are migratory exchanges between the regions of the reservoir. Therefore, the stock in one region depends not only on the previous stock and catch in the region, but also on the stock and catch in neighboring regions. We derive the Nash and cooperative equilibria for an infinite planning horizon.We consider two ways to maintain the cooperation: incentive equilibrium and time-consistent imputation distribution procedure. We investigate the cooperative incentive equilibrium in the case when the center punishes players for a deviation.Also we consider the case when the center is a player and find the Shapley value and time-consistent imputation distribution procedure. We introduce a new condition which offers an incentive to players to keep cooperating.     

系统操作者与管理者行为的博弈演化与收益分析*

为研究工程项目系统中,操作者安全行为与管理者奖惩行为的相互博弈情况,确定操作者和管理者收益,提出博弈演化与收益分析方法。操作者代表系统实际使用者,行为包括安全和不安全行为;管理者代表系统管理者和所有者,行为包括奖励和惩罚行为。确定方法的基本参数;研究博弈演化过程的博弈逻辑关系,从悲观和乐观角度研究二者不同行为相互作用后的收益关系,给出操作者收益和管理者收益的逻辑表达式。结果表明:方法能得到博弈过程演化结果,同时能根据收益结果表达式判断博弈胜出方。     

Optimizing a warranty–based sustainable product service system using game theory

Abstract

In recent years, the concepts of sustainability and product service system have been closely associated with each other. In today’s competitive markets, due to Extended Producer Responsibility and customer environmental awareness, producers shift from ‘product-seller’ towards ‘product-service provider’ for using the environmental and economic advantages of coupling a product with services. This paper proposes a novel approach to determine the optimal warranty period and the out-of-warranty replacement period, from the point of view of the producer and the customer to minimise the total cost of usage and end of life of product. As regards the fact that adopted strategies by producers and customers sometimes are in conflict and it affects choosing the optimal product usage period, a game theory model was developed in this study. Finally, a case study with data from chain of local notebook service centres was applied to demonstrate some practical aspects of the developed model.     

Game analysis of Chinese stakeholders in collective forest rights system reform

In the current stage of Chinese forest ownership reform, the central and local governments as well as the forest farmers play different roles with variations in their expected returns. Managing these respective relationships between the forestry stakeholders to maximize their benefits while actively engaging each stakeholder in the collective forest ownership reform process has become an important issue. This study uses the game theory methodology to analyze the relationship between the different reform stakeholders and then builds on the forest farmers’ participation in the reform model process at the reform movement micro-level. This model calculates the forest products equilibrium marketing sales and the government subsidies provided to the forest farmers, when the forest farmers willingly participate in the reform process. It will provide a reliable basis for formulation of government policies which positively impacts Chinese forestry reform.     

电力突发事件应急管理中的博弈

电力安全一直是人们关注的问题,电力系统对无法预料的灾难性突发事件表现的非常脆弱,电力突发事件的应急管理对维护电力系统安全运行具有十分重要的意义。电力突发事件的状态是在不断变化的,应急管理人员必须根据电力突发事件发展趋势动态地调整管理活动。本文分析了突发事件应急管理中＂电力突发事件＂与＂应急管理者＂之间的动态博弈过程,＂应急管理者＂会随着＂电力突发事件＂的动态演变,不断调整其管理方法,控制住＂电力突发事件＂。通过分析＂电力突发事件＂与＂应急管理者＂之间的博弈,构建了电力突发事件有效应急管理程序。＂应急管理人员＂以动态博弈的思想处理＂电力突发事件＂,结果表明该方法能更好的发挥应急处理预案的作用,更有效的处置＂电力突发事件＂。     

Designing a mixed performance measurement system for environmental supply chain management using evolutionary game theory and balanced scorecard: A case study of an auto industry supply chain

This paper proposes a mixed performance measurement system using a combination of evolutionary game theory and the balanced scorecard (BSC) in environmental supply chain management (ESCM) that measures and evaluates business operations using the four different perspectives of finance, customer, internal business process, and learning and growth. ESCM plays an important role in the supply chain which leads to the reduction, reuse and recycling of resources involved in both upstream and downstream activities. This paper presents guidance for practical managers in evaluating and measuring ESCM by developing a knowledge-based BSC and evolutionary game theory. The primary purpose of this paper is to apply the proposed method in a case study to one of Iran's biggest auto industry supply chain SAIPA Company. The results of this study indicate that the adoption of ESCM, in the absence of regulatory pressures and cost-saving measures is triggered by public pressures and its implementation is limited by organizational factors and strategic myopia.