中国湿地生态补偿的利益博弈分析

我国采取了一系列加强湿地生态环境保护的措施,推进了湿地生态状况的改善.但在实践过程中,生态保护仍存在着结构性的政策缺位,湿地生态补偿作为调整损害与保护生态环境主体间利益关系的一种制度安排,是保护生态环境的有效措施.从博弈论的角度出发,分析湿地生态补偿的利益相关者,通过建立湿地生态补偿主体和客体的博弈模型,得出湿地生态补偿主体、客体的纳什均衡策略,并提出针对性的建议.     

基于进化博弈的生态建筑项目开发商群体行为研究

以进化博弈理论为基础,构建了开发商群体在生态建筑项目开发决策中的动态博弈模型,打破了经典博弈理论中参与人完全理性的不合理假定.模型充分讨论了政府激励措施对开发商行为的影响,其结果较好地解释了因信息不对称造成的我国生态建筑项目“市场失灵”现象,为合理引导开发商进行生态建筑项目建设提供了决策依据.     

A FRAMEWORK FOR PROCESS INDICATORS TO MONITOR FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: PRACTICE TO AN URBAN WATER SYSTEM

Although very often used, the concept of sustainable development has not yet been perceived pragmatically. Due to its process nature, in this paper, we argue that sustainable development is a process in which the essential feedback loops, or Viability Loops as we name them, in the system in question are kept healthy and functional. This process deals with evolutionary changes with the end point not known in advance. According to this perception, measurement of sustainable development does not make sense. Rather, we should look for the process indicators to monitor systems for sustainable development. The purpose of the paper is to develop a methodology to deal with monitoring systems for sustainable development and its practice in an urban water system. Using a system dynamics approach, the paper adopts a systemic monitoring framework based on the idea of Viability Loops to define process indicators to monitor systems for sustainable development. To illustrate the application of the framework, its practice in the urban water system of Tehran, the capital of Iran, is provided as an example. The example of the urban water supply system of Tehran is given as a case study, albeit with some unavailable data. Here, four typical viability loops are discussed. The results of this application show that the flows of informative signals are lacking. Adopting the process indicators, we can see the gaps between the public perceptions of water abundance, the costs of water provision and energy utilizations, and what is going on in the reality are getting wider. That indicates that the viability loops are not functional enough to produce effective changes to offset the reinforcing mechanisms. The sustainable development of the system is impaired due to the persistence of those reinforcing mechanisms.     

Incorporating Evolutionary Measures into Conservation Prioritization

Abstract:  Conservation prioritization is dominated by the threat status of candidate species. However, species differ markedly in the shared genetic information they embody, and this information is not taken into account if species are prioritized by threat status alone. We developed a system of prioritization that incorporates both threat status and genetic information and applied it to 9546 species of birds worldwide. We devised a simple measure of a species' genetic value that takes into account the shape of the entire taxonomic tree of birds. This measure approximates the evolutionary history that each species embodies and sums to the phylogenetic diversity of the entire taxonomic tree. We then combined this genetic value with each species' probability of extinction to create a species-specific measure of expected loss of genetic information. The application of our methods to the world's avifauna showed that ranking species by expected loss of genetic information may help preserve bird evolutionary history by upgrading those threatened species with fewer close relatives. We recommend developing a mechanism to incorporate a species' genetic value into the prioritization framework.     

环境保护中政府和公众的博弈

发展经济和保护环境是现代政府治理的主要课题。环境问题越来越严峻,对公众的影响越来越深,政府和公众的环保意识不断增强,他们不断地参与到环境保护运动中。政府和公众都是理性的经济人,他们有不同的利益诉求。由于信息交流的不顺畅,政府和公众在环境保护参与中进行着博弈。在博弈的过程中,博弈的情景不断变化,政府和公众对环境问题的认知在不断地变化,他们采取的策略也不断发生变化,他们之间的博弈从合作博弈到非合作博弈再到合作博弈,不断循环,从而达到发展经济和保护环境双重目的。     

电力工业环境污染问题的博弈分析

就中国电力工业环境污染问题,在简要介绍其污染的现状和严重性及国内外研究的基础上,根据博弈论的基本原理,构建了电力工业环境污染与治理两个方面的博弈模型,旨在通过该模型分析电力工业环境污染行为产生的原因。通过对博弈模型决策问题的分析,并结合经济学原理,得出环境问题产生的根源在于环境资源的过度使用和供给的不足。最后,提出了防治电力工业环境污染相应的政策和建议,以期为加强电力工业环境管理提供参考。     

农家乐生态旅游发展与环境保护博弈分析

近年来农家乐旅游作为一种新兴的生态旅游在中国农村地区迅速发展,但是由于缺乏经验指导。目前也遇到了很多问题,其中环境问题尤为显著,如：垃圾废物随意排放、土地利用混乱带来的水土流失、农民只追求经济利益而引起的环境过度负荷等。本文以农家乐生态旅游的可持续发展为根本出发点,从农家乐旅游相关各方的利益关系出发,分别对参与农家乐生态旅游的农户之间、参与与不参与农家乐生态旅游的农户之间以及当地政府与参与农家乐旅游的农户之间进行了简单博弈分析,从而为农家乐旅游目的地的环境保护管理工作提出了一定的可行性观点。     

政府与排污企业间激励和监督优化模型研究

科学的监督和有效的管理是实现环境可持续发展的必由之路,政府与排污企业的博弈是一个值得关注的重要问题。论文在信息不对称情况下,建立了政府与排污企业间的纯激励模型和激励监督混合模型研究它们之间的博弈关系。结论认为政府通过一定的激励和监督手段可以规范排污企业的行为,并得出了政府采用最优策略的存在性条件,最后对机制设计中的控制参数的灵敏度以及模型的鲁棒性进行了探讨,对政府制定合理的激励监督措施可以提供理论参考依据。     

The San Francisco Bay-Delta: A failure of decision-making capacity

The paper reviews the history of Bay-Delta decision-making in California in order to highlight the continuity between what happened with CALFED and what happened in the preceding decades since water project deliveries began in 1949. Throughout this period, there has been intense conflict about whether and how to transfer water from the Bay-Delta to users elsewhere—a conflict marked by a fundamental opposition of interests among stakeholders. We document how the State of California has failed to organize itself effectively to resolve this conflict and make a decision on how to manage the Delta. The strategy consistently adopted by the State was to encourage the main parties – agricultural and urban water diverters, and fisheries and other instream-protection interests – to work out a solution among themselves, rather than imposing one externally. However, economic theory suggests that a bargaining solution is unlikely to exist because of the extreme opposition of interest among the parties. The Bay-Delta history amply confirms this theoretical prediction. Thus, the State's strategy of relying on voluntary agreement to resolve the issue is fundamentally misconceived and is, at some level, an abdication of its responsibility.