On Finding Solutions to Ethical Problems in Agriculture

A distinction should be made betweentwo types of ethical problems. A Type I ethicalproblem is one in which there is no consensusas to what is ethical. A Type II ethicalproblem is one in which there is a consensus asto what is ethical, but incentives exist forindividuals to behave unethically. Type Iethical problems are resolved by making,challenging, and reasoning through moralarguments. Type II ethical problems areresolved by changing the institutionalenvironment so that people do not haveincentives to behave unethically. Type Isolutions, however, will not be effective insolving Type II problems. Examples inagriculture and elsewhere show howdistinguishing between Type I and Type IIethical problems will help in theidentification of solutions to ethical issuesin agriculture.     

Crime in post‐Katrina Houston: the effects of moral panic on emergency planning

This study used a mixed methods approach to estimate whether a moral panic occurred after Hurricane Katrina forced the evacuations of more than 250,000 people to Houston, Texas. The study viewed data from the Houston Police Department combined with a qualitative review of references of criminal activity in local print media. In total, over 8,500 lines of text were analysed to discern themes associated with media representations of the influence of evacuees on the city of Houston. There was little evidence of statistically significant increases in crime over the months following the evacuations. There was, however, evidence that evacuees, principally from New Orleans, were blamed for perceived increases in violent crime and lawlessness. There are also significant policy implications for state, local and federal governments. In particular, the policies of the Federal Emergency Management Agency were blamed for at least some of the perceived crime attributed to Katrina evacuees.     

Naturalness: Beyond Animal Welfare

There is an ongoing debate in animalethics on the meaning and scope of animalwelfare. In certain broader views, leading anatural life through the development of naturalcapabilities is also headed under the conceptof animal welfare. I argue that a concern forthe development of natural capabilities of ananimal such as expressed when living freelyshould be distinguished from the preservationof the naturalness of its behavior andappearance. However, it is not always clearwhere a plea for natural living changes overinto a plea for the preservation of theirnaturalness or wildness. In the first part ofthis article, I examine to what extent theconcerns for natural living meet ``theexperience requirement.' I conclude that someof these concerns go beyond welfare. In thesecond part of the article. I ask whether wehave moral reasons to respect concernsfor the naturalness of an animal's living thattranscend its welfare. I argue that the moralrelevance of such considerations can be graspedwhen we see animals as entities bearingnon-moral intrinsic values. In my view the``natural' appearance and behavior of an animalmay embody intrinsic values. Caring for ananimal's naturalness should then be understoodas caring for such intrinsic values. Intrinsicvalues provide moral reasons for action iffthey are seen as constitutive of the good lifefor humans. I conclude by reinterpreting,within the framework of a perfectionist ethicaltheory, the notion of indirect dutiesregarding animals, which go beyond andsupplement the direct duties towardsanimals.