基于经济学视角的职业健康规制问题研究

用经济学分析工具对现有的职业健康规制进行探讨,研究规制机构、企业和劳动者三方行为主体的博弈,通过分析存在的问题,提出解决职业健康规制的对策。在理顺职业健康规制体制,健全机构的同时不断完善法规体系。同时,加强对劳动者职业健康的保障,完善第三方介入机制,并且加大对违规企业的处罚力度,提高对劳动者的赔偿。不断强化企业作为职业健康责任主体的意识,推进职业危害防治技术创新,培养"以人为本"的职业健康安全文化观念。     

驾驶员注意涣散检测技术研究

通过对注意涣散时驾驶员头部运动及面部表情变化特征的分析,系统实时监测驾驶员眼睛、嘴巴位置和运动状态信息,构建驾驶员注意涣散特征表征参量,实现对驾驶员注意涣散状态信息的检测与提取。驾驶员注意涣散表征量具有复杂的非线性特征,利用BP神经网络非线性识别的优势对驾驶员注意特征进行模式分类,实现驾驶员不同注意涣散状态下的特征捕捉。同时采用Dempster-Shafer证据推理技术,对驾驶注意涣散多源表征信息进行决策融合,实现对驾驶员注意涣散状态的判断。结果表明,BP神经网络与D-S规则多源信息决策融合技术的运用提高了驾驶员注意涣散特征检测的准确性和可靠性。     

瓦斯爆炸过程中火焰瞬时传播规律研究

在改善后的瓦斯爆炸试验条件下,为了得到任意位置的火焰传播速度,对火焰通过各传感器所处的位置与其对应时间进行统计分析,发现可以用二次抛物线方程来表达火焰传播距离与其对应时间之间的关系,由此推导火焰瞬时传播速度随管道位置变化的关系式,得到管道任意位置及任意时刻的火焰速度计算公式。研究发现:瓦斯爆炸火焰传播运动过程近似于匀加速直线运动过程;当加螺旋环时火焰传播过程接近于匀速直线运动。随着管道长度的不断增大,火焰瞬时速度不断增加,但增加的幅度越来越小,当管道长度达到某值后,火焰速度将趋于某一定值。煤矿井下可根据各点计算得出的火焰速度大小,采用相应的预防措施,减少瓦斯爆炸造成的损失。     

中小企业安全生产“供求”与政府管制

从安全生产作为一种"公共产品"的视角,分析中小企业供给与需求状况,得出目前中小企业安全生产处于"供给低、需求低"的非正常状态,说明劳动力市场对安全供求的调节已经失灵;通过对安全管制下中小企业日常安全管理行动的调研,结合相关研究成果,说明中小企业安全生产管制存在"管制失灵";对安全生产管制存在的问题进行分析,并提出以完善安全生产法律法规体系为前提,以加强中小企业安全生产监管信息库建设为基础,以建立和完善中小企业安全生产三大机制为手段将中小企业安全生产引入良性发展轨道。     

农地转用政策与农地转用最优数量——外部性内化视角的实证分析

尽管不少文献对农地转用政策的有效性进行了分析,但我国农地转用政策在农地-市地配置优化中的作用却较少受到关注。论文从外部性内化的视角出发,利用地方政府农地转用模型对土地用途管制、税费政策的作用机制和配置效应进行研究。在考虑多项政策影响的基础上,对湖北省地方政府决策函数进行拟合,并结合近年来农地外部性测算的结果实证分析了农地转用政策的合理性及其对农地转用数量的影响。实证结果表明,土地用途管制和税费政策均能显著地抑制农地转用数量,但政策的影响效果则存在差异。其中,税费政策的数量标准与外部性数量基本一致,但土地用途管制对农地转用的抑制效果已经超出了外部性内化的目标。根据这一结果,结论部分讨论了相应的政策含义及农地转用配置优化的对策建议。     

Prices vs quantities with multiple pollutants

We examine the choice of policy instruments (price, quantity or a mix of the two) when two pollutants are regulated and firms' abatement costs are private information. Whether abatement efforts are complements or substitutes is key determining the choice of policies. When pollutants are complements, a mixed policy instrument with a tax on one pollutant and a quota on another is sometimes preferable even if the pollutants are identical in terms of benefits and costs of abatement. Yet, if they are substitutes, the mixed policy is dominated by taxes or quotas.     

Economics of additionality for environmental services from agriculture

We present a model of additionality for offsets sold from agriculture to industrial sector sources regulated by cap-and-trade. We consider a potential policy where agricultural sources would not be covered by cap-and-trade requirements but would be eligible to receive offsets whenever their emissions fall below a policy-specified baseline, and would not be penalized for emissions above their baseline. Major results are: (1) The optimal baseline should be set above the average counterfactual emissions of participating farms, an unexpected result that has been missing from the literature. (2) The optimal trading ratio should be greater than one (a ton of offsets counts for less than a ton of covered emissions) even under emissions certainty. Previous research has justified such trading ratios by emissions uncertainty. (3) Emissions uncertainty does not justify a change in the baseline if the accompanying emissions model is unbiased. (4) An optimal combination of policies is to subsidize offsets and tighten the baseline relative to the no-subsidy case.     

Investment in cleaner technology and signaling distortions in a market with green consumers

I analyze the pricing and investment behavior of a firm that signals the environmental attributes of its production technology through its price to uninformed environmentally conscious consumers. I then analyze the effect of change in environmental regulation on the signaling outcome and the firm's ex ante incentive to invest in cleaner technology. When regulation is weak, a firm signals cleaner technology through higher price; in this case, the firm earns lower profit when it has cleaner technology and thus, has no incentive to invest in cleaner technology. The price charged by the clean firm declines sharply beyond a critical level of regulation. When regulation is sufficiently stringent, the firm with cleaner technology charges lower price but earns higher signaling profit, and ex ante the firm has positive incentive to invest in cleaner technology. With weak regulation, the incentive of the firm to directly disclose its environmental performance rather than signal it through price is increasing in the level of regulation; the opposite holds when regulation is sufficiently stringent.     

剥落型矿柱与早强胶结充填体相互作用损伤演化分

为了研究矿柱底部严重剥落形成的上宽下窄型矿柱与早强胶结充填体的相互作用,进行了现场地质调查,选用石蜡模拟早强胶结充填体进行室内试验,同时进行数值模型的构建和试验模拟研究。试验结果表明:在加载过程中,破坏主要发生在矿岩中,石蜡充填体由于具有较强的变形能力,没有明显的破坏裂纹;矿岩中的裂纹主要沿矿岩和充填体接触面进行延展,直至延伸至临空面破坏;试样表壁的石蜡薄层表征显示在加载过程中,在试样表壁大的裂纹带附近伴随小裂纹产生。通过相关研究,厘清剥落型矿柱与早强充填体的相互作用机理及破坏规律,以便开展针对性的矿柱补强,确保充填采场安全稳定。