The Cost of Developing Site-Specific Environmental Regulations: Evidence from EPA's Project XL

The flagship of the Environmental Protection Agency's regulatory reinvention initiative, Project XL has been touted as a regulatory blueprint for a site-specific, performance-based pollution-control system, but widespread complaints about the costs of the program beg the question of whether the costs of tailoring regulations to individual facilities are manageable. To address this question, this paper presents original survey data on a sample of 11 XL projects. We find that the fixed costs of putting in place XL agreements are substantial, averaging over $450,000 per firm. While stakeholder negotiations are widely cited as the principal source for these costs, we find that they actually arise mainly from interaction between participating facilities and the EPA. Moreover, EPA management problems are perceived by our survey respondents as having inflated project development costs. Finally, we find that the key factors that explains differences in costs across XL projects are the scope and complexity of the project proposal. These findings suggest that Project XL favors large firms that can afford to pay significant project development costs, that EPA management problems must be resolved to reduce costs, and that there may be a significant economic bias against complex and innovative proposals—precisely the type of proposals that Project XL was designed to foster in order to improve the efficiency of the regulatory system.     

Monitoring, enforcement, and the choice of environmental policy instruments

How to choose among the dozen policy instruments available to environmental management agencies has been a matter of concern and debate among environmental economists for the entire life of the profession – nearly four decades. The ability, or lack of it, to measure the quantities or observe the actions made "enforceable" by particular policy instruments ought clearly to be central to this choice. However, all too often the monitoring problem has been assumed away. When it is reintroduced in realistic forms, we find, not surprisingly, that some favorite policy instruments, such as pollution charges, are not applicable to some important problems, such as runoff pollution from farms; that marginal subsidies, by changing the burden of proof, may no longer be symmetric with charges; and that the apparent freedom from monitoring requirements of the newly fashionable instrument involving the public provision of information about firms or products is "paid for" by our inability to say anything about its performance on other dimensions that are also of interest. Electronic Publication     

Reinventing Environmental Regulation from the Grassroots Up: Explaining and Expanding the Success of the Toxics Release Inventory

/ The success of the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) stands in stark contrast to most other environmental regulations in the United States. Between its inception in 1988 and 1995, releases of chemicals listed on the TRI have declined by 45%. We argue the TRI has achieved this regulatory success by creating a mechanism of "populist maxi-min regulation." This style of regulation differs from traditional command-and-control in several ways. First, the majorrole of public agencies is not to set and enforce standards, but to establish an information-rich context for private citizens, interest groups, and firms to solve environmental problems. Second, environmental "standards" are not determined by expert analysis of acceptable risk, but are effectively set at the levels informed citizens will accept. Third, firms adopt pollution prevention and abatement measures in response to a dynamic range of public pressures rather than to formalized agency standards or governmental sanction. Finally, public pressure ruthlessly focuses on the worst polluters-maximum attention to minimum performers-to induce them to adopt more effective environmental practices. TRI has inadvertently set in motion this alternative style of regulation that has, in turn, dramatically reduced toxics emissions in the United States. By properly understanding the mechanisms that drive TRI's accomplishments, more intentional public policy designs can expand the system of populist maxi-min regulation and achieve even more rapid toxics reduction.     

油田井场废水配制压裂液处理技术实验研究

针对油田井场废水高悬浮物、高色度、高金属离子浓度的特征,以处理后配制压裂液为目标,通过p H值调节及无机高分子絮凝法对井场废水进行了处理实验。结果表明,碳酸钠作为优选的p H值调节剂,可以在较低的p H值条件下有效去除废水中的高价金属离子;无机絮凝剂聚合硫酸铁在强碱性条件下对于悬浮物、色度的去除效果明显优于聚合氯化铝。聚合硫酸铁絮凝法可以使井场废水达到配制压裂液用水的要求。     

中国污染物总量减排数据核算体系研究

"十一五"期间,中国对COD和SO2两种污染物开展总量减排工作,预期指标超额完成。"十一五"期间构建起来的总量减排数据核算体系为中央政府提供了相对准确的减排数据,是减排取得成功的基础。本文通过研究减排数据核算体系来对总量减排的成功进行制度性解释。本文采用文本分析和实地调研的方法,描述了中国减排数据核算体系的组织机构及其基本职责,整理出了自下而上的数据生成、流动机制和自上而下的数据核查、反馈机制,归纳出总量减排数据核算体系相较于传统环境统计的基本特征:一是设立了区域督查中心和各级总量控制部门等专门的组织机构;二是数据的双向流动机制,中央拥有对减排数据的审核权和最终确定权,并且会将正式确定后的数据逐级反馈给地方政府并应用于上级政府对下级政府的行政考核当中去;三是在数据核算中采用环境监测数据,并因此进行了全国范围的环境监测能力建设;四是减排工作全过程数据核算。这些新特征使得中国减排数据核算体系得以提升减排数据质量,对地方政府可能的违规行为进行约束;将减排绩效与地方政府考核相结合,通过政治激励促进地方政府开展减排工作;加强地方政府环境监管能力,保障减排工作的开展和完成。但现有数据核算体系仍然存在监测数据利用不到位而导致行政成本较高、减排量核算细则"一刀切"导致政策公平性缺失等亟需改进完善的问题。     

中国城市水务业特许经营法律制度研究简

特许经营作为城市水务业市场化改革的重要实现形式,经历了一个“由盛转衰”的历程。总结其中缘由,现有立法在政府管制体制、政府管制内容、招投标制度和竞争机制的构建方面存在诸多问题。完善城市水务业特许经营法律制度应“双管齐下”,着重从市场准入管制、价格管制和质量管制三方面完善相关制度设计。     

飞机环控系统典型故障分析

环控系统解决了飞机座舱的供气、调温和增压问题,座舱的压力制度按3个阶段进行。通过典型的飞机环控系统故障,对座舱压力调节机理进行了分析,介绍了座舱压力调节过程,分析了导致飞行员耳膜疼痛、座舱压力持续下降的原因,提出了预防故障发生的建议。     

Prices vs quantities with multiple pollutants

We examine the choice of policy instruments (price, quantity or a mix of the two) when two pollutants are regulated and firms' abatement costs are private information. Whether abatement efforts are complements or substitutes is key determining the choice of policies. When pollutants are complements, a mixed policy instrument with a tax on one pollutant and a quota on another is sometimes preferable even if the pollutants are identical in terms of benefits and costs of abatement. Yet, if they are substitutes, the mixed policy is dominated by taxes or quotas.     

THE REGULATED RIPARIAN VERSION OF THE ASCE MODEL WATER CODE: THE THIRD WAY TO ALLOCATE WATER1

ABSTRACT: Lawyers, engineers, and hydrologists are accustomed to thinking of water law as falling into one of two incompatible models: riparian rights (under which water is allocated by courts according to the relative reasonableness of the competing uses) and appropriative rights (under which water is allocated according to the temporal priority of the competing uses, largely by the action of the water users themselves but perfected by the issuance of an administrative permit). Usually unnoticed is the existence of a third approach, which I have dubbed “regulated riparianism.” Under regulated riparianism, water is allocated by water permits issued after an administrative determination of the reasonableness of the proposed use before the use is commenced. This system, now in place in about half of the states east of Kansas City (plus Hawaii), thus is fundamentally different from either the traditional ripanan rights that it replaces or the appropriative rights found in western states.     

不同类型环境规制对国际R&D溢出效应的影响比较研究——以长江经济带为例

基于2003~2014年长江经济带的省际面板数据探讨了不同类型的环境规制对国际RD溢出效应的影响,通过熵值法客观赋权,构建命令控制型、市场激励型和自愿参与型3种环境规制指数,进一步考察了不同类型的环境规制对国际RD溢出的影响。研究表明:(1)环境规制对国际RD溢出水平呈现"反N型"曲线关系,虽然类型不同,但随着环境规制强度不断提升,国际RD溢出效应均呈现先下降、后上升、再下降的趋势;(2)不同类型的环境规制对国际RD溢出的作用具有异质性,当前在长江经济带发挥作用的主要是命令控制型和市场激励型环境规制,自愿参与型环境规制对国际RD溢出效应的激励作用尚未完全显现。结论在一定程度上印证了"波特假说"在开放条件下也是成立的,最后依据上述结论提出了相应的政策建议。