公众参与环境执法角色关系探析

环境是公共的,环境利益具有公众性。在环境执法中积极吸纳公众意见,是国家民主管理社会的体现。公众参与环境执法的角色定位即：政府在环境执法中处于核心地位,拥有最终裁量权;企业是环境执法的对象;公众是环境执法的最终受益者。政府、企业与公众的沟通协调是公众参与环境执法的有效机制。     

生态文明下的环境法制

生态文明建设的进程受到诸多因素的制约,如生态环境意识、环境立法、行政执法和司法缺陷、法律政策等,同时生态文明建设中面临诸多的难题,如公众参与、生态补偿、环境责任及环境纠纷等,应通过完善立法、执法及司法建设,以及完善公众参与机制、生态补偿机制、环境公益诉讼制度等保障机制来解决这些问题。本文首先通过比较分析生态文明与环境法制的关系,结合我国生态法制建设困境,提出了完善生态文明建设的一系列的环境法治保障措施,即从立法、执法、司法角度,从而实现科学发展观,构建和谐社会,最终实现环境—社会—经济协调发展的任务。     

浅谈深圳市环境监督管理全覆盖移动执法系统的建设和应用

环境监督管理全覆盖移动执法系统,是利用现代无线通信技术、计算机技术等先进技术手段,利用手持终端(PDA)、手提电脑等设备,通过无线数字通信网的支持,实现在任何执法地点都可从后台业务系统中获取所需的业务数据、文字、图片、视频等信息,同时将现场执法的信息及时回传至后台系统中。本文介绍了移动执法系统的建设以及应用的情况。     

联合执法机制在区域环境利益平衡中的应用

在追求环境效应与经济发展获得＂双赢＂的今天,跨行政区域联合执法已经成为平衡区域环境利益、妥善解决区域间环境纠纷,进而促进环境与经济协调发展的重要手段。本文提出了包括组建联合执法小组、主持联合执法会议、建立信息共享平台和实现联合监测的联合执法机制,并概括地阐述了确立长效性执法主体、先期处理制度、联合执法活动、活动监督、异议处理和惩罚制度的具体执行程序。试图利用联合执法的机制来解决区域间环境利益失衡的难题,以期为决策者提供相应的理论支持或政策参考。     

Connecticut statewide sTEP wave evaluation

INTRODUCTION: Selective Traffic Enforcement Programs (sTEPs) are a proven method to change motorists' behavior. Since 1997, the Connecticut DOT's Division of Highway Safety has organized a statewide seat belt enforcement program, with sTEP waves every three or four months. To date, 28 waves have been implemented. METHOD: Pre-wave and post-wave seat belt observation surveys are conducted by both state and municipal police across the state. Survey results, as well as a summary of all enforcement activity during the wave, are submitted for evaluation. RESULTS: Connecticut seat belt use has continued to rise from one wave to the next in a predictable "saw blade" pattern. CONCLUSIONS: The data clearly demonstrate that agencies that have participated in a greater number of waves have experienced the greatest increase in belt use. Belt use has not yet plateaued and additional sTEP enforcement seems indicated. However, evidence from other states suggests that a plateau may occur somewhere in the mid 80% range. IMPACT ON INDUSTRY: Should this occur, Connecticut will work toward strengthening the round the clock model, emphasizing the importance of aggressive primary enforcement.     

浅谈组建综合林业行政执法队伍的有关设想

现行的林业行政执法体制有许多弊端,组建综合林业行政执法机构,成立综合执法队伍,统一林业执法权有其理论根据、法律依据和现实依据,这样整合了林业执法力量,加大了打击破坏森林资源违法犯罪活动的力度,还便于林业绿色事业的管理与发展,并对综合林业执法提出了一些具体设想.     

谈影响环境执法的若干因素与对策

环境执法是我国环境法制建设的一个重要组成部分。本文分析了当前我国环境执法的主要因素,并提出了应对策略。     

Building a global taxonomy of wildlife offenses

Most countries have many pieces of legislation that govern biodiversity, including a range of criminal, administrative, and civil law provisions that state how wildlife must be legally used, managed, and protected. However, related debates in conservation, such as about enforcement, often overlook the details within national legislation that define which specific acts are illegal, the conditions under which laws apply, and how they are sanctioned. Based on a review of 90 wildlife laws in 8 high-biodiversity countries with different legal systems, we developed a taxonomy that describes all types of wildlife offenses in those countries. The 511 offenses are organized into a hierarchical taxonomy that scholars and practitioners can use to help conduct legal analyses. This is significant amidst competing calls to strengthen, deregulate, and reform wildlife legislation, particularly in response to fears over zoonotic threats and large-scale biodiversity loss. It can be used to provide more nuance legal analyses and facilitate like-for-like comparisons across countries, informing processes to redraft conservation laws, review deregulation efforts, close loopholes, and harmonize legislation across jurisdictions. We applied the taxonomy in a comparison of sanctions in 8 countries for hunting a protected species. We found not only huge ranges in fines (US$0 to $200,000) and imprisonment terms (1.5 years to life imprisonment), but also fundamentally different approaches to designing sanctions for wildlife offenses. The taxonomy also illustrates how future legal taxonomies can be developed for other environmental issues (e.g., invasive species, protected areas).     

Multiple receptor ambient monitoring and firm compliance with environmental taxes under budget and target driven regulatory missions

We analyze the potential for an environmental monitoring agency under different regulatory missions to use multiple measures of ambient pollution levels to induce firm compliance via endogenously determined probabilistic firm-level inspections of polluting activities. Departing from previous analyses, we consider a framework where the regulator has multiple, rather than a single, measures of ambient pollution in a setting where many firms are subject to a self-reported emissions tax that is not perfectly enforceable. Under a budget-driven mission, we show that a regulator can fruitfully utilize the added information from multiple ambient monitoring receptors to induce improved environmental compliance through the creation of strategic interactions among firms. Additionally, our results provide new evidence on the relative efficiency of budget- vs. target-driven environmental enforcement missions.     

Verifiable and non-verifiable anonymous mechanisms for regulating a polluting monopolist

Optimal regulation of a polluting natural monopolist must correct for both external damages and market power to achieve a social optimum. Existing non-Bayesian regulatory methods require knowledge of the demand function, while Bayesian schemes require knowledge of the underlying cost distribution. We introduce mechanisms adapted to use less information. Our Price-based Subsidy (PS) mechanisms give the firm a transfer that matches or approximates the incremental surplus generated each period. The regulator need not observe the abatement activity or know the demand, cost, or damage functions of the firm. All of the mechanisms induce the firm to price at marginal social cost, either immediately or asymptotically.