Bilateral Monopoly: A Market for Intercountry River Water Allocation

/ Collaboration of countries with an aim to share fresh surface water resources promises to generate potential joint benefits. Unfortunately, existing agreements lack the perspective and capacity to produce any real action in efficient cross-border water allocation. When that problem is encountered by any two adjacent countries claiming riparian rights to the same watercourse, this paper suggests that apossible solution to be examined is a water market. This market requires the relevant countries to engage in a bargaining process as described in the theory of bilateral monopoly. The bargaining process should determine both the water quantity to be transferred and the price to be paid. However, there has to be a fair allocation of the joint benefits resulting from the transfer for a sustainable price solution. As an empirical illustration, the paper examines the case of river Nestos shared by Bulgaria and Greece in the southern Balkans. A net revenue function quadratic in water is specified and estimated using scarce data on three agricultural crops in Greece. Sensitivity analysis on the size and distribution of the net benefits is also performed.KEY WORDS: Bilateral agreements; Water markets; Efficient allocation     

我国部分商品粮基地土壤重金属污染的差异分析与综合评价探讨

根据1988年全国农业环境质量状况调查资料,选取我国部分商品粮基地县土壤重金属污染数据(污染指数),通过多元统计分析,揭示了各商品粮基地土壤重金属污染的差异与分类.建立模糊综合评判模型对各商品粮基地土壤污染状况进行了综合评价,得到了各商品粮基地土壤污染程度的相对排序.      

The principal–agent model with multilateral externalities: An application to climate agreements

We consider contracting of a principal with an agent if multilateral externalities are present. The motivating example is that of an international climate agreement given private information about the willingness-to-pay (WTP) for emissions abatement. Due to multilateral externalities the principal uses her own emissions besides subsidies to incentivize the agent and to assure his participation. Optimal contracts equalize marginal abatement costs and, thus, can be implemented by a system of competitive permit trading. Moreover, optimal contracts can include a boundary part (i.e., the endogenous, type dependent participation constraint is binding), which is not a copy of the outside option of no contract. Compared to this outside option, a contract can increase emissions of the principal for types with a low WTP, and reduce her payoff for high types. Subsidies can be constant or even decreasing in emission reductions, and turn negative so that the agent reduces emissions and pays the principal.     

The relentless progress of commodity exchanges in the establishment of primary commodity prices

A continuously expanding group of commodities are being priced on commodity exchanges. This paper explains the causes to the increasing preference of exchanges as pricing instruments. It also provides the detail of the shift in the 1970s and 1980s from producer determined prices to prices set by commodity exchanges for three major commodities—aluminum, nickel and petroleum.     

Voluntary conservation of endangered species: when does no regulatory assurance mean no conservation?

Voluntary conservation agreements are becoming increasingly important in implementing the Endangered Species Act on private land. We analyze when such agreements arise and what level of conservation they generate in the presence of uncertainty about future conservation benefits and irreversibility of habitat loss and species extinction. Our results suggest that the likelihood of an agreement and the resulting conservation levels depend on the background threat of regulation, the cost advantage offered by voluntary agreements, and the availability of assurances regarding future regulation. Under conditions likely to hold in practice, conservation agreements that offer assurances may generate higher levels of conservation and higher net social benefits than agreements that do not offer assurances. However, the resulting level of conservation will not be optimal, and may be lower than that attainable under regulation.     

The decline of a regional fishing nation: The case of Ghana and West Africa

Inadequate trade policies, globalization of the fishing industry, dominance of Europe's distant water fleets, declarations of exclusive economic zones (EEZs) by neighbouring West African nations, overfishing and a lack of good governance contributed to the decline of Ghana as a regional fishing nation, a position it had held since the 18^th century. The prohibitive cost of access arrangements limited Ghana's access to distant waters. The country's marine environments have been impacted by overexploitation of stocks and the use of destructive methods. Subsistence fishing has become the sole means of survival for many fishers. The decline of the fishing sector has limited the country's ability to meet domestic demand and threatened the economic and food security of many Ghanaians. The article traces the early history of Ghana's fisheries, their gradual decline during the last four decades, and outlines recommendations for policy changes to address the situation and steer the nation on a course towards sustainable fisheries.     

Greening up: the effects of environmental standards in EU and US trade agreements

Can environmental provisions in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) foster an environmental race to the top? The ways in which different enforcement mechanisms in North–South PTAs affect the implementation of environmental standards in developing countries are examined. It is argued that environmental provisions in European Union (EU) and United States (US) PTAs will be effective in instigating policy change in partner countries, although the timing of the effect will vary significantly. Fines and sanctions in US PTAs incentivize partner countries to reform during the negotiation process. Reform in EU PTA partners is predicted to occur during agreement implementation as a result of the EU’s policy dialogue approach. Illustrative evidence is provided and the hypotheses are tested using statistical estimations of EU and US PTAs with environmental provisions on developing countries’ environmental policy reform.     

Domestic politics and the formation of international environmental agreements

We investigate the effect of domestic politics on international environmental policy by incorporating into a classic stage game of coalition formation the phenomenon of lobbying by special-interest groups. In doing so, we contribute to the theory of international environmental agreements, which has overwhelmingly assumed that governments make decisions based on a single set of public-interest motivations. Our results suggest that lobbying on emissions may affect the size of the stable coalition in counterintuitive ways. In particular, a powerful business lobby may increase the government's incentives to sign an agreement, by providing it with strong bargaining power with respect to that lobby at the emission stage. This would result in lower total emissions when the number of countries involved is not too large. We also show that things change radically when lobbying bears directly on the membership decisions, suggesting that both the object and timing of lobbying matter for the way in which membership decisions, emissions and welfare are affected.     

International environmental agreements with support

We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of international environmental agreements, with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without becoming coalition members themselves. We assume their support takes the form of a monetary transfer to the coalition, in order to induce larger coalitions, higher levels of public good provision and higher payoffs. We show that, under mild conditions on the costs and benefits of contributing to the public good (e.g. abatement of greenhouse gas emissions), there exist equilibria with support. Allowing for support increases payoffs to each of three types of agents: members, supporters and free-riders.