二氧化碳捕集利用与封存项目纳入碳市场的现状、挑战与对策

二氧化碳捕集、利用与封存（CCUS）被认为是燃煤和燃气电厂以及钢铁、水泥和石化等行业实现碳中和的重要技术选项,而碳市场则是重要的市场化减排机制,提高两者的衔接水平,对于我国“双碳”目标的实现具有重要意义。通过总结国际上CCUS项目与碳市场衔接的成功经验,可以为我国CCUS项目与碳市场衔接提供相关借鉴。本文系统梳理了国内外CCUS项目纳入碳市场的立法、激励政策、CCUS减排核算方法学研究情况,识别出我国在CCUS项目与碳市场衔接方面尚存在法律支撑不足、缺乏激励政策以及CCUS项目碳减排核算方法不准确等一系列问题,最后提出多项建议以推动我国CCUS项目与碳市场的衔接：①完善碳市场监管和法律体系,促进CCUS与碳市场衔接;②研判CCUS优先领域,分阶段促进不同行业CCUS项目纳入碳交易市场;③强化政策激励,打通CCUS与碳市场衔接的投融资与成本疏导路径;④分阶段完善碳交易市场建设,充分发挥碳市场金融属性促进CCUS与碳交易市场衔接;⑤建立完善的监测、报告和核查（MRV）标准体系和证书制度,保证CCUS项目减排量核证的准确性和规范性。     

碳排放交易制度下城市减排的机会成本研究——基于中国碳排放试点城市的实证检验

作为全球气候治理的重要手段,碳排放交易制度受到了广泛的关注与讨论。基于此,本文采用我国2010-2016年城市面板数据,运用非参数方法构建方向性环境距离函数测算了2009-2015年城市减排的机会成本,计算结果显示,试点地区与非试点地区的碳排放的机会成本整体表现为上升的趋势,且试点地区的碳排放的机会成本总体低于非试点地区。在测算城市减排机会成本的基础上,运用双重差分法来检验碳排放交易制度的有效性。经检验发现：碳排放交易制度有利于降低城市减排的机会成本,然而由于碳排放交易制度还存在碳排放权初始分配制度缺失、碳排放交易制度的定价机制扭曲等问题,因此其对降低城市减排的机会成本作用较小,并且进一步通过对政策时间趋势的分析得出政策效应随时间推移而逐渐减弱。     

总量控制区域排污权的初始分配方法

提出了区域排污权的初始分配方法该方法通过引入"平权函数"和"平权排污量"保证初始排污权分配的现实性和公平性;通过引入"有效环境容量"保证初始排污权分配与环境质量目标相一致作为简化实例,本方法应用于某区域SO₂排污权的初始分配,该区域包括3个子控制区、12种行业类型．分配结果合理可行。     

The significance of futures trading in minerals and oil

Futures trading has been introduced for aluminium and oil in recent years and the range of contracts available on various minerals and oil products continues to widen. Concern has been expressed by producers of a number of minerals, including nickel and platinum, that the introduction of futures trading may introduce a speculative element to price determination that will create inappropriate or excessively volatile prices. It is the purpose of this article to analyse the role of futures trading in relation to trade in underlying commodities in general and especially for trade in minerals and oil. Evidence from oil and platinum markets, in particular, is adduced and examined in the light of earlier evidence of the influence of futures trading on underlying commodities. The contribution of futures trading is examined in detail and conclusions are reached on the significance of futures trading for minerals and oil.     

Clearing the air: The costs and consequences of higher CAFE standards and increased gasoline taxes

Concerns about energy security and climate change have sparked legislators’ interest in reducing gasoline consumption by increasing corporate average fuel-economy (CAFE) standards. Using an empirically rich simulation model and cost estimates for anticipated fuel-economy technologies, we estimate annual costs of reducing long-run gasoline consumption by 10% via a 3.8 miles per gallon increase in the standards, and the potential cost savings from allowing manufacturers to buy and sell fuel-economy credits. Maximum gasoline savings would be realized only after all existing vehicles were replaced, or 14 years in our model. A gasoline tax would produce greater immediate savings by encouraging people to drive less, and eventually to choose more-fuel-efficient vehicles. We demonstrate the advantage of a tax by comparing the cost of the higher CAFE standards over the first 14 years against the cost of a gasoline tax that would save the same amount of gasoline over that time.     

Strategic pollution control and capital tax competition

In an analytical model of symmetric countries with mobile capital and local or transboundary pollution we investigate whether competition in emissions taxes (or emissions caps) and capital taxes leads to efficient outcomes when governments act strategically. When they have capital taxes and emissions caps at their disposal, they refrain from taxing capital and set their caps inefficiently lax [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. When they have the option to tax capital and emissions, capital is subsidized [untaxed] and emissions taxes are inefficiently low [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. In case of transboundary pollution emissions caps are Pareto-superior to emissions taxes. That holds regardless of whether the environmental policy is applied as stand-alone policy or combined with capital tax competition.     

绿证交易、发售电配额制与可再生能源财税减负效应

为促进清洁能源消纳利用和减轻标杆电价政策财税负担,绿色电力证书(绿证)核发和认购制度已在全国试行。为验证两类政策并存下绿证交易的财税减负作用,该文构建绿证定价和财税减负效应模型,分类探讨不同交易机制和配额安排:绿证自由市场、发售电配额强制市场交易如何影响售证方定价策略和配额主体履约抉择,论证绿证市场均衡和政策互动如何影响可再生能源补助支出、电价附加和绿证交易的税负转嫁效应。模型论证与分类市场情景表明:①绿证交易提供了低成本履约的制度安排,有助于财税减负;②电力市场管制和交叉补贴电价政策下,发电商配额导致火电企业最优履约抉择是自建绿电项目而非绿证交易,绿证市场有价无市;③售电配额的市场交易效率更高,但发电商实施领导跟随-产量最优策略将造成电力和绿证价格双攀升,变相增加电价负担;④并网消纳和补贴拖欠削弱绿证价格而降低补贴转嫁,售电配额调整通过跨区绿电需求变化影响税负转嫁。这些结论蕴含的政策意义是:①兼顾绿电支付意愿、成本分担与应用目标,健全绿证认购市场体系;②理顺绿证定价与惩罚机制,确保绿证市场竞争均衡与履约效率;③完善省级配额机制,引导具备成本优势的跨区绿证交易;④协调政策互动效应,增强绿电溢价和绿证减负效应。     

基于水排污权交易的流域生态补偿研究

市场导向的流域生态补偿措施是政府补偿机制下的对流域水资源进行生态补偿的重要措施,市场导向的补偿措施之一是构建基于水排污权交易的市场体系,目前这一体系的理论构架尚未建立。本文尝试通过借鉴碳排放交易体系来构建流域内水排污权交易市场,探讨对中国现阶段以政府补偿为主要内容的流域生态补偿进行补充。本文在借鉴欧盟碳排放交易体系(EU ETS)三阶段改革内容基础上,结合水污染排放特征,构建了流域内水排污权交易市场,并通过建立流域生态补偿模型,基于考察流域内上、下游排污企业进行水排污权交易的内在动因,从理论层面分析水排污权交易市场运行机制。研究表明,水排污权交易市场同样可采用"总量控制与交易"机制,其基本要素包括水污染排放上限、覆盖范围、配额分配方式、交易保障体系、法律基础等;水排污权交易市场是对现有流域生态补偿机制的补充,形成了"政府宏观调控为主导、市场机制有效补充"的协同模式;上游地区企业获得的生态补偿主要源于分配得到的水排污权,市场机制能够激励上游地区污染减排。最后,本文提出水排污权交易市场体系应该从以下几个方面进行推进:制定排污权交易的相关法律法规,从法律上界定排放权的所有权和可交易性质;水排污权交易的市场定位仅是对现有流域生态补偿机制的有效补充,决不能忽视政府补偿在生态补偿中的主导作用;水排污权交易不局限于某个地区内部,而应该分流域建立水排污权交易,从而实现跨界流域生态补偿;流域生态补偿需兼顾补偿与惩罚机制,通过制度设计激励污染减排。     

Biochar use in forestry and tree-based agro-ecosystems for increasing climate change mitigation and adaptation

This study reviews the potential use of biochar as soil amendment in afforestation, reforestation, agroforestry, fruit tree orchards, and bio-energy plantations. Implementing this practice could sequester large amounts of carbon (C) over the long-term, potentially offsetting anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide, and mitigating climate change. On a global scale, this practice could sequester between 2 and 109.2 Pg biochar-C in 1.75 billion ha of degraded and deforested lands and agroforestry systems. An additional considerable amount could be sequestered in the soil of fruit tree orchards and bio-energy plantations. The anticipated improvement in the quality of the biochar-amended soils is expected to enhance resilience to these land uses, increasing their adaptation capacity to climate change. Yet, specific questions still need to be addressed, for example, the impact of biochar on the availability of nitrogen and potassium for plants in acidic soils and under humid conditions, as well as the impact of biochar on soil and trees in alkaline soils and under Mediterranean or drier conditions. Also, a full assessment of health hazards and environmental risks related to the production of biochar and its application in soil is required. Other questions relate to the environmental and economic costs of biochar application. Therefore, life cycle assessments and economic calculations should be conducted on a site-specific basis and include the practices of feedstock collection, transportation, processing, and spreading. International actions should regulate biochar practice as an eligible means for funding under the C finance mechanism. Specifically, payments should be provided to landowners for accomplishing ecosystem services.     

异质性减排政策下碳资产质押融资演化博弈分析

政企融协同创新背景下的碳资产质押融资是助力绿色金融发展、实现碳达峰与碳中和的重要举措。然而多方努力下,控排企业与金融机构的融资积极性尚未被完全激发,致使碳资产质押融资业务发展缓慢。本文拟考虑异质性减排政策,构建地方政府、控排企业和金融机构的演化博弈模型,分析碳资产质押融资过程中各方主体的损益关系,并通过数值仿真探究相关参数对政企融协同创新策略的影响。结果表明：①单一碳交易政策下强化推进碳减排政策有利于促进政企融协同创新。②复合碳减排政策对地方政府和控排企业双主体的策略选择影响较大,甚至致弱控排企业向质押策略演化。③地方政府可在单一碳交易政策下降低碳价管制成本和企业超排罚款;在复合碳减排政策下适当加征罚款,最大限度地发挥政策效力并正确引导企业的减排行为。