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Adapting the requirements of IEC 61511 to a batch system can be frustrating, particularly for multi-product units. While a Safety Instrumented System (SIS) for continuous operation is often a straightforward detect-decide-act loop, implementing a SIS for a batch system may involve multiple safety functions, time- or state-dependence, intricate calculations, or complex installations. Relationships between the SIS elements and the basic process control system (BPCS) must be tightly managed, providing both for the safety of the unit and its ability to operate without spurious trips or other hindrances. These issues are further complicated when multiple products requiring different functions or setpoints are produced in the same SIS-protected batch unit.This paper will discuss the challenges particular to the design, operation, and maintenance of a SIS in multi-product batch operations and present practical options for successfully resolving the concerns. A key insight into successful adaptation is treating the batch SIS as a “permission” system for the BPCS to operate. Although many items can be addressed through clever engineering practices, sustainable success relies on proactive, robust management of the safety lifecycle. 相似文献
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Functional safety is related to the safety functions of a safety-related system that uses electrical/electronic/programmable (E/E/PE) devices such as sensors, logic solvers, and final elements. A legacy system is a safety-related system which offers safety functions but which was not designed to comply with the IEC 61508 standard. This paper presents a procedure for assessing the hardware safety integrity of a legacy system so as to confirm its functional safety. The procedure defines the systematic relationship between the safety function and hardware system using a function-structure map (FSM) and assesses the hardware safety integrity centered on the safety function. The proposed procedure is applied to a boiler control system of a fossil-fuel power plant. 相似文献
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功能安全的定量评定技术已成为确保石化行业安全生产的重要手段。针对石化行业普遍存在的功能安全问题,笔者以国际电工学会(IEC)专门制定的功能安全评定标准IEC61508及IEC61511为指导,介绍其标准制定的背景、目的、体系结构以及如何利用标准开展石化行业安全联锁系统(Safety Instrumented System,SIS)的安全与误跳车定量分析。通过对SIS开展定量安全评估,可发现联锁功能存在的安全不足与误跳车现象,对于提高我国石化行业安全生产水平具有重要的促进作用,标准中有关寿命周期功能安全管理方法及重要的工程经验也对提高我国石化安全生产水平具有借鉴作用。 相似文献
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为了更好解读IEC 60068-2-5:2010中的辐照度和温度设定,及如何执行该标准,结合标准中对辐照度和温度设定的要求,提供具体的解决方案。建议在执行标准时,应使用日光过滤片来过滤氙灯光源,实现该标准对光源的要求。同时建议使用340 nm点控制,辐照度设定为0.60 W/m2@340 nm。对于温度的设定,建议按照标准中图2的温度上升、下降与时间的关系,对其进行设定。另外,标准中程序A的循环接近最严酷的自然条件,而程序B和程序C的循环比程序A的严酷很多。因此,一般情况下推荐程序A,对于耐候性好的材料,需要加速测试的,推荐程序B。 相似文献
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Sung Kyu Kim Yong Soo Kim 《Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries》2013,26(6):1212-1220
Safety instrumented systems (SIS) are becoming increasingly complex, and form a growing proportion of programmable electronic parts. The IEC 61508 global standard was established to ensure the functional safety of SIS; however, it was expressed in highly macroscopic terms. The safety integrity level (SIL) is a criterion describing whether a component meets the safety requirements of a SIS. The safety requirements give a target SIL for the expected risks using hazard analysis and risk assessment (HARA). The SIL must correspond to the safety requirements. This study introduces an evaluation process for determining the hardware SIL through failure modes, effects, and diagnostic analysis (FMEDA). First, the components of the SIS subsystem are defined in terms of failure modes and effects, and then the failure rate and failure mechanism distribution are assigned to each component. The safety mode and detectability of each failure mode are determined for each component and, finally, the hardware SIL is evaluated. We perform a case study to evaluate the hardware SIL of the flame scanner system using HARA and FMEDA, where the safety requirement of the flame scanner was determined using the risk graph method. We verified that the hardware SIL of the flame scanner corresponded to the safety requirement. 相似文献
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《Process Safety and Environmental Protection》2014,92(4):324-328
The International Standards for Functional Safety (IEC 61508 and IEC 61511) are well recognised and have been adopted globally in many of the industrialised countries during the past 10 years or so. Conformance with these standards involves determination of the requirements for instrumented risk reduction measures, described in terms of a safety integrity level (SIL). During this period within the process sector, layer of protection analysis (LOPA) has become the most widely used approach for SIL determination. Experience has identified that there is a type of hazardous event scenario that occurs within the process sector that is not well recognised by practitioners, and is therefore not adequately handled by the standard LOPA approach. This is when the particular scenario places a high demand rate on the required safety instrumented function. This paper will describe how to recognise a high demand rate scenario. It will discuss what the standards have to say about high demand rates. It will then demonstrate how to assess this type of situation and provide a case study example to illustrate how to determine the necessary integrity level. It will conclude by explaining why it is important to treat high demand rate situations in this way and the resulting benefit of a lower but sufficient required integrity level. 相似文献
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IEC61850通讯规约在500kV芝堰变电站的应用 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
随着用户对电能可靠性和质量要求的不断提升,智能电网、互动电网等技术逐步兴起。数字化变电站是智能电网的物理基础,国际电工委员会发布的IEC61850标准为数字化变电站技术奠定了理论基础。本文探讨了IEC61850规约在智能化一次设备以及数字化通信技术的发展及在500KV芝堰变电站的具体应用。 相似文献