How do organisational cultures influence safety? To answer this question requires a strategy for investigating organisational culture. By far the most widely used research strategy is the perception survey. An alternative is for researchers is to immerse themselves in one or more organisations, making detailed observations about activities and drawing inferences about the nature of the organisation’s culture (the ethnographic method). A third technique makes use of the wealth of material that is assembled by inquiries into major accidents. This paper describes how this material can be used to provide insights into organisational cultures. It draws on specific examples from the author’s own work as well as the cultural analysis carried out by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. It concludes with some additional suggestions for carrying out research on safety-relevant aspects of organisational culture. 相似文献
Instead of legislating after the Bhopal accident, Canada choose to innovate by adopting a consultative approach. In 1987, Environment Canada set up the Major Industrial Accidents Council of Canada (MIACC), a non profit organization financed by the federal and provincial governments and industry.
MIACC was a process rather than a structure. Governments, industries, responders, trade unions, NGOs, etc. have shared their expertise. It has worked as a partnership for the development of standards, guidance documents, etc. in prevention, preparedness, response and recovery.
MIACC ceased to exist in 1999. Although, MIACC disappearance is unfortunate, it is not dramatic. A culture of partnership, of working together towards common objectives, is now well in place and influences the development of regulations.
Natural disasters and the 911 terrorist attack on New York triggered the publication of regulations.
The legislative process started in 2001 with the Province of Quebec adopting a new Civil Protection Act for the protection of persons and property against disasters.
Year 2003 saw major developments in the regulation of emergencies—changes that are likely to have significant influences on how companies operate in Canada. Surprisingly, however, these changes have received little attention in the media, and many companies may not be aware of their implications.
This paper will review these developments, and will examine what has already taken place. Topics include:
• The federal regulation of environmental emergencies under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act;
• Extension of the Criminal Code of Canada to allow criminal charges and possibly heavy penalties for senior officials and corporations, including an explicit legal duty to protect workers from harm;
• Quebec Civil Protection Act designed to identify and manage risks;
• Ontario‘s stepwise regulation of municipal emergency preparedness with the intended goal of NFPA 1600 compliance by 2007, and the implications for the process industries;
• Potential regulation at the municipal level.
Keywords: Canada; Regulatory framework; Major hazards 相似文献
Chains of accidents, in literature generally referred to as domino effects, knock-on effects, cascade effects or escalation effects occur very infrequently but with disastrous consequences. There exist very few software packages to study such domino accidents in complex industrial areas and to forecast potential catastrophes caused by secondary order (involving a sequence of three installations submitted to two consecutive accidents), tertiary order or even higher order accidents. Moreover, available domino software focuses on risk assessment and on consequence assessment. None of these toolkits specifically addresses the prioritization of installation sequences in an industrial area in order to facilitate objective prevention decisions about domino effects. This paper describes the application of a new computer-automated tool designed to support decision-making on preventive and protective measures to alleviate domino effects in a complex surrounding of chemical installations. Using a holistic approach and thus looking at the entire industrial area as a whole, all sequences of three installations in the area are ranked according to their danger contribution to domino effects. An example of a cluster of chemical plants demonstrates the level of qualitative and quantitative input data required. The example is also used to explain the toolkit results, as well as the surplus value and the benefits for company safety managers and regulators. 相似文献
Many small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are obliged to adopt a Safety Managements System (SMS) by the Directive 2012/18/EU for the control of Major Accident Hazards (Seveso III). The difficulties of implementing an SMS within a small sized work organization are well known by practitioners, including inspectors and auditors and have been discussed in many recent papers. In the present paper is discussed a new method, based on the bowtie model, to build an easy and effective SMS. The very core of this method is a “safety net model”, which is able to connect in a network all the tangible and intangible elements of safety, including equipment, operating instructions, procedures and safety documents. This safety model has been used as the core of a smart application, the strength of which is the workers' contribution. The application allows the users to build step by step an SMS. It starts from a first version based just on regulations and standard codes (version 0), then it integrates internal knowledge through the bowtie paradigm (version 1). Near misses' discussion is used to transfer actual workers' experience into the system, to get intermediate improvement of the SMS (version 1.x). At the end audit may be used to a major release of the SMS (version 2). The full cycle has been tested at two small Seveso establishments: a galvanic plant and small glue manufacturer. 相似文献
When a major hazard occurs on an installation, evacuation, escape, and rescue (EER) operations play a vital role in safeguarding the lives of personnel. There have been several major offshore accidents where most of the crew has been killed during EER operations. The major hazards and EER operations can be divided into three categories; depending on the hazard, time pressure and the risk influencing factors (RIFs). The RIFs are categorized into human elements, the installation and hazards. A step by step evacuation sequence is illustrated. The escape and evacuation sequence from the Deepwater Horizon offshore drilling platform is reviewed based on testimonies from the survivors. Although no casualties were reported as a result of the EER operations from the Deepwater Horizon, the number of survivors offers a limited insight into the level of success of the EER operations. Several technical and non-technical improvements are suggested to improve EER operations. There is need for a comprehensive analysis of the systems used for the rescue of personnel at sea, life rafts and lifeboats in the Gulf of Mexico. 相似文献