Analysis of underlying causes of investigated loss of containment incidents in Dutch Seveso plants using the Storybuilder method

In the Netherlands there are around 400 “Seveso” sites that fall under the Dutch Major Hazards Decree (BRZO) 1999. Between 2006 and 2010 the Dutch Labour Inspectorate's Directorate for Major Hazard Control completed investigations of 118 loss of containment incidents involving hazardous substances from this group. On the basis of investigation reports the incidents were entered in a tailor-made tool called Storybuilder developed for the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment for identifying the dominant patterns of technical safety barrier failures, barrier task failures and underlying management causes associated with the resulting loss of control events. The model is a bow-tie structure with six lines of defence, three on either side of the central loss of containment event. In the first line of defence, failures in the safety barriers leading to loss of control events were primarily equipment condition failures, pre start-up and safeguarding failures and process deviations such as pressure and flow failures. These deviations, which should have been recovered while still within the safe envelope of operation, were missed primarily because of inadequate indication signals that the deviations have occurred. Through failures of subsequent lines of defence they are developing into serious incidents. Overall, task failures are principally failures to provide adequate technical safety barriers and failures to operate provided barriers appropriately. Underlying management delivery failures were mainly found in equipment specifications and provisions, procedures and competence. The competence delivery system is especially important for identifying equipment condition, equipment isolation for maintenance, pre-start-up status and process deviations. Human errors associated with operating barriers were identified in fifty per cent of cases, were mostly mistakes and feature primarily in failure to prevent deviations and subsequently recover them. Loss of control associated with loss of containment was primarily due to the containment being bypassed (72% of incidents) and less to material strength failures (28%). Transfer pipework, connections in process plant and relief valves are the most frequent release points and the dominant release material is extremely flammable. It is concluded that the analysis of a large number of incidents in Storybuilder can support the quantification of underlying causes and provide evidence of where the weak points exist in major hazard control in the prevention of major accidents.     

我国重点行业环境保护与节能减排宏观要求及政策建议

从我国目前节能减排的形势出发,结合几大高污染、高能耗行业的环保现状,给出了能够实现环保与节能减排的总体原则并重点提出了相应的宏观政策建议。     

Inherently safer design in offshore oil and gas projects

Like all hazardous installations, inherently safer design (ISD) is one of the key tools in offshore oil and gas projects to minimize risks in offshore facilities. As the life cycle of offshore facilities is relatively short compared with onshore counterparts and there are many projects running every year, the potential is high for raising inherent safety standards and lowering safety risks throughout the offshore industry as old facilities are phased out. This paper gives an overview of offshore facilities and examples of implementation of ISD. Good examples of ISD are numerous. Industry guidance on ISD implementation abound. Yet, the systematic implementation of it in the industry is patchy. There are many reasons for factors which impede the effective, efficient and consistent implementation of ISD in projects. This paper describes some of them and proposes solution to address them. They include (a) the effective integration of ISD into hazard management systems with appropriate language to engage all disciplines in projects, (b) the phasing of resources to enable the project to capture ISD measures which are only available during early phases, (c) application of appropriate ISD goals and ISD performance metrics at various stages and (d) the appropriate use of quantified risk assessment to support ISD.     

焚烧炉气相燃烧工况条件优化的分析与计算

对固体废弃物焚烧过程进行了简要分析，认为设计好气相燃烧工况，使挥发性组分完全燃烧，是控制主要有害有机组分的破坏去除率的关键。计算了（１）在动力控制条件下，不同温度时的多种有机物ＤＲＥ达９９．９９％所需的时间；（２）在扩散控制条件下，不同粒径固体废弃物的不同分析量挥发性组分完全燃烧所需的时间。讨论了炉内温度，气体在炉内停留时间，氧浓度等因素至ＤＲＥ的影响。     

易燃、易爆、有毒重大危险源评价方法与控制措施

论述了重大危险源和重大事故隐患的定义;介绍了易燃、易爆、有毒重大危险源评价方法;在辨识评价的基础上,提出了制定重大危险源事故应急计划,加强监控、管理等措施     

九十年代以来全球重大天气气候事件回顾

本文首先揭示了九十年代全球变暖背景下北半球中高纬度地区冬季的异常冷暖气候事件及其相应的环流形势。着重回顾了全球热浪、暴雨洪涝、大范围持续干旱及热带风暴等重大灾害性天气气候事件及其影响，并对其形成的可能原因进行了一些诊断分析。     

重大危险源控制技术研究现状及若干问题探讨

本文论述了重大危险源的定义，辨识标准及重大危险源控制系统；介绍了国外重大危险源控制技术的研究和应用进展；对建立我国重大危险源控制系统进行了探讨，提出了尽快制定我国重大工业危险源控制法规、重大危险源辨识标准以及建立分级监察和控制体系等建议。     

从美国法规“高度危害化学物质处理过程的安全管理”谈我国重大危险源的控制

简要介绍国外、特别是美国在控制重大危险源方面的基本情况，针对我国实际，提出“辩识──评价——监察”的管理模式作为控制重大危险源的对策。     

长沙市城市公共安全综合试点方案

简要介绍了城市公共安全综合试点项目的启动背景 ,分析了长沙市目前的公共安全现状 ,提出了综合试点方案 ,包括建立长沙市公共安全基础数据库 ,开展重大危险源辨识和生命线应急能力评估 ,建立长沙市重大事故预防控制体系 ,建立长沙市应急联动系统 ,编制长沙市公共安全规划等五部分。该方案既结合了长沙的实际又具有较高的起点 ,实施思路清晰 ,它的实施对提高长沙市的公共安全水平具有重要意义且试点成果具有一定的典型性和示范性。