AGGREGATE MARGINAL RETURNS FROM WESTERN IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE1

ABSTRACT: Pressure is increasing in the western United States to reallocate water from irrigated agriculture to other competitive uses. Since water is normally allocated through water rights and not necessarily by the price system, the question of economic efficiency is a continual concern. Study results show that returns per acre-foot of water used in western irrigation are quite high and are closely tied to the livestock industry. Returns per acre-foot of water used for crops ranged from $60 to $1,500. When water was used to support livestock, returns per acre-foot ranged from $100 to $600. Clearly, losses of water supply that reduced irrigation production could also lower farm income significantly. Estimated returns also show what alternative uses would have to pay for water under competitive market conditions. Production elasticities are also shown for various states.     

COST SHARING IN TRANSITION: THE CASE OF PLAN 6, CENTRAL ARIZONA PROJECT1

ABSTRACT: In the past, development of Federal water resource projects depended heavily or exclusively on Federal financing of construction costs. However, pressures on the Federal budget, environmental issues, and the notion that there are economic efficiency gains when beneficiaries of Federal water resource projects increase their cost share are causing changes. The case of the Central Arizona Project Plan 6 is a noteworthy example of the transition to more non-Federal participation in water resource development. This is because the non-Federal financing is to be provided for a project already under construction. The negotiation and terms of the Plan 6 financing agreement between the Department of the Interior and multiple interests in Arizona are used as an example of how Federal water project cost sharing is in a state of transition. The negotiation process is described, a financial analysis is provided, and the terms of the agreement and policy issues that were deliberated in the Executive Branch of the Federal Government are discussed.     

WATER POLICIES FOR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT1

ABSTRACF: Examination of a series of studies of the economically efficient water allocations in the Upper Colorado River, Yellowstone River, and Great Basins indicate that water is not a serious general physical constraint on the development of energy resources, so long as public institutions do not hinder the exchange of water rights in markets. Energy development will cause limited impacts on other water-using sectors, principally agriculture. There appears to be little reason to develop large-scale water storage facilities, even during periods of reduced water production. Water storage developments appear to be necessary only when institutional constraints severely restrict water rights markets and transfers.     

BIOECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR WASTEWATER REUSE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION1

ABSTRACT: Urban wastewater can be a valuable source of water and plant nutrients for agricultural producers, particularly in arid regions. The scientific literature reveals cautious optimism concerning the biological, institutional, and economic viability of irrigating crops with secondary-treated effluent. A derived effluent demand function for agricultural producers near Tucson, Arizona, reveals a potential annual demand of 11,000 acre-feet under present price and proposed delivery system conditions. In this case, wastewater could be exchanged for ground water and both the urban and rural areas would gain.     

AHP法在废水治理工程评价中的应用

应用层次分析法（ＡＨＰ）的原理，建立了废水处理工程的评价模型，并结合废水处理的实例进行了研究，结果证明了ＡＨＰ法是评价废水处理工程的有效方法。     

WATER MARKETS AND DECENTRALIZED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT: INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES1

ABSTRACT: Because of its importance and the perceived inability of private sector sources to meet water demands, many countries have depended on the public sector to provide water services for their populations. Yet this has resulted in many inefficient public water projects and in inadequate supplies of good quality and reliable water. Decentralization of water management, including the use of water markets, cannot solve all of these water problems, but it can improve the efficiency of water allocation. When given adequate responsibility and authority, water user associations have effectively taken over water management activities at a savings to tax payers. Moreover, water markets add the potential benefit of improving water efficiency within a sector as well as providing a mechanism for reallocating water among sectors. The key question involves developing innovative mechanisms for reducing the transaction costs of organizing water users and of making water trades. Water rights need to be established which are recorded, tradable, enforceable, and separate from land if markets are to operate effectively. Also, institutions are needed that effectively resolve conflicts over water rights, including third party impacts and water quality concerns.     

EVALUATING INTERDEPENDENT WATERSHED CONSERVATION AND GROUND WATER MANAGEMENT REFORMS1

Abstract: Conserving the watershed can help to preserve ground water recharge. Preventing overuse of available water through pricing reforms can also substantially increase the value of an aquifer. Inasmuch as users are accustomed to low prices, efficiency pricing may be politically infeasible, and watershed conservation may be considered as an alternative. We estimate and compare welfare gains from pricing reform and watershed conservation for a water management district in Oahu that obtains its water supply from the Pearl Harbor aquifer. We find that pricing reform is welfare superior to watershed conservation unless the latter is able to prevent very large recharge losses. Watershed conservation that yields net gains in combination with pricing reform may cause net losses without the pricing reform. If adoption of watershed conservation delays the implementation of pricing reform, the benefits of the latter are significantly reduced.     

THE IMPORTANCE OF INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE IN CONTROLLING AGRICULTURAL RUNOFF1

Abstract: Agricultural runoff, such as dissolved mineral salts and selenium, creates pronounced downstream impacts to agricultural producers and to wildlife. The ability to manage these problems efficiently depends critically on the institutional pricing structure of irrigation water delivery agencies. An important characteristic of irrigation water delivery is whether irrigators pay per unit of water received or make one payment regardless of the quantity of water received. In this study we compare the effectiveness of agricultural runoff reduction policies in two regions that employ these different water pricing structures. We find that reduction policy is more effective and can be achieved at a lower cost when water is priced on a per unit basis and that growers have greater incentive to act on their own to reduce runoff problems. Operating under a per unit pricing system encourages water conservation and runoff reduction, which creates public benefits that are not achieved under the single-payment, fixed allotment method of irrigation water delivery.     

Resource scarcity,energy use and environmental impact: A case study of the New Bedford,Massachusetts, USA,fisheries

The commercial fishing fleet in New Bedford, Massachusetts, USA, harvests seafood on George’s Bank, home of one of the nation’s most productive fisheries. We calculated the energy return on investment (EROI) and carbon intensity of protein harvest in the New Bedford fisheries from 1968 to 1988. EROI is the ratio of the energy content of the edible fish protein harvested to the quantity of fossil fuel energy used directly in the harvesting process. Carbon intensity is the quantity of carbon dioxide (CO₂) released (from the burning of fossil fuels) per calorie of edible fish protein harvested. The results show that the EROI of protein harvest declined from 0.18 to 0.028 from 1968 to 1988, indicating that the energy used to harvest seafood increased from about 6 to 36 kcal of fuel for each kilocalorie of protein harvested. The quantity of CO₂ released per calorie of edible fish protein is a linear function of energy use and therefore increased in a similar manner. During this period there was a large increase in fishing effort (caused by the increase in the real price of seafood products, favorable tax treatment for new vessel construction, and low interest loans from the government), and a decline in several important species of fish. The results suggest that fishing pressure could be managed effectively by the regulation of fuel use by the fleet. Despite the increase in the price of many seafood products, fishermen absorbed many of the costs of increasing scarcity in the form of longer working hours and fewer men per vessel.