The additionality problem with offsets: Optimal contracts for carbon sequestration in forests

Carbon offsets are a frequently discussed tool for reducing the costs of an emissions reduction policy. However, offsets have a basic problem stemming from asymmetric information. Sellers of offsets have private information about their opportunity costs, leading to concerns about whether offsets are additional. Non-additional offsets can undermine a cap-and-trade program or, if the government purchases them directly, result in enormous government expenditures. We analyze contracts for carbon sequestration in forests that mitigate the asymmetric information problem. Landowners are offered a menu of two-part contracts that induces them to reveal their type. Under this scheme, the government is able to identify ex post how much additional forest each landowner contributes and minimize ex ante its expenditures on carbon sequestration. To explore the performance of the contracting scheme, we conduct a national-scale simulation using an econometric model of land-use change. The results indicate that for an increase in forest area of 61 million acres, government expenditures are $5.3 billion lower under the contracting approach compared to a uniform subsidy offered to all landowners. This compares to an increase in private opportunity costs of just $110 million dollars under the contracts. Thus, the contracting scheme is preferable from society's perspective.     

Use of contract models to improve environmental outcomes in transport infrastructure construction

The type of contract model may have a significant influence on achieving project objectives, including environmental and climate change goals. This research investigates non-standard contract models impacting greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) in transport infrastructure construction in Australia. The research is based on the analysis of two case studies: an Early Contractor Involvement (ECI) contract and a Design and Construct (D&C) contract with GHG reduction requirements embedded in the contractor selection. Main findings support the use of ECIs for better integrating decisions made during the planning phase with the construction activities, and improve environmental outcomes while achieving financial and time savings.     

The Ability of Landowners and Their Cooperatives to Leverage Payments Greater Than Opportunity Costs from Conservation Contracts

In negotiations over land‐right acquisitions, landowners have an informational advantage over conservation groups because they know more about the opportunity costs of conservation measures on their sites. This advantage creates the possibility that landowners will demand payments greater than the required minimum, where this minimum required payment is known as the landowner's willingness to accept (WTA). However, in recent studies of conservation costs, researchers have assumed landowners will accept conservation with minimum payments. We investigated the ability of landowners to demand payments above their WTA when a conservation group has identified multiple sites for protection. First, we estimated the maximum payment landowners could potentially demand, which is set when groups of landowners act as a cooperative. Next, through the simulation of conservation auctions, we explored the amount of money above landowners’ WTA (i.e., surplus) that conservation groups could cede to secure conservation agreements, again investigating the influence of landowner cooperatives. The simulations showed the informational advantage landowners held could make conservation investments up to 42% more expensive than suggested by the site WTAs. Moreover, all auctions resulted in landowners obtaining payments greater than their WTA; thus, it may be unrealistic to assume landowners will accept conservation contracts with minimum payments. Of particular significance for species conservation, conservation objectives focused on overall species richness, which therefore recognize site complementarity, create an incentive for landowners to form cooperatives to capture surplus. To the contrary, objectives in which sites are substitutes, such as the maximization of species occurrences, create a disincentive for cooperative formation. La Habilidad de Propietarios y Sus Cooperativas para Implementar Pagos Mayores que los Costos de Oportunidad en Contratos de Conservación     

Health sector recovery in early post‐conflict environments: experience from southern Sudan

Health sector recovery in post‐conflict settings presents an opportunity for reform: analysis of policy processes can provide useful lessons. 1 The case of southern Sudan is assessed through interviews, a literature review, and by drawing on the experience of former technical advisers to the Ministry of Health. In the immediate post‐conflict phase, the health system in southern Sudan was characterised by fragmentation, low coverage of health services, dismal health outcomes and limited government capacity. Health policy was extensively shaped by the interplay of context, actors and processes: the World Bank and the World Health Organization became the primary drivers of policy change. Lessons learned from the southern Sudan case include the need for: sustained investment in assessment and planning of recovery activities; building of procurement capacity early in the recovery process; support for funding instruments that can disburse resources rapidly; and streamlining the governance structures and procedures adopted by health recovery financing mechanisms and adapting them to the local context.     

施工承包企业安全成本及其核算的研究

依据施工承包企业安全管理的目标、特点和程序,提出安全成本的概念和构成以及保证性安全成本对损失性安全成本的直接影响.同时,借助施工安全成本与安全度的关系、提高安全技术工作的经济合理性、加速构建施工承包企业安全成本核算制度,优化施工承包企业的安全管理工作,并为提高企业经济效益及社会经济运行的安全度奠定基础.